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*** Dale F. Eickelman’s Request

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Mr Robert Gates

Deputy Director of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington DC 20505

February 10, 1986

Dear Mr Gates:

As a member of the Board of Directors of the Middle East Studies Association and Chair of its Ethics Committee, I noted with interest your comments in the January 20, 1986 New York Times and the fact that you will speak at Harvard later this week.

I would appreciate receiving a copy of your Harvard speech, together with any other publicly available documents or statements concerning current CIA policies governing relations with the academic community, and in particular university-based foreign area study centers and scholars.

Sincerely,

[Signed]

Dale F. Eickelman

Professor of Anthropology

*** Robert M. Gates' Response

Central Intelligence Agency

Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

24 February 1986

Professor Dale F. Eickelman

New York University

Department of Anthropology

New York, N.Y. 10003

Dear Professor Eickelman:

I certainly do appreciate your interest in CIA and its relationship with the academic community. Enclosed is a copy of the full text of the speech. I hope you will find this useful.

Sincerely

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Robert M. KUates

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Enclosure:

As Stated

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** [Front Matter]

*** [Title Page]

ISLAM IN PAKISTAN

PRINCETON STUDIES IN MUSLIM POLITICS

DALE F. EICKELMAN AND AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON, SERIES EDITORS

A list of titles in this series can be found at the back of the book

Islam in Pakistan

A HISTORY

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-2.jpg]]

Muhammad Qasim Zaman

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*** [Dedication]

For Shaista

*** Acknowledgments

MANY PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS have assisted me in the course of my work on this book. I am grateful above all to Shaista Azizalam and to our children, Zaynab and Mustafa, for continuing to enrich my life with their love and companionship. I owe a great debt as well to my sister and brother-in-law, Rabia Umar Ali and Umar Ali Khan, for hosting my visits to Islamabad with their unmatched hospitality and for facilitating my research in Pakistan. I would not have been able to carry out my work without their help. My nephews and nieces, too—Valeed and Moosa, Ayesha, and Rahem and Samah—have been the source of much joy and hope, for which I am grateful.

I would like to thank Megan Brankley Abbas, Sarah Ansari, the late Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Michael Cook, Eric Gregory, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Robert W. Hefner, Husain Kaisrani, Muhammad Saeed Khurram, Sajid Mehmood, Steve Millier, Hossein Modarressi, Gyan Prakash, Ali Usman Qasmi, and Qamaruz-

Zaman for their help with accessing research materials and, in several cases, for answering my queries and providing valuable feedback. The writing of this book has been made possible by a grant from the Guggenheim Foundation as well as research leave and other support from Princeton University. I am much indebted to these institutions. I wish also to thank the library staff at the various places in Pakistan, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States where I have carried out my research. In particular, I wish to thank David Magier, other members of the staff of the Firestone Library at Princeton University, and all those working behind the scenes at its interlibrary loan and Borrow Direct offices for attending to my requests with great courtesy and efficiency. My students, undergraduate as well as graduate, have been instrumental in helping me try new approaches, deepen my knowledge, and explain things better. For this I am very grateful.

Some of the material on which this book is based was presented as lectures at Boston University; the Davis Center for Historical Studies at Princeton University; Northwestern University; the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; the University of Chicago; and the Yale Law School. I thank the organizers of those events for their invitations—in particular, Owen Fiss, Robert Gleave, Brannon Ingram, Anthony Kronman, Philip Nord, Tina Purohit, Mariam Shaibani, Zayn Siddique, SherAli Tareen, and Amir Toft—and their audiences for their comments and questions. I also thank Indiana University Press and Cambridge University Press for permission to use, in revised form, some of the material I have previously published as the following articles: “Islamic Modernism, Ethics, and the Shari‘a in Pakistan,” in Robert W. Hefner, ed., Shari‘a Law and Modern Muslim Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016); “Pakistan: Shari‘a and the State,” in Robert W. Hefner, ed., Shari‘a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Muslim World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); and “The Sovereignty of God in Modern Islamic Thought,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd ser., 25 (2015).

Over the course of many years, Fred Appel, my editor at Princeton University Press, has offered support, encouragement, and much astute advice. It has been a privilege and a pleasure to work on this and other projects with an editor of such remarkable abilities. Feedback from the outside readers has helped improve this book in some important ways; I am deeply appreciative

of their careful and sensitive reading and their counsel. I would like to also thank Sara Lerner, who has shepherded this book through production with her characteristic thoughtfulness, skill, and efficiency. I am especially glad to have had the opportunity to work with her a second time. I wish as well to acknowledge Thalia Leaf, Theresa Liu, and many others at Princeton University Press for their assistance with various matters related to this book. I owe a special debt to Jennifer Harris, whose keen eye and expert advice in copyediting the manuscript have helped turn it into a much better book.

Shaista has long been my mainstay. She has patiently fostered the conditions that have allowed me to bring this work to fruition. As a small token of my gratitude for this and for much else, I dedicate this book to her.

*** A Note on Transliteration, Spelling, Abbreviations, and Other Conventions

THIS BOOK USES a system of transliteration that often reflects Urdu pronunciation of Arabic and Persian words and names. In cases where a proper name is spelled by the person concerned in a particular way in English, that spelling has usually been retained—hence, Liaquat Ali Khan rather than Liyaqat ‘Ali Khan; Abdul Hakim rather than ‘Abd al-Hakim; Ayub Khan rather than Ayyub Khan, and so forth. In some cases, however, the English and the Arabic spellings of a name have had to be distinguished from each other: thus Mawdudi when referring to the Urdu titles of his books and Maududi when citing the English translations.

With the exception of the ‘ to signify the Arabic letter ‘ayn (as in ‘Umar or shari‘a) and’ to represent the hamza (as in Qur’an), diacritics are not used in this book. The hamza itself is used when it occurs within a word (as in Qur’an) but not when it occurs at the end (thus ‘ulama rather than ‘ulama’). With the notable exception of the term ‘ulama (singular: ‘alim), the plural forms are usually indicated by adding an “s” to the word in the singular, as in madrasas (rather than madaris) or fatwas (rather than fatawa). Certain terms that occur repeatedly in the book, such as shari‘a and ‘ulama, are not italicized. Other Arabic and Urdu words are italicized at their first occurrence, but usually not afterward. When the fuller

version of an Arab name is not being used, I also dispense with the Arabic definite article “al-” (for example, Fakhr al-din al-Razi but subsequently Razi).

Unless otherwise noted, translated passages from the Qur’an follow M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an: A New Translation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), and, less often, A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, 2 vols. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), with occasional modifications.

The following abbreviations are used in this book:

| AFM | Archives of the Freedom Movement |

| AISC | All India Shi‘a Conference |

| BL | British Library |

| BPC | Basic Principles Committee |

| CAPD | Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates

| CF | Cabinet Files |

| CRO | Commonwealth Relations Office |

| GAPP | Ghulam Ahmad Parwez Papers |

| JP | Jinnah Papers |

| JUI | Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam |

| MMA | Muttahida Majlis-i ‘Amal |

| NAP | National Archives of Pakistan |

| NAPD | National Assembly of Pakistan Debates |

| NDC | National Documentation Center, Cabinet Division, Islamabad |

| NWFP | North-West Frontier Province |

| PMS | Prime Minister’s Secretariat |

| PPP | Pakistan People’s Party |

| Q | Qur’an |

| RAC | Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York |

| TNA | The National Archives, Kew |

| UP | United Provinces |

*** Maps

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-4.jpg][MAP 1. India under the British, identifying the principal places referred to in this book.]]

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-6.jpg][MAP 2. Pakistan, 1947.]]

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-8.jpg][MAP 3. Pakistan today, identifying the principal places mentioned in this book.]]

** Introduction

THIS BOOK IS CONCERNED with the history of, and the contestations on, Islam in colonial India and Pakistan. The first modern Muslim state to be established in the name of Islam, Pakistan was the largest Muslim country in the world at the time of its foundation; today, it is the second most populous, after Indonesia. All the key facets of modern Islam worldwide were well represented in colonial India and they have continued to be so in Pakistan: Sufism; traditionalist scholars, the ‘ulama, and their institutions of learning, the madrasas; Islamism; and Islamic modernism. Several of them received their earliest and what proved to be highly influential articulations in this vast region. It was in colonial India, for instance, that some of the first modernist Muslim intellectuals had emerged, and their work soon came to resonate well beyond South Asia.[1] Sayyid

Abul-A‘la Mawdudi (d. 1979), whose career straddled British India and the first three decades of Pakistan, was, for his part, one of the most influential Islamist ideologues of the twentieth century. South Asia did not pioneer madrasas, but few countries match the growth that this institution and those associated with it have witnessed over the course of Pakistan’s history. It is in Pakistan, too, that the movement of the Taliban emerged in the years following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. And in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan has been not only a major front in the global War on Terror but also the site of an Islamist radicalism that has had important implications for contemporary Islam, and not just in South Asia.

As one might expect, there is a significant body of literature on different facets of Islam in colonial South Asia and in Pakistan. What is lacking is a work that brings them together within the confines of a single study.[2] Such studies have seldom been attempted for other regions of the Muslim world either. This is hardly surprising, given that the examination of any particular facet, whether Islamism or the Islam of the ‘ulama, already poses enough challenges to allow a venture very far beyond it. Yet, the sum of more specialized studies can fall considerably short of meeting the need for a broader view of the religious landscape. This book is an effort in that direction. How have various facets of Islam interacted with one another and with a state created in the name of Islam? How are the different Islamic orientations to be distinguished from one another? What sort of constraints have the differences among them placed on the ability of their adherents to join hands at particular moments in history? How significantly and to what effect had the various religious orientations that occupied the South Asian Islamic landscape at the beginning of the twentieth century changed in relation to one another by the early twenty-first century? What is the context, both immediate and long term, in which Islamist militancy has emerged in Pakistan? What has hampered the ability of the governing elite to effectively combat it? And why has Islamic modernism undergone a decline in the course of Pakistan’s history, as I would argue it has? These are among the questions I address in this book.

Though the scope of this study is necessarily broad, certain facets of Muslim religious life have had to remain largely unattended here. How Islamic beliefs and practices are reflected in and shaped by poetry and fictional literature,

art, media, and film falls, with some exceptions, outside the scope of this book. So does the lived practice of Islam. It would take extensive ethnographic work, not attempted for this study, to shed light, for instance, on the nature and meaning of devotional practices at Sufi shrines or how such shrines participate in the political economy of the region in which they are located. The question of how madrasas are viewed in or sustained by the local communities among which they operate likewise requires the kind of work that lies beyond the ambition and scope of this study. By the same token, questions relating to the religious beliefs of ordinary women and men and the changes their understandings of the faith have undergone would have to depend not only on microlevel studies but also on large-scale surveys, neither of which exist in abundance for Pakistan.

This is not intellectual history in the narrow sense of being concerned only with a history of ideas; it is keenly interested in the political and other contexts in which particular ideas developed and why certain understandings of Islam found themselves disadvantaged vis-à-vis others. Nor does it posit any sharp distinction between belief and practice, between normative and lived Islam.[3] Yet, it does rely more often than not on written expressions of Islam, of debate and contestation on it, of the development and change it has continued to undergo. It is therefore more attentive to the discourses and the initiatives of those aspiring to shape people's religious and political life than it is to those whose lives were presumably being informed or shaped by such discourses. Once again, however, the barriers between these two sides look firmer in outward appearance than they may be in reality. Official archives, too, can shed much light on life, thought, and agency at the grassroots, after all. For instance, the extensive records of the Court of Inquiry that the government of the Punjab had established in the aftermath of a religio-political agitation directed against the Ahmadis, a heterodox community, in 1953 is an unusually rich resource for an understanding not only of the views of the modernist elite governing the new state but also of the perspectives of the religio-political groups that had been involved in the agitation. We also get occasional glimpses in these records of small-time mosque-preachers, local leaders, and ordinary people caught up in it. An archive such as this, despite its focus on one particular set of events, has much to say about varied facets of Islam in Pakistan and that is how I have utilized it here.[4] When it comes to state legislation, to take another example, we may not always know very well how particular initiatives relating to Islam actually shaped people's lives. But even here, what we can

try to understand is not only what vision animated those legislative initiatives but also what responses they evoked from members of particular religious groups and how the initiatives and the responses in question have shaped a contested religious sphere in colonial India and in Pakistan.

If not all facets of Islam can be accommodated into this study, not all even among those represented here can obviously occupy center stage. That belongs to Islamic modernism, which I understand as a complex of religious, intellectual, and political initiatives aimed at adapting Islam—its beliefs, practices, laws, and institutions—to the challenges of life in the modern world. Such challenges were felt most forcefully under European colonial rule. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century modernists—and not just the Muslims among them, though it is on them that I focus here—had internalized to various degrees colonial assessments of the societies under European governance. These were seen, in contrast with the European world, as tradition-bound, stagnant, priest-ridden, and superstitious; their laws as antiquated, capricious, and barbaric; their precolonial rulers as corrupt and despotic; their intellectual cultures as decadent, and their systems of education as devoid of useful knowledge.[5] Defeat at the hands of the European powers had exposed the hollowness of traditional norms, practices, and structures, showing them all to be unsustainable. While colonial officials saw such contrasts as a justification for their rule, the early modernists viewed them as necessitating a thoroughgoing reform of Muslim thought and practice.

Modernist reformers tended also to differ from colonial, and Orientalist, analyses of Muslim societies in their conviction that Islam could, in fact, be adapted to the needs of the modern world without ceasing to be Islam. Writing in the early twentieth century, Lord Cromer, the consul-general of Egypt (1883–1907), had cautioned: “let no practical politician think that they have a plan capable of resuscitating a body which is not, indeed, dead, and which may yet linger on for centuries, but which is nevertheless politically and socially moribund, and whose gradual decay cannot be arrested by any modern palliatives however skillfully they may be applied.”[6] The modernist enterprise was, however, predicated precisely on the conviction that the decline of Muslim societies could indeed be remedied and that it did not require relinquishing Islam itself. What it did require was that Islam be restored to its original purity, and its core values combined with what

European science and other forms of modern knowledge had to offer. Only then would the adherents of this religion be capable of scientific, moral, and material progress in the modern world. Yet, the acquisition of Western knowledge, a key facet of modernist reform, carried significant costs, some of which threatened only to substantiate predictions about the irreconcilability of Islam and the modern world. As Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), the pioneering modernist of Muslim South Asia observed in 1884, “May the English-educated young men … forgive me, but I have not seen a person … with an inclination for the English sciences who still has complete faith in the Islamic matters as they are current in our time.”[7] The silver lining to this sobering assessment was, of course, that the “Islamic matters … current in our time” were not the authentic teachings of Islam. Yet, it did underscore the herculean nature of the project of giving Islam an expression that was true to its original teachings, at home in the modern world, and capable of being seen by the community at large as authentic. Nearly nine decades later, Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), an influential scholar who will figure prominently in this book, found that a robust combination of properly Islamic norms and modernizing reform was still elusive among the governing elite of countries like Pakistan: “many of the bureaucrats in these countries are not Muslim modernists but simple modernists, i.e., Westernizers, while quite a few are simple conservatives and the instances of Muslim modernists are very few indeed. But it is my belief that Islamic modernism has good chances of eventual success, although … the final outcome is uncertain.”[8] That belief and that uncertainty have continued to characterize Islamic modernism.

The modernists have never become anything akin to a school of law or theology, let alone a sect.[9] They have had significant differences among themselves and their positions have continued to evolve, as one might expect. Even so, as the foregoing would already suggest, some core convictions are recognizable as having frequently guided modernist thought and policy: that the true “spirit” of Islam resides in the Qur’an and in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad rather than in how Muslims have either lived or thought about their religion for much of their history; that self-professed loci of Islamic authority, such as the ‘ulama and the Sufis, have distorted the teachings of Islam, illegitimately assumed the role of intermediaries between God and the believers, fragmented the unity of the faith and, in concert with unenlightened despots, been at the heart of Muslim decline; that the fundamental teachings of Islam are not merely in accord

with but superior to, and no less universal than, the best of what modern, liberal, values have had to offer to the world.[10] As Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan, had put it in the constituent assembly in March 1949, in moving what has come to be known as the Objectives Resolution, the goal in establishing the new state was “to give the Muslims the opportunity that they have been seeking, throughout these long decades of decadence and subjection, of finding freedom to set up a polity which may prove to be a laboratory for the purpose of demonstrating to the world that Islam is not only a progressive force in the world, but it also provides remedies for many of the ills from which humanity has been suffering.”[11]

Easy to caricature today for their idealism and bombast, such convictions have had great purchase in Muslim circles seeking to find a way of simultaneously being good Muslims and leading successful lives in the colonial—and postcolonial—dispensations. Those holding them have often sought much more than that, however. Enjoying positions of considerable influence as intellectuals, makers of public opinion, political leaders, and the governing elite, they have sought to transform the entire religious landscape in accordance with their conceptions of Islam and of how its interests, and those of ordinary believers, are best served. Insomuch as the sweep and audacity of their aspirations relate to all facets of Islam, it does seem worthwhile to study Islam in conditions of modernity with reference to them.[12]

Some scholars have seen Islamic modernism as a particular phase in the intellectual and political history of the modern Muslim world, one largely limited to the era of European colonialism. Later generations, according to this view, would go in other directions, among them secular nationalism, Marxism, and Islamism.[13] I take a rather different view in this study. Secular nationalism and Marxism have not had much purchase in Pakistan, and while Islamism has always been an important part of the religio-political landscape, it has never come close—despite warnings from different quarters—to governing the country, either through electoral or other means. For its part, modernism has continued to guide official policy on matters relating to Islam, its institutions, and its practices. Modernism has indeed been in gradual decline in Pakistan. But it took several decades after the establishment of the state for that decline to set in. Among my concerns in the following chapters is not only to illustrate and account for this decline but

also to shed some light on how, both in its aspirations and in its decline, modernism has shaped, even as it has been shaped by, other facets of Islam.

To speak of decline in this case is not, moreover, to posit that modernism has exited the scene or is about to do so. The fact that it remains ensconced in the corridors of power is enough to suggest otherwise. In the wider Muslim world and beyond, too, modernist intellectuals have continued to make their presence felt.[14] Though couched in a rather different language, the key concerns of such intellectuals in the contemporary world reveal broad continuities with their acknowledged and unacknowledged predecessors. Such continuities are to be observed in discourses on the Qur'an's "universals," which alone are held to encompass the shari'a's principal concerns and the religion's true spirit, as opposed to the specifics of a medieval consensus on this or that matter. They are equally in evidence in the purported concordance between Islam and liberal values. Speaking in terms of any clearly recognizable end to the phenomenon of Islamic modernism misses such continuities. Some scholars would posit the transformation of an earlier modernism into what is sometimes referred to as today's Islamic liberalism, with the latter consisting in constitutionalism, the rule of law, the universality of human rights, the empowerment of women, and social justice, all justified in terms of a critique of traditionalist Islam by way of a rereading of the foundational texts—the Qur'an and hadith, the reported teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.[15] Given, however, that there are major similarities of approach between the modernists and the Islamic liberals in question, with the same figures sometimes characterized in the scholarly literature as modernists and at others as liberals, the analytical value of a sharp distinction between the two remains unclear.[16] It can also obscure the fact that, for all its stress on constitutionalism, Islamic liberalism, like statist liberalism elsewhere, has tended to have an authoritarian streak.[17] As will be seen, such authoritarianism has long been a marker of Islamic modernism, too.

Though it is modernism that this study foregrounds, a different choice could arguably have been made as a way of studying broader religio-political trends in colonial India and Pakistan. The audacity of modernist aspirations is matched by that of the Islamists, who in fact share much with them in their social and educational backgrounds as well as in their dim view of how Islam

has been lived in history.[18] If anything, the Islamists go further in seeking to harness the state to the project of implementing their scripturally anchored vision of Islam. As Mawdudi, the preeminent Islamist ideologue of South Asia, had it in an early work:

<quote>

The state that the Qur'an envisions has not just a negative but also a positive goal. It does not seek merely to prevent people from oppressing one another, to guard their liberties, and to defend itself against foreign aggression. It strives also to implement that balanced system of social justice that the Book of God has presented. Its aim is to erase all those forms of evil and to establish all those facets of the good that God has elucidated with His clear guidelines. To accomplish these goals, political power, persuasion and proselytism, means of education and upbringing, societal influence and the pressure of public opinion will all be used, as necessitated by the circumstances…. This is an all-encompassing state. The sphere of its operation extends to the entirety of human life. It seeks to mold all areas of culture in accordance with its particular moral conceptions, its reformist program.[19]

</quote>

In the case of the Islamists, this vision is predicated, of course, on the very opposite of a self-conscious accord with Western, liberal values.[20] It is based, rather, on the aspiration to make the shari'a the law of the land, to order all aspects of Muslim life in accordance with its presumed dictates, to have everyone submit altogether to the implications of the sovereignty of God. One could, in principle, write about various dimensions of Islam by showing how the Islamists have sought to shape, even as they have been influenced by, those other dimensions, diverging from or converging with them and illuminating in the process some major Islamic developments in the region as well as their social and political contexts.

One could likewise write about Islam with the 'ulama as a key point of reference. After all, a good deal of the intellectual, religious, and social history of medieval Islam is intertwined with that of the 'ulama, not only because of their claims to religious leadership but also because their

intellectual concerns straddled a variety of disciplines and because they were well-represented among the local notables across Muslim societies.[21] The transformations their institutions and practices have undergone since colonial times are a useful index of many broader changes that have shaped Islam and Muslim societies in the modern world. At the same time, the ‘ulama’s identity and authority are defined, more than anything else, by their grounding in a long-standing religious and scholarly tradition, and it is with reference to this tradition that they typically articulate their understanding of Islam, answer questions of belief and practice, and draw boundaries between themselves and others. This fact can open revealing vistas on the transformations in question. Tensions between resistance to perceived encroachment on their hallowed tradition and their acknowledged and unacknowledged adaptations to change provide fertile means for understanding not just the thought and politics of the ‘ulama but also the larger world they inhabit.[22]

Despite such competing and potentially fruitful possibilities, I have chosen to give center stage to modernism in this study of Islam in colonial India and Pakistan. Besides their intrinsic interest, this is largely because the modernists were some of the most influential intellectual and political elite under the British, and, as noted, it is they who have controlled the levers of power since the inception of Pakistan.[23] While the Islamists have aspired to the public implementation of Islamic norms through the state as, indeed, have the ‘ulama, they have not come to power, as they did in Iran after the revolution of 1979, in Afghanistan with the Taliban, and, more recently, under the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Instead, it is the modernists who have actually defined, if with mixed results, what position Islam would have in the Pakistani constitution, how and on what terms the madrasas would be reformed or Sufi shrines brought under state regulation, what shari‘a-based laws would be enacted and within what boundaries they would have effect, and so forth. The justification, scope, and limits of such measures have been matters of intense contestation. It is in the context of such contestation that competing conceptions of Islam are cast in sharp relief and rival claims to religious authority have continued to be articulated.

Four methodological points are worth noting before proceeding further. First, that the modernists—the intellectuals among them as well as members of

the political and the governing elite—loom large in this study and yet the book is not exclusively devoted to them has required choices of its own. I have tried to delineate major aspects of competing religio-political trends in British India and in Pakistan in such a way that they are not reduced to how the modernists have viewed them, or vice versa. Nor have I limited my account of those other facets to points of direct contact with modernism. The fact that modernism does occupy center stage in my account has nonetheless allowed me to highlight some particular dimensions rather than others of the wider landscape. For instance, the career of Sufism in twentieth-century South Asia could be described from a variety of different angles: the history of particular Sufi orders; reformist discourses among the Sufis; Sufism, politics, and the colonial and the postcolonial state; South Asian Sufi trends in their interaction with those in the wider Muslim world, and so forth. My account is especially attentive to how Islamic modernism has figured in some of the contestations on Sufism, but the ways in which the ‘ulama and the Islamists have viewed Sufism and how they have been variously shaped by aspects of Sufi thought and practice is part of my discussion, too. The concern throughout is to offer a broadly illustrative view of Islam in some of its key dimensions and the complex ways in which these dimensions have interacted with and been shaped by one another. This approach would, I hope, allow for a fuller account of the changing Islamic landscape in British India and Pakistan than has usually been attempted while helping avoid a reification of any of the Islamic orientations under discussion here.

Second, a focus on Islam, as is the case here, admittedly poses some interpretive danger: of assuming that it plays a greater role in people’s lives than does anything else and of making it the key explanatory factor in accounting for their thought and practice; conversely, of setting it apart from the rest of their lives. Without engaging in a detailed methodological discussion of such matters, suffice it to say here that I have tried to remain mindful of these pitfalls in what follows. I have done so primarily by placing my discussion of varied facets of Islam in the relevant historical, social, and political contexts, without reference to which it is impossible to make sense of the developments in question. We ought to be equally mindful of the fact that treating putatively religious matters as merely incidental to the study of a society, polity, or economy poses at least as many interpretive problems as does an examination that takes Islam seriously. Indeed, such neglect can be

quite misleading in studying a society and state where contestations on Islam have indeed occupied center stage.

Third, a discussion of Islam in the modern world often made it tempting for scholars of an earlier generation and still does for many observers and policy analysts today to posit an age-old “tradition” in conflict with “modernity,” with the former visualized as either in the process of being swept away by the latter or as thwarting it from ushering in an era of enlightened progress.[24] Tradition in such narratives is the very opposite of change—it is blindly imitative of the past, inflexible, anachronistic, sterile; modernity is the sum of values one ought to aspire to. The language of such binaries poses special problems in the study of Muslim societies since the nineteenth century because this is precisely the language that the Muslim modernists have themselves used to characterize their rivals;[25] the latter, for their part, have often been equally enamored of this language, with the difference that the pejorative implications of what the modernists call traditionalism are abandoned and the modernist concern with reform, innovation, and change is invested in turn with the darkest, most foreboding colors.[26] Yet, as will be seen in the following chapters, traditionalist scholars could be flexible and pragmatic in accommodating themselves to new circumstances; to the extent that their critics have recognized this, they have attributed it to their opportunism. We need not rule out political opportunism in all instances, of course, but it hardly accounts for the variety of positions the ‘ulama and the Islamists have been capable of taking on particular issues. Likewise, it is important to recognize that they have often had good strategic and rhetorical reasons to be inflexible when they have chosen to be so. Conversely, the modernists have not necessarily been more open to rethinking their certainties than have many ‘ulama and Islamists, and over the course of their history, they too—without becoming a school of law or theology—have evolved a tradition of their own. In what follows, I will need to occasionally speak in terms of the modernists versus the traditionalists, of the conservative opposition to modernism, and so forth. On such occasions, it should be kept in mind that this language is intended principally to evoke certain contrasts in the religio-political landscape, usually as seen by those inhabiting it, not to give it any normative value. Nor is it to prejudge the outcome of the contests, of which we will observe many instances in this book, among feuding but not always clearly delineated sides.

Finally, the use of the term “modernism” for the kind of thought and practices that I examine in this book might be seen by some as problematic. In the context of early twentieth-century European and American art and literature, modernism has other connotations, among them, “the recurrent act of fragmenting unities (unities of character or plot or pictorial space or lyric form), the use of mythic paradigms, the refusal of norms of beauty, the willingness to make radical linguistic experiment, all often inspired by the resolve (in [T. S.] Eliot’s phrase) to startle and disturb the public.”[27] There could be overlaps between the philosophical underpinnings of that modernism and the aspirations of particular figures among Muslim modernists, but it is not my concern to explore them in this book.[28] Though commonly used by earlier scholars and observers of Islam, modernism has come to be replaced by categories such as liberalism and reformism. As used by the critics of the modernists, the term can also carry pejorative suggestions about a new-fangled and inauthentic Islam.

Yet, its usage in the context of Western art and literature does not, by itself, render the term unserviceable for other purposes. As Nils Gilman has argued, American modernization theorists of the 1950s and the 1960s, too, can be characterized as modernists. In their case, “modernism was not just an aesthetic phenomenon but also a form of social and political practice in which history, society, economy, culture, and nature itself were all to be the object of technical transformation. Modernism was a polysemous code word for all that was good and desirable.”[29] Something similar could be said of the Muslim modernists who will figure in this book. Further, there is no clear dividing line between modernism and liberalism, as has been observed, and a category like “reformism” would not allow us to distinguish the approaches of many among the ‘ulama and the Islamists from those characterized as modernists here. As for its pejorative connotations, it is worth bearing in mind that the modernists have used this characterization for the likes of themselves.[30]

Needless to say, terms used to describe other religious and political trends can have their own difficulties. Islamists, for instance, do not usually characterize themselves as such, preferring to be seen simply as good Muslims. Islamism tends, moreover, to be conflated by many observers with

militancy, yet violence is not a defining feature of this phenomenon. And even as many scholars and political leaders have been keen to insist that Islamists are not representative of Islam as a religious tradition, the term Islamist could be taken to posit precisely that conflation between the phenomenon and the wider tradition. Such difficulties do not make Islamism unusable as category of analysis, but they do suggest the need for some careful handling. Much the same is true of modernism.

*** The Structure of This Book

This book on the whole is organized in thematic rather than chronological terms. The first two chapters are designed, however, not only to highlight certain facets of Islam but also to provide a broad historical overview of developments in colonial India and in Pakistan, roughly from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. In focusing on particular groups or themes, subsequent chapters fill in historical detail as needed, but their primary goal is to illustrate evolving trends as they relate to the group or theme in question and, of course, to show how the various facets of Islam have interacted with one another. Consequently, these chapters will often range freely over the entire period covered by this book, though the primary focus continues to be on developments since the birth of the state of Pakistan.

Chapter 1 introduces many of the groups that will form the subject of this book and charts their emergence and development in conditions of British colonial rule. As will be seen, the traditionalist orientations that enjoy great prominence in the South Asian landscape had begun to take a recognizable shape only in the late nineteenth century, though they drew, of course, on older styles of thought and practice. The early modernists, for their part, were rooted in a culture that was not significantly different from the ‘ulama’s. Among the concerns of this chapter is to trace their gradual distancing from each other. The processes involved in it would never be so complete, in either British India or in Pakistan, as to preclude the cooperation of the modernists and their conservative critics at critical moments. Nor, however, were the results of this distancing so superficial as to ever be transcended for good.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of modernism in Pakistan, from the country's inception to the present. It draws attention to the salience of ethical commitments in modernist conceptions of Islam—commitments that were often meant as a counterweight to traditionalist understandings of Islamic law and as justifications for its reform, but which also stood in some tension with the authoritarianism that has often characterized Islamic modernism. Much of this authoritarianism came from the fact that it was the modernists who populated the ranks of the governing elite, that this elite has remained in power for long periods of time without much accountability to the people, and that the best chance that many modernist intellectuals have had of seeing their ideas implemented has been through unsavory alliances with unrepresentative rulers. But some of the authoritarianism has been endemic to modernist conceptions of Islam itself, a fact far more apparent to those at their receiving end than to the modernists themselves.

The 'ulama are the focus of chapter 3, which seeks to bring out some of the ambiguities of the relationship in Pakistan between them and the modernists. The traditionalist 'ulama have had some very particular ideas about an Islamic state, ideas at considerable variance with those of the modernist governing elite. Yet, even as the 'ulama have bitterly resisted modernist legislation on matters seen as encroaching upon their understandings of Islam, they have often been willing to accommodate themselves to constitutional and political developments in the country as spearheaded by the modernists, and they have continued to benefit from the patronage extended to them by successive governments. The modernists, for their part, have seldom been able to develop a significant constituency among the 'ulama, and this despite the existence in Pakistan's early decades of some 'ulama with a modernist orientation. Besides drawing attention to the latter, and thereby to fractures within the ranks of the 'ulama, this chapter seeks also to shed some light on how the 'ulama associated with particular doctrinal orientations have fared in relation to one another and how one of these, represented by the Deobandis, has overtaken others in the religio-political sphere.

In turning to Islamism, chapter 4 provides an account of one of the most central of all Islamist ideas, in Pakistan and in the wider Muslim world—the

idea that sovereignty belongs to God alone. As Mawdudi and other Islamists have articulated it, the implication is that all legal and political authority derives from God and His injunctions, as enunciated in the Qur'an and in the normative example of the Prophet Muhammad. One could not be a Muslim without accepting this idea, nor could a state be Islamic without recognizing it. As will be seen, however, the Islamists are not the only people who have espoused the sovereignty of God. It has figured prominently in non-Islamist, including modernist, circles, too. For instance, the previously mentioned Objectives Resolution endorses it as well. Part of the concern of this chapter is to examine what it has meant in different circles. We would seek also to explore the provenance and history of this idea. Though it is usually taken for granted that Mawdudi had put this idea into circulation, the question of how he may have come upon it has never been asked. Then there is the question, which we will also examine in this chapter, of why his formulation, rather than any other, has been the most influential among competing conceptualizations of the idea.

Any study of Islam in a predominantly Muslim state and of aspirations to give it a prominent place in the state necessarily raises questions about religious minorities. Though I touch briefly in this book on non-Muslim minorities, the focus of chapter 5 is on two Muslim minorities, the Ahmadis and the Shi'a, and some of the contestations around their position in the state. How these communities have fared in Pakistan is part of the story here, with the Ahmadis being declared a non-Muslim minority in 1974 and significant Shi'i-Sunni sectarian violence in the country since the 1980s. The principal concern of the chapter is, however, to explore the anxieties that the existence and activities of these minority communities have generated among the 'ulama and the Islamists. In case of the Ahmadis, it will be seen that the anxieties in question have had to do not merely with the peculiarities of Ahmadi beliefs about the Prophet Muhammad, but with Islamic modernism itself. Though most South Asian modernists are not Ahmadis, Ahmadi discourses have tended to echo ideas similar to those of many modernists, and this has served to aggravate conservative opposition to the Ahmadis. The anxieties generated by the Shi'a, much exacerbated by the impact and rhetoric of the Iranian revolution of 1979, have a different locus, and they, too, go beyond Sunni discomfort with particular Shi'i beliefs and practices. Much more than the Ahmadis, the Shi'a have raised difficult questions about what, if any, kind of Islamic law can be given public force in

Pakistan, laying bare in the process nagging uncertainties about whether Pakistan can ever fully claim to be an Islamic state.

Chapter 6 moves to some other expressions of contestation in the religious sphere, taking place in this instance on the once expansive terrain of Sufism. Long a core part of Muslim identity, in South Asia and elsewhere in the Muslim world, Sufi practices, doctrines, and institutions have continued into modern times to exercise considerable influence not only on common people but also on the religious and political leaders of the community. Though many among the ‘ulama, including the reformists in their ranks, have often had a relatively seamless relationship with Sufism, the Islamists, too, and even the modernists have been receptive to the appeal of Sufism. It is not difficult, for instance, to detect ideas of a Sufi provenance in some core modernist commitments. Yet, the conditions of modernity, the claims of the modern state, and modernist and Islamist efforts to radically reshape Islam in a particular image, with some recent help from militant Islamist groups, have hit institutional Sufism hard. Sufism has had some other vulnerabilities, too, which have also contributed to a certain shrinking of the space it has traditionally occupied in this part of the world.

Chapter 7 focuses on religio-political violence, whose widespread incidence, after Pakistan’s realignment in the US-led War on Terror in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent rise of a new, Pakistani, Taliban, has threatened the very fabric of state and society. Like the rest of the book, this chapter takes a long historical view, one that goes well beyond the post-2001 developments and their immediate context. I examine the violence in question from two broad and intertwined perspectives, one relating to the state and the other to Islam and those speaking in its terms. Part of my concern in this chapter is to contribute to an understanding of how the governing elite and the military have often fostered the conditions in which the resort to religiously inflected violence has been justified. But I also suggest that the nonstate actors—ideologues and militants—have had an agency of their own, which is not reducible to the machinations of the state, and that their resort to relevant facets of the Islamic tradition also needs to be taken seriously in order to properly understand their view of the world and such appeal as they have had in particular circles. By the same token, even as it has helped cultivate a certain narrative of jihad, the Pakistani ruling establishment has often

labored under severe constraints in trying to control that narrative, and some understanding of such constraints, too, can shed useful light not only on religio-political violence but also on the career of Islam in Pakistan.

The epilogue ends this book with some reflections on the changes Islam has undergone in Pakistan, over the course of the country's history but also in comparison with where the relevant religious trends stood in the early twentieth century.

** Chapter One: Islamic Identities in Colonial India

*** An Islamic Mosaic

South Asia has been home for centuries to rich traditions of learning in the Islamic foundational texts as well as law, theology, and philosophy. Yet, it is a remarkable fact that the doctrinal orientations that now dominate Sunni Islam in South Asia all took their distinctive shape only during colonial rule in the late nineteenth century. Shi'ism, too, underwent significant change during this period. How did members of these rival orientations interact with one another? How do these orientations relate to facets of Islam in earlier times? In what ways were Islam and Muslim politics in colonial India shaped by political and other developments in the wider Muslim world? And how, in late colonial India, did the movement for a separate Muslim homeland both develop and navigate its way through this fraught religio-political landscape? In addressing such questions, it is important to avoid a teleological view that would have this landscape necessarily result in the religio-political contestations that are the subject of the following chapters. At the same time, as will be observed, subsequent developments in Pakistan cannot be adequately understood without reference to it.

I begin with the orientations that might broadly be characterized as traditionalist, in that they are premised on a self-conscious continuity with a scholarly tradition that extends back into the formative period of Islam. This is a tradition represented by the 'ulama, the religious scholars who have long seen their vocation as the preservation and transmission of religious

knowledge and the concomitant guidance of lay people in its light. The first of these orientations in South Asia's Sunni Islam came to be associated with a madrasa established in 1866 in the north Indian town of Deoband. Inaugurated less than a decade after the formal establishment of British colonial rule over India, the madrasa represented the idea that the Muslim community's beliefs and practices had to be reordered in light of the foundational texts and rooted in unswerving fidelity to Islamic legal norms. What was perhaps most notable about this vision was not the appeal to the need for reform, of which there had been many earlier expressions in and outside India, but rather the underlying view that a reinvigorated Islamic identity offered the most effective means of coping with the radically changed world in which the Muslims of India had come to find themselves. It was by learning to be true to their Islamic commitments that Muslims could survive the adversity and the dislocations of life under colonial rule, and it was the calling of those associated with the madrasa at Deoband to inculcate proper Islamic norms among people while continuing long-standing traditions of Islamic scholarship.

What were these dislocations? Centuries of Muslim rule had come to an end with the abortive Mutiny of 1857. Although many among the 'ulama had long maintained a certain distance from the royal court, the existence of Muslim rulers had been taken for granted and deemed necessary for the implementation of the shari'a. Even rulers whose policies and lifestyles did not conform much to Islamic prescriptions appointed Muslim judges—qadis—as well as other judicial and religious functionaries, and even those among the scholars and the Sufis who did not frequent royal courts could indirectly benefit from the largesse of the rich and powerful. Two of India's Muslim neighbors, Iran and Afghanistan, escaped colonial rule. Several other Muslim countries—for instance, Egypt and Morocco—managed to retain at least the formal trappings of Muslim rule even when they came to be governed by European powers. India, on the other hand, was subjected to the full force and effects of colonialism, the only exception being pockets of Indian regions that were left by the British to the governance of hereditary indigenous rulers, some of whom happened to be Muslim. The onset of colonial rule meant, among other things, the establishment of a new legal system, one that was administered according to the norms of English common law even when it allowed facets of the shari'a to govern matters of personal status—notably, marriage, divorce, and inheritance. It also required that those dependent on the patronage of the erstwhile Muslim ruling elite

had to fend for themselves in other ways. An entire culture and way of life were in peril.

Deoband was a response to the establishment of colonial rule, but it was not a revolt against it. The madrasa in the town of that name and numerous others all over India that soon began to be patterned on it were more indebted to the model of English public schools—classrooms, an academic calendar, a fixed curriculum, annual examinations—than they were to the institutions that had previously existed in India or elsewhere.[31] Some of those associated with the management and support of these madrasas were themselves lower-ranking officials in the colonial bureaucracy. British officials did have their suspicions of such institutions, and there inevitably were those within them, as well as doctrinal rivals outside, whose words and actions could give substance to such suspicions. Many Deobandis were nonetheless keen to affirm loyalty to the British,[32] and it was not before the second decade of the twentieth century that the Deobandis became active in colonial politics.

Loyal or not, there could be no mistaking that Deoband sought to represent an alternative to the conditions in which Muslims of colonial India found themselves. It was an alternative articulated in religious terms, but it had other dimensions too, and these included not just the political, to which we will come later, but also the socioeconomic. The Deobandis did not refuse such patronage as came their way, from an Afghan king or the rulers of the Muslim princely states of Hyderabad and Bhopal—the sort of patronage that would have sustained madrasas in earlier times as well.[33] However, they depended primarily on the support of ordinary members of the community. Even meager donations by large numbers of people could go far toward generating the funds that were necessary for the upkeep of these relatively modest institutions. In turn, such fundraising helped foster networks of supporters and gave them a stake that they had not had before in the continuance of these institutions. This model of support has helped sustain madrasas in South Asia since colonial times and not just those of the Deobandis. It has undergirded their growth even as it has made it difficult for governments to regulate their financial and other affairs, much more so than would have been the case if they were tied, say, to landed endowments or other clearly identifiable sources of funding.

The second orientation that has come, since colonial times, to occupy a large space in modern South Asian Sunnism is associated with Ahmad Riza Khan (d. 1921) of Bareilly, a town in north India. The Barelawis, as they are commonly characterized, stand in marked contrast to the Deobandis. They have had their own madrasas, where hadith, Islamic law, and other religious sciences are studied. But they are best known not for scholarship in these areas but rather for Sufi and other devotional practices centered on the shrines and persons of holy men. Though the Deobandis have also had considerable space for Sufi piety in their doctrinal orientation, the world of the Barelawis was and remains a significantly more enchanted one. The Prophet is deemed not merely to be a source of normative teachings, but a living presence, and supplication to the saints is a regular feature of Barelawi practice. This style of religiosity has deep roots in South Asian Islam. Ahmad Riza Khan had tried to give it a new respectability both by preaching against particular practices that he viewed as blurring the boundaries between Islam and Hinduism and by defending particular practices against Deobandi and other critics. It was his followers who continued in the proper ways of earlier Muslims, he said, and they were the true Sunnis, not those others whose puritanical attitudes amounted to a break with the past and a profound disrespect toward some of Islam’s holiest personages. [34]

The Barelawis are in some ways the most traditionalist of the Sunni orientations to emerge in colonial India. Indeed, despite their association with a colonial-era figure, their emergence had more to do with their doctrinal rivals and the desire to stand their ground against them than it did with their own beliefs and practices, which had a long history in Indian Islam. It also had to do of course with the conditions of colonial rule. As will be observed, print and other technologies allowed Ahmad Riza Khan, no less than his rivals, to reach new audiences, and the ever-growing number of madrasas enabled the Barelawis to train new generations of ‘ulama on a larger scale and with a greater measure of standardization than could have been possible earlier. The increasing awareness—fostered in part by ubiquitous colonial practices of enumeration and classification—of the existence of a large Hindu majority in India also necessitated that a distinctive Muslim identity be articulated in opposition to it, the more so in a milieu in which the rivals of the Barelawis alleged that their practices were

insufficiently distinguishable from those of the polytheists. For all that, there are important substantive and rhetorical continuities between the devotionalism of the colonial Barelawis and earlier traditions of Sufi-inflected piety. Indeed, it would be difficult to account for the prominence of the Barelawi orientation in colonial India without recognizing that what it represented in many cases was a new name for a complex of long-standing devotional and customary practices.

Deoband, by contrast, was often self-conscious in distinguishing itself from existing practice. Its reform consisted precisely in such distinction. Yet, the success of the Deobandis in colonial India owed itself not merely to a new organizational model but also to the fact that they, too, could make credible claims to a sense of continuity with the past. The learning their madrasas imparted was aligned with a long-standing tradition. Deobandi reformism gave pride of place to the study of hadith, which had a venerable history in India. A key figure in the Deobandi genealogy was the great eighteenth-century north Indian hadith scholar Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762), whose significance has rested not only on his magisterial writings or the scholarly networks his distinguished family spawned but also on the fact that he has come to be seen as a crucial link in the onward transmission of religious learning from earlier times. This last point is best appreciated by noting that, despite a thriving book culture, the authenticity and authority of hadith texts has continued well into modern times to depend on a chain of identifiable human links going back all the way to Muhammad. In early modern South Asia, Wali Allah was the most prestigious of them.[35] The Deobandis have been important in extending Wali Allah’s intellectual influence to new circles; in turn, Wali Allah’s image as one of the most important of precolonial India’s religious scholars and reformers has served to give credibility and historical depth to the Deobandi enterprise.

The least traditionalist of the conservative Sunni orientations to emerge in colonial South Asia is that of the Ahl-i Hadith. In marked contrast with the Deobandis and the Barelawis, both of whom adhere to the Hanafi school of Sunni law, the Ahl-i Hadith reject the authority of all such schools (madhhabs) and therefore of a legal tradition that has guided Muslim societies since the ninth century. To the Deobandis and the Barelawis, a Hanafi identity has meant working within the framework of the rules, norms, and methods associated with past scholars of this school of law

—of submitting to their overarching authority (taqlid). The Ahl-i Hadith, by contrast, view taqlid as investing fallible humans with an authority that belongs only to God and the Prophet Muhammad. To them, this is not very different from the abhorrent “saint-worshipping” practices of the pirs—claimants to Sufi authority—and their ignorant followers. Instead, they insist on a purity of belief that replicates that of Islam’s first generations, the salaf (hence their common designation as the Salafis), and on direct recourse to the Islamic foundational texts, as opposed to approaching those texts through the distorting lenses of a long-standing legal tradition.

This is not to say, however, that the Ahl-i Hadith lack their own authoritative figures from the past. In the eighteenth century, Wali Allah had argued against the rigidity of the boundaries between the Sunni schools of law and in favor of ijtihad—that is, the derivation of new legal rulings, as needed, in light of the foundational texts. Although he had not gone quite so far as the Ahl-i Hadith, the latter, too, see him as an important figure in their own genealogy. Given the centrality of the Prophet’s teachings to their doctrinal orientation, earlier scholars and commentators of hadith are also crucial links in the Ahl-i Hadith understanding of their scholarly tradition. Indeed, Siddiq Hasan Khan (d. 1890), a leading Ahl-i Hadith scholar of the late nineteenth century whose career had taken an unexpected turn with his marriage to the ruler of the princely state of Bhopal, had utilized some of the resources that had thereby come his way to sponsor the printing and dissemination of classical and early modern commentaries on hadith. He had also written commentaries of his own on the Qur’an and hadith, as did some other Ahl-i Hadith scholars of the colonial era.[36] Theirs is a far less colorful tradition than that of the Barelawis, but it is a tradition nonetheless.

The Shi‘a of colonial India reveal notable similarities with their Sunni rivals, though these need to be seen against the background of some obvious differences. By far the most numerous of the Shi‘a were, and are, the Imamis or Ithna ‘asharis (“Twelvers”), who, unlike the Sunnis as well as other Shi‘i orientations, believe in twelve divinely appointed imams. The last of these imams is believed to have gone into occultation in the late ninth century and is awaited as the promised mahdi or messiah. Several ruling dynasties in precolonial India were Shi‘i, but the Shi‘a as a whole comprised a minority of the total Muslim population in South Asia. Since the eighteenth

century, the region of Awadh in what under the British became part of the United Provinces (UP) was ruled by a wealthy Shi‘i dynasty, with its patronage of Shi‘i causes extending to the revered Shi‘i shrine cities of southern Iraq. Lucknow, the capital of this princely state, would remain the center of Shi‘i learning and culture in colonial times even as it emerged as a theater of growing conflict with the Sunnis.

Within decades of the formal establishment of British rule, Shi‘i madrasas had begun to be established in UP and elsewhere with organizational features similar to those of Deobandi and other Sunni institutions. Cadres of ‘ulama trained at these madrasas built on centuries-old traditions of Shi‘i learning all while benefiting from the opportunities provided to them by colonial rule. Much like the Sunni madrasas, Shi‘i institutions came to impart learning in ways that were more standardized than had been the case earlier, and they too showed a greater awareness than before of the need to distinguish themselves from other Muslims.[37] An All India Shi‘a Conference began as well to hold annual meetings from 1907, with attendees drawn from across the Indian subcontinent. Though riven from its first years by tensions between the Shi‘i ‘ulama and their critics, this institution, along with many others, had a role in shaping a distinct Shi‘i identity in colonial India. For instance, its delegates were regularly tasked during its early years with visiting different parts of the country to report on the state of the Shi‘a living there—the number of mosques and centers of devotional practice (imambargahs) in particular locales, the degree to which Shi‘i rituals were observed by people, the economic condition of the community, and so forth.[38] The conditions in question were frequently stated to be grim. As the honorary secretary of the conference observed in 1911, basing himself on his travels in India over the previous two years, “in some places there is no one to lead the funeral prayer, marriages do not take place in accordance with the prescriptions of the sinless imams, and people are not acquainted with basic matters relating to prayer and fasting.”[39] Such assessments could be emotionally powerful, and they helped undergird unceasing appeals for Shi‘i self-awareness, organization, networking, and fundraising. None of this was unique to the Shi‘a.

For all the deeply unsettling effects that colonial rule had had on Muslims of South Asia, it had also served to kindle a new intellectual and religious vitality in traditionalist circles. A good deal of it came from the need to

respond to questions on which the very future of Islam seemed to many people to hinge. How were the interests of Islam and Muslims best served under foreign, non-Muslim rule? Was it by reforming putatively inauthentic customary norms under the searing light of the Islamic foundational texts and with a renewed commitment to the Hanafi legal tradition or, as the case may be, to textually anchored Shi‘i norms? Was Islam best served through a reinvigorated Sufi piety? Did the most appropriate path to a good Muslim life lie instead in a rejection of Sufi practices and of the medieval schools of law, which tended to obstruct rather than facilitate an anchoring of Islamic norms in the foundational texts? Muslim traditionalists might lament that Islam was under siege in British India, that the British were out to destroy their law and their culture, but the very challenge of responding to this threat had also given a new vigor, a new sense of agency, to the traditionalists. Even the All India Shi‘a Conference, though it came to be dominated by the modernists, had begun as an ‘ulama-led platform.[40]

Some of this agency came, as observed, from the framework and the tools that the conditions of colonial rule had provided. Though all foreign rule is, by definition, exploitative, it has not been seen as equally oppressive. Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935), an influential Syrian scholar and pan-Islamist of the early twentieth century, thought, for instance, that British colonial rule allowed people greater freedom than did any other colonial powers.[41] Shi‘i, Deobandi, Barelawi, and Ahmadi scholars took turns praising British rule in early twentieth-century India.[42] Much of this was guided by an instinct of self-preservation in a milieu in which the hostility of a well-entrenched colonial power carried heavy costs. For all that, it is worth noting that the British in India had sought to leave the arena of religion outside their formal purview, and this may be part of what Rida and others had had in mind. The avoidance of direct intervention in the religious sphere does not mean, of course, that it had escaped the effects of colonial regulation. The very definition of a sphere as “religious” shaped it in distinctive, and often coercive, ways. By decreeing, for instance, that the shari‘a in the context of the colonial judicial administration meant only the laws of personal status and that the shari‘a rules even in those areas would be guided by the principles of English common law and administered by judges trained in that legal tradition rather than specifically by Muslim judges, the British reshaped Islamic law to its very core. Nevertheless, there was an arena that colonial rule made available to the ‘ulama of different doctrinal orientations, one in which they were relatively free to

establish as many madrasas as they could, and issue as many fatwas and publish as many books as they wanted to.

This sort of freedom was not quite new to India. Already in the time of the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605), his courtier Badayuni (d. 1615) had remarked in an acerbic history he was then secretly writing that India “is a wide place, where there is an open field for all licentiousness, and no one interferes with another’s business.”[43] Such freedom would, however, become institutionalized in British India. The traditionalists did not necessarily appreciate it any more than had Badayuni, for it meant that their rivals, and all kind of heretics, had as open a playing field as they did themselves. Other Muslim voices could be equally suspicious of it. So Akbar Ilahabadi (d. 1921), an Urdu poet noted for his sarcasm, evoking the memory of Hallaj, the mystic who was executed in early tenth-century Baghdad for what his opponents had deemed blasphemous statements: “Friends, celebrate our government …, [under which] you can say, ‘I am the Truth [that is, God]’ but not be hanged for it.”[44] The modernist poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), too, had attributed the emergence of the heterodox Ahmadis—many of whom viewed Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908) as a prophet and were seen by other Muslims as contravening the doctrine that Muhammad was the last of God’s prophets—to the British policy of laissez faire in religious matters. We will examine the controversy surrounding the Ahmadis in Pakistan at some length in chapter 5. Iqbal’s misgivings about British religious policy in India are, however, worth highlighting in the present context: “In so far as Islam is concerned,” Iqbal wrote, “it is no exaggeration to say that the solidarity of the Muslim community in India is less safe than the solidarity of the Jewish community was in the days of Jesus under the Romans. Any religious adventurer in India can set up any claim and carve out a new community for his own exploitation. This liberal state of ours does not care a fig for the integrity of a parent community, provided the adventurer assures it of his loyalty and his followers are regular in the payment of taxes due to the state.”[45]

It is in this colonial framework that we should see the significance of technologies facilitating as never before the travel of people, goods, and ideas. The Indian railway system, for instance, was a major feat of colonial engineering and bureaucracy. Between 1861 and 1946–47, railway tracks had grown from 1,587 to 40,524 route miles; already by 1902, India was “the

world’s fourth-largest railway system measured by route length.”[46] The number of passengers traveling by trains had grown from 19,283,000 in 1871 to 1,189,428,000 in 1946–47.[47] This obviously created unprecedented opportunities in the economic, social, and political arenas, but it did so in matters relating to people’s religious life as well. Two examples are instructive here. Jama‘at ‘Ali Shah (ca. 1841–1951), a Sufi master belonging to the Naqshbandi order, had taken to traveling by rail from his base in the Punjab for months on end to visit groups of disciples all across the Indian subcontinent. It was not unusual for Sufi shaykhs to be mobile, but the degree of his itinerancy was striking.[48] By contrast, the Deobandi Sufi and scholar Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (1863–1943) spent much of the first four decades of the twentieth century at his Sufi lodge in Thana Bhawan, a small town not far from Deoband, and it was there that throngs of visitors came to him, thanks again to the small railway station that connected his lodge to the rest of the subcontinent. Thanawi, it is worth noting, also carried on an extensive correspondence with those seeking his guidance. He would reply to the letters almost as soon as he had received them, often responding point by point to the queries posed to him and frequently on the original letter itself. It was then put back in the mail, but not before the relevant portions had been copied for the record. Colonial postal service was as crucial to the dissemination of the master’s teaching as was the railway system to bringing people (and the mail—twice a day) to him. So, of course, was the technology of print, which extended the reach and influence of such figures beyond anything an earlier age could offer. Many of the fatwas that Thanawi later published had originated in his letters to particular correspondents.[49] One of his most important Sufi works, the Training of the Wayfarer (Tarbiyat al-salik), is likewise based on letters to those seeking the master’s spiritual and ethical guidance.[50]

Though Thanawi was an unusually prolific author, his writings as well as those produced by associates under his supervision give us an idea of the range of publications by the ‘ulama and the Sufis in colonial India. Besides numerous fatwas, he published an Urdu translation of and commentary on the Qur’an, a number of books—to some of which we will return later—on matters relating to Sufi thought and practice, a work on norms of comportment for women that has come to enjoy the status of a veritable classic in the genre, and much else. Deobandi ‘ulama were not unique in the production of such works. Nor were the pursuit of learning and the edification

of fellow scholars the only functions of these writings. They served also to stake out new claims to authority—within a particular doctrinal orientation vis-à-vis other scholars of that orientation and, within the crowded field of colonial Islam, vis-à-vis doctrinal and other rivals. Ahl-i Hadith commentaries on the reported teachings of the Prophet Muhammad tended, among other things, to show how the Hanafi legal norms had only a tenuous basis in them. Such challenges could hardly be allowed to go unanswered, of course, and there was much ink, ingenuity, and money that was spent on the production of impressive Deobandi commentaries on hadith. The technology of print also meant that autodidacts could challenge the ‘ulama’s understanding of the foundational and other texts in unprecedented ways, which in turn required the traditionalists to articulate and defend their authority and to try to broaden the reach of their own discourses in new ways.

The challenges and the opportunities brought forth by colonial rule would not, however, have produced a traditionalist revival without the prior existence of a vibrant religious and scholarly tradition. Rashid Rida had commented on the vitality of traditionalist scholarship in India in late medieval times and contrasted it unfavorably with the state of affairs elsewhere: “Were it not for the meticulous attention to the study of hadith on the part of our brothers, the ‘ulama of India, it would have become extinct in the eastern lands. For it has been debilitated in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Hijaz since the tenth century of the hijra [sixteenth century CE], reaching its nadir towards the beginning of the fourteenth century [the late nineteenth century CE].”[51] Rida had scores to settle against the representatives of what he saw as the moribund scholarly culture of the famed al-Azhar in Cairo, yet his claim was not unfounded. It was on this scholarly tradition that the Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith had built, and even Shi‘i madrasas, long known for a focus on philosophy and theology, had come to give a prominent place to the study of hadith in their colonial-era institutions of learning.[52] The study of law, so important a feature of Deobandi scholarship since the late nineteenth century, likewise drew on a core area of Indian Islamic scholarship in precolonial times. The Islamic “rationalist” sciences, too—notably logic and philosophy—had continued in colonial India, and their association with particular clusters of scholars would persist into the early twentieth century. For their part, a number of Sufi orders had seen a certain revival in parts of eighteenth-century South Asia.[53] Quite apart from the fact that the ‘ulama did not agree on how to address the challenges posed to

them by the onset of colonial rule, the very depth and breadth of their intellectual heritage would, by itself, have precluded a shared answer. This, incidentally, is a significant part of what may account not simply for the vigor of the traditionalist response to colonialism but also for its fragmented character.

It is easy to see the Muslim modernists as breaking decisively with the sort of tradition the ‘ulama represented in colonial India. There is more than a little truth to this, as will be observed. Yet, it is important to recognize that the early modernists, who occupied a growing space in the Islamic mosaic of colonial India, were part of the same broad culture that their contemporary ‘ulama inhabited. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), the pioneering modernist of the late nineteenth century, had established his Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh (hereafter, often Aligarh College), in the UP, in the conviction that the only way in which Muslims could cope with the adversities of colonial rule was through an English schooling. This position was premised on a dim view of traditional madrasas and those associated with them. Sayyid Ahmad’s social background and his norms of cultural comportment were nonetheless hardly different from his contemporary ‘ulama’s and of those supporting their institutions. He belonged to a family that was devoted to some leading Islamic figures of the time: the descendants of Shah Wali Allah, on the one hand, and the circle of Shah Ghulam ‘Ali, a revered Sufi master of Delhi, on the other.[54] In the early 1850s, he had commenced a translation of the Alchemy of Happiness (Kimiya-i sa‘adat), a famous Persian work on ethics by the great Sufi and jurist al-Ghazali (d. 1111). The idea of the translation had come from Hajji Imdad Allah (d. 1899), a Sufi of the Chishti order who figures prominently in the genealogy of the founders of the madrasa at Deoband.[55] Incidentally, it was at the lodge previously occupied by Imdad Allah that Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi would later establish himself in Thana Bhawan. Some of Sayyid Ahmad’s own writings before the formal establishment of British rule in 1858 could have come from one of his Sufi contemporaries. Then there is the fact that, even as a modernist reformer breaking with the tradition of the ‘ulama, Sayyid Ahmad expressed at least some of his views through the traditional medium of the commentary on the Qur’an. Further, as his biographer Altaf Husayn Hali (d. 1914) argued, a number of the theological and exegetical positions that Sayyid Ahmad’s critics had found objectionable could be shown to have some basis in medieval Islamic thought itself.[56]

Much the same is true of Sayyid Ahmad’s leading allies and of other early modernists. Mahdi ‘Ali Khan (d. 1907), better known as Muhsin al-Mulk, was born a Shi‘i but had later become a Sunni and, early in his career, had written a hard-hitting polemic against Shi‘ism.[57] He had translated a small portion of Ghazali’s magnum opus, The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya ‘ulum al-din), while drawing extensively on the great Persian mystical poet Rumi (d. 1273) to elucidate and enliven the work.[58] Despite what he shared of Sayyid Ahmad’s modernist outlook, the two men had significant disagreements on particular theological and exegetical matters, and Muhsin al-Mulk had enough traditional learning to be able to invoke it in defense of his own arguments.[59] Hali was likewise rooted in a traditional intellectual culture. He is most famous for his biography of Sayyid Ahmad, which, in its robust support of his protagonist’s religious views, showed considerable grounding in classical and modern Islamic theology. But the biography that earned him greater respect from his peers was not Sayyid Ahmad’s but rather that of the Persian poet and moralist Sa‘di (d. 1291).[60] The early modernists were often altogether fluent in the world of medieval Persian ethics.

Another figure in Sayyid Ahmad’s circle, who also served as a trustee of Aligarh College, was Nazir Ahmad (d. 1912). In the history of Urdu literature, he is best remembered as the author of early didactic novels that sought to instruct Muslims in how to navigate their lives in the colonial milieu. But he also published an Urdu translation of the Qur’an as well as a major work called Rights and Duties (al-Huquq wal-fara’iz). Published in three substantial volumes, this was a systematic treatment of what the author took to be the full spectrum of proper Islamic beliefs and practices, with the final volume devoted to matters of morality and ethics. Each section in the book, discussing a particular belief, ritual, or other practice, a virtue or a vice, is structured in the form of passages from the Qur’an, citations from the traditions of the Prophet, an effort to resolve disagreements between and among the relevant hadith reports, and the author’s own comments on the topic in light of those texts. The resulting work, impressive simultaneously for its erudition and its accessibility, was meant to be a “code of conduct” (dustur al-‘amal) for all. As he put it in the preface to this largely forgotten book, every Muslim able to read

the Urdu language ought to have a copy of this code of conduct—at the very least, each family should.[61]

Though both Hali and Nazir Ahmad had significant traditional learning, it was Shibli Nu‘mani (d. 1914), who served for many years as a professor of Persian and of Arabic at Aligarh College, who had perhaps the strongest claim to being a member of the ‘ulama.[62] Shibli, as he was commonly known, had been educated by ‘ulama well known for their expertise in the Islamic rationalist tradition. On Sayyid Ahmad’s encouragement, he would later write two important books on Islamic theology—one a historical overview of major theological orientations, the other a normative work toward a reformulation of some key theological tenets. In addition, he wrote full length biographies of ‘Umar (r. 634–44), the second successor of the Prophet Muhammad, and of the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (r. 813–33) as well as of several major figures, including Abu Hanifa (d. 767), the eponymous founder of the Hanafi school of law; Ghazali; Rumi; and the medieval Persian poet and astronomer ‘Umar Khayyam (d. 1131). Toward the end of his life, he also embarked on a biography of the Prophet Muhammad, a monumental work that was completed many years after Shibli’s death by his star pupil, Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi (d. 1953).

Shibli was a key figure in the founding of the Nadwat al-‘Ulama (“the conclave of religious scholars”) in Lucknow in 1894, a forum that sought to mobilize the ‘ulama in support of the reform of traditional religious education and to bring some order to the institutions imparting it. A decade later, it established an educational institution, a dar al-‘ulum, of its own, which has also come to be popularly known as the Nadwat al-‘Ulama. With people like Shibli as its guiding lights, the Nadwa—both the movement and the school—had been meant as well to bridge some of the distance between traditionalist institutions and modernist colleges, though it would come to be significantly closer to the Deobandi orientation than to Aligarh. The Nadwa has produced many distinguished scholars, all bearing the suffix “Nadwi” as a mark of their association with its Dar al-‘Ulum. Shibli’s biographer, Sulayman Nadwi, was one of them. By the time of his death, he had become a disciple of the traditionalist Sufi Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi. Some of the other graduates of the Nadwa we will meet later would be truer to Shibli’s modernist inclinations.

My final example of the intellectual culture of the early modernists is Mirza Muhammad Hadi (d. 1931), a Shi‘i contemporary and acquaintance of Shibli from Lucknow. A graduate of the University of the Punjab, Hadi is best known in the history of Urdu literature for a novel, written under the pen name Ruswa (“the disgraced”), that depicts the life of a courtesan of Lucknow. He spent considerable time as a translator, too, rendering works by Plato and Aristotle into Urdu (via their available English translations), as well as writings on psychology by some of his English contemporaries. He also wrote on medieval Islamic thought, and one of his works in this area is an abridged Urdu translation of an Arabic commentary on al-Suhrawardi, a twelfth-century thinker controversial even by the standards of the premodern Muslim philosophers.[63]

That the early modernists were well acquainted with, and in several instances, deeply immersed in, a traditional intellectual culture is not surprising, of course, for that is the only culture they had really known while growing up. This should not, however, obscure their critique of that culture and tradition, or the sometimes strident responses their writings and activities provoked in turn from those who saw themselves as the guardians of that tradition. For instance, at the inaugural session of the All India Shi‘a Conference in 1907, Mirza Hadi had strongly opposed a resolution that wanted nothing to be done under the conference’s auspices that was opposed to the shari‘a. His point was not, of course, that this forum ought to be able to contravene the shari‘a, but only that there was no clear mechanism for deciding whether something was or was not in consonance with the sacred law.[64] This made no allowance for the Shi‘i ‘ulama, who considered themselves to be precisely that mechanism. He had also proposed a resolution of his own asking that the conference dissociate itself from polemical and other “inflammatory” writings against sectarian rivals. This gesture toward Islamic ecumenism provoked sharp rebukes from the Shi‘i ‘ulama and their associates, who took it to be a thinly veiled attack on their scholarly concerns and, indeed, an affront to their efforts to give their community a distinct identity.[65] This initiative, too, was defeated, but it was an unpropitious beginning for the conference. More challenges to their authority awaited the ‘ulama in subsequent sessions of this annual conference, and they decided some years later to withdraw their support for it.

Critics of Sayyid Ahmad Khan alleged, for their part, that he wanted the Muslims to become English in all but their religion.[66] Some thought that even the religion of those studying at Aligarh would not be safe.[67] Such fears were exaggerated, but it is not difficult to see why they would have resonated with many people. Sayyid Ahmad was not only an educational entrepreneur; he was also a theologian. In a series of ambitious works, including a biography of the Prophet Muhammad and unfinished commentaries on the Bible and the Qur'an, he sought to defend Islam against Orientalist criticisms and to argue that the theological doctrines and legal institutions that tended to attract the most adverse comment either had no basis in scripture or could be explained in modern, rational terms. Thus, he denied that the Qur'an really spoke of any supernatural or miraculous occurrences. And he argued that, far from allowing slavery and polygyny, the Qur'an had in effect prohibited them. Nor did he think that the Qur'an's strictures against usury were to be understood as a prohibition of all financial interest; the monetary assets of his college were kept in interest-bearing accounts.[68] Underlying these and other positions was his fierce opposition to taqlid. He blamed it, as would generations of modernists, for the intellectual stagnation of Muslims, but an attack on it also meant a challenge to the authority of the 'ulama that was anchored precisely in firm adherence to the norms and methods of their earlier masters. His rejection of taqlid had obvious affinities with the Ahl-i Hadith. The latter did not, however, share his advocacy of a wholehearted embrace of European modernity.

As Sayyid Ahmad and some of his associates viewed it, his ventures in Islamic theology were intended to produce an antidote to the sort of doubts about Islam that he knew an exposure to Western learning would create in the Muslim youth.[69] The task of producing a new theology could hardly be left to a people—the 'ulama—who refused to see that the old theology was no longer adequate to responding to the religious challenges Muslims faced and who, in any case, had only a faint understanding of the social, intellectual, and political developments in the contemporary world to which a new theology had to be a response. From the 'ulama's perspective, however, any such theology was meant only to turn people away from core Islamic beliefs. Despite a broadly shared culture, these were not small disagreements between the early modernists and the 'ulama. They remained

unresolved. That the study of Islam did not acquire more than a token place at what purported to be the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College had much to do with the fact that the purpose for which the college was founded was the imparting of an English, not an Islamic, education. So far as the study of Islam was concerned, the most significant intellectual presence on campus during the last decade and a half of Sayyid Ahmad's life was Shibli's. Yet, his was an uncomfortable presence. According to Shibli's biographer, part of what had led to his departure soon after the death of Sayyid Ahmad in 1898 was the concern of the administration that his lectures on Islam had become a little too popular with the students and were leading them to neglect their other subjects.[70] But the 'ulama's opposition to Sayyid Ahmad the theologian had also helped marginalize the study of Islam at Aligarh, with the modernist reformer concluding in effect that salvaging his educational venture was much more important than courting ceaseless religious controversy. This meant excluding not just his own theological views from the curriculum, but, with some exceptions, much of Islam itself. The exceptions included collective ritual prayers, which even the English administrators of the college saw as good for a sense of discipline among the students. [71]

*** Indian Politics and the Wider Muslim World

How did colonial politics shape the key orientations that formed the Islamic mosaic of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries? How was the political landscape itself shaped by them? And how did developments in the wider Islamic world impact on, and were themselves impacted by, Islam in colonial India? The early modernists, to begin with them, were largely docile in political terms. Their calls upon Muslims to acquire an English education and to rethink the ways they understood their religious tradition were predicated, after all, on the conviction that the British Empire was there to stay and that the best the Muslims could hope for was a position of respectability within the framework of that empire. Given moreover that Aligarh College was modeled on English institutions of learning, it made sense for Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his associates to look to colonial authorities for moral, financial, and political support. As conservative Muslim opposition to Aligarh grew, with a concomitant weakening in its fundraising efforts, so did its dependence on the patronage of the British.[72]

This indebtedness meant that political causes that were unpopular with colonial authorities were distasteful to Sayyid Ahmad as well. The British were suspicious of the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, and of its effort to mobilize Indian political opinion in pressing for greater indigenous representation in the governance of the colony. Sayyid Ahmad, too, opposed this organization and urged Muslims to stay away from it. But it was not just a fear of antagonizing the British that underlay this opposition. Sayyid Ahmad could take daring positions when he deemed it necessary to do so. Against the counsel of some of his associates, he had embarked on his biography of the Prophet Muhammad to refute that of Sir William Muir (d. 1905), despite the fact that Muir was one of the most powerful men in northern India at the time.[73] Sayyid Ahmad's misgivings about the Congress also rested on larger concerns. Among these was the worry that Muslims would be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Hindu majority in a system of representative government. There was also the fear that the better-educated and politically more conscious Bengalis—by whom he primarily meant Hindu Bengalis—would lord it over everyone else in any such dispensation. And at the heart of his discomfort with the Congress was the conviction that India was home to many diverse nations, and that Muslims would be ill-served if they labored under the illusion that they and the Hindus were members of a single nation with shared interests.[74]

Less than a decade after Sayyid Ahmad's death, similar concerns had begun to find expression in the All India Muslim League. Limited forms of representative government were on the horizon in British India, and the question was no longer whether but how Muslims should participate in the emerging political system. The founders of the Muslim League, many of whom had strong ties to Aligarh College, believed that Muslims had their own interests to protect and that they were best represented as a distinct religious and political community. This meant, among other things, that Muslims ought to have the right to separate electorates, whereby only Muslims could vote for Muslim candidates standing for elected office. A number of Muslims did participate in the annual meetings of the Congress from its first years, and it was a Muslim from Bombay, Badr-ud-din Tyabji (d. 1906), who presided over the third annual session of the organization in 1888. Some even at Aligarh had pro-Congress leanings. Shibli was one of them.[75] Conversely, there would be occasions

in the course of its early career when the Muslim League would join hands with the Congress in pursuit of particular causes. Nonetheless, the idea of a separate Muslim identity was a powerful one, and no organization would embody it more fully than the Muslim League.

Like the modernists, the ‘ulama, too, were generally docile during the half century or so following the Mutiny of 1857. That was a lesson learnt from the Mutiny itself. The two founding fathers of the Deoband madrasa, Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi (d. 1877) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905), were remembered to have participated briefly in this last great challenge to the onset of colonial rule, and the decision of their mentor, Hajji Imdad Allah, to leave India for good and take up residence in Mecca may have had to do with those events as well. Even as their religious activities were a response to the challenges of colonial rule and, in this sense at least, had a political dimension to them, the early Deobandis were keen to steer clear of overt political activism. Colonial authorities, too, tended to leave them alone.

By the early years of the twentieth century, however, Deoband was undergoing change in its politics.[76] Some at the madrasa were keen to establish a network of their own, perhaps along the lines of an old boys’ association that already existed for Aligarh’s graduates.[77] To this end, Mahmud Hasan (d. 1920), a much respected professor of hadith at Deoband, had summoned ‘Ubayd Allah Sindhi (d. 1944), a Sikh convert to Islam who had once been a student at the madrasa, to establish an association of Deoband’s alumni now scattered all over the country. Though the thinking behind this association, the Jam‘iyyat al-Ansar, remains opaque, it caused enough nervousness among the loyalist administrators of Deoband to expel Sindhi from the madrasa. That was in 1913. Indians, including many Muslims, were by then increasingly awake to the possibilities of political action to resist colonial rule. With a vigorous Indian Muslim press, there also was a new awareness in many circles of the dismal plight Muslims of India shared with their coreligionists abroad. Morocco was brought under French colonial rule in 1912 and Italy soon came to rule Libya. Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro had joined hands against the Ottoman Empire, which fared poorly in these Balkan wars. There was much to unsettle such accommodation as many Muslims had made over the past half century to life under colonial rule.

With Mahmud Hasan's blessings, if not at his instigation, Sindhi sought to find ways of bridging some of the gulf between the products of institutions like Deoband and those of Aligarh. This was a cause to which he would remain committed all his life. Another commitment of his at this time was pan-Islam. Indeed, the effort to bring together Muslims of varied intellectual formations was part of the larger venture to forge an anti-colonial alliance among Muslims of different lands. The latter effort soon overtook the former. Shortly after the beginning of World War I, Sindhi left for Kabul to explore the possibilities of a grand coalition that would include Muslim and non-Muslim revolutionaries from India, the king of Afghanistan, the Ottomans, and the Germans. The plot—remembered by the British colonial authorities as the Silk Letter Conspiracy—came to nothing. Mahmud Hasan, who had traveled from Deoband to Mecca to assist Sindhi with the plan from the holy city, was arrested by the pro-British Sharif of Mecca and handed over to the British. They interned him and some of his associates on the island of Malta for the duration of the war. Sindhi, for his part, would spend the next quarter century in exile in Afghanistan, Soviet Russia, and Turkey, but mostly the Hijaz, which, by the time he arrived there, had become part of the Saudi kingdom. It was not until 1939 that he was allowed to return to India.

Though Sindhi's efforts to galvanize a pan-Islamic movement against British colonial rule, to bring English-educated and madrasa-trained Muslims together on a shared platform, and to enlist Muslims and non-Muslims in a joint anti-colonial venture had borne little fruit, all three found powerful expression in the Khilafat movement that was launched in India at the conclusion of World War I. The Muslims of India were already perturbed during the course of the war at the prospect of having to fight against the Ottomans on behalf of Britain and its allies; with the Ottoman defeat, the caliphate teetered on the brink of collapse and the security of the Muslim holy places in the Hijaz, which had long been under Ottoman oversight, seemed itself to be in peril. It was in defense of the Ottoman Empire and especially of the Islamic holy lands that the Muslims of India came together as they never had before.

Ottoman claims to the caliphate were not secure. Most glaringly, perhaps, they lacked lineal descent from the Prophet's tribe of Quraysh, which much

of medieval constitutional theory had required as a condition for the caliph's legitimacy. Nonetheless, in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century India, the Ottoman Empire had come to be viewed by many as a veritable center of the Muslim world, the symbol of such unity as Muslims still possessed; any threat to it was a threat to Islam itself. Even Sayyid Ahmad Khan had been an avid supporter of the empire, and he had changed this stance only after the British and the Ottoman empires found themselves on opposite sides.[78] Shibli, for his part, had received a medal of honor from the Ottoman government in the course of his travels through Istanbul and Egypt in the early 1890s,[79] and it was at his initiative that the Syrian pan-Islamist Rashid Rida had been invited to preside over the annual session of the Nadwat al-'Ulama in 1912.[80] Shibli, however, had died in 1914, and new leaders were on the scene by that time.

One of them was Abul-Kalam Azad (d. 1958), a traditionally educated religious scholar who had become a firebrand Urdu journalist. At the conclusion of World War I, Azad came to play a key role in mobilizing Muslim sentiment around the idea that the defense of the Ottoman caliphate was a religious obligation upon all believers. In a book, The Problem of the Caliphate, published in 1920, he castigated the British for allowing freedom to its Muslim subjects on "small" matters, such as prayer and fasting, while attacking the institution of the caliphate, which stood at the very foundation of their religion.[81] Turning on their head the modernist apologetics that had sought to push jihad to the margins of Islamic doctrine and practice, Azad argued that it became a binding obligation upon every single Muslim (fard 'ayn) when a Muslim land was under attack and that this obligation was plainly stated in the very same Islamic legal texts to which the British themselves had given official recognition, for purposes of judicial administration, in their courts in India.[82] In a withering swipe at Deoband, whose administrative head had recently been honored by the government for his loyalism, Azad stated: "The spectacle of those claimants to religious knowledge and veneration who have received [such] titles … is striking…. They profess to be religious leaders of the Muslims and they control large institutions of learning—institutions in which the very books are studied day and night that enumerate [the aforementioned] rules [on jihad]. Even stranger is the fact that many Muslims whole-heartedly accept their claims to leadership."[83] The Muslims clearly needed new religious leadership, and Azad was eager to present himself as a candidate for it.

Others were on call, too. The aforementioned Mahmud Hasan had great stature even before he became publicly associated with pan-Islamic causes. His aura of piety was such that 600 of the 750 or so people on board the ship that was taking him from India to Arabia had become his disciples en route.[84] But Mahmud Hasan was gravely ill when released from internment on Malta after World War I. He died in 1920, though not before he had publicly given his blessings to the Khilafat movement and to the alliance between Hindus and Muslims in their anti-colonial struggle. Another key figure from among the ‘ulama on the political scene at this time was ‘Abd al-Bari Farangi Mahalli (d. 1926), the scion of a distinguished family of religious scholars from Lucknow. He was also a Sufi pir, his wide circle including some English-educated Muslims as well.

By far the most prominent leader of the Khilafat movement was the journalist Muhammad ‘Ali, a graduate of Aligarh who had subsequently obtained a BA from Oxford. Though he had benefited from Shibli’s presence at Aligarh and would later become a disciple of ‘Abd al-Bari, Muhammad ‘Ali was the product of a very different milieu than the one to which the early modernists had belonged. His education reflected Sayyid Ahmad’s decision to exclude any substantial study of Islam from Aligarh’s curriculum, and it would be later in his life, under British internment, that Muhammad ‘Ali would “discover” the Qur’an.[85] The significance of that discovery will be discussed in chapter 4. What bears mentioning here is that his lack of religious credentials did not prevent him from a full embrace of a religious idiom in defense of the Ottoman caliphate or the forging of an alliance with the traditionally educated religious scholars.

Even as he had urged Muslims to end all dealings with the British, Azad, like Mahmud Hasan, had provided them with a religious justification for cooperation with the Hindus. Adducing Qur’an 60.10, Azad had argued that Islam did not forbid friendship with non-Muslims qua non-Muslims but only with those among them who were hostile to Muslim interests.[86] ‘Abd al-Bari and the ‘ulama-led Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind, founded at the end of World War I, took a similar view. It was at the hands of Muhammad ‘Ali that the potential for bringing Muslims and Hindus together on a shared platform was to be realized, however. His key partner on the Hindu side was M. K.

Gandhi (d. 1948), a lawyer who had recently returned from South Africa and had come to establish himself as one of the most important leaders of the Congress.

That Gandhi should have joined hands with the Khilafatists and the ‘ulama in defense of a resolutely Islamic institution might sound surprising. After all, pan-Islam conjured anxieties about a grand transnational alliance against non-Muslims not just among the British but also in many Hindu circles. For Gandhi, however, this was an opportunity to establish closer ties with the Muslim leadership and to mobilize popular sentiment against colonial rule. For their part, Muhammad ‘Ali, his Aligarh-educated elder brother Shaukat ‘Ali (d. 1938), Azad, and other Khilafat leaders did not need to make neat distinctions between Indian and Islamic interests, for the British were a threat to both sets of them. And so the alliance was forged. But it did not last long. In his struggle against apartheid in South Africa, Gandhi had been developing a politics of peaceful noncooperation and of civil disobedience, and it is these political strategies that he wanted to bring to the Khilafat movement. By contrast, some Hindu and Muslim leaders—including Muhammad Ali Jinnah (d. 1948) and Jawaharlal Nehru (d. 1964)—preferred negotiation with the colonial regime; there were those, on the other hand, who wanted a fuller confrontation with the government. The anticolonial sentiment that the Khilafat and noncooperation movements had generated proved difficult for their leaders to contain, and challenges to colonial authority inevitably came to acquire violent dimensions. In one notable incident, twenty policemen were burned alive in a UP village, leading Gandhi to indefinitely suspend the noncooperation movement and to call off the impending civil disobedience movement. That dealt a blow to the Khilafat movement, but it was not the only one. The leaders of the movement had spent a good deal of their energy raising funds for the Ottomans, and a portion of the proceeds would play a not insignificant role in the Turkish war of independence.[87] But there also were instances in which the Khilafat funds had been misappropriated, and the much publicized financial scandals contributed their part to weakening the movement. The greatest psychological setback to the movement was administered, however, by the Turks themselves. In late 1922, the Turkish Grand National Assembly decided that the religious institution of the caliphate and its putatively political arm, the sultanate, were to be separated and the latter abolished. In early 1924, the caliphate itself was terminated. The following years would see much discussion of the possibilities of resurrecting the caliphate, and there were

many competing candidates for it. The movement in India no longer had its raison d’être, however.

Despite its failure, the Khilafat movement was momentous in significance. Confirming the worst fears of colonial authorities, it had demonstrated the power of pan-Islam in mobilizing Muslim sentiment. It had shown that the pan-Islamic sentiment could be effectively combined with Indian politics and that Muslims and Hindus could come together in pursuit of at least partially shared goals. It had also highlighted the authority and influence of the ‘ulama. Many Muslims had been willing to give up their jobs when the ‘ulama told them, in a famous “collective fatwa,” that they could not work for or under a government that was hostile to Islam.[88] More dramatically, Azad and some fellow ‘ulama had issued a fatwa in 1920 stating that it was no longer permissible for people to live in what, under British rule, had become a “land of war”—an infidel territory.[89] Tens of thousands of people heeded the call to begin what would soon turn out to be a disastrous trek to Afghanistan. Even apart from such demonstrations of the ‘ulama’s influence on the lives and thinking of ordinary believers, the Khilafat movement would have been inconceivable without the religious justification prominent religious scholars had provided for it. It is a mark of the prominence of the ‘ulama in the movement that even the English-educated Muhammad ‘Ali and his brother Shaukat would come to be known, in the course of their participation in it, by epithets typically reserved for the ‘ulama; they had become Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali and Mawlana Shaukat ‘Ali, and they retained these titles till the end of their lives. The movement had also shown that it was possible for the English-educated—the “men of the ‘New Light,’” as Muhammad ‘Ali and others referred to them—and the ‘ulama to come together on a shared platform. The ‘Ali brothers had Mawlana ‘Abd al-Bari of Farangi Mahall as their pir, their spiritual guide, and those associated with Aligarh and with Deoband worked hand in hand. No less remarkable was the spectacle of ‘ulama belonging to varied doctrinal orientations working together in defense of the Ottoman caliphate and the Islamic holy lands.

But the limits of such cooperation were equally telling, and no less significant for future developments. Even as many among the ‘ulama had joined hands with the English-educated, the ‘ulama were not a united bloc. Ahmad Riza Khan, the leader of the Barelawis, had been appalled at Hindu leaders being

invited into mosques in the euphoria of the Khilafat movement.[90] Some prominent Deobandis shared those misgivings. Unlike Mahmud Hasan and Husayn Ahmad Madani, a fellow internee on the island of Malta who would soon rise to greater prominence in Indian politics, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi was opposed to the movement. He, too, found it intolerable that Gandhi—for whom he liked to use the Qur’an term taghut, “idol”—and other Hindu leaders should have been invited into mosques to address Muslims.[91] The suggestion on the part of some Khilafat leaders, notably the fellow scholar ‘Abd al-Bari, that Muslims refrain from the consumption of cow meat was equally unpalatable to Thanawi.[92] It was not that consuming it was obligatory; it was rather, Thanawi said, that no one had the authority to forbid what Islamic law had permitted, and doing so in deference to the polytheists was the more reprehensible. Thanawi also believed that Muslims were party to an implicit “contract” with the British colonial authorities, and the Khilafat agitation was not only a breach of that contract, the failure of the movement also threatened to make life less tolerable for Muslims.[93]

Though in the case of some Muslim leaders—Azad and Madani, in particular—the Khilafat movement helped forge lifelong alliances with the Hindu political leadership, communal harmony had begun to fray while the movement was still in progress. The concord of the modernist leadership and the ‘ulama did not endure either. Here, too, those paying some attention would have noticed signs of vulnerability at the very moment that this alliance was being forged. The basis on which the authors of the “collective fatwa” of 1920 had called upon Muslims to boycott government-supported Westernized educational institutions is telling in this regard. “The prevailing education and training lead to … evils such as the predominance of the love of worldly affairs, love for honour, worship of lust, negligence of and carelessness towards religion, etc., and all these things are ‘haram’ [forbidden]. Therefore, on the basis of ‘the means of sin are sin’ it is obligatory to refrain from getting and giving such education.”[94] Though the modernist and the ‘ulama leadership of the movement was as one in arguing for this boycott, justifications such as these leave little ambiguity about what the ‘ulama really thought about the “men of the new light.” The latter’s own misgivings, as expressed by Muhammad ‘Ali in an autobiographical fragment, are not difficult to detect even in what profess to be words of praise for the ‘ulama who had joined hands with the modernist leaders of the movement; for the other ‘ulama, his contempt was unrelieved. “Be it said to the credit of the ‘Ulama,” Muhammad ‘Ali wrote, “that they did not hesitate

… to pocket their pride and in a way even accept the lead of men whom they had but a generation ago finally consigned to perdition…. Only those of the Ulama whose concern seemed to be the retention of their own quasi-priestly authority more than the maintenance of orthodoxy still kept aloof, and these for the most part exhibited a deplorable pusillanimity when faced with some unpleasant consequences of religious zeal."[95] Not long after the end of the Khilafat movement, Muhammad 'Ali and his brother Shaukat had parted company even with their own pir, 'Abd al-Bari.[96]

Finally, the Khilafat movement had raised the question, more forcefully than it had been posed before, of what the relationship was between pan-Islam and national belonging. Was it the case, as Iqbal had asserted in a speech that was quoted in the 1911 census of India, that the "idea of Islam is … our eternal home or country wherein we live, move, and have our being"? That would mean, as he thought it did, that "it is above everything else as England is above all else to the Englishman and 'Deutschland über alles' to the Germans."[97] At the other end of the spectrum on this question, the Kemalists of the nascent Turkish Republic had decided that no reconciliation between pan-Islam and nationalist aspirations was possible. Some among the Indian leaders, too, would come to renounce their pan-Islamic past. 'Ubayd Allah Sindhi, one of the most zealous in the pursuit of a grand pan-Islamic alliance, was later also among the most vocal in criticizing such ambitions, counseling his coreligionists and others to focus instead on building an intercommunal platform geared toward Indian independence and socioeconomic justice.[98] Less vocally, Azad, too, moved away from pan-Islamism and in the direction of secular nationalism as the best framework in which to promote the interests of the people of India. Others seemed to want it both ways. As Muhammad 'Ali put it just weeks before his death in 1931: "I have a culture, a polity, an outlook on life—a complete synthesis which is Islam. Where God commands, I am a Muslim first, a Muslim second, and a Muslim last, and nothing but a Muslim…. But where India is concerned, where the welfare of India is concerned, I am an Indian first, an Indian second, an Indian last, and nothing but an Indian…. I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric. One is India, and the other is the Muslim world."[99]

*** Islam, Law, and Politics in the 1930s

Many of the religious and political trends we have encountered so far are mirrored, in some of their complexity and the ambiguities of their interrelationship, in the career of Muhammad Iqbal, the single most important modernist intellectual of late colonial India. Iqbal was a product not of Aligarh but instead of another institution of English learning, the Government College of Lahore, and he later studied philosophy at Cambridge and Munich, from where he received a PhD in 1908. While in England, he had been called to the bar, and practicing law was to be his principal means of livelihood. Yet unlike many other modernists of his generation but like those of a generation earlier, Iqbal was anchored in some key areas of the Islamic intellectual and religious tradition. His doctoral dissertation was a study of Islamic metaphysics in the medieval Persian world, and it was in the Persian language that he wrote some of his most eloquent verse.

Iqbal's early poetry reveals a marked attachment to the "soil of the homeland" of which, he said, he considered "every speck to be a deity."[100] Though he never became a firebrand in the manner of Azad and Muhammad 'Ali, the expanding reach of European colonialism and the increasingly obvious weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire in the early years of the twentieth century came nonetheless to shape his thinking in other directions. Before long, as noted, Iqbal had begun to speak of Islam as the "eternal home" of Muslims, and he would develop this theme during the remainder of his prolific career. A famous passage in a long Persian poem Iqbal published in 1917 reads:

<quote>

Our essence is not bound by any placeThe vigour of our wine is not containedIn any bowl. Chinese and IndianAlike the sherd that constitutes our jarTurkish and Syrian alike the clayForming our body. Neither is our heartOf India, or Syria, or RumNor any fatherland do we professExcept Islam …[101]

</quote>

Iqbal’s Persian epic, Javid nama (1932), has Jamal al-din “al-Afghani” (d. 1897), the quintessential pan-Islamist of the late nineteenth century, admonish fellow Muslims in rousing words such as the following:

<quote>

The Lord of the West, cunning from head to toeTaught the people of religion the concept of countryHe thinks of the centre, while you are at discord—Give up talk of Syria, Palestine, Iraq!If you can discriminate between good and evilYou will not bind your hearts to clods, stones, bricks.What is religion? To rise up from the face of the dustSo that the pure soul may become aware of itself![102]

</quote>

Similar ideas informed his presidential address to the All India Muslim League in Allahabad in 1930. There he argued that “Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity—[that is,] … a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal—has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India.”[103] Thanks to this “free gift” of Islam to them, they alone among the peoples of India were “a nation in the modern sense of the word.”[104] Insomuch as it was Islam’s gift, this sense of nationhood transcended particularistic boundaries. However, it could not exist as a mere idea; it had to find concrete realization. Not unlike “the Lord of the West,” Muslims, too, needed a sociopolitical center, which nonetheless would not bind their hearts to mere clods, stones, and bricks. For all the pan-Islamic drift of Iqbal’s thought, there is a palpable tension here between what Muhammad ‘Ali had described almost contemporaneously as his two nonconcentric circles.

The ambivalent relationship between Islamic universalism and territorial centralization is illustrated further by Iqbal’s response to the Kemalist termination of the Ottoman caliphate. One might have assumed that the unceremonious demise of a key pan-Islamic symbol would evoke deep anguish from the poet. However, though he had briefly served on the Punjab Khilafat Committee, his participation in the movement was at best listless, and he had been opposed to the noncooperation movement and what it entailed in terms of the boycott of educational institutions.[105] Remarkably,

in 1922, at a time when many other Indians were renouncing the titles they had received from colonial authorities, Iqbal had received knighthood. And once the Kemalists had made their fateful move, it was not with the emotion of a poet but with the cool-headed analysis of a philosopher that he commented on it. In a lecture on ijtihad, in which he had spoken in a characteristic modernist vein of the need for a radical rethinking of the Islamic legal tradition, Iqbal adduced the Turkish Grand National Assembly's decision to abolish the caliphate as an instance of precisely such rethinking: "Turkey's Ijtihad is that according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly."[106] He considered this to be a "perfectly sound" position.[107] More importantly, he saw Republican Turkey as charting the path to an intellectual awakening of momentous proportions:

<quote>

It is, I think, the English thinker Hobbes who makes this acute observation that to have a succession of identical thoughts and feelings is to have no thoughts and feelings at all. Such is the lot of most Muslim countries today. They are mechanically repeating old values, whereas the Turk is on the way to creating new values. He has passed through great experiences which have revealed his deeper self to him. In him life has begun to move, change, and amplify, giving birth to new desires, bringing new difficulties and suggesting new interpretations. The question which confronts him today, and which is likely to confront other Muslim countries in the near future, is whether the Law of Islam is capable of evolution—a question which will require great intellectual effort, and is sure to be answered in the affirmative.[108]

</quote>

Though Iqbal was not always quite so laudatory in his comments on the Kemalists,[109] his misgivings about nationalism took a back seat in this instance to his excitement about new possibilities of ijtihad. Those misgivings never went away, however. They would find a striking expression in the poet's last days, conjoined in that instance with all that the modernists disliked about the 'ulama.

In a speech in late 1937, the aforementioned Husayn Ahmad Madani, a leading figure in the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind and a close ally of the Congress, had made the remark that nations were defined by territory, so that the Muslims living in the subcontinent were part of the Indian nation (qawm). There was some misreporting of this observation in the Indian press and Iqbal took Madani to be asserting that a religious community (millat) was defined in territorial terms. He reacted sharply, insisting, as he had in his writings for many years, that the bonds of Islam transcended the limits imposed by territory, race, and language.[110] But the controversy involved issues that were much larger than the precise connotations of particular terms—qawm and millat—or even the universal claims of Islam, on which Madani’s view was not different from Iqbal’s.[111] Iqbal believed that to see a nation as defined in territorial terms was, in case of Muslims, to sunder the unity of their global religious community. Madani, for his part, thought that his way of making an accommodation with Indian nationalism was in fact truer to the spirit of Islamic universalism. Differences of religion, Madani argued, were immaterial to the constitution of a nation, though they were central, of course, to a community of faith—the millat. Conversely, the unity of that faith-community was not undermined by the existence of territorially based composite nations. In subsequent years, he would develop this point further to assert, in articulating his opposition to the demand for a separate Muslim homeland, that what contravened global Muslim unity was the existence of territorially based Muslim polities such as the one being demanded in the name of Pakistan. The assumption was, of course, that a secular state comprising members of different religious communities would not demand religious allegiance from its citizens; a Muslim state, on the other hand, would demand such allegiance from the Muslims living within its territories, thereby serving in effect to cut them off from the wider Muslim world.

From Iqbal’s vantage, Madani was the very prototype of the ‘ulama who did not understand modern ideas, in this case, nationalism, and were thus providing dangerously bad counsel to their followers. If, Iqbal wrote in refuting Madani, “a nation comprises different religions and communities, the communities generally die away and the only common factor that remains in the individuals of that nation is irreligiousness.”[112] At the very least, in such a nation, “Islam will be reduced to an ethical ideal with indifference to its social order as an inevitable consequence.”[113] But men like Madani did not understand the Qur’an either: “Circumstances have forced the present-

day ulama to say things and interpret the Quran in a way which could never have been the intention of the Prophet and the Quran."[114] In an extraordinary move, he concluded the rejoinder to Madani by comparing the latter's position to that of the Ahmadis, against whom the Deobandis had been leading the charge for many years: adopting the modern ideology of nationalism was tantamount to admitting, Iqbal said, that Islam was imperfect and needed something new, much like the Ahmadis thought that Islam had needed a new prophet.[115] The modernists have often castigated the 'ulama for failing to change with the times. There is some irony here in Iqbal's upbraiding Madani and his likes for being rather too willing to change, thereby losing sight of what were meant to be timeless Islamic teachings.

By the time of Iqbal's death in April 1938, at least some elements in the Islamic mosaic of colonial India had come to acquire a sharper delineation than had been the case a half century or so earlier. Many others remained fluid, however, as they do to this day. Thanks to Ahmad Riza Khan, who had died in 1921, the Barelawis had an identity that went beyond an amorphous devotionalism; they were a distinct doctrinal orientation in late colonial India. In at least some cases, the differences between the Imami Shi'a and the Sunnis had also become sharper. Sunnis of Lucknow, like those of many other places, had long participated in Muharram processions commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn, a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third Shi'i imam. Yet, such processions could also be flashpoints for sectarian tension because they provided occasions for ritual Shi'i execration of leading companions (sahaba) of Muhammad. The Shi'a hold these companions—including Abu Bakr and 'Umar, the first two successors of Muhammad—responsible for thwarting the legitimate claims of 'Ali to the community's headship; the Sunnis, for their part, revere these companions as second only to the Prophet in virtue and authority. Nothing underscored the growing tensions between the Sunnis and the Shi'a in late colonial Lucknow more than the demand by some Sunnis to publicly praise the Prophet's companions (madh-i sahaba) as a counterpoint to Shi'i execration of them. Husayn Ahmad Madani was one of the key leaders of this campaign.

Madani's role in this controversy suggests that the Deobandis, too, had come to articulate a distinct identity for themselves, indeed well before the Barelawis did, and their influence would continue to grow in late colonial

times. Their ever-increasing madrasas were key to this identity and to their visibility in the colonial religious sphere. The official history of Deoband, written to commemorate its centenary, counted nearly 9,000 madrasas providing religious education at various levels throughout South Asia.[116] It is worth noting by way of comparison that the aforementioned ‘Abd al-Bari of Farangi Mahall had founded a madrasa in Lucknow in 1905, but, for all his family’s prestige and networks, the madrasa spawned no other institutions and its own doors would close in 1969.[117] The Barelawis, the Ahl-i Hadith, and the Shi‘a had their madrasas as well, but they did not compete in numbers with those of the Deobandis.

The Deobandis had other assets, too. Though they were not necessarily more prolific than their doctrinal rivals, at least two of their works had acquired the status of classics already in colonial times, unlike anything produced by their rivals. One was a translation of the Qur’an by Mahmud Hasan, the revered scholar involved in the Silk Letter Conspiracy. Even before that involvement turned him into a figure of national importance, the administrators of Deoband expected his translation to become a source of revenue for the madrasa’s publishing house.[118] It is based on an early Urdu translation of the Qur’an by a son of Shah Wali Allah, and it has, in turn, remained perhaps the most influential Urdu rendering of the Qur’an.[119] The other book was the Heavenly Ornaments (Bihishti zewar) of Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi. As noted, Thanawi was a much sought after Sufi master and a seemingly limitless source of fatwas, all of which helped cement not just his own status in late colonial India but also that of his doctrinal orientation. That influence, in marked contrast with that of most other scholars of his age, had reached the central legislative assembly itself by the mid-1930s. This merits a brief detour here.

Though the British had given recognition to Islamic law in matters relating to personal status, their judicial administration was based on the assumption that any judge schooled in English common law and ruling according to what were taken to be the Muslim community’s authoritative norms could decide on the matter at hand. To many ‘ulama, however, none but a Muslim judge could implement the religious law. Thus, it was impermissible to them for a woman to have recourse to colonial courts to have her marriage dissolved in the event, say, of the disappearance of her husband. Instead, that woman had to wait for the duration of a natural lifespan before being able to

presume the death of her husband. The hardship that the ‘ulama’s insistence on following the relevant Hanafi norms created in such instances was sufficiently severe for an apparently substantial number of women to renounce Islam itself. There is nothing to suggest that this was a protest against Islam; it sought rather to exploit a loophole in Hanafi law. Medieval jurists had stipulated that apostasy served to dissolve a marriage. In earlier times, an apostate woman would presumably have been forced to reconvert and been punished for her infraction, but, with its commitment to religious freedom, apostasy carried no such consequences in British India.

The ‘ulama were compelled to respond, with Thanawi taking the lead. He conferred with prominent scholars in India, most of them Deobandi, wrote to scholars in the Hijaz, and then published a juridical treatise—The Consummate Stratagem for the Helpless Wife (al-Hila al-najiza lil-halila al-‘ajiza)—in 1933.[120] The book argued that a woman whose husband had gone missing could have her marriage dissolved four years after his disappearance, as the somewhat more accommodating Maliki law stipulated, though it still required the decision of a Muslim judge before such dissolution could take place. It also argued that the woman’s apostasy had no effect on the marriage. When the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Bill was introduced in the central legislative assembly in December 1935, it was this treatise that provided the intellectual basis for it.

The debate on the bill and its outcome are illuminating not only as an illustration of a growing Deobandi influence,[121] but also for what it tells us about the ambiguities of the ‘ulama’s relationship with the modernists. When the bill was enacted into law in 1939, the key ‘ulama demand that the dissolution of marriage take place at the hands of a Muslim official had been pointedly left out. Significantly, many modern-educated Muslims had themselves opposed that demand. As the representative of the Muslim Ladies Association of Karachi had observed, “Though the spirit of Muslim law requires that … [it] should be administered by Muslim kazis [judges], my Association is not aware that the Tribunal in a country which has a non-Muslim government must necessarily be Muslim.”[122] Many others had concurred, not all for the same reasons.[123] In his concluding remarks on the bill, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan of the All India Muslim League had argued that the requirement relating to Muslim judges was “not at all practicable” and, in any case, that a non-Muslim judge might well be more

knowledgeable than one who was Muslim. He had also observed that to give legislative effect to this demand after nearly a century or so during which non-Muslim judges had annulled Muslim marriages and permitted women plaintiffs to remarry would be tantamount to “casting the stigma of illegitimacy upon innocent people and … laying the foundation of widespread and complicated litigation.”[124]

Zafrulla Khan was an Ahmadi. In 1953, as Pakistan’s first foreign minister, he would be at the center of an anti-Ahmadi agitation in Pakistan, though that story belongs to chapter 5. In view of the history of Deobandi hostility toward the Ahmadis, it is ironic that he found himself on the same side as Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi on many core aspects of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Bill. Yet, Zafrulla Khan was also a modernist, and as suggested by his opposition to the demand for Muslim judges, there were significant differences between him and the ‘ulama. His reasoning, moreover, was his own even when he seemed to agree with the ‘ulama. Whereas Thanawi had made a painstaking case to show that certain strands of the Hanafi tradition allowed a marriage to stand even in case of a spouse’s apostasy, Zafrulla Khan’s position was far more radical:

<quote>

as the result of such study as I have been able to devote to this question over a number of years, I venture to submit that in Islam as interpreted in the time of the Holy Prophet and in the time of the first four caliphs, for mere change of faith unaccompanied by anything else which might constitute an offense against the State, there is prescribed no penalty whatsoever…. [T]his doctrine of the automatic dissolution of marriage in case of a woman who renounces Islam is a legacy from the doctrine of capital punishment for traitors, which was misapplied to apostates, and the attempt is being made by means of this … [legislation] to abolish one of the consequences of that penalty.[125]

</quote>

In its break with the classical scholastic tradition in favor of a direct recourse to the foundational texts and in its liberal commitments, this was vintage

modernism. The modernists had helped the ‘ulama get some of what they wanted, but not without leaving a distinctly sour taste in their mouths.

Two years earlier, in 1937, the outcome of another legislative initiative had turned out even less happily for the ‘ulama. In that instance, it was the Bombay-based lawyer and president of the Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who had taken the lead in shepherding the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Bill through the central legislative assembly. The initiative had had the support of the Deoband-dominated Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind—“the greatest Moslem religious body,” as the bill’s statement of objects and reasons had characterized it in again underscoring the growing prominence of the Deobandi orientation in the Indian religious landscape.[126] A key rationale for the bill, which sought to replace customary norms with the shari‘a in matters of personal status, was to restore to Muslim women the rights that were often denied to them in practice.[127] The situation that the bill sought to rectify prevailed largely in the Punjab, where the British colonial administration was tied to the support of the landed magnates. The landholdings there had needed to be protected from fragmentation not just at the hands of rural, often Hindu, creditors but also from the workings of the Islamic law of inheritance, which granted women shares that were unequal to those of men but substantial enough to threaten the viability of agricultural estates. In a milieu in which the ‘ulama had been preaching and writing for decades against un-Islamic, including local customary, practices, it had come to look increasingly scandalous to many Muslims that they should be prevented from living according to their sacred law. This bill was a symbolically resonant effort to remedy just that.

The symbolism of the bill soon came to get the better of its substance, however. Under pressure from colonial officials, as well from the estate holders themselves, the inheritance of agricultural land—which is where the most egregious contravention of the shari‘a law tended to occur—was removed from the bill’s purview from the start. Ironically, therefore, the very women whose “disgraceful” status[128] had prompted this legislation in the first place were largely left out of it. Yet, this did not divest the bill of all its appeal, which rested after all on the claim that the shari‘a, however truncated it had come to be in colonial India, was being brought back to life. As David Gilmartin has argued, Jinnah, fully alert to this appeal,

was willing to make all necessary compromises on the bill’s content as long as its shari‘a-laden symbolism was retained.[129]

Given those compromises, the ‘ulama’s response was mixed. Husayn Ahmad Madani clearly viewed it as a failure.[130] To scholars of his ilk, too much had been conceded on the path to this legislation, which meant that it could no longer be viewed as an expression of the shari‘a, properly speaking. More ominously, the modernists’ willingness to see the shari‘a tailored as necessary suggested that Islam was merely a plaything in their hands, that they would stop at nothing in pursuit of their interests. Yet, there were ‘ulama, of decidedly lesser stature but influential perhaps in their local contexts, who took a different view. It was that view that Justice Din Muhammad, a respected modernist jurist from the Punjab, had adduced in opposing the shari‘at application bill in the first place. He claimed that “none” of the ‘ulama of the Punjab, when consulted earlier about such legislation had been

<quote>

prepared to say that from a purely Muslim point of view it was essential that a Bill on the lines proposed should be introduced. In fact they expressed their willingness to support any measure which provided for mandatory compensation to be given to the daughters in lieu of their share in their fathers’ inheritance…. This by itself would show that the doctors of Islamic law in the Punjab realized the delicacies of the situation here and did not favour any measure which may go to the length visualized in the present Bill.[131]

</quote>

Though Madani and some modernists would have dismissed such unnamed ‘ulama as either insufficiently knowledgeable about their legal tradition or as too beholden to the beneficence of their landholding patrons, such views do show that the ‘ulama could take unpredictable and varied positions even on important shari‘a-related questions. For his part, Justice Din Muhammad was unusual in recognizing greater interpretive flexibility among the ‘ulama than did most of his peers. Iqbal had recognized no such thing in his aforementioned exchange with Madani.

*** The Movement for Pakistan

For all the criticism directed at it, the Shari‘at Application Act of 1937 was a success for Jinnah. Yet, this was a difficult time for him. The Muslim League had done poorly in the provincial elections held under the Government of India Act of 1935. The Congress, for its part, had won many impressive victories in the elections and had proceeded to form ministries in eight provinces. There were gleams of hope even in those dark days, however. An ‘alim and Sufi of Thanawi’s stature had come out in support of the League and, prior to the elections, even the normally pro-Congress Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind had entered into an alliance with the League. The elections had also shown that the victorious Congress had vulnerabilities of its own when it came to the Muslim vote. It had not won a single seat from among those reserved for Muslims in UP; the League had won twenty-nine of those, out of a total of sixty-six.[132] Choosing to ignore such warning signs, the Congress leadership showed itself unwilling to share power with the League and instead launched a Muslim mass contact campaign—a thinly veiled effort at a hostile takeover of the Muslim constituency. The conduct of the Congress ministries, in UP and elsewhere, was not designed to reassure Muslim skeptics either. There had long been some disconnect between the inclusive, noncommunalist, and secular positions that were the trademark of the Congress high command and an aggressive Hindu-inflected politics at local levels, and this became more noticeable under Congress rule.[133] The Muslim League did everything to play up such instances, to paint them as a preview of an impending Hindu raj, and to present itself as the exclusive representative and guardian of Muslim interests. When the Congress ministries resigned at the outbreak of World War II, in protest against Britain’s inducting India into the war without consultation with the Indian political leadership, the League celebrated a “day of deliverance.” It was against the backdrop of this experience with the Congress ministries and of the insistence by the Congress leadership that Indian support in the war effort was contingent on a British promise of full independence for India that the Muslim League first articulated its demand for Pakistan.

Speaking in Lahore on March 22, 1940, as the president of the Muslim League, a decade after Iqbal’s famous address to the party, Jinnah made the

clearest case thus far that the Muslims of India were no mere minority but rather a distinct nation and were accordingly entitled to a political future of their own:

<quote>

The problem in India is not of an inter-communal but manifestly of an international character, and it must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Musalmans, but also to the British and Hindus. If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure the peace and happiness of the people of this Subcontinent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands, by dividing India into “autonomous national States”…. It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality.[134]

</quote>

The following day, the League adopted a momentous resolution:

<quote>

no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.[135]

</quote>

This had echoes of what Iqbal had said in 1930, and Iqbal had in fact come to be informally associated in his last years with the demand for “Pakistan.” A delegation from Egypt’s al-Azhar that had visited India in 1936 and met Iqbal had reported that he “speaks of the necessity of the state of Pakistan (mamlakat Bakistan), one that will comprise Punjab, Kashmir, the [North-West] Frontier, and Baluchistan in order to return Islam’s glory to it in this region. He speaks as well of the exchange of inhabitants between the state of Pakistan and the rest of the Indian states.”[136] The word “Pakistan” came not from Iqbal, however, but rather, in 1933, from Rahmat Ali, an imaginative Indian Muslim studying at Cambridge.[137] It was not long after the Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution that many friends and foes alike came to associate it with the demand for Pakistan.

Precisely when Jinnah himself adopted the idea of Pakistan, as a state that would be self-governing and separate from the rest of the Indian subcontinent, is a matter of considerable disagreement. Pakistani historiography tends to see the Lahore Resolution of 1940 as marking the decisive moment at which the demand for a separate state was finally articulated, and it was thenceforward only a matter of having it accepted by the British and the Congress. A very different view, which has found wide acceptance among historians of late colonial India, posits that even after Jinnah had come to speak regularly of Pakistan, it was a tactic to secure concessions from the British and the Congress for the Muslim-majority provinces within a loosely confederated Indian union.[138] On this view, it was ironically the Congress leadership that, for all its identification with a united India, had eventually concluded that the division of the country was preferable to what would otherwise be a cripplingly weak and ineffective union. If the official Pakistani perspective is too teleological, however, and allows little by way of change since 1940 in the League’s thinking on Pakistan, the interpretation that posits Pakistan as essentially a “bargaining counter” until almost the eve of India’s partition makes the idea of a Muslim homeland much too vacuous;[139] and it does not adequately account for Jinnah’s ability to rally people around it. Mobilizing support for a Muslim center, a homeland, required the conception to have some content, with more substance accruing to it over the years. Conversely, the idea need not be fully worked out, let alone nonnegotiable in its implications, for it to develop a growing appeal. What it did need was for Jinnah to stake out a credible claim that the Muslims of India were a distinct nation and that the Muslim League was their sole representative.

The first of these claims was not a particularly hard sell. After all, the British had long based their administration on the idea that India was inhabited by different religious communities. Much as the Congress resented it, the system of separate electorates had enshrined that idea in the evolving political system of colonial India. The Muslim League's insistence in the 1940s on being a distinct nation represented an extension of that same position. Significantly, even those Muslims who were allied with the Congress did not deny that Muslims were, indeed, a community set apart from the others that inhabited India. In his exchange with Iqbal, as would be recalled, Madani had argued that the Indian Muslims were part of the same nation as the others living in this country, but he had had no doubt, any more than the British or the Muslim League did, that they were a separate religious community. Islamic ties trumped all others, he had said.[140] And he did not even rule out the establishment of an Islamic state in India at some indeterminate point in the future, once the generality of India's inhabitants had converted to Islam.[141] The leaders of the Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-i Hind did not see in such formulations any slippery slope to the Muslim League view. But some at least of their followers could be excused if they discerned no sharp distinction between a separate community and a separate nation.[142] Even so literate a person as Iqbal had failed to see that distinction in any neat terms.[143]

The second claim, that the Muslim League was the exclusive representative of the Muslim community, was obviously extremely contentious. The Congress wanted to be seen as representing the people of India as a whole, including its Muslims. In striking illustration of that claim, it had elected Abul-Kalam Azad to preside over the party's annual session in March 1940, just days before the Muslim League session at which Jinnah would make his historic speech. Muslim Congressmen like Azad were a standing argument against the Muslim League's raison d'être, just as they were against the very idea of a separate Muslim nationhood. Jinnah had no illusions about that challenge. His Lahore address in March 1940 can be read in part as a point by point refutation of Azad's argument—far more clearly enunciated than anything Madani would ever say—that Muslims had nothing to fear in a united India, for the country belonged as much to them as it did to the Hindus: "Our eleven centuries of shared history has filled all corners of our Indian life with its building blocks," Azad said. "Our languages, our poetry,

our literature, our culture, our tastes, our dress, our norms and customs, and numerous facets of our daily lives—there is no area that does not bear the stamp of this shared existence."[144] Jinnah could not have had it more differently: "The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither intermarry nor interdine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions."[145] Jinnah was not above personal rebukes either, which only underscored the gravity of the threat he perceived Muslims like Azad to represent to the League's claims. In July 1940, Jinnah stated in a telegram to Azad: "you have completely forfeited the confidence of Muslim India. Can't you realize you are made a Muslim 'show-boy' Congress President to give it colour that it is national and deceive foreign countries. You represent neither Muslims nor Hindus. The Congress is a Hindu body. If you have self-respect, resign at once."[146] Azad, however, would remain the president of the Congress for the next six years, to the Muslim League leader's great discomfort.

Though Jinnah had to occasionally remind enthusiasts that the Muslim League was "mainly a political organization,"[147] the fact that it was tied to a particular religious community meant that invocations of Islam were anything but uncommon from its platform. Iqbal's presidential address in 1930 is a prominent example of this. Jinnah's own statements came to be laced with references to Islam from around the time of the 1937 elections.[148] Pakistan, Jinnah told Aligarh students in 1941, was the only way "to save Islam from complete annihilation in this country."[149] He urged the Muslim League delegates from the Punjab, whose province had been slow in warming to him, to "substitute love for Islam and your Nation … for sectional interests."[150] Islam and the Qur'an, he told his audience in Karachi in December 1943, were "the sheet-anchor of Muslim India. I am sure that as we go on and on there will be more and more of oneness—one God, one Book, one Prophet, and one Nation."[151] An especially effusive message he delivered on the occasion of Eid, marking the end of Ramadan in September 1945, deserves to be quoted more fully:

<quote>

Every Musalman knows that the injunctions of the Quran are not confined to religious and moral duties. "From the Atlantic to the Ganges," says Gibbon,

“the Quran is acknowledged as the fundamental code, not only of theology, but of civil and criminal Jurisprudence, and the laws which regulate the actions and the property of mankind are governed by the immutable sanctions of the will of God.” Everyone, except those who are ignorant, knows the Quran is the general code of the Muslims. A religious, social, civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal, penal code, it regulates everything from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life; from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body; from the rights of all to those of each individual; from morality to crime, from punishment here to that in the life to come, and our Prophet has enjoined on us that every Musalman should possess a copy of the Quran and be his own priest. Therefore, Islam is not merely confined to the spiritual tenets and doctrines or rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating the whole Muslim society, every department of life, collectively and individually.[152]

</quote>

Any ‘alim worth his salt would have looked askance—and for more than one reason—at the recommendation that every Muslim ought to be his own “priest.”[153] Even so, the broad spirit of such appeals to Islam had significant purchase among the ‘ulama, and the League was keen to enhance it. Not long after the Lahore Resolution, the UP branch of the Muslim League set up a committee to formulate a vision of what an Islamic state would look like. Its members, not limited to supporters of the League, included Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, Azad Subhani, ‘Abd al-Majid Daryabadi, and Sayyid Abul-A‘la Mawdudi. They had all participated in different capacities in the Khilafat movement. Two of them, Sulayman Nadwi and Daryabadi, were close to Thanawi. Sulayman Nadwi and Subhani were both ‘ulama; Mawdudi had enough traditional religious learning to pass for one when it suited him to do so, but it was as journalists that he and Daryabadi had made their names. We will return to facets of Mawdudi’s thought in chapter 4. What is worth noting here is that it was around this time, in 1941, that Mawdudi had founded his Jama‘at-i Islami, which has been a major contributor ever since to public debates on Islam. Such was the composition of the committee. The actual task of delineating the characteristics of an Islamic state fell to another religious scholar, Muhammad Ishaq Siddiqi Sandelawi Nadwi. A product of the Nadwat al-‘Ulama and later a professor there, he soon produced a substantial manuscript titled “The Political System of Islam.” More peculiarly, perhaps, the committee was never able to meet to discuss

its contents, and it took many years for it to be published as a book.[154] This might suggest that the Muslim League leadership was rather more interested in being seen as taking the religious scholars seriously than it was in what they had to say. What they did have to say in this instance deserves notice, however.

Although the treatise did not call explicitly for reviving the caliphate, the contours of the Islamic state it delineated were suffused with the idea and the memory of the caliphate. Ishaq Nadwi argued that the cornerstone of the "system of the caliphate" was the doctrine of God's oneness and the concomitant necessity of human servitude to God.[155] God alone is sovereign and the exclusive source of all law,[156] and it was a recognition of this fact that made the Islamic system of government different from, and superior to, all others of a human devising.[157] The Qur'an reports God's promise "to those … who believe and do good deeds … to make them successors [the Arabic term here is a cognate of 'caliphs'] to the land, as He did those who came before them" (Q 24.55). But, Ishaq Nadwi cautioned, this promise did not simply depend on sound belief and good deeds. It required actively striving for the establishment of an Islamic political order.[158] Indeed, such struggle was a religious obligation, which some people had to undertake on behalf of the community as a whole or else the community at large would be remiss.[159]

One more feature of this work is worth mentioning, and that relates to the central role it gave to the 'ulama in the running of the state. Medieval Sunni political theory requires that the caliph be elected and his actions regulated by "those who loosen and bind." Many jurists thought that this group consisted of leading 'ulama, others argued that it comprised the military and political elite, and yet others wanted both sort of notables to be counted among this select group. Ishaq Nadwi leaned toward the third view, but he made it clear that it was the 'ulama who really were to be in charge and that other notable figures were to be called in only as needed and always under the careful oversight of the 'ulama.[160] The 'ulama were to occupy a central position in the legislative assembly—a key site of binding and loosening the public affairs of the community—for it made no sense for Islamic legal matters to be overseen by those not knowledgeable in them, let alone by non-Muslims or Muslims of wayward beliefs (he mentioned the Shi'a and the Ahmadis in this regard).[161] The ruler himself was to be well-

grounded in religious and juridical matters, much as many medieval jurists required of the caliph, but if not, he would need to be all the more dependent on the ‘ulama’s guidance.[162] This utopian vision of government leaves little room for the sort of modernizing elite that was at the forefront of the movement for Pakistan; it seems also to leave uncertain space for autodidact intellectuals like Mawdudi. It is not clear how Mawdudi would have responded to this imagining of an Islamic polity if he, as a member of the committee, had been able to debate it with its author.[163]

Quite apart from the League leadership’s failure to take such discourses seriously, there were good reasons for the Islamists and the Sunni ‘ulama to resist coming over to Jinnah’s side. Mawdudi, for one, spent the last years of colonial rule bitterly opposing the League on grounds that its Westernized leadership was unsuited to the task of establishing an Islamic state. For their part, the Sunni ‘ulama feared that they and their conceptions of Islam would come in for some rough treatment in a state governed by the modernists.[164] The internal partition that Muslim India would undergo with the establishment of Pakistan also represented a frightening prospect, though not to them alone. Many of their centuries-old centers of religious life, the final resting places of their revered teachers and Sufi masters, would have to be left to the mercy of non-Muslims. The Muslim community itself would be sundered. Jinnah could talk cavalierly about the “sacrifice” the Muslims of the minority provinces needed to make for the good of the Muslim-majority provinces, on occasion arrogating to himself the authority to sacrifice them. In a speech in Kanpur in March 1941, he was reported to have said that “in order to liberate 7 crores [70 million] of Muslims where they were in a majority he was willing to perform the last ceremony of martyrdom if necessary and let two crores [20 million] of Muslims be smashed.”[165] Such language raised questions about whether Jinnah could be entrusted with guarding the interests of the community at large; and it could not but be anathema to the representatives of a religious tradition that saw the protection of life as one of its cardinal values.[166] All stakeholders in the future of the Indian subcontinent could perhaps agree, these ‘ulama thought, to grant Hindus and Muslims parity in the central legislature of a free, united India and on its Supreme Court. This, indeed, is what the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind had proposed in a constitutional formula in 1945 as a way of keeping India undivided and securing Muslim interests within it.[167]

The religious arguments for supporting the Muslim League were no less weighty, however. The demand for a separate Muslim homeland had created the prospect of establishing an Islamic state with a central role in it for the ‘ulama, and there was no telling when, if ever, any such opportunity would arise again. The League leadership was not known for its piety, but that was scarcely different from the generality of earlier Muslim leaders. The ‘ulama could try to reform these leaders’ waywardness and to reorient them toward proper Islam. They could also mobilize Muslim public opinion in such a way that anyone who did not adhere to the ‘ulama’s guidelines in religious matters would be ousted from the League itself.[168] Ultimately, then, the ‘ulama had to decide whether to trust the Muslim League or the Congress, and some notable figures had convinced themselves, as Thanawi had earlier, that the Muslim League was the preferable option. In late 1945, long-simmering tensions within the ranks of the Deobandi ‘ulama took an institutional form with the establishment of the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam (JUI), a pro-Muslim League breakaway faction of the Jam‘iyyat al-Ulama-i Hind. Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani (d. 1949), a Deobandi stalwart, was its president. Like the Deobandis, the Barelawis, too, were divided on the question of Pakistan, with some notable figures among them opposing the demand for Pakistan while the All India Sunni Conference, a Barelawi organization, supported it.[169] The Shi‘a were no different. Though Jinnah himself was a Shi‘i and Shi‘i modernists tended to preach sectarian harmony far more frequently than any exclusionary message, there were significant misgivings in various Shi‘i circles about what it would mean for them to live in a state dominated by the Sunnis.[170]

The Muslim League put the influence of ‘ulama like Shabbir ‘Usmani to good use as the movement for Pakistan gained momentum. For all of Jinnah’s insistence that his party alone represented the Muslims of India, the claim was still untested. The elections to the central and provincial legislative assemblies in 1945–46 provided him the opportunity, indeed the imperative, to vindicate it. The party labored against significant odds. Much of the League’s leadership, like Jinnah himself, came from provinces in which Muslims were a minority, rather than from the Muslim-majority provinces that needed to be won over to comprise the new Muslim homeland. The League had never developed anything comparable to the Congress’s grassroots organization in those provinces, which meant that bringing them

over would have to be a matter of opportunistic alliances at elite levels—and of intense religious propaganda.[171] In the Punjab, for instance, where politics was dominated by rural magnates associated with a ruling party—the Unionists—that did not identify itself with Islam, Muslim League propagandists put much imagination and energy into articulating their religious appeal. Though no less attentive than others to considerations of kinship and other local ties, it was the transcendent appeal of Islamic solidarity that the League showed itself to represent, while its rivals were portrayed as a throwback to dissension, intrigue, and moral chaos—all captured by the resonant Qur'anic term fitna.[172] The specter of fitna had always haunted Muslims; the fitna par excellence of Islamic history was the civil war less than a quarter century after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, which had sowed the seeds of sectarian groups for all times to come. In late colonial India, the demand for Pakistan was a promise to reunite disparate Muslims in a homeland of their own. So far as League propagandists were concerned, this unity had in fact already been achieved in the person of Jinnah and it was now only a matter of putting it on display. It is telling that Husayn Ahmad Madani had to go out of his way to argue in 1945 that Jinnah did not in fact represent a binding legal consensus—ijma'—of Muslims, which would make it sinful for people to oppose him.[173]

Those associated with hereditary shrines also played an important role in helping with the propaganda effort. They included not just the keepers of shrines in the Punjab, a province rich in them, but also influential people from much further afield. The shrine of Mu'in al-din Chishti (d. 1236) in Ajmer is among the most hallowed Sufi precincts in all of India. Its sajjada nishin—"the occupier of [the ancestors'] prayer rug" there—was a supporter of the Muslim League, though Rajasthan, where the shrine is located, had no prospect of becoming a part of Pakistan. He also helped the party leadership identify other 'ulama and Sufis who could be invited to a conference the League was planning to highlight its Islamic commitments in the fall of 1946.[174] Jama'at 'Ali Shah, another League supporter mentioned earlier with reference to his train trips, went so far as to characterize Jinnah as a saint (wali Allah).[175] Coming from saintly figures, such endorsements could be powerful.

Compared to the elections of 1937, the Muslim League was spectacularly successful in its campaign in 1945–46: it emerged as the biggest winner in the two largest Muslim-majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal, and it had a majority in Sindh as well. The League's victory had much to do with its simultaneous embrace of Islam in its varied forms—modernist, 'ulama-led, Sufi, and Shi'i, among others. It had to do as well with Jinnah's success in reorganizing the party at the all-India level and in persuading Muslim politicians at local levels, in the Punjab, Bengal, Sindh, and elsewhere, to switch to the Muslim League at little or no cost to their political habits or their inherited privileges.[176]

There were vulnerabilities, however. The specter of "sectionalism" haunted the Muslim League then, as it had Iqbal in 1930,[177] and it would continue to inform the deep misgivings with which the central government, already from the time of Jinnah's governor-generalship, viewed provincial elites in Pakistan. The 'ulama's support, too, carried costs, though the League's leadership may not have noticed the full price just yet. Pressing leading 'ulama into service in support of the Muslim League meant an endorsement of their influence; this at least is how they tended to see it. For his part, Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmani had left little doubt that his support—and that of the other 'ulama—was a partnership in equal terms with the Muslim League: "One section possesses religious knowledge ('ilm) and the other represents the nation's power and authority (qawmi qudrat o iqtidar). In the realm of politics, knowledge and power have to work together. Knowledge without power is helpless and impoverished. And power without knowledge leads to oppression and imbalance. Political authority and religion are twins."[178] He had also tied the 'ulama's support to how the Muslim League conducted itself in the new homeland. What the 'ulama had agreed to help legitimize they could also divest of its legitimacy. The same was true of the pirs. Less than six years after the establishment of Pakistan, an anti-Ahmadi agitation would severely test government authority in the Punjab and bring life in the provincial capital and other major cities to a standstill. It had the support not just of leading 'ulama but also of prominent pirs, and the precincts of major shrines were used then to denounce the Muslim League government just as they had once been used to bring people under the party's banner.[179]

As the religious rhetoric accompanying the demand for Pakistan became ever more extravagant, the League leadership had less control than it would have admitted of the forces that were being unleashed. Jinnah may have remained willing to negotiate the precise form Pakistan would take almost till the eve of the partition of India, but it was not clear if those most galvanized by the promise of a Muslim homeland would see such negotiations as anything but a betrayal. The following report from a campaign worker on religious sentiment in rural Punjab in the run-up to the 1945–46 elections is instructive both about the popular mood and about the apprehensions it was creating in some party circles:

<quote>

One thing which we have particularly noticed is that the message of the League has reached even the remotest villages. We saw people who knew Pakistan, League and Quaid-i-Azam [Jinnah's title, "the Great Leader"]. They think that the League wants to establish a Muslim State, and about Quaid-i-Azam they think that he is some big Moulvi who has a long beard and is very religious. Villagers are very anxious to see him…. The most touching scene we noticed was in a village where we went with a green flag; the villagers followed us and then an old man of eighty years came forward and kissed the flag and burst into tears…. At certain places young villagers questioned us when jihad would be declared. They were anxious to make sacrifices. I feel that the League should take some steps after elections, otherwise it would have terrible effect on the masses who were awakened now.[180]

</quote>

Some of the ferocity with which government authority was challenged in 1953 was not unrelated to the perception in many circles that the promise of Pakistan, and of Islam in Pakistan, had not been realized.

The decades between the formal establishment of British colonial rule in India and the birth of Pakistan were a time of extraordinary ferment in the history of Muslim South Asia. By the end of this period, a number of Muslim orientations with a more or less distinct identity existed that had not been on the scene at its beginning. There were the Deobandis, the Barelawis, the Ahl-i Hadith, the Ahmadis. The Shi'a had had a long prior existence, but they,

too, had undergone significant changes akin to those of their Sunni rivals in conditions of colonial rule. The Islamists were beginning to make their presence felt, though they had yet to come into their own. Perhaps most visible of all were the modernists, whose thought and careers exhibited more concretely than others the impact of colonial rule and who provided a good deal of the Muslim political leadership.

Some quite specific visions of Islam, of what it meant to lead a good Muslim life—what was good and what was Muslim about it—were in competition in colonial India, as indeed they were in other Muslim societies. The Shi‘a, the Sufis, the ‘ulama, and the modernists had conflicting ideas on these matters. But the ideas also crisscrossed and converged across these communities just as they could be and often were in conflict within them. Sunni and Shi‘i ‘ulama shared much in their vision of their place, as ‘ulama, in society, though this did not alleviate the competition and conflict between ‘ulama of various doctrinal orientations. The ‘ulama and the modernists could be at greater or lesser distance from one another as well; that distance was at its smallest in case of the first modernists of the nineteenth century, but it grew as a new generation, schooled in Westernized institutions of learning, came of age.

The modernists did not have a sectarian identity in the way the ‘ulama, with their increasingly articulate doctrinal orientations, did. Indeed, a criticism of such divisive orientations and the polemics and boundary drawing that accompanied them was a staple of modernist polemics against the ‘ulama. As Iqbal had put it early in the twentieth century, “I condemn this accursed religious and social sectarianism…. Islam is one and indivisible; it brooks no distinctions in it. There are no Wahabies [Ahl-i Hadith or Salafis], Shias, Mirzais [Ahmadis] or Sunnies in Islam. Fight not for the interpretations of the truth, when the truth itself is in danger.”[181] Yet, the modernists, too, had some very particular ideas about Islam, and despite caricatures suggesting that they followed wherever their English masters led them, they were no less committed to their religious beliefs, to shaping everything around them in their light. This had made for a difficult and unstable relationship with the ‘ulama and others, but it had not precluded instances of concerted action, most notably during the Khilafat movement and even more so during the movement for Pakistan. The establishment of a state the modernists had envisioned and one they were poised to govern after

successfully leading the movement for it created unprecedented new opportunities to put their vision of Islam into place. It also came to reveal great gaps in that vision, and many yet unanswered questions about what it would take to put some such vision into practice in a fledging polity and a fractured religious landscape.

** Chapter Two: Modernism and Its Ethical Commitments

IN HINDSIGHT, blurred as it is by the state’s chronic political instability and eventually its dismemberment in 1971, it is easy to miss the excitement that the creation of Pakistan had produced among many of its citizens. This excitement did nothing to alleviate the severe problems that the country faced in its early and subsequent years. But it would be difficult to make sense of some of the grandiose modernist rhetoric that we will encounter in the following pages without recalling the euphoria that had accompanied the birth of this Muslim homeland. An overview of the major phases in the political history of Pakistan and of how modernism has fared in it is the principal concern of this chapter. I take modernist political ethics—conceptions of the good as they relate to the public and political spheres—as a key point of reference in this overview.[182] This chapter seeks equally to bring out some of the ambiguities and contradictions that have both accompanied and enervated modernist thought. Many of these have had to do with the fact that, while modernist intellectuals have frequently spoken of justice, liberty, equality, and tolerance, they have often been allied with authoritarian regimes. Such alliances are partly explicable by the desire to bring about change in a hurry, from the top down, partly by the belief that traditionalist and Islamist authoritarianism cannot be combated in any other way, and partly by the fact that the governing elite have often had modernist commitments of their own.[183] However, quite apart from questions of strategy, there is also an authoritarian streak in at least some of the modernist intellectuals’ own discourses, the implications of which have sometimes been clearer to their opponents than they have to the modernists themselves.

*** The First Years

In an uncomplimentary piece on the guerilla warfare then taking place in Kashmir, the influential American magazine Life had observed in January 1948 that “Jinnah still had no real national program for Pakistan except the incitation of fanatic Moslem zeal.”[184] Despite the prominence of Islam in his prepartition discourse, “fanaticism,” however, was far from Jinnah’s temperament. When necessary, he tried to reassure his audiences on that score. In a speech addressed to the American people in February 1948, he noted that “Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State, that is, rule of or by priests with divine mission. We have many non-Muslims such as Hindus, Christians, Parsis. But they are all Pakistanis and equal citizens with equal rights and privileges and every right to play their part in the affairs of Pakistan national state.”[185] In his very first speech as the president of the constituent assembly of Pakistan, he had offered similar assurances, indeed in a language that sits uncomfortably with the idiom in which he had frequently made the case for Pakistan:

<quote>

If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.… We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalese [sic], Madrasis, and so on—will vanish.… You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State.[186]

</quote>

At a moment of wild communal frenzy—with several hundred thousand killed and nearly twelve million displaced[187]—these sober words may have been Jinnah’s way of urging calm and of underlining the state’s commitment to the

welfare of all its inhabitants, including religious minorities. Yet, he did not cease to refer to Islam. “If we take our inspiration from the holy Qur’an, the final victory … will be ours,” he said in Lahore in October 1947.[188] A few months later, addressing the Karachi Bar Association, he castigated those “who deliberately wanted to create mischief and made propaganda that the Constitution of Pakistan would not be made on the basis of Shari‘at.”[189] What Jinnah seems to have meant by the shari‘a was what the British in India had meant by it, viz, the Muslim laws of personal status governing matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. What he seems not to have meant was that the state should commit itself to Islamic law in its fullness, as Mawdudi and the ‘ulama had it. The religious vocabulary the modernists often shared with the Islamists and the ‘ulama would cause many problems, but Jinnah died well before they came to a head.

Many of Jinnah’s modernist successors would continue to articulate their Islamic sensibilities with some fervor. One of the most striking expressions of these was a resolution, moved in March 1949 by Liaquat Ali Khan, the prime minister, outlining the objectives of the constitution that was then being framed. The Objectives Resolution began by declaring that “sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limit prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.” It then went on to affirm the “principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam,” and assured fundamental rights to all its citizens, including the minorities. At the same time, Muslims were to “be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna [the normative example of the Prophet].”[190]

There is much ambiguity in the Objectives Resolution. God and the state of Pakistan are both sovereign and, though the people of Pakistan are to exercise it as a trust from Him, it is left unspecified how God’s sovereignty finds expression in the rest of the world.[191] There is a commitment to liberal values, but precisely how they are to be guided by Islam and what that would mean for non-Muslims remains unstated. Yet, modernist supporters of this resolution were not much troubled by such ambiguities. A recognition of the sovereignty of God, the subject of chapter 4, was to them not a matter of setting up dueling claims to ultimate authority but rather of

underscoring the state's democratic aspirations—since this sovereignty was to be exercised by the people—and of underlining that even the people could not overturn certain fundamental commitments. To these modernist politicians, far from there being any conflict between Islam and liberal values, Islam was their very embodiment.[192] Tethering them to Islam was not to dilute them but instead to affirm the sincerity of modernist convictions: it was not just that such values were good in themselves, adhering to them meant nothing less than being true to Islam itself. For its part, the "enabling clause" of the Objectives Resolution, as it came to be known in Pakistan's constitutional history, was simply what one would expect of a state that had been created in order to allow Muslims to preserve their particular way of life and their religion. But again, insomuch as Islam embodied ethical values that the entire world could relate to, enabling the country's citizens to live in accordance with them held great promise for everyone.

Exhilarating as it was to many people, this vision of an Islamic polity created unease in other circles. The 'ulama did not want to see the modernists conduct their experiments unsupervised in what Liaquat Ali Khan had referred to as a laboratory,[193] and there were secular Muslim voices in and outside the constituent assembly that warned against a constitution based on religious ideas. Some of the most vocal opposition came from representatives of the non-Muslim minority in the house. According to the 1951 census, Hindus comprised about 13 percent of the country's population and 22 percent of the population of East Bengal (later East Pakistan).[194] Despite assurances to the contrary by Muslim modernists in and outside the assembly, leaders of the Hindu minority found it impossible to shed the fear that they would be relegated to the status of second-class citizens in the new polity. One leader of the Congress, the opposition party in the constituent assembly, had discussed the matter with some 'ulama from the Punjab, and they had underlined to him their standard view that a non-Muslim could not be the head of a Muslim state.[195] Indeed, so close was the association in people's minds between being Muslim and being a Pakistani that this Hindu member, Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya, had been asked, when traveling in Europe, how he could consider himself a Pakistani at all.[196]

The Hindu members of the assembly would continue to voice significant objections as the seemingly never ending constitution-making process

continued. During the debate in 1953 on the report of the Basic Principles Committee (BPC), they offered some especially uncomfortable criticism of the Islamic provisions of the proposed constitution. For instance, to require that the head of the state be a Muslim, as the BPC had recommended,[197] begged the question of what the definition of a Muslim was that the head of the state had to fit.[198] The BPC had also recommended that no legislation was to be “repugnant” to the Qur’an and the sunna.[199] In response, a Hindu member, Raj Kumar Chakraverty, had asked “how far the principles of the Quran may be enforceable or practicable or suitable in our public life and public relations in the modern context of things.”[200] Though they would not have warmed to the parallel, Muslim modernists themselves were known to ask this question in deriding traditionalist understandings of the shari‘a. The BPC had suggested, furthermore, that “an organization should be set up for making the teachings of Islam known to the people.”[201] In being seen as a barely disguised attempt to enlist the resources of the state in the cause of proselytism, this had provoked an especially sharp reaction from the Hindu opposition. Indeed, some went beyond a rejection of state-sponsored proselytism to question the superiority of Islam over other religions. As one Hindu member bitingly observed, “every milkman calls his curd the best.” In language that would be unthinkable for a non-Muslim member of the Pakistani parliament to use today, he continued, “We Hindus do believe that our religion is superior to the primitive religion of Muslims.”[202]

For the modernist members of the assembly and others in the government, such observations were as unwelcome as they were troubling. They also raised suspicions about the allegiance of the Hindu parliamentarians to the new Muslim state. Some of these non-Muslim legislators were found to maintain residence across the border, in West Bengal, and the governor of East Bengal was keen to have their membership of the assembly revoked on this and other grounds.[203] The questions that such members raised could not, however, be resolved by such threats. For they went to the heart of what it meant to claim, as Jinnah had, that the Qur’an was a code of law.[204] Their observations also cast some disconcerting light on the gap between Islamic ideals and the far from edifying realities of contemporary Muslim life. A common modernist response to this last point was to acknowledge this distance but to turn it into a reassurance to the minorities: since Pakistan would be guided by true Islam, which was very different from how Muslims had actually lived their faith, non-Muslims had nothing to fear from Islam.

This left unanswered the question of why Muslims would be able to follow proper Islam now if they had failed to do so for much of their history. One suggestion in this regard, which came from the modernist philosopher Khalifa Abdul Hakim (d. 1958) and seemed more indebted to the Hegelian march of history than to a study of the Muslim past, was that only in modern times had the world become sufficiently mature to properly handle and implement Islamic values in their true spirit.[205] But such formulations could not have satisfied the critics either. Then there was the question, perhaps the most uncomfortable of all, of whose understanding of Islam was to take precedence over that of others. The interpretations put forth by the ‘ulama and the Islamists were very different from the picture of Islam that many modernists of the constituent assembly wanted the world to see. Yet, representatives of the conservative camp had high hopes for a prominent voice in the state, not least because of all that had been said in the run up to the establishment of Pakistan. In acknowledgement of such hopes, the BPC report had envisioned a board of five people “well versed in Islamic laws” to advise the president and the provincial governors on whether any new legislation contravened the Qur’an and the sunna.[206] Not everyone agreed that this was a “mullah board”—a characterization that used a familiar modernist pejorative for the ‘ulama—but it did raise unsettling questions about precisely who would guide parliamentary legislation when it came to Islam.[207] Here the modernists’ discomfort with the prospect of having to defer to the ‘ulama matched that of the non-Muslims.

Modernist misgivings on this score are on full display in a bitterly polemical tract, “Iqbal and the Mulla,” that Khalifa Abdul Hakim published in Urdu in 1952. Originally from the Punjab, Abdul Hakim had obtained a DPhil from Heidelberg University in 1925, with a dissertation on the metaphysics of Rumi, and he had taught philosophy for many years at the Osmania University in the princely state of Hyderabad.[208] Very unusually for the modernists, his writings included a translation of the Bhagavad Gita in Urdu verse.[209] Shortly after his arrival in Pakistan, he had established the Institute of Islamic Culture in Lahore and he served as its first director. Abdul Hakim moved in the highest government circles in the early years of Pakistan. In 1952, he had been dispatched by the governor-general, Ghulam Muhammad, to East Bengal to report on the mood in that province.[210] Earlier that year, the governor of that province had written to the governor-general with the suggestion that he “distribute free copies [of Abdul Hakim’s Islamic Ideology] to [the] Ulema Conference now being held in

Karachi."[211] Evoking Iqbal, that book represented a sustained engagement with "[t]he inescapable fact … that Muslim life in all its aspects has to be thoroughly reconstructed if Muslims have to occupy an honourable place in the life of contemporaneous and future humanity. The question is whether Islam is a worn-out creed and is to be discarded as a hindrance to progress or whether we have to reinterpret it in the light of material and intellectual advance of humanity."[212] The worn-out Islam was, of course, that of the mullas; it needed to be replaced with something else. As Iqbal had put it in his Reconstruction, quoting an unnamed author, "The verdict of history … is that worn-out ideas have never risen to power among a people who have worn them out."[213]

Abdul Hakim's tract, "Iqbal and the Mulla," a sustained effort to document the extremely poor opinion Iqbal had of the traditionally educated religious scholars, was clearly produced at official bidding. It is a mark of modernist self-confidence at the time that Abdul Hakim showed no interest in defending Iqbal against any misgivings that this caricature of the 'ulama might have given rise to. Instead, it was deemed sufficient to expose the mullas by drawing on Iqbal's verse and—given Abdul Hakim's personal acquaintance with the poet—some anecdotes from him. The author did not desist from adding his own reflections to this already colorful material. The 'ulama come across as opportunistic, covetous for material gain, wedded to an anachronistic tradition, indifferent to matters of social welfare and, above all, intent upon creating and perpetuating sectarian divides in the community. They were a threat to both state and religion and to give them a formal role in legislative matters would jeopardize both.[214] From the perspective of many modernists in and outside the constituent assembly, the proper response to the threat of the mulla was not, however, to divest the proposed constitution of its Islamic moorings, as the non-Muslims demanded; it was to disentangle Islam from the mulla.

The debate on the basic principles of the yet unframed constitution was taking place under the shadow of riots that had rocked the Punjab province in early 1953. A long-simmering movement led by the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, an organization that had often been allied with the Indian National Congress in prepartition India but had managed to align itself with the Muslim League in Pakistan's early years, sought to have the Ahmadis declared non-Muslims and those among them occupying important government positions removed

from office. The most notable of such figures was Pakistan's first foreign minister, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, and it was around the calls for his dismissal that the agitation came to a head in February and March 1953. Aspects of this agitation will be examined in later chapters. Here, it would suffice to observe that this Punjab-based agitation had laid bare what the modernists saw as the menacingly raw power of religious zealotry. As the Punjab chief minister, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, understood things, two distinct orientations faced each other in the country. There was, on the one hand, "the scourge of Mullaism which has threatened our state from the first day." On the other, there was the proper "Islam [that] does not stand for any nonsense which resembles priesthood or Brahmanism.... It advocates a society where there is no dictation from sanctified Mullas and wherein every adult Mussalman is as good and as much responsible follower of the faith as the other."[215]

What the agitation had also revealed was that the governing elite's stock in political legitimacy had already plummeted by this time. The implications of this were less openly acknowledged by the elite than was the threat of the mulla, but the inspector-general of the Punjab police did not mince words in his own confidential assessment of the situation:

<quote>

In Pakistan everyone says that leaders are most chary of giving up their positions and continue in office by undemocratic methods.... Severe criticism is made against the Central Government as in spite of more than five years having passed even the constitutions [sic] has not so far been drawn up.... [T]he Government ... has no mass contact. The Muslim League leaders cannot give an intelligent lead and in fact cannot face the electorate. In India the situation is probably equally difficult, but Pandit Nehru is still the popular leader. No Government can run today without the goodwill of the common man.... The bridge between the common man and the leaders is widening. [216]

</quote>

Such invitations to soul searching did not go anywhere, however. Martial law had briefly had to be imposed in Lahore to quell the agitation, giving the

province, and the country, its first taste of military rule. Though boding ill for the future of civilian authority, it had served to reassure the modernists that, when it really mattered, conservative forces could be kept at bay. The true locus of Islam did not, in any case, lie with such forces. As Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (d. 1958), sometime governor of Punjab, observed during the debate on the basic principles of the constitution in October 1953, “my friends [the Hindu members of the house] should not have any misapprehension on the basis of a saying of a Mullah here or a Maulvi there; such type of people you find everywhere. They are mostly people who are not learned in the real sense of the term.”[217] Yet, as a member of the Hindu opposition noted, one could not ignore the views of the ‘ulama at will. And even some very learned religious scholars had expressed themselves in ways that did not fit modernist reassurances about what the state’s Islamic identity would mean for those who did not subscribe to it.[218]

Muslim modernists have seldom spoken in a single voice. Nonetheless, as has been seen, theirs is an Islam that professes to be democratic, though not necessarily according to Western specifications; it affirms pluralism, though with a high premium on unity; and rather than being legalistic, it is anchored in ethical norms, which are best derived from the Islamic foundational texts. If it is not the Islam of the secularists, with their putatively separate religious and political spheres, it is even less that of the ‘ulama. For all the barely concealed disagreements of their own, the ‘ulama had wanted to reserve a role for themselves in determining that no legislation was repugnant to the teachings of the Islamic foundational texts. The constitution that was finally put into force in March 1956 gave them no such role. It had significant Islamic content, but it was almost entirely in accord with modernist sensibilities.

The Objectives Resolution, with its declaration that sovereignty belongs to God and that the people of Pakistan exercise it as a sacred trust, served as the preamble to the constitution. In its “directive principles of state policy,” the constitution envisioned that the state—now named the Islamic Republic of Pakistan—would take various measures “to enable the Muslims … individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah.”[219] A federal and parliamentary system of government was outlined, with the proviso that the office of the president, the titular head of the state, could only be occupied by a Muslim.[220] In keeping with

the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee, the constitution reiterated the provision that no law would be repugnant to the Qur'an and the sunna and that laws already on the books would be brought into accord with the foundational texts. To this end, a commission was to be appointed to advise the government on matters of repugnancy to Islam.[221] This, incidentally, was the modernist answer to the 'ulama's demand that they be able to determine whether the laws of the land conformed to Islamic norms. Nothing was said about the composition of the commission. The constitution also envisioned an institution "for Islamic research and instruction in advanced studies to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis."[222] What this would mean in practice was also left undefined.

Ironically, though it had taken the country nearly nine years to get its constitution, the final product was drafted in some hurry. In 1954, the governor-general, Ghulam Muhammad (d. 1956), had decided that the house had lost the confidence of the people, whereupon he had proceeded to dissolve the assembly. There had been growing distrust between East Bengal and the western provinces of the country and especially between Bengali and Punjabi politicians. In East Bengal, the Muslim League had been routed in the 1954 provincial elections, and this had created anxieties among the military and bureaucratic elite, preponderantly from the western provinces, about the impending domination not just by the Bengalis but especially by left-leaning politicians among them. Military and bureaucratic officials had already come to exercise an authority well beyond their normal job descriptions and this, they felt, had to be guarded in the greater national interest against corrupt, incompetent, squabbling, even subversive politicians. Delicate negotiations had been taking place with the United States on Pakistan's joining security alliances against the Soviet Union in return for much needed military and economic aid and these, too, had had to be insulated from the harsh glare that some politicians wanted to cast on them.[223]

Political instability did not, however, end after the last governor-general, Iskandar Mirza (d. 1969), had become the first president of the republic under the new constitution, drafted by the second constituent assembly. There was a succession of prime ministers, all serving at the pleasure of the president, himself a former bureaucrat, and of an increasingly visible

commander-in-chief, General Ayub Khan. In the end, the bureaucratic and military elite, unhappy with the politicians they saw around them, unsure about what the forthcoming general elections would mean for them and for their vision for the country but confident that they had the support of Western powers and especially of the United States, decided to bring Pakistan's first experiment with parliamentary democracy to an end. In early October 1958, Iskandar Mirza declared martial law in the country and abrogated the constitution. By the end of that month, General Ayub Khan, the chief martial law administrator, had pushed Mirza out of office to himself become the president. He would remain in office over the next decade.

*** Modernism in the Ayub Khan Era

In his view of Islam, Ayub Khan shared much with the modernist politicians he had replaced. As he told the 'ulama in May 1959 in a speech at a Deobandi madrasa, the Dar al-'Ulum Islamiyya at Tando Allahyar in Sindh, Islam was a "progressive religion" but a great distance had come to separate religion and life.[224] He chastised them for reducing Islam to a set of dogmatic beliefs and practices, of presenting it as the enemy of progress, of "impos[ing] on twentieth century man the condition that he must go back several centuries in order to prove his bona fides as a true Muslim."[225] Rather than remaining mired in their sectarian squabbles, the 'ulama needed to help bring people together on the basis of shared beliefs while learning to speak to them across educational and occupational divides. He also alerted them to the threat of communism then facing the world. This was best combated not through Western materialism but rather through Islam, which, he said in echoing Liaquat Ali Khan's speech on the Objectives Resolution, "alone provides a natural ideology that can save the soul of humanity from destruction."[226]

Though Ayub Khan had called for the 'ulama's assistance in the task of national development, the latter would have seen it more as harangue than an olive branch.[227] In any case, he seems never to have expected much of them. It was on military, bureaucratic, and judicial officers that he relied for ideas and governance, and even the functioning of the "basic democracy" that he envisioned for Pakistan depended on them. The president wanted a complete overhaul of the country. To this end, no less than thirty-three

commissions were appointed to make recommendations to him about various facets of national life, most of them during his first years in office.[228] Among these was the constitution commission, whose recommendations became the basis of Pakistan's second constitution, which came into effect in 1962.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

In contrast with the 1956 constitution, Pakistan was to have a presidential form of government and the political system was based on Ayub Khan's view that the interests of the country were best served by a "controlled form of democracy."[229] The key political unit was the union council/committee, with its members elected by people at local levels. As laid down in the Basic Democracies Order promulgated in October 1959, these councils comprised the machinery of the government at local, district, and divisional levels—in each instance, working together with and under the guidance of bureaucratic officials.[230] Drawn equally from East and West Pakistan and numbering eighty thousand in all, the basic democrats were to serve as an electoral college for the election of the president, the federal legislature, and the two provincial assemblies.[231] (The four provinces of West Pakistan had been amalgamated into "one unit," on par with East Pakistan, in 1955.) Ayub Khan's emphasis was on development, unity of purpose, and efficiency. A powerful president who sat at the helm of the administrative pyramid and was able to exercise effective control over the legislature was the means to these ends. As Ayub Khan put it in an autobiography published while he was still in office, this "type of executive and legislature … approximated … those that existed at the time of the early Caliphs."[232]

The new constitution had its share of explicit Islamic provisions, too, and several of these were in line with the previous constitution. The president was required to be a Muslim and a version of the Objectives Resolution again formed the preamble to the constitution. No law was to be "repugnant to Islam"[233] and Muslims were to be "enabled … to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam."[234] The constitution provided for an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology to help the government do so while also advising the executive and the legislature on the principles that were to guide law-making.[235] It also

mandated the establishment of the Islamic Research Institute, much as had the previous constitution.[236]

There also were significant contrasts with the previous constitution on matters Islamic. Where the Objectives Resolution and the 1956 constitution had spoken of sovereignty as a sacred trust from God to be exercised by people “within the limits prescribed by Him,” the preamble to the 1962 constitution made no reference to any such limits. It had also omitted to mention that the Islam that the government was to enable people to live by was the one “set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.”[237] Even the official name of the state was the Republic of Pakistan and not the Islamic Republic.[238]

Such changes to the 1956 constitution were too much for the ‘ulama and the Islamists. Though the constitution commission had affirmed that Pakistan was “an ideological, and not a secular, State,”[239] conservative critics of the constitution feared that the country was being set precisely on the path to secularism. In those circles, secularism did not simply mean that public policy would be independent of religion (which the constitution said it would not be); it also conjured the image of moral anarchy. The omission of any reference to the divine “limits” within which people were to exercise the sovereignty delegated to them by God likewise suggested that the government was intent upon flouting those limits. This impression was reinforced by the lack of reference in the constitution to the Qur’an and the sunna as the foundational sources in which the government’s understanding of Islam was to be anchored. Although these foundational texts can and have been understood by Muslims in a variety of different ways, the notion that the modernists were now trying to free their interpretations of Islam from any textual restraint conjured sinister images in religious circles.

It did not help that a religious movement known as the Ahl al-Qur’an and much maligned in ‘ulama circles was thought to have influenced the constitution’s pointed omission of the Qur’an and sunna as sources of Islamic guidance.[240] The movement, best known for rejecting the authority of hadith, had arisen in British India and, for several decades after the establishment of Pakistan, it was led by Ghulam Ahmad Parwez (d. 1985), an

autodidact Punjabi religious intellectual and, for many years, a government bureaucrat.[241] From his early years in office, the president was in touch with Parwez, as the latter's private papers make clear. Parwez would later also serve as a member of the Committee on Fundamental Conflict, constituted by the government of Pakistan in 1967 to suggest ways of dealing with "the conflict between the Mullah and the intelligentsia," which meant, in effect, devising ways of countering the influence of the 'ulama and the Islamists in society.[242] Yet, perceptions aside, the degree to which Parwez may have been able to put his stamp on public policy on Islam is far from clear.[243] The simplicity of reference to "Islam" in the 1962 constitution probably reflects the president's own desire to streamline things rather than Parwez's influence, which one would expect to have taken the form of affirming an exclusive reliance on the Qur'an,[244] not of omitting any reference to the sunna and the Qur'an. And though Parwez's understanding of the Qur'an was often at considerable remove from the mainstream,[245] the president's went further in some respects. In a letter to Parwez in July 1960, Ayub Khan had observed that "even in the Quran[,] while respecting the principles, matters that relate to rules and regulations should be subject to adjustment in accordance with the circumstances of the time. Unless this happens, I do not foresee any future for Muslims in this new world."[246] An Islam unencumbered by the specifics of the foundational texts was obviously better suited to this vision. In response, Parwez had refused to believe that the president could really have meant that "the Quran should partly be taken as immutable, partly as redundant and partly as alterable."[247] Despite such disagreements, and irrespective of how far the regime wanted to heed him, Parwez would have recommended himself to Ayub Khan for such help as he could offer in combating the influence of the 'ulama and of Mawdudi's Jama'at-i Islami. Lacking a social base for his movement and with limited appeal in the public sphere, there was little he was able to do.[248] But he did provide considerable aggravation to the 'ulama, who went so far as to formally rebuke his views in a 1962 fatwa that bore over a thousand signatures.[249]

Taking on the 'ulama was not easy, however. Even as the regime occasionally thought of a decisive confrontation with them, its ongoing struggle with the 'ulama had mixed results and no clear victors. Ayub Khan did not relent on some of his key modernist initiatives, notably the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961.[250] But all the Islamic provisions of the 1956 constitution that the 1962 constitution had initially lacked were brought back

into it with the first amendment, enacted less than two years after its promulgation. The country’s name, too, was the Islamic Republic of Pakistan once again.[251] The president’s retreat on the more expansive Islamic provisions was not merely a recognition of the ‘ulama’s influence, however. It was also good politics. With the new constitution in effect, Ayub Khan had decided to enter the political arena. He had already been elected president by the basic democrats in February 1960; in a time-honored authoritarian tradition, 95.6 percent of the electorate had voted for him.[252] But he would need to be reelected in due course and it was to this end that he became a member of the venerable Muslim League. Indeed, he was elected president of the party the very day the parliament passed the first amendment to the constitution.[253] As a card-carrying politician, Ayub Khan needed to allow greater space to people’s religious sensibilities, as the ‘ulama claimed to understand and define them, than he had wanted.[254] For all that, modernism was still in its element. And no one represented it better during the 1960s than the Oxford-educated Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988).

FAZLUR RAHMAN

Although he was the son of an early graduate of the Deoband madrasa, much of Fazlur Rahman’s own education took place in Westernized or Western institutions of learning. He completed his master’s in Arabic at the Punjab University in Lahore and earned a DPhil from Oxford in 1949, with a dissertation that provided a critical edition of a work on psychology by the great Muslim philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037). Rahman taught for some years at the University of Durham in England and then at the Institute of Islamic Studies at Mc-Gill University before returning to Pakistan. After a year as a visiting professor at the Institute of Islamic Research, he became its director in 1962. He would continue in this position until 1968.[255]

Envisioned by the constitution of 1956 as a key instrument in the “reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis,” the institute was founded after the abrogation of that constitution but before the enactment of the second. Its own constitution was understandably more expansive in stating what was expected of it: “to define Islam in terms of its fundamentals in a rational and liberal manner and to emphasize, among others, the basic Islamic ideals of universal brotherhood, tolerance and social

justice," all while keeping the religion's "dynamic character" in view.[256] With his credentials as an internationally respected scholar of Islamic thought and his modernist inclinations, Fazlur Rahman was the right person for the job. The inaugural issue of the institute's journal contained the first installment of a series of essays by him that sought nothing less than to reconfigure the relationship among what Muslims have long recognized as the fundamental sources of Islamic law while also offering a radical reinterpretation of the nature and authority of the sunna, the normative example of the Prophet.[257]

It has been widely accepted by Sunnis since the third century of Islam—the ninth of the common era—that the Qur'an, the sunna, consensus (ijma') and human reason exercised within particular limits are the four sources of the law. The sunna is seen as enshrined in hadith, statements attributed to the Prophet Muhammad or purporting to describe some aspect of his conduct. Human reason could take the form of ijtihad to arrive at new legal rulings in light of the foundational texts. But, in the interest of preserving the coherence and integrity of their legal tradition, Sunni scholars came to gradually restrict it largely to analogical reasoning, whereby existing rulings could be extended by way of analogy to new cases. The very positioning of reason at the bottom of the scale suggested its subordinate role in the articulation of norms, for it was constrained not only by what the Qur'an and the sunna had already delineated but also by the consensus of the earlier scholars; matters already agreed upon by those scholars could usually not be reopened for debate. As Rahman saw it, this way of conceptualizing the relationship among the sources of the law had led to a deep-seated aversion to change and a concomitant intellectual sterility. For someone committed to the view, as he was, that God could not have wanted this outcome for His religion any more than He could have intended that human beings take leave of their reason, Islamic orthodoxy was a deviation from the original spirit of Islam. This was a familiar modernist view. Unlike many others, Rahman had the intellectual tools to demonstrate how the results of a medieval scholarly consensus contrasted unfavorably with the dynamism of Islam's first generations.

In line with contemporary Western scholarship, Rahman argued that much of what is attributed to the Prophet in the form of hadith does not go back to him but reflects instead the evolving views of the early community. Early

Muslim scholars recognized that numerous hadith reports were unreliable, and they developed sophisticated methods for trying to sift what they saw as “weak” or outright forged traditions from the “sound” ones. The latter came to comprise major collections of hadith, recognized as the most authoritative guides to the Prophet’s normative example. Rahman was unwilling to treat even the contents of these authoritative collections as an exception to his view of hadith. Yet, unlike many Western scholars, he did not see hadith merely as pious forgery—statements attributed to the Prophet by subsequent generations of Muslims in pursuit of their particular ends. Instead, he argued that the early community had come to model itself on the practice of the Prophet while continuing to elaborate on and to develop that model in light of their changing circumstances. Hadith gave concrete form to this lived tradition, which could be glimpsed through it.[258] Yet, the idea, one that became the defining feature of Sunni orthodoxy, that the sunna could only be found in the form of hadith reports—fixed statements attributed to the Prophet—meant that it ceased to be a living and evolving tradition, henceforth to be found in hallowed texts, with their gatekeepers, rather than in the community’s lived practice. Reclaiming Islam’s original dynamism required that Muslims today liberate themselves from servitude to those texts and instead seek guidance in the principles still discernible behind the Prophet’s sunna.[259] Unlike Parwez and the Ahl al-Qur’an, Fazlur Rahman did not want to jettison hadith as a source of norms, for it was an indispensable bridge to understanding the Prophet’s thought and practice and to the Qur’an itself;[260] but it was as this bridge that it was to be used, rather than as a fixed source of unalterable rulings.[261]

Even the Qur’an, for all its preeminent authority, was not necessarily binding in all its particulars. This was partly because the teachings of the Qur’an were meant to be interpreted by people in light of their changing circumstances, which required something other than a literalist submission to those teachings. But it was also because Muhammad himself had given expression to divine revelation in terms of how he had understood it in his milieu, which could hardly be transposed seamlessly onto other times and places. No wonder that “the early generations were not bound by what later came to be called ‘nass’ or the letter of the text.”[262]

In view of this understanding of the sunna and of the Qur’an, it made sense that the relationship between the foundational texts, consensus, and ijtihad needed to be reconfigured, again in light of how Rahman understood it to have worked in early Islam. The consensus of the community had then functioned as a means of legitimizing the results of juridical reflection—ijtihad—on how best to follow the Qur’an and the normative example of the Prophet. That is, ijtihad was logically prior to ijma‘ and was continuously evaluated by it. The sunna, for its part, was essentially what the community had come to agree upon, its consensus.[263] As Rahman put it in concluding his Islamic Methodology in History, “our earliest generations looked upon the teaching of the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet not as something static but essentially as something that moves through different social forms and moves creatively. Islam is the name of certain norms and ideals which are to be progressively realized through different social phenomena and set-ups.”[264]

With this historically informed theoretical framework, one would think that Rahman did not need to engage in any elaborate demonstration of how the ‘ulama had gotten things wrong on particular matters. He could have contented himself simply with articulating what a “progressive” interpretation of the foundational texts would entail. But he did engage in a sustained critique of some long established norms, and he did so with relish. An article on financial interest published in his institute’s Urdu journal in 1963 and in its English journal some months later offers a useful illustration.[265]

The Qur’an categorically forbids riba (Q 2.278–79; 3.130), and this prohibition has generally been understood by Muslim scholars to extend to all transactions that involve financial interest. Such blanket prohibition would obviously impede the working of any complex economy, and medieval Muslim societies knew of many strategies through which to circumvent it. For their part, Muslim modernists have sought to explain it away by arguing that while some Qur’anic teachings are universal in scope and application, others—including polygyny and the severe punishments prescribed by the Qur’an for particular infractions (hudud)—are best seen as specific to their time and place. They have also argued that what riba really means is exorbitant forms of usury rather than financial interest as such. Rahman

adhered to these modernist views on all scores, but it is his mode of argumentation that merits attention here.

Rahman began by adducing the various forms in which the Arabic root “r-b-w” occurs in the Qur’an in order to determine the original connotations of the term riba, and he then proceeded to establish how the Qur’anic verses on the matter relate to one another. He acknowledged that the Qur’anic prohibition had, in fact, typically been understood to apply to all interest-based transactions, including seemingly nonoppressive ones, but he argued that it had intended to target only the sort of practices that involved a “redoubling” of interest. This expansive application was to be explained by the fact that “all these individual cases were part of one riba-system in whose nature it was to be so exorbitantly usurious. Therefore, what had to be banned was the system as a whole, and hence no exceptions could be made in individual cases. When the entire system was banned, the milder cases within that system were also naturally abolished since the system itself was tyrannical. It cannot, therefore, be argued that since the Qur’an abolished even the milder cases … the bank-interest of today also stands condemned.”[266] Rahman went on to examine the hadith-reports on riba, noting their ample contradictions and demonstrating how an increasingly rigid view had come to overtake chronologically earlier indications that certain forms of interest may have been permitted and practiced in the time of the Prophet and his companions.[267] Throughout the discussion, he critiqued not just premodern juristic understandings of riba but also the stringent views of modern Islamists and ‘ulama. He argued, for instance, that a common definition of riba as “every loan from which some profit accrues” may have originated in tenth-century lexicographical attempts at offering comprehensive definitions and that it was only in the eleventh century that it found its way into hadith collections.[268] Modern ‘ulama and Islamists refused to recognize the late origins and therefore the unreliability of this sort of hadith-reports; nor did they acknowledge the variety of ways in which riba had been understood by the medieval lexicographers and exegetes.[269]

It should be clear from the foregoing that Fazlur Rahman posed a serious challenge to the ‘ulama. Not content simply to call for ijtihad, which was odious enough to many ‘ulama of the time, especially when coming from the wrong circles, he wanted to unsettle the very foundations of their legal

theory. His detailed critique of their views, as in case of riba, showed not only that he could speak their scholarly language but also that he could highlight embarrassing inconsistencies in the revered tradition from which they derived their authority. It would have been surprising if the ‘ulama had ignored him. They did not.

Already in 1963, Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi, a prominent Deobandi ‘alim and public intellectual at whose madrasa Ayub Khan had spoken some years earlier, had taken issue with Rahman’s views on financial interest, denying that the Qur’an had intended to prohibit it only in its excessive forms.[270] In a press conference, he went on to also castigate Rahman for unorthodox views on the nature of prophethood. While still teaching at Durham in the UK, Rahman had published a book in which he had analyzed medieval Islamic discourses on this subject and shown how the Sunni theologians differed in their understanding of prophecy from the Muslim philosophers who wrote in the Hellenistic tradition. In his comments to the press, Thanawi gave the impression that Rahman saw a prophet merely as a superior intellect rather than one receiving revelations from God, as the standard Islamic view would have it. This would have been damning in the Pakistani context, though Rahman was on firm ground in pointing out in his rejoinder that what he had been describing were Avicenna’s views rather than his own.[271] Thanawi had also acquired a copy of a letter that Rahman had written in August 1962 to Wilfred Cantwell Smith (d. 2000), the founder of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill, where Rahman had taught before coming to Pakistan. In this letter, Rahman had observed that “this country suffers from extremes, the most dangerous being the politics-mongering conservatives.” He had also mentioned his plan to invite Western scholars of Islam who could “constructively participate in training researchers here.”[272]

Responding to the questions put to him by the national daily Dawn in light of Thanawi’s allegations, Rahman questioned the ethics of “utilizing a stolen personal letter,” though he did acknowledge that he had written to Smith in this vein. He made a distinction, however, between scholarly methods, which is what he wanted to cultivate with the aid of Western scholars, and interpretive Islamic work, which only Muslims could undertake. He also noted that it was not just Western scholars of Islam but also those from the Muslim world that he wanted to associate with the work of the institute.[273]

Such assurances would not have assuaged the ‘ulama any more than did Rahman’s reminder that his father, a Deobandi scholar, had contributed to his intellectual formation. As Thanawi caustically observed, if Rahman had thought like his father, his book on the idea of prophecy would have been dedicated to him or to some other Deobandi, “rather than to the Jew[ish] Orientalist” Simon van den Bergh.[274] The roster of early contributors to the institute’s journal, Islamic Studies, would not have reassured the ‘ulama either. During its first three years, to limit ourselves to this small sample, the list is a veritable who’s who of Western scholarship on Islam: A. J. Arberry, Bernard Lewis, Marshall Hodgson, G. E. von Grunebaum, Henri Laoust, Claude Cahen, C. E. Bosworth, Louis Gardet, Annemarie Schimmel, Henri Corbin, S. D. Goitein, and E.I.J. Rosenthal. There were Muslim contributors, too, but few were of the stature of these European scholars. The fact that these scholars were willing to contribute articles to this journal reflected their estimation of its promise and their respect for Rahman’s own scholarly standing. But none of this cut any ice with leading figures among the ‘ulama. Instead, they would have seen the very respect for Rahman in Western scholarly circles as confirmation of his wayward views. What made these views positively dangerous from the perspective of these ‘ulama was, of course, the fact that their author had access to the highest echelons of power.

Rahman was not squeamish about the close alignment between his scholarly positions and government policies. The article on financial interest had been occasioned by questions in the parliament about whether a budget that took financial interest for granted could be Islamic.[275] Rahman had expressed himself in support of birth control as well. This was a high-priority issue for the government, but it was opposed by the Islamists and the ‘ulama.[276] Together with Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, Rahman was also a member of the Committee on Fundamental Conflict, discussed in more detail later. One of the tasks this committee had been assigned by the government in 1967 was “to provide a definition of the ideology of Islam.”[277] Rahman began publishing a series of articles on this subject in his institute’s journal the same year.[278]

There was much in these articles that would have pleased Ayub Khan, who had read the first of them.[279] They contained a strong endorsement of the system of basic democracies, which was presented as a check on “the vested interests of various educated classes … to conceal the mind of the dumb masses from being correctly expressed.”[280] They offered suggestions to the effect that local imams and preachers should be recruited to provide “moral backing” to the local administration[281] and that the religious sphere should be made subject to government regulation.[282] Though Ayub Khan had reluctantly come round to allowing political parties to operate and himself led the Muslim League, Rahman argued that a multiparty system was undesirable on Islamic grounds.[283] A statist vision was on full display in these articles: “Islam is a charter for interference in society and this charter gives to the collective institution of society, i.e., the Government, the right and duty to constantly watch, give direction to, and actually mould the social fabric.”[284] A Qur’anic justification was offered even for press and media censorship: “The Qur’an … asks the Government to disallow the public broadcast of news which is not in the public interest, and denounced such practices as a mischievous license calculated to demoralise the people and disunite them.”[285] In 1960, Ayub Khan had promulgated his notorious Press and Publications Ordinance, which had drastically curtailed the freedom of the press. If the government needed a belated endorsement of it from the Qur’an, Fazlur Rahman thought he could provide it.

In keeping with the statist view, it is no surprise that Rahman underlined the need for a strong man at the helm of the affairs. But some of the language is extraordinary, for instance when elucidating how the Qur’an presents God: “God’s concept is functional, i.e., God is needed not for what He is or may be but for what He does. It is exactly in this spirit that Aristotle compares God to a general of the army. For the general (in Aristotle’s concept) is not a soldier among other soldiers—just as God is not an extra-fact among facts—but represents ‘order,’ i.e., the fundamental function of holding the army together.”[286] In a later work, Rahman was markedly more restrained in speaking of the strong man: “The Qur’an will tolerate strongman rule only as a temporary arrangement if a people is immature, for how can a society whose people remain immature produce mature leaders? The efforts of several Muslims in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to justify and propagate the idea of a strongman rule, therefore, run in the very teeth of

the Qur’an.”[287] But that was a decade after the fall of Ayub Khan.

Not everything in the articles from the 1960s fit government policy very well. For instance, there was a strong emphasis in them on social justice, and though the constitution spoke of it as well, it would have been discordant in Ayub Khan’s Pakistan. As the country’s chief economist had observed in 1967, a mere twenty-two families had come to be in control of 66 percent of the country’s industrial resources and of 80 percent of its banking industry.[288] On the other hand, common people had seen the price of basic food commodities sky rocket: the price of fish, the staple food in East Pakistan, had increased 140 percent between late 1964 and early 1967 and that of wheat, the staple in West Pakistan, had risen by 78 percent during the same period.[289] Nonetheless, Rahman’s was a largely unflinching effort to provide an Islamic justification for the policies of the government and the “moral backing” it needed to reshape the religious sphere.

In early 1967, the year Rahman began publishing these articles, there was talk in government circles of a “showdown” with the religious scholars.[290] It was in this regard that the governors of West and East Pakistan had met in February to establish the Committee on Fundamental Conflict, characterized by its chairman, the minister for information and broadcasting, as “the most important Committee that has ever been set up in the country.”[291] This was apparently precipitated by a particularly noisy controversy in January that year over the sighting of the Eid al-Fitr moon. The official “moon sighting committee” was headed by the defense minister, a naval official,[292] and it included only one member of the ‘ulama. The committee had declared Thursday, January 12, to be the day of Eid, but many leading religious figures refused to accept this, instead urging their followers to celebrate it on Friday. There was a whispering campaign that the regime saw a Friday Eid as auguring ill for its future and that this was the reason it had wanted it on Thursday.[293] At issue for the government, leaving aside the alleged superstition, was its claim to authority—to decide when the country would celebrate its most important religious festival. To the ‘ulama and Islamists like Mawdudi, the issue was instead the government’s tampering with even the most basic of Islamic rituals. It is a mark of the government’s impatience with such challenges that five leading religious figures, including Mawdudi and the aforementioned Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi, were imprisoned and the

press was secretly warned not to carry any news stories in that connection. Meanwhile, the government prepared to “crush the Mullahs, first by taking on all the Mullahs who speak against the Government.”[294]

That showdown never took place, however. Though Rahman could still flatter Ayub Khan by invoking Aristotle and, in another analogy from ancient Greece, the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington could describe the Pakistani president as coming closer than anyone else in the developing world to “a Solon or Lycurgus,”[295] the government had begun by then to look increasingly vulnerable on a variety of fronts. The self-confidence with which Ayub Khan himself had assured Ghulam Ahmad Parwez in 1960 that political systems “unsuited to our genius” would not be allowed back into the country and that “[t]hese are issues over which right-minded people with convictions have accepted even civil wars” would have been misplaced in 1967.[296] A real rather than merely hypothetical civil war was then brewing in East Pakistan. There was discontent, too, on the outcome of the India-Pakistan war of 1965, which the regime had intended to be limited to the disputed Kashmir region but which had become an all-out military engagement between the two countries and in which Pakistan had fared less well than the government propaganda had it. The Tashkent agreement that the Soviet Union had brokered in early 1966 between India and Pakistan had embarrassed the government further by leaving the Kashmir question unresolved. Food prices were soaring. Islamists and the ‘ulama did not have enough street power to take on the regime on their own, and they seem not to have wanted to do so. But they could, and did, continue to contribute to a sense of its illegitimacy. The controversy over the correct Eid day was a sign of their growing disaffection. Another took the form of their increasingly vocal opposition to Fazlur Rahman.

In 1966, Rahman had published a new book, Islam—a broad-ranging survey of key facets of the religious tradition from a distinctly modernist perspective. Chapters of the book began to appear in Urdu translation in the institute’s journal the following year. Before long, the book became part of public debate in Pakistan, and the chapter on the Qur’an gave to the ‘ulama what they had been looking for. Here Rahman had argued for the agency of the Prophet in the making of the Qur’an, a view that goes against the orthodox insistence that Muhammad was simply the deliverer of a divine revelation that was altogether external to him. As he had put it,

“orthodoxy (indeed, all medieval thought) lacked the necessary intellectual tools to combine in its formulation of the dogma the otherness and verbal character of the Revelation on the one hand, and its intimate connection with the work and the religious personality of the Prophet on the other, i.e., it lacked the intellectual capacity to say both that the Qur’an is entirely the Word of God and, in an ordinary sense, also entirely the word of Muhammad.”[297] This meant that the Qur’an would have looked rather different, in its idiom and its teachings, if it had taken shape in circumstances other than Muhammad’s. The implication was, of course, that its teachings needed to continue being tailored to changing times and places. In the wake of the controversy over this position, Rahman argued that the eighteenth-century jurist and Sufi Shah Wali Allah had held similar views, and so had Muhammad Iqbal.[298] But the ‘ulama, despite professions of great reverence for Wali Allah, have never been altogether comfortable with many of his views,[299] and Iqbal, though often quoted for rhetorical effect, carries little weight in their circles. Irrespective of its cogency as a psychological interpretation of prophethood or of its genealogy, Rahman’s critics saw it as an attack on the timeless universality of the Qur’an and the nonnegotiable authority of its norms. The controversy that his 1958 book on the idea of prophecy had generated was as nothing compared to the public outcry on Islam. Rahman’s position as the director of the Institute of Islamic Research was no longer tenable. The government was too weak to try to defend him with any vigor, as the minutes of the cabinet meeting a day before his resignation on September 5, 1968, make clear:

<quote>

True that the masses were steeped in ignorance about the correct nature of our religion but the time was not ripe now for the Government to start the propagation of reformed ideas. With our current rate of literacy it was difficult to put across rational views in religious matters. It would serve no useful purpose if Government took upon itself the responsibility to expound and defend the views of Dr. Fazlur Rahman. He should defend himself and Government should only provide him the necessary assistance and backing. The relevant portions of his book which was being misinterpreted should be translated into Urdu and Bengali and widely publicized. He should volunteer to appear in the discussion meetings and Government should only make it possible for the parties to meet.[300]

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The president noted helplessly in his diary on September 5: “[I]t is quite clear that any form of research on Islam which inevitably leads to new interpretations has no chance of acceptance in this priest ridden and ignorant society. What will be the future of such an Islam in the age of reason and science is not difficult to predict.”[301]

In tendering his resignation, Rahman had stated that he had not written this book at the bidding of the government and, in fact, that it was written before he had taken up his position at the institute.[302] Ironically, the book that he was then writing at the behest of the president, on the ideological underpinnings of Pakistan, may have made his views on the nature of revelation more odious to the religious groups than they may have been otherwise.

THE END OF AN ERA

As dark clouds hung over the country—with talk even of its breakup—the Ayub Khan regime finally gave way after a decade in power. The people of East Pakistan had long nursed grievances against the decision, going back to Jinnah,[303] to make a culturally alien Urdu the national language of the country. Those grievances contributed to an increasingly strident Bengali nationalism that was in full bloom by the last years of Ayub Khan. There were economic disparities between the two wings, too, and these had been exacerbated to East Pakistan’s disadvantage by the much touted industrial development of the Ayub Khan era. The substantial Hindu population of the region was viewed with suspicion even by high-ranking government officials, and Muslim Bengalis, too, were treated by West Pakistani officials with some derision. I will return to these points later. The Awami League, the most influential political party of East Pakistan, came to formally demand in 1966 a reconfiguring of the country into a loose confederation that would leave only defense and foreign affairs to the center, have the provinces collect all taxes, and even give East Pakistan its own military. These were among the famous “six points” of the party. For obvious reasons, this was not acceptable to the rest of the country, least of all to the Punjab-dominated military. In early 1968, the government claimed to have discovered a Bengali

conspiracy to secede from the union through an armed insurrection supported by India. There was skepticism in some circles about the gravity of this conspiracy, though the government took serious note of it and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (d. 1975), the leader of the more radical wing of the Awami League, was incarcerated. The effort to bring him to trial proved abortive, but not before it had contributed to turning the sentiment in East Pakistan from anti-government to more resolutely anti-state.

Many leading figures had been allowed back into the political arena in early 1967. They wasted little time in forming an alliance against the government. Later that year, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (d. 1979), who had long served in Ayub Khan's cabinet, established his own political organization, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).[304] Ayub Khan's last days in office also saw much student and labor unrest. There was growing student radicalism in East Pakistan, and labor strikes throughout the province. Many of these took place under the leadership of the Deoband-educated Mawlana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (d. 1976), who was known as much for his socialism as for developing a new and fearsome tactic of having mobs "encircle" government offices and other targets of choice.[305] West Pakistan, too, saw its share of unrest. On one occasion, in March 1969, nearly 2.5 million laborers participated in a strike in the western wing.[306] By that time, the military was no longer willing to continue to bolster the regime. Once that was clear, Ayub Khan resigned from office, handing over the reins of government to the commander-in-chief, General Yahya Khan, who proceeded to declare martial law and abrogate the constitution of 1962.

General elections were held in December 1970—the very first by way of adult franchise in Pakistan's history.[307] About two dozen parties participated in them, including a number of religio-political organizations. It was widely expected that Mujibur Rahman's left-leaning Awami League, campaigning on its six-points platform, would do well, but almost no one had anticipated the scale of its victory. The campaign had taken place in the immediate aftermath of unprecedentedly destructive cyclones in East Pakistan that killed around 500,000 people and left many more seething at what they saw as the government's indifferent relief operations.[308] The Awami League won every single seat earmarked for East Pakistan in the National Assembly—162 out of a total of 300—and not a single seat from anywhere in western Pakistan, where it had contested for a mere eleven

seats. (The West Pakistan One Unit had been dissolved in July 1970, prior to the elections, resurrecting the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier Province [NWFP], and Balochistan there.) The other leading organization was Bhutto's People's Party. Campaigning on a platform of "Islamic socialism," it secured 81 seats in the National Assembly, all from the western provinces; it had not even bothered to put up candidates in East Pakistan.[309]

Despite the Awami League's electoral triumph, the military had qualms about handing over power—and the task of framing the new constitution—to a party that harbored secessionist aspirations. Mujibur Rahman was not willing to share power with the People's Party, and Bhutto, unlike smaller parties from West Pakistan, was strongly opposed to any political arrangement that meant his party's exclusion from the government. For its part, the Awami League feared a West Pakistani conspiracy to prevent it from coming to power; its leadership was also under pressure from those of its supporters who would brook no compromise on the party's platform. Amidst a political deadlock and escalating violence in East Pakistan, a military operation was launched in the province in late March 1971. East Pakistan was now in open revolt, with an increasingly organized militia, the Mukti Bahini, leading the resistance with Indian military and logistical support. The following months saw many massacres, by Pakistani troops and militia attached to it and by the Mukti Bahini. Several million people fled to India,[310] which eventually precipitated a short war between the two countries. By the time the war ended, with the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers in Dhaka on December 16, 1971, a new Muslim country had emerged in South Asia. The Pakistani military estimated that about 26,000 people had been killed in East Pakistan in the course of its operations. According to Bangladesh sources, the figure was closer to three million.[311] Neither estimate is credible, though it remains clear that a very heavy cost had been incurred in terms of human suffering. The provinces of West Pakistan were now all that remained of the country that had been founded a quarter century earlier. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took office as its president and subsequently, after the new constitution had been promulgated in 1973, as the prime minister.

*** The Bhutto and Zia al-Haqq Years

It is extraordinary how little public discussion there has been in Pakistan about the events leading to the secession of East Pakistan.[312] In any case, Bhutto's image was clearly tarnished by those events; he had been instrumental in preventing the transfer of power to the Awami League and many therefore thought that he shared the blame for the country's breakup. There were other vulnerabilities, too. In particular, Bhutto's Islamic socialism did not sit well with conservative religious groups. A much publicized fatwa issued in 1970 and condemning socialism of all kinds had carried more than one hundred signatures by the 'ulama, some of them prominent figures in the religious sphere.[313] Bhutto strove hard to bolster his Islamic credentials. The 1973 constitution was well-stocked in its Islamic provisions, though these were largely in line with those of the two previous constitutions. In March 1974, the summit meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a pan-Islamic body with its headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was held in Lahore. Luminaries including King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates, Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, Mu'ammar Qaddafi of Libya, and Yasir 'Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization were in attendance at this gathering, which took place in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the Arab oil embargo against several Western countries for their support of Israel. In hosting this conference, Pakistan had signaled that it still retained the aspiration to play a prominent role in the Muslim world, though it was also motivated by Bhutto's desire to gain a measure of religious legitimacy within Pakistan.[314] As Syeda Abida Hussain, a Punjabi politician belonging to the People's Party, told Bhutto's wife in offering her assessment of the event, "Prime Minister Bhutto has emerged as the undisputed leader of the Muslim World.… Pakistanis feel proud that we are led by a modernist who can hold his own against any world leader and effectively advocate all just causes of Muslims."[315] The summit meeting also gave Bhutto the political cover to officially recognize Bangladesh as a sovereign state; Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was among those who attended the summit.

Later that year, the Bhutto regime gave in to growing 'ulama pressure to have the Ahmadis declared a non-Muslim minority. A constitutional amendment now defined a "Muslim" in such a way that the Ahmadis were explicitly excluded. On other fronts, even as he sought to improve the lot of industrial labor, Bhutto had taken on the more radical leftist elements in the labor movement almost from the beginning of his tenure.[316] He also came to distance himself from hardline leftist elements in his own party, again in

an effort to reassure conservative critics. To similar effect, in October 1974, a Ministry of Religious Affairs was established. In December that year, in a smaller yet symbolically meaningful gesture, the Bhutto government had a gold-plated door installed at the shrine of the Sufi saint Shaykh ‘Ali Hujwiri in Lahore.[317]

Fazlur Rahman, by then professor of Islamic thought at the University of Chicago, was among the people whose advice the government again sought on Islamic matters. Rahman was keen to offer it, sometimes taking the initiative himself. In December 1974, he wrote to Bhutto, commenting on the prime minister’s statement on the occasion of the National Assembly’s declaring the Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. Bhutto had stated that this was “a secular decision because we live in modern times, have a secular constitution and believe in the citizens of the country having equal rights.” “But surely,” Rahman wrote to Bhutto,

<quote>

living in modern times and belief in the equal rights of all citizens are not secular for Muslims but Islamic; nor do we have a secular constitution but an Islamic one—and self-professedly so! And this Islamic Constitution has Islamically granted Fundamental Rights to all citizens…. It is commonly said that “Islam comprehends both religious and secular matters,” or that “Islam is at the same time a religion, a polity, a law etc.” Such clichés are always misleading since they insinuate the dichotomy of the religious and the secular all over again into Islam which is seen as something composite of the two. The truth seems to be rather that Islam, as such, is concerned with all moral values—whether these are in the social, economic or political fields.[318]

</quote>

To this, Bhutto had replied that the statement in question

<quote>

related not to the content of the decision of the National Assembly but to the process by which it was taken. What I wanted to convey was that this process was entirely democratic and, therefore, quite within the comprehension of people who have a secular orientation. A decision of this kind has to be understood not only by Muslims but also by others…. As you know, we cannot afford to let a misunderstanding arise that we are running a theocratic state.[319]

</quote>

Together with Leonard Binder, a political scientist also at the University of Chicago, Rahman was then directing an ambitious, multicountry project called Islam and Social Change funded by the Ford Foundation, and he was keen to have the assistance of the bureaucracy in facilitating the research in Pakistan. More importantly, however, he would have seen in his contacts with the Pakistani government an opportunity to pursue some of the goals that had been interrupted with the fall of the Ayub Khan regime. Despite his aforementioned misgivings about “the dichotomy of the religious and the secular,” Rahman did not hesitate to offer specific suggestions on the goals the newly created ministry concerned specifically with religious affairs ought to set for itself. In part, he said in this regard, it was necessary “to present Islam in socio-moral terms and to link these socio-moral principles positively with the broad ideals of rational, liberal and humanitarian progress.” This had been done “for the first time” under Ayub Khan. But it had been done to the neglect of “religious emotion.” “[T]he regime had hoped that this religious emotion will, in course of time, be largely channeled towards the socio-moral side, which did not happen on any large scale.”[320] The new ministry of religious affairs needed, therefore, to systematically address this side of Pakistani religious life, for instance, by turning devotional practices such as those relating to the Prophet’s birthday into “opportunities to effectively communicate to the masses the positive virtues of Islam like good neighbourliness, mutual help, sacrifice for others and for social progress, cleanliness, honesty, etc. The vast emotional fund must be turned towards positive moral and social virtues of nation building and national integration. Otherwise, this emotionalism will become riotous and end up as a negative and destructive force.”[321] In line with his statist views of the Ayub Khan era, and in the interest of shaping the religious sensibilities of the people, he suggested that the ministry set up a “directorate of public preaching” to train and employ mosque-imams. He also proposed the

establishment of an Islamic university to train ‘ulama and to help reduce some of the distance between traditional Islamic and the modern sciences. He floated as well the idea of a Dar al-ifta, an official body that would issue authoritative rulings on religious matters.[322]

Rahman expressed some similar ideas in a note he wrote in 1975 at the request of the government, in which he made recommendations on what the People’s Party should say on Islam in its manifesto for the next general elections. Leaving the specific recommendations aside, his introductory comment is worth quoting here:

<quote>

It is commonly believed that Islam is not just a “religion” in the narrow sense regulating an individual’s relationship with God but “a comprehensive way of life” regulating mutual human relationships in the family and in the public life…. Whereas this view of Islam is essentially correct … [m]any groups, like the Jama‘at-e-Islami, have sought, through this formula, to perpetuate and impose on Muslims a whole medieval structure of law and institutions which they call “the Islamic System,” thereby obstructing healthy and necessary socio-economic development. The only sense in which this formula is tenable and practicable is that Islam be viewed as a set of values and social objectives to be gradually realized in a given society rather than any fixed system of law deduced at any given period of time, past and future. Any system of law and institutions that, in the public sector, will seek to realize these eternal values at a particular time will be the Islamic system for that time.[323]

</quote>

As would be noticed, these ideas are very similar to what Rahman had said in his Islamic Methodology in History, published in 1965. He may have felt that a democratically elected government, such as Bhutto’s, might have better success than an authoritarian regime in fostering an understanding of Islam based on “values and social objectives” rather than on an anachronistic religious law. He was to be disappointed in any such hope. The Bhutto regime was nervous about the challenge the religious parties posed to its legitimacy, and the manifesto that the People’s Party

unveiled in launching its election campaign showed little interest in any Islamic experimentation.[324] Instead, it was content to affirm its Islamic credentials by designating Friday the weekly holiday rather than Sunday.[325] Such measures did not satisfy the religious parties, who formed a powerful electoral alliance against it. The official results pointed to a victory for the People's Party, but the opposition alleged widespread rigging and proceeded to launch a country-wide agitation to dislodge Bhutto and install "the system of the Prophet" (nizam-i Mustafa). The unrest in the country led, in July 1977, to the imposition of martial law by General Muhammad Zia al-Haqq. Bhutto was hanged two years later. Zia al-Haqq stayed in power till 1988, overseeing during those years the most extensive effort the country had yet experienced to "Islamize" the society and economy.

It is tempting to see the Zia al-Haqq years as marking a sharp decline in the fortunes of Islamic modernism in Pakistan. In broad terms, that would be a fair assessment, but with two caveats. First, though the 'ulama and the Islamists received a good deal of state patronage in the Zia al-Haqq era, the civil and judicial bureaucracy continued to be staffed by many of the same Western-educated people who had manned these offices in earlier decades. And despite its rhetoric of Islamization, the regime itself took measures to carefully delimit its scope. Banks continued to deal in financial interest, though they now had "interest-free" sections as well. And Ayub Khan's Muslim Personal Laws Ordinance of 1961, another bête noire of the Islamists and the 'ulama, was protected against judicial review. It fell outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Shari'at Court, whose mandate, ironically, was to see if new and existing laws were in contravention of the shari'a. But, second, it is important to recognize that modernism was already in retreat under Bhutto.[326] There was some mention of Islamic social justice and related themes in the pages of Islamic Studies, the journal of the Islamic Research Institute, during the Bhutto years, but there was little, in that journal or anywhere else, to parallel the sort of modernist discourse witnessed in the Ayub Khan era. Bhutto was keen to avoid taking positions that could be controversial in Islamic terms. Further, as Fazlur Rahman had noted in reporting on his trip to Pakistan in 1975, "the government [was] … anxious to keep on the right side of Saudi Arabia both for reasons of economics and of a political Islamic solidarity."[327]

Some of those who might have been important contributors to modernist discourse had left that camp well before Bhutto came to power. There is perhaps no better illustration of this than the career of Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari (d. 1978), a much respected Urdu literary critic. ‘Askari had acquired some prominence in literary circles already before the partition of the Indian subcontinent, and he consolidated that reputation in the years following the establishment of Pakistan. He was fiercely patriotic, a stance that led him to castigate those associated with the left-leaning Progressive Writers Association for putting their class-based ideological commitments above loyalty to the new state. Yet, ‘Askari himself had leftist leanings. Before partition, he had defended the demand for Pakistan on grounds that “it would be the first populist and socialist state in the Indian subcontinent. As such, it would serve the interests not just of the Muslims but also of the Hindu masses, since it would assist in uprooting capitalism … and in the establishment of a permanent peace and security.”[328] In the 1950s, he remained highly critical of Pakistan’s alignment with the United States in the Cold War in ways that accorded with left-leaning sensibilities.

But things changed during the Ayub Khan era. Newspaper columns and writings in literary magazines had been the main vehicles of ‘Askari’s expression, but the Ayub Khan regime imposed severe restrictions on the press. By the time of Ayub Khan’s fall, as Aftab Ahmad, a close associate of ‘Askari, has recounted it, the literary critic was a changed man. Some leftist leanings remained, making him a staunch Bhutto loyalist. But, in other respects, ‘Askari had gravitated irrevocably to the camp of the ‘ulama. Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi was the yardstick of the orthodox tradition for him, and he spent his last years translating into English a major Urdu commentary on the Qur’an by Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, a disciple of Thanawi and the founder of what today is the largest Deobandi madrasa in Pakistan.[329]

‘Askari’s traditionalism was never quite that of Deoband. It was at least as indebted to the Perennialist philosophy of Rene Guénon[330] as it was to Thanawi, and his critique of modernism had its roots in his dissatisfaction with literary modernism in Europe.[331] It is significant nonetheless that his conflation of European anti-modernist and Islamic trends took him all the way to Deobandi traditionalism in Pakistan. Around the time of the fall of the Ayub Khan regime, he had written a short book titled Modernism, specifically for the benefit of madrasa students.

[332] Here, he sought to introduce those training to become ‘ulama to key moments in the history of Western thought, laying much of the blame for the deleterious effects of unrestrained individualism and the breakdown of religious authority on the rise of Protestantism.[333] His concern was not, of course, to defend Catholic structures of authority but rather to urge the ‘ulama to be cautious in their criticism of Catholic Christianity, for what they said about Catholic priests was echoed in what Westernized Muslims had come to say about the ‘ulama themselves.[334] His larger purpose in this treatise was to make Western thought and its specialized terminology intelligible to his madrasa audience so that they could better defend themselves and others against the subtle challenges it posed. By extension, the goal was to enable the ‘ulama to be on their guard against certain Muslim modernist proclivities. For instance, ‘Askari argued that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European thinkers had tended to separate morality from religion, basing the former not on revealed truth but rather on human nature and reason. Instead of thinking of morality and ethics as a facet of religion, religion itself had come to be reduced to them. This way of thinking had had a significant impact on Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the pioneering Muslim modernist in South Asia, and on subsequent generations, he said, and he went on to offer this warning: “The ‘ulama should be on their guard when English-educated people praise the ethical principles of Islam. For these people tend to think of [all Islam,] even Sufism, as mere ethics.”[335]

The case of Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari helps draw our attention to weaknesses in the appeal of modernism well before the advent of Zia al-Haqq, and indeed even of Bhutto. It also points to some other things, however. Even as the ‘ulama have faced sharp polemics from the modernist camp, they have been able to make some prized inroads within that camp. What this example also shows is that the ‘ulama have received some unexpected help from the modernist governing elite in making such incursions. At the very time when Islamic modernism was practically a matter of state policy, Ayub Khan’s draconian curbs on the freedom of expression may have done more than the ‘ulama could on their own to draw the likes of ‘Askari in their direction.[336] Yet, the opposition to modernism, and to modernist ethics, has also inhibited the ‘ulama from venturing beyond their long-standing concern with the ethical formation of the individual toward any sustained engagement with social and political ethics.[337] If anything, such engagement within the ranks of the ‘ulama has declined in recent decades.

Telling as they are in some ways, the implications of ‘Askari’s example should not, however, be exaggerated. For even under authoritarian rule, there could be significant cultural vibrancy and experimentation. An instance relating to the wider cultural arena in the 1970s and the 1980s, rather than specifically to Islam, is worth considering here. The widely read poet Parvin Shakir (d. 1994), who published four collections of verse between 1977 and 1990, is noted for bringing a self-confident feminine voice to her work and for exploring themes relating to female desire.[338] As the literary critic C. M. Naim observed in 1993 with reference to Shakir and some other contemporary women poets, “What often comes as the greatest surprise to an unaccustomed Urdu reader is the palpable sensuality in some of their poems; it is of a different order from that attempted by any male poet in Urdu.” Naim continued: “the new women poets, including Shakir, have written on a range of experiences within marital love which no male poet ever wrote about in Urdu. Sexual intimacy, pregnancy, childbirth, infidelity, separation and divorce—these are topics that one would look for in vain in the books of contemporary male poets, not to mention their predecessors.”[339]

Shakir was not engaged in any overt subversion of religious, social, or gender norms. Instead, as an officer in the civil service of Pakistan, she was a member of the bureaucratic establishment. The fact that three of her collections of poetry were published in the Zia al-Haqq years and that two of them won important prizes suggests that she was not seen as a threat to that or any other establishment. Some of her sharper social criticism was published, moreover, after the Zia al-Haqq era.[340] That does not necessarily mean that she was complicit in the regime’s authoritarianism. To explore female sensuality in suggestive if guarded verse at a time when conservative gender norms were a matter of state policy was not a conformist move. Shakir’s position as a member of the higher bureaucracy probably gave her protections not available to many of the more strident left-leaning opponents of Zia al-Haqq. Her case indicates nonetheless that the cultural sphere even under authoritarian rule was more varied than ‘Askari’s trajectory might suggest. Even so, traditionalist and Islamist forces were continuing to gain ground.

The rise to power of the Harvard- and Oxford-educated Benazir Bhutto on Zia al-Haqq's death in 1988 appeared to create new openings for Islamic modernism.[341] Yet, despite the popular mandate that she carried, she was always vulnerable to charges of being too Westernized, too little committed to the implementation of Islamic norms. It was a matter of great pride for her, and for her admirers in Pakistan and abroad, that she was the first Muslim woman ever to be elected to the office of the prime minister anywhere in the Muslim world. Her conservative opponents insisted on making it a liability, however, arguing that Islam did not allow a woman to serve as the head of a government.[342] This argument had clearly not been influential enough to prevent Benazir Bhutto's election. That leaders of religio-political opinion could themselves adopt unexpected positions on precisely this issue had already been demonstrated in early 1965 when Mawdudi had decided to support the candidacy of Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the nation's founder, in her contest with Ayub Khan for the country's presidency.[343] Another illustration would be furnished by Mawlana Fazlur Rahman's alliance with Bhutto during her second term in office—an alliance significant because he was the leader of one of the most conservative of religio-political parties, the Jam'iyyat 'Ulama-i Islam.[344] For all such pragmatism on the conservative side, it is significant that there was no serious effort on the part of the modernists to make an Islamic case for a woman's political leadership.

Benazir Bhutto's religious critics found much other ammunition against her as well. During what proved to be his last months in office, Zia al-Haqq had promulgated the Implementation of Shariah Ordinance.[345] It served to highlight his religious aspirations at a time of greatly depleted support for the regime even in religious circles. Questions about whether particular laws were repugnant to the shari'a were to be referred under this ordinance to the Federal Shari'at Court. Yet, in a measure of the continuing modernist hold on public policy, certain core areas remained outside the Shari'at Court's jurisdiction: "[I]f the question relates to Muslim personal law, any fiscal law or any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and procedure, the Court shall refer the question to the High Court which shall decide the question."[346] With such exclusions and given the fact that the high courts did not have any 'ulama presence on them, there was no immediate danger to the country's modernist laws or its interest-based economy. The ordinance did, however, have symbolic power, and Bhutto's opponents castigated her bitterly when she allowed it to lapse.

To make things more difficult for her government, the conservative and center-right parties dominating the parliament’s upper house adopted a “shari‘at bill” of their own, though the president had dismissed the government on charges of corruption before the bill could be debated in the more powerful lower house, the National Assembly.[347]

The next government was led by Nawaz Sharif (1990–93), whose party had helped with the passage of the shari‘at bill in the Senate. Keen to highlight his Islamic commitments and to contrast them with Bhutto’s deficit in that respect, Sharif quickly maneuvered the passage of the Enforcement of Shari‘ah Bill and put it into effect in May 1991. Though the measure was hailed as “one of the most significant events in Islamic history,”[348] it did little to change how the country was governed or how Islamic law was given effect, let alone improve the lives of ordinary people. It did serve, however, to fuel further expectations as regards Islamization. But this government, too, proved short-lived, to be succeeded a second time by that of Benazir Bhutto (1993–96).

By far the most important development of these years had to do with neighboring Afghanistan. The Soviet occupation of that country had come to an end in 1989 and the Soviet Union itself collapsed shortly thereafter. Though the Afghan struggle against the occupying forces had been supported by the United States, underwritten by rich Arab regimes, and coordinated in good measure by Pakistan’s military intelligence, it was as a jihad that it had been carried out. How and with whose backing the war had been waged was ultimately less important than the fact that a seemingly mighty superpower had been brought low by bedraggled mujahidin. This was profoundly empowering for religio-political groups, in Pakistan and in the wider Muslim world. The mujahidin, however, had never succeeded in sorting out their mutual disagreements, and the end of the Soviet occupation led to a civil war among factions dominated by the Afghan warlords. It would continue for several years, to the great misery of ordinary Afghans. A seemingly surprising response to this situation came in late 1994, while Benazir Bhutto was the prime minister, in the form of a movement emerging from the Afghan refugee camps of Pakistan. Its leaders and many of those comprising it were associated with Deobandi madrasas of Pakistan, hence their designation as the Taliban—“students.” They had risen

to end the atrocities of the warlords, to restore order, to bring proper shari‘a norms to Afghanistan.

There was much murky intrigue and politics behind the rise of the Taliban. The Pakistani military, working through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), wanted an alternative to the fractious mujahidin. It also sought “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, a place to fall back on in the dire straits of an Indian penetration across Pakistan’s eastern front. There were also close connections between guerilla warfare in Afghanistan and the insurgency in Kashmir, as will be observed in chapter 7. Peace in Afghanistan was coveted, too, by the US petroleum conglomerate, Unocal, which sought to build a pipeline through Afghanistan to oil-rich Central Asia. Once again, however, such unsavory calculations were largely irrelevant to religio-political groups in Pakistan. What mattered to them was the fact that a movement uncompromisingly committed to the implementation of Islamic norms had emerged on the scene. There was no stopping it. By September 1996, the Taliban were in control of the Afghan capital, Kabul.[349] Already before entering it, they had begun to implement some of the most stringent punishments that could be found in Islamic law. As a Pakistani newspaper reported in March 1995, “The first ever amputation of hands and feet of three Afghans convicted of theft was recently carried out in Helmand province in southwestern Afghanistan on the orders of the Islamic courts established by the Taliban.”[350]

It is hard to imagine Benazir Bhutto not being profoundly embarrassed by the Taliban. On occasion, she tried to make light of their excesses: “I believe the Taliban lock up their women behind closed doors, but as a woman leader we have come into power [sic] through votes,” she said in late February 1995.[351] In a posthumous work, published shortly after her death in December 2007, she would try to elide the question of her government’s role in the rise of the Taliban, arguing instead that her removal from power had served to make the Taliban more extreme.[352] Leaving aside the merits of that claim, it is true that officials elected even to Pakistan’s highest offices have often had a rather limited say in the policies pursued by the military vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India.[353] Yet, Bhutto’s own interior minister had been a key figure in facilitating the rise of the Taliban, and the aforementioned Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, whose Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam was among the strongest of Taliban supporters in Pakistan,

was an ally of the government at the time.[354] The point is not, of course, that Bhutto shared the Taliban's sensibilities. It is rather that aggressively conservative voices had become far more prominent in the Pakistan of the 1990s, sometimes in alliance with the government, than had been the case earlier. Nawaz Sharif's second stint as prime minister (1997–99), following Bhutto's dismissal in 1996, would continue that trend. A notable feature of his time in office in that instance was a vigorous effort to amend the constitution so that it would be possible to bring about further amendments with a simple majority in the two houses of the parliament rather than a two-thirds majority in each house. The initiative was billed as a move toward "the removal of any impediment in the enforcement of any matter relating to the Shariah and the implementation of the injunctions of Islam."[355] Critics, some within Sharif's own party, saw it however as a power grab by a perennially insecure prime minister seeking to capitalize on what was then a large parliamentary majority. Sharif's worries were not unfounded. Before the constitutional amendment had cleared both houses, his government, too, had fallen to a military takeover in 1999.

For much of the 1990s, as this brief survey shows, the winds were clearly not blowing in any direction conducive to modernist initiatives. Yet, given that modernism has usually been sponsored from the top down, a change of government could always create quick opportunities for a reversal of trends. The military coup of 1999 created just such opportunities. There would be concerted efforts to imbue Islamic modernism with new life in the years when General Pervez Musharraf was in power in Pakistan (1999–2008), especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

*** The Years of "Enlightened Moderation"

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, and subsequent developments have exacted an enormous price from Pakistan. In being forced to abruptly change course from being a sponsor and key supporter of Afghanistan's Taliban regime to an ally of the United States in the War on Terror, the Musharraf government faced the wrath of the country's Islamist and other religio-political groups. The years following 2001 saw the emergence of a neo-Taliban insurgency not just in Afghanistan but also in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the former North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan

(hereafter, frequently, the Frontier). The militant groups associated with this insurgency would long resist the military operations periodically launched against them while carrying out scores of suicide bombings and other terrorist acts that have not ceased to put severe strains on the economy and society and to imperil the country's stability.[356]

Ironically, the 2001 terrorist attacks also gave the regime of General Musharraf an opportunity to recharge a dormant modernism. As the new government tried, with uncertain vigor, to confront militant Islamists and allied groups, it also took it upon itself to pursue a larger modernist program. Thus, in 2002, the government was able to secure a new ruling on the vexed question of financial interest from a reconstituted Shari'at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court—the highest judicial body established in the Zia al-Haqq era to rule on questions relating to Islamic law. In 1991, the Federal Shari'at Court had determined that all forms of financial interest constituted the riba prohibited by the Qur'an. The Shari'at Appellate Bench had upheld that judgment in 1999, requiring the government to end all interest-based transactions by July 2002. Days before the deadline, the latter court set aside those rulings, sending the case back to languish with the Federal Shari'at Court.[357] The Musharraf regime also took some steps toward regulating the affairs of the country's numerous madrasas. And in late 2006, it set aside some of the more draconian provisions of shari'a-based penal laws, the Hudood (hudud) Ordinances, that General Zia al-Haqq had promulgated in 1979. Passed by the parliament as the Protection of Women Act, 2006, this law made it more difficult than had been the case earlier to use the Hudood laws as an instrument of social control, for instance, by bringing accusations of sexual impropriety to court. It will be discussed in chapter 3.

The regime had coined a term for its modernist initiatives. Musharraf liked to speak of "enlightened moderation." "It is a two-pronged strategy," he wrote in a programmatic article in the Washington Post in June 2004. "The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift. The second is for the West, and the United States in particular, to seek to resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid in the socioeconomic betterment of the deprived Muslim world."[358] Musharraf presented this vision to the Organization of the Islamic Conference and received an endorsement from it.[359] Not for the first time in the history of Islamic modernism, Pakistan appeared to have a

role to play both within the Muslim world and in facilitating better relations between the Muslim world and the West. There was some talk as well as of making enlightened moderation a part of the social studies curriculum in the country's public schools.[360] None of this would survive the fall of the Musharraf regime in 2008.

Some of the ambiguities of this phase in Pakistani modernism may be brought out with reference to Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1951), an ally of sorts that Musharraf had found during his years in power. Ghamidi, then a Lahore-based commentator on the Qur'an, had once been a member of the Islamist Jama'at-i Islami but had left that organization on account of disagreements with Mawdudi. He was an informal but lifelong student of Amin Ahsan Islahi (d. 1997), a prominent Qur'an exegete who, in his early career, had himself been a leading figure in the Jama'at-i Islami. Ghamidi had been writing well before the advent of General Musharraf, and some of his ideas came to be seen as well-suited to the regime's interests.[361]

Ghamidi has argued, for instance, that Muslim religious scholars, the 'ulama, should not meddle in politics but ought, rather, to concentrate on the religious guidance of the people as well as of the ruling elite.[362] In marked contrast with Mawdudi, he holds that the establishment of an Islamic state is not a religious obligation.[363] And unlike the expansive view that the Islamists tend to take of the powers of the state, Ghamidi believes that, in religious terms, the state cannot require its Muslim citizens to do anything more than believe in God and the Prophet, perform their ritual prayers, and pay the zakat tax. It cannot, for instance, obligate them to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca or to fast, or conscript them for jihad.[364] Nor does he believe that jihad can be prosecuted by any but an established government, thus ruling it out on the part of militant groups and other nonstate actors. It is worth noting, finally, that Ghamidi was highly critical of Zia al-Haqq's Hudood Ordinances, which he saw as contravening the shari'a on a number of grounds. Views such as these could and did lend useful support to the Musharraf regime as it battled Islamist militants and worked to revise the Hudood Ordinances. Ghamidi was appointed as a member of the Council of Islamic Ideology. Since 2002, a significant number of new television channels have made their debut in Pakistan, and this, too, helped give Ghamidi a new prominence in the country and, by extension, greater usefulness from the viewpoint of the government.[365]

Yet, the alignment between Ghamidi’s positions and the concerns of the government was far from perfect. For instance, to Ghamidi, all forms of financial interest are covered by the Qur’anic prohibition of riba,[366] which was hardly a convenient view from the perspective of the Musharraf regime. That a Muslim government can impose only a very small number of religious obligations on its citizens may have been welcomed by the government as an antidote to Islamist conceptions of the state, but the idea in question is opposed to the expansive power of any government, not just an Islamist one. Ghamidi’s view on this score is based, moreover, on a narrow textualism, his justification being that the relevant Qur’anic verses and hadith reports require only the aforementioned three things of those submitting to the authority of the state.[367] This is a very different approach from, say, Fazlur Rahman’s, with its often detailed engagement with the Islamic religious tradition in defending or critiquing particular positions. On the question of hudud, to be discussed more fully in the next chapter, Ghamidi leaves the imposition of the penalties to the discretion of the state and his formulations serve to considerably restrict the application of the severest punishments.[368] Yet, it is significant that he does not question the principle of the continued applicability of hudud laws.[369] Once again, there is a significant contrast to be noted here with Fazlur Rahman’s effort in the Ayub Khan era to offer an ethical reinterpretation of hudud by arguing that it is not the content and the authority of hudud laws that should be seen as invariant—as the traditionalist jurists have tended to do—but rather their goal of deterring people from committing certain crimes and of reforming the criminals.[370] It is telling that there was no discussion of Rahman’s work when the Musharraf regime took it upon itself to rectify some of the excesses of the Hudood Ordinances. And Rahman, who in the 1960s had written an extensive rebuttal of the traditionalist views on the prohibition of financial interest, was passed over in almost complete silence as the judges of the Shari‘at Appellate Bench went about their task of reversing the earlier, anti-interest, verdict.

Though Ghamidi’s television appearances were presumably watched by many urban, middle-class Pakistanis, he lacked any meaningful social base in the country. And even the government of General Musharraf had no compunctions about ignoring him when so doing seemed politic. On the

other hand, Ghamidi's conservative views on many Islamic matters did little to shield him from the wrath of the militants. The editor of his journal was injured in an attack, and one of Ghamidi's close associates was later assassinated. Ghamidi himself was forced to flee to Malaysia in 2010.[371]

Two other intellectuals also merit a brief discussion to further highlight the ambiguities as well as the constraints of contemporary modernism. The first is Muhammad Shakil Auj, who, at the time of his assassination in 2014, was professor and dean of the faculty of Islamic Studies at the University of Karachi. Auj's approach to Islam, outlined in numerous articles on a wide variety of exegetical, social, and legal issues, was guided by the conviction that the Qur'an alone was the source of authoritative norms and that the positions enshrined in the Islamic scholastic tradition ought to be evaluated in its light and not vice versa.[372] In principle, few Muslims would dispute this proposition, except that, in practice, the foundational texts have tended to be refracted through the lenses of the later juristic and other traditions. This approach led Auj to move away from the positions espoused by mainstream Hanafi 'ulama in Pakistan and toward some distinctly modernist views. He argued, for instance, that a "philosophical ijtihad" aimed at reorienting the entire juridical tradition had become necessary in modern times, and that this needed to precede the "legal ijtihad" that sought only to address specific needs.[373] He insisted, as have other modernists, that the shari'a was intended by God to create ease rather than hardship for people.[374] Adducing the relevant Qur'anic passages, he tried to show that many non-Muslims could be considered believers, even "Muslims" in their particular contexts, and that such Qur'anic teachings could serve as the basis of mutual "coexistence" in today's world.[375] In a series of essays on matters relating specifically to women, Auj critiqued the practice of underage marriage, whose validity is recognized by most premodern jurists and which continues to be accepted by many 'ulama today.[376] He made a case for the permissibility of a Muslim woman's marriage to a Jewish or Christian man, disallowed by most jurists.[377] And he argued that a woman was not prohibited from going outside her home and traveling alone, without her face covered, even going on the pilgrimage to Mecca without a male guardian.[378] He explained why the testimony of a woman should be considered equal to a man's, except in the specific case of certain financial transactions where the Qur'an says that they are unequal (Q 2.282) as well as in matters of inheritance, on which, too, the Qur'an is explicit (Q 4.11–12).[379]

Yet, rather like Ghamidi, there were severe limits to Auj's professed desire to rethink traditional norms. The most striking instance of this is his spirited defense of polygyny.[380] Arguing against the familiar modernist tack of seeing it as tied to the need to provide for orphan girls—a context the Qur'an itself invokes (Q 4.3)—Auj observed that this logic would require also limiting numerous other Qur'anic passages according to the specificities of their contexts: "What would be left of the Qur'an, for purposes of general [that is, non-context-bound] application if we continued to proceed in this way?"[381] Auj also rejected any extension in a woman's right to initiate a divorce beyond the limited recourse Islamic law has traditionally allowed to them.[382]

In the treatise that became the basis of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939, Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi had helped institutionalize the practice of inserting a clause in the marriage contract whereby the groom "delegated" his authority to divorce his wife to her, to be used by her when necessary. Auj insisted that this, too, was not a right that the shari'a allowed to women.[383] He also argued against the payment of alimony beyond the three-month "waiting period" following the divorce, as stipulated in the Qur'an.[384]

Auj's positions on polygyny, divorce, and alimony show how traditionalist views—sometimes significantly more conservative than a Thanawi's—can stand unsteadily alongside progressive ones. His reliance on the Qur'an to the exclusion of the legal (fiqh) tradition allowed him to challenge established social and legal norms, but this was accompanied by a refusal, in marked contrast with many earlier modernists, to systematically rethink the scope and implications of particular Qur'anic injunctions. The progressive positions were nonetheless enough to fuel opposition to him. The circumstances of his assassination remain murky. He was shot and killed while being driven to a social event organized by the Iranian Cultural Center in Karachi in honor of a "medal of distinction" he had received from the government of Pakistan for his scholarly work.[385] He was not a Shi'i, but any perception of cultural patronage from Iran would have been unwelcome to Sunni militants. University politics may also have played a role: he had been investigating the complicity of some of his colleagues in the granting of

fake degrees,[386] and there were petitions from students against his anti-Islamic views.[387] There were allegations, too, that he had blasphemed Islam at a lecture while visiting the United States.[388] And the head of a leading Deobandi madrasa in Karachi was said to have characterized some of his views as amounting to apostasy, though the mufti later claimed that his fatwa to this effect was itself fake.[389] Whatever the actual cause of his assassination, his religious views seem to have played some role in it. The government's conferring an award on him for writings that some thought blasphemous may have made him even more of a target in a city, Karachi, where target killings are unremarkable events.[390]

My second example relates to Muhammad Khalid Masud (b. 1939), an internationally respected scholar of Islamic law, who served for several years under General Musharraf as the chairperson of the Council of Islamic Ideology. Masud received his PhD from the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill with a dissertation on the Andalusian jurist Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 1388). The idea that the shari'a is meant to serve certain overarching purposes (maqasid) and that legal rulings should be enacted or evaluated in light of those purposes—the protection and promotion of life, religion, property, progeny, and intellect—has had significant purchase in reformist circles in modern Islam. Shatibi was among the jurists most closely associated with this idea, and his work has therefore received much admiring attention from scholars in modern times. Masud is a notable figure among such scholars.[391]

To Shatibi, the shari'a's broad concern with the good (maslaha) of the believers was classifiable into three categories: necessities (daruriyyat); needs (hajiyyat); and things conducive to promoting general human welfare (tahsiniyyat). Viewed another way, the necessities comprised the nonnegotiable core of the shari'a, the needs were lower on the scale, and matters merely conducive to public interest were to be understood as "embellishments" rather than as core values. Such categorizations, too, have helped the modernists make the case for a rethinking of particular legal norms in light of how they address human necessities and how changing needs might be accommodated by the shari'a.[392] Masud has argued, for instance, that the rulings that belong to the second and third of these categories are best seen as sociocultural norms, which are therefore not central to the shari'a and

ought to remain open to change.[393] Thus, while many jurists have insisted that a woman needed a male guardian to authorize and validate her marriage, Masud observes, following Shatibi, that “[g]uardianship is not an essential requirement, as its absence does not damage the essential objectives of the law, but it imbues those laws with a cultural and aesthetic value…. [In the past, the position of] the guardian created a balance to protect the vulnerable gender…. Modern concepts of equality before law and justice based on individual rights … require a redefinition of the rights of parents, who would not need the authority [of guardianship] … to keep that social balance.”[394]

Masud has also argued that there is no Qur’anic injunction that prevents a woman from having full rights of divorce. During his tenure as its chair, the Council of Islamic Ideology did, in fact, recommend a change in the law to that effect.[395] Shakil Auj’s understanding of the Qur’an had brought him to the opposite conclusion on this question, as has been seen. Arguably, both Auj and Masud had a point: the Qur’anic language does take it for granted that it is men who divorce their wives, as Auj had observed,[396] but it is also true that the Qur’an does not explicitly reject a woman’s right to initiate a divorce, as Masud has it. Incidentally, this example goes some way toward illustrating the limits of a legal approach that is anchored, as it is in Auj’s case, exclusively in the Qur’an.

Masud, too, has been the object of conservative ire. A national newspaper had quoted him as saying in November 2007 that “Islam is not a complete code of life. This was Mawlana Mawdudi’s idea. Rather, Islam is only a complete [that is, perfect] religion. And Islam does not require [women] to cover their face and head; this is only a cultural norm.” In a strident response, the editor of Bayyinat, the journal of a prominent Deobandi madrasa in Karachi, accused Masud of insulting Islam, the Prophet, and God:

<quote>

If Islam is not a complete code of life, then the question is whether or not God has in fact given to people a code of life according to which to order their lives in keeping with His will. If the answer is in the affirmative, then

that code ought to be identified so that one can gain God’s favor by living accordingly. If, however, the answer is in the negative, then is this not insulting God and is it not tantamount to denying His divinity (uluhiyya) and His [attribute of] being the nurturer (rububiyya)? … Following [Masud’s] logic, would we not have to concede—God preserve us from it!—that Muslims are misguided, wayward, and ignorant? If so, would this be true only of Muslims today or would this foul judgment also extend to the early Muslims—the legal authorities (mujtahid imams), the companions [of the Prophet] and their followers, even the Prophet himself?[397]

</quote>

The words carried an unmistakable threat, and though no one seems to have tried to act on them, it would not have been surprising if someone had. What is more remarkable perhaps is the government’s choice for Masud’s successor as chair of the Council of Islamic Ideology. In 2010, President Asif Ali Zardari of the People’s Party appointed Mawlana Muhammad Khan Shirani, a Balochistan-based leader of the government’s coalition partner, the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam, to head the council. It would have been hard to find someone representing a sharper contrast with Masud or, by the same token, more in accord with the sentiment behind the Bayyinat editorial. As chairman, Shirani has declared, inter alia, that a husband may discipline his wife with “light beatings,” that a wife has no legal right to divorce in the event of her husband taking an additional wife, and that the existing laws against underage marriages are not in conformity with the shari‘a.[398] Among the Council’s ten members at the time, there was only one woman, the daughter of a previous head of the Jama‘at-i Islami.[399]

Islam, as imagined by the Pakistani modernists, has had strong ethical sensibilities. This foregrounding of ethics—in the Objectives Resolution, among other places—was alluring enough for the literary critic Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari to have had to warn even the ‘ulama against its appeal. Such concerns have continued to guide the modernists even in exile. They are, for example, at the heart of Fazlur Rahman’s influential book, Major Themes of the Qur’an, first published in 1980 and incorporating, incidentally, some of the ideas first adumbrated in the articles he had written on the ideology of Islam for Ayub Khan.[400] When Rahman was awarded the Giorgio Levi Della Vida Medal by the Center for Near Eastern Studies at the

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), in 1983 in recognition of his contributions to the study of Islam, the theme of the conference in his honor was none other than “ethics in Islam.”[401] Ghamidi, too, has continued to develop his ideas in exile—for instance, on the matter of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Within Pakistan, Shakil Auj was given as well to highlighting the ethical dimensions of Islam. He had dedicated one of his books to his late father, “who taught me to love all human beings irrespective of religion or doctrinal orientation—indeed, to love not just humans but also animals, which I consider to be the final lesson of religion and the pinnacle of humanity.”[402] For its part, Masud’s approach to legal reform has continued to be informed by the shari‘a’s overarching ethical purposes.

Although some of the decline of Pakistani modernism can surely be imputed to the Islamization policies of the late 1970s and the 1980s, which themselves were part of global Islamic “revivalist” trends of those decades, the story, as recounted so far, is considerably more complex. The fact that modernist initiatives have emanated from a governing elite with a tenuous political legitimacy or from the intellectuals allied with them has also contributed much toward weakening those initiatives. Khalifa Abdul Hakim was a friend and confidant of Ghulam Muhammad, the bureaucrat turned governor-general who is remembered for unrelenting political intrigue and for the dismissal of the country’s first constituent assembly.[403] Some of the vehemence with which Fazlur Rahman’s religious views were opposed by the ‘ulama surely had to do with his very visible association with an authoritarian regime.[404] Nearly four decades later, similar misgivings presumably led Qazi Husayn Ahmad, the leader of the Islamist Jama‘at-i Islami, to characterize Musharraf’s “so-called enlightened moderation as a threat to the identity of Pakistan and Islamic values.”[405]

But it is not just the embrace of the governing elite that has threatened to undermine Pakistani modernism. Authoritarianism has also tended to narrow the space in which modernist intellectuals may have been able to articulate their views, as the case of Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari illustrates. Another example relates to the declining fortunes of the ideal of social justice. It was in modernist circles rather than among the ‘ulama or even among the Islamists that this ideal had once resonated most widely. An especially strong commitment to it is in evidence in Abdul Hakim’s work. The first edition of his Islamic Ideology, published in 1951, had even contained a

chapter titled “Muhammad and Marx.”[406] Yet, fears of communism, heightened by Pakistan’s alignment with the United States during the Cold War, meant a significant weakening of the discourse on social justice.[407] The suspicion on the part of authoritarian and even quasi-democratic governments of all forms of organized opposition likewise found expression in their efforts to curtail the trade unions. Ironically, a good deal of the weakening of the labor movement in Pakistan is attributable already to the policies of the democratically elected Islamic socialist Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.[408] The Zia al-Haqq regime contributed its own considerable share to it. And since the early 1990s, the increasing privatization of the economy has tended to weaken the trade unions still further. A mere one percent of labor was unionized in 2014.[409] This is not a conducive climate for modernist disquisitions on social justice and related ethical ideas.

Finally, the modernists have often been less than eager to reassure those skeptical of their intentions. Their discourses on non-Muslim minorities, for instance, have not comforted them, as has been seen. The commission established by Ayub Khan to make recommendations for a new constitution for the country was not unrepresentative of modernist sentiment—and its attendant blind spots—when commenting on a Hindu parliamentarian’s complaints that young Pakistani Hindus were being forced to seek employment in neighboring India:

<quote>

As a matter of fact, it appears to us that these “brilliant young men” are not anxious to work for Pakistan. There have been, we understand, cases of persons, of the Hindu community, who had been abroad on scholarships earned in Pakistan, going away to India after being fully qualified. This indicates that these young men are not seen in employment in our country not because they are unable to secure it, but because they are not desirous of serving this country. They apparently do not feel happy here, which indicates that they are not reconciled to the idea of Pakistan.[410]

</quote>

For a country that then had a substantial Hindu minority, this was an extraordinary statement to come from the highest levels of government.

[411] The Islamists and the ‘ulama could hardly have expressed their misgivings toward the minorities more bluntly.

All too frequently, modernist attitudes toward the ‘ulama as well have been marked by a thinly disguised contempt. Given the ‘ulama’s influence in society, this has not served the modernists well. Khalifa Abdul Hakim’s “Iqbal and the Mulla,” for instance, seemed almost designed to offend them. Ironically, Abdul Hakim did more than many other modernists to cultivate a site for ‘ulama with a modernist orientation.[412] We will meet some of them in the following chapter. But this, too, was an initiative toward supplanting the traditionalists more than it was of building bridges to them. The ‘ulama, even the traditionalists among them, are a diverse lot, with considerable flexibility in their ranks and substantial ability to adapt to change. An insufficient recognition of this fact has often prevented the modernists from finding or cultivating long-term allies in the conservative camp, with significant attendant costs.

** Chapter Three: The ‘Ulama and the State

IF THE MODERNISTS have tended to see the ‘ulama as deadening the true spirit of Islam and of impeding the realization of Islamic ideals in society and polity, it is worth asking what the ‘ulama have found wanting in some key modernist initiatives in Pakistan. I address this question by taking matters relating to constitution-making, Islamic legislation, and madrasa reform as my key points of reference. Another concern of this chapter is to bring out some not insignificant differences within the ranks of the ‘ulama when it comes to attitudes toward the modernists. Pakistan’s early decades saw ‘ulama who might even be characterized as modernist in some of their approach and attitudes. But, as in colonial India, even those decidedly opposed to modernist legislation and other initiatives have often maintained relations with the modernists that are far from being uniformly adversarial. How have the ‘ulama benefited from the patronage of the governing elite and what has it meant for how their doctrinal orientations have fared in the Pakistani religio-political sphere? Without reducing a changing religious landscape to its political context, an evocation of the contours of this landscape, too, is among the concerns of this chapter. Other

dimensions of this evolving scene will become clearer in the following chapters.

*** The Traditionalist ‘Ulama: A Negotiable Maximalism

Though he died just over two years after the establishment of Pakistan, no religious scholar has enjoyed the stature Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani did in the new state. He was known to be close to the prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and he had come to be informally designated as the shaykh al-Islam, a title that was clearly meant to evoke the head of the sprawling religious establishment under the Ottomans. The day following his death on December 13, 1949, was declared a national holiday in Pakistan.[413] To many among the modernists, ‘Usmani was a standing argument against those who had questions about their understanding of Islam or about the sincerity of their convictions. Further, as the prime minister had observed during the debate on the Objectives Resolution in March 1949, if people with misgivings about the public role of Islam genuinely wanted to be reassured on that score, they should listen not to the “so-called Ulemas [who] … have come with [the] particular mission of creating doubts in your mind regarding the bona fides of the Mussalmans of Pakistan” but rather to “what we and men like Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Osmani have been telling [them] … about Islam.”[414] Yet, ‘Usmani’s vision of an Islamic polity was not quite the prime minister’s.

Like Liaquat Ali Khan, ‘Usmani had delivered what became a famous speech on the Objectives Resolution.[415] It had several important commonalities with that of the prime minister, briefly discussed in the previous chapter. Like Liaquat Ali Khan, ‘Usmani spoke of Islam’s ability to serve as a panacea for the ills afflicting humanity, and he contrasted Muslim achievements in the past with the historical record of other nations and communities. Like the prime minister, he stressed Islam’s democratic nature and sought to assuage minority anxieties about life in a state guided by Islamic norms. Yet, there were some striking differences between the two statements. While Liaquat Ali Khan had spoken of the justification for Pakistan in terms of safeguarding the Muslim way of life, he had made no reference to the implementation of Islamic law.[416] ‘Usmani, on the other hand, saw an “Islamic system” (Islami nizam), by which he evidently meant a system anchored

in Islamic law, as the goal of the state,[417] and he quoted Jinnah several times in support of this point. Unlike the prime minister, ‘Usmani underscored the centrality of the model of the Prophet Muhammad’s first four successors, the Rashidun, to the new state.[418] The more discerning listeners would also have noted that the prime minister and the shaykh al-Islam were not quite on the same page so far as the role of the religious scholars in the new polity was concerned. “Islam does not recognize either priesthood or any sacerdotal authority,” Liaquat Ali Khan had said; “therefore, the question of a theocracy simply does not arise in Islam. If there are any who still use the word theocracy in the same breath as the polity of Pakistan, they are either labouring under a grave misapprehension, or indulging in mischievous propaganda.”[419] ‘Usmani, too, had noted that, “in Islam, a religious government does not mean papacy or church government. Having broken an idol with its statement, ‘they [that is, the Jews and the Christians] take their rabbis and their monks as lords beside God’ [Q 9.31], can the Qur’an conceivably allow its worship?”[420] Yet, while the prime minister would have clearly counted the ‘ulama as part of the “priesthood” that he wished to spurn,[421] ‘Usmani, as the new state’s preeminent ‘alim, could hardly be expected to go along with this. And it is telling that in quoting Jinnah’s Eid message of 1945, which had “our Prophet enjoin … on us that every Musalman should possess a copy of the Quran and be his own priest,”[422] ‘Usmani had quietly omitted this line about the priesthood of all believers.[423]

Much like the blueprint prepared by Ishaq Nadwi in the wake of the Lahore Resolution of 1940 had it, ‘Usmani and his ‘ulama associates saw themselves as the people whose views the governing elite needed to recognize as authoritative in all matters concerning Islam. In appointing a subcommittee of the ‘ulama to advise it on how Islamic norms ought to inform the much awaited constitution, the Basic Principles Committee went some way toward precisely such recognition. ‘Usmani had died by the time this subcommittee, the Board of Ta‘limat-i Islamia (“Islamic Teachings”), was established, and the board’s designated chair, Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, took some time to arrive from India. In any case, the board’s recommendations provide a useful window on the ‘ulama’s vision of Pakistan as an Islamic state, as well as their view of the modernist elite.[424]

The board envisioned the functions of the Islamic state in ambitious, albeit vague, terms:

<quote>

Such a state is required to work for the consolidation and glory of Islam, implementation of its scheme of life in all its fullness, eradication of vices, propagation of virtues, creation and maintenance of healthy moral atmosphere, ensuring procurement of necessaries of life and dispensation of full justice to all the people inhabiting the territory irrespective of their religion, race or colour, etc., preservation of human dignity as enunciated by Islam, diffusion of knowledge and learning, maintenance of peace and order inside the territory, enforcement of punishments and penalties prescribed by Shariat, control and disbursement of public money in an equitable manner as laid down by Islam, maintenance and consolidation of armed forces to avoid and meet all possible danger from any quarter whatsoever, protection, as a Divine trust, of the legitimate interests of Non-Muslims living within the territory and the general well-being and prosperity of the masses.[425]

</quote>

This was a utopian view of how the state should act and, in being guided by medieval constitutional theory, also a very traditional one. The traditionalism is underscored, besides much else, by the idea that a pious ruler, elected for life on the model of the Rashidun caliphs, was most suited to convert Islamic political theory to practice. Given, furthermore, that Pakistan was to be an ideological state,[426] only those committed to its Islamic ideology could be entrusted with the highest offices. This meant obviously that non-Muslims could not hold such offices.[427] And should the country adopt a parliamentary rather than a presidential form of government, the real powers were to rest exclusively with the parliament's Muslim members.[428] As for women, the board saw their proper sphere of activity as the household rather than the public or political arena. But if they must become part of the parliament, only those beyond menopause ought to serve.[429] The assumption was, of course, that postmenopausal women would no longer pose the same degree of threat to the moral order that was represented by younger women. The office of the president was, in any case, to remain a male preserve. And the person occupying that office had to be not merely a Muslim but also "virtuous in … terms of the Shariat, … not

guilty of major sins, … not habitually indulgent in the commitment of minor sins and … not openly profligate in the observance of the Rules of Shariat."[430]

On the question of ensuring that no laws were repugnant to the teachings of Islam, as the Objectives Resolution had already laid it down, the board envisioned a body such as itself—a "Committee of Experts on Shariat"—to advise the president and the parliament.[431] This, of course, was a rechristened version of what the medieval jurists would have called the people "who loosen and bind" the public affairs of the community. Its critics called it the mulla board. Any parliamentary disagreement on interpreting Islamic matters was to be referred to this body.[432]

Like the Objectives Resolution, it is easy to caricature the recommendations of the Ta'limat-i Islamia board—in this case, for its traditionalist romanticism.[433] They seem wedded to the memory of the Rashidun, without seriously examining whether there was any historical basis to that memory or how the putative ways of Islam's first caliphs could be replicated in mid-twentieth-century Pakistan. Yet, caricatures apart, the 'ulama were open to considerable flexibility. Even as they staked out what clearly was a maximalist position, they repeatedly showed themselves willing to compromise. Though the board thought that a pious ruler need not have any term limits, they were not opposed to having them.[434] Though they recommended a presidential system of government as being more in line with Islamic political traditions, they found a parliamentary system acceptable.[435] Though they did not approve of the non-Muslim minorities playing any significant role in the parliament, they were willing to accept their membership in the legislative assemblies.[436] Though they believed that women were best suited to domestic life, they did not disallow their presence in the parliament. Perhaps most importantly, though they saw the Islamic state as mandated to implement God's law, they recognized the legitimacy of parliamentary legislation on matters not already regulated by the shari'a. This did not quite mean, as Leonard Binder has it, that "legislation … was limited by the Shari'a, but outside of it."[437] In the board's words, it meant rather that new laws "are not only not [to be] in conflict with the requirements of Shariat but are also devised in light of its broad and basic principles, go well with the spirit of Islam and are conducive to the accomplishment of the aims and objects of an Islamic state."[438]

Insomuch as such legislation was guided by shari‘a norms, it scarcely needed to be outside it.

In the interim (and quickly withdrawn) report it submitted to the constituent assembly in September 1950, the Basic Principles Committee had rejected almost all the recommendations of the Board of Ta‘limat-i Islamia.[439] The ‘ulama lamented this in a famous statement issued in 1951 on the principles that they thought should guide an Islamic state.[440] The final BPC report, submitted in late 1952, was significantly more favorable to the ‘ulama, though the constitution of 1956 again scaled back what the modernists were willing to offer them. A number of Islamic provisions aside, the constitution was a far cry from any maximalist vision of the Islamic state. Yet, it is again a measure of their flexibility and pragmatism that the ‘ulama and the Islamists came almost immediately to endorse it.[441]

If recommendations such as those of the Ta‘limat-i Islamia board, as well as other pronouncements to similar effect, had more flexibility about them than stereotypes of hidebound ‘ulama might have suggested, their rhetorical and moral force should not be missed either. Among other things, they were meant to put the modernist elite on the defensive in what was billed on all sides to be an Islamic state. In prepartition India, Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani had brushed aside the fears of some prominent ‘ulama that the modernists were out to destroy the religious scholars.[442] ‘Usmani’s speech to the constituent assembly, the Ta‘limat-i Islamia board’s recommendations, and the ‘ulama resolution of 1951 were all vigorous if not aggressive appeals, in the court of public opinion, to what the modernists needed to live up to if they were to be true to their professed Islamic commitments. The board’s recommendations were also a thinly veiled critique of prevailing conditions. While many ‘ulama subscribed, as they still do, to the ideal of a ruler “virtuous in terms of the Shariat,” positing that ideal was clearly also meant as an indictment of a governing elite whose lifestyles diverged markedly from it. The modernists were sensitive to such charges. Consider the testy exchange between justices Muhammad Munir and M. R. Kayani—the two judges comprising the Court of Inquiry looking into the Punjab anti-Ahmadi disturbances of 1953—and Amin Ahsan Islahi, a noted religious scholar and exegete who was then associated with Mawdudi’s Jama‘at-i Islami:

Q: Have you been making speeches and publicly saying that leaders in Pakistan have been leading a notoriously un-Islamic life?

A. I do believe that they are leading an un-Islamic life and I must have expressed this opinion.

Q. When you denounce a man that he is leading an un-Islamic life, do you know his inner character; and can you, without knowing anything about his character, consider it right to proclaim that he is leading a notoriously un-Islamic life?

A. Whatever his character may be, if he does not observe outwardly all the apparent injunctions of Islam, I claim for myself the right publicly to accuse him of leading an un-Islamic life. Such criticism of public leaders is fully justified by all standards.

Q. Do you give to your own critic the right that despite your compliance with the outward forms of Islam, he considers you, according to modern ethical standards, a debased and depraved man?

A. Yes.[443]

*** The Modernist ‘Ulama

As discussed in the previous chapter, the ‘ulama have been able on occasion to turn some members of the modernist camp into their allies. The modernists, too, have had some significant allies within the ranks of the ‘ulama. Despite impeccable scholarly credentials, such people have fared poorly at the hands of the more traditionalist ‘ulama, however, and though some noted modernists had served as their patrons, they have not had much visibility in accounts of Islamic modernism either. Yet, no study of Islamic modernism or of the ‘ulama, for that matter, would be complete without some attention to their discourses. In this section, I consider two examples of

such ‘ulama, Muhammad Hanif Nadwi and Muhammad Ja‘far Phulwarwi, both of whom were members of the team of scholars assembled by Khalifa Abdul Hakim at his Institute of Islamic Culture in Lahore in the 1950s.

A native of Gujranwala in the Punjab, Hanif Nadwi (d. 1978) was educated, as his name suggests, at the Nadwat al-‘Ulama in Lucknow. He later served for many years as a prayer leader at a mosque in Lahore, where he came to be well-known for his lectures on the Qur’an. Over the course of a prolific career, he published a number of books on hadith—he was an adherent of the Ahl-i Hadith or Salafi orientation—and on the Qur’an, works on Islamic law, and studies on such medieval luminaries as Ghazali (d. 1111), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), and Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406). Though his scholarly career had begun well before the partition of the Indian subcontinent, a good deal of his published work belongs to his decades-long association with the Institute of Islamic Culture. He had joined this organization shortly after its inception in 1951. It gave him financial security and it provided a direction to his writings. Late in his life, he also served as a member of the Council of Islamic Ideology.[444]

Books published under the auspices of the institute were typically addressed to a modern-educated audience. They were meant to instruct such readers in Islam while buttressing particular modernist positions. But they also sought to speak to the traditionally educated, especially when written in Urdu rather than in English, and by ‘ulama like Hanif Nadwi rather than by intellectuals like Khalifa Abdul Hakim. Not all those who had studied in madrasas were learned scholars, of course, which meant that they, too, could be educated further in Islamic matters and perhaps steered away from an inherited conservatism. There may have been the hope that even distinguished traditionalists would join in a conversation that the institute was trying to sponsor through its researchers. A good example of a work that strove to address these varied audiences is Hanif Nadwi’s Problem of Ijtihad (Mas’ala-i ijtihad).[445]

Published in 1952, just a year after the institute’s foundation, the book is much broader in its scope than its title suggests. Echoing Shah Wali Allah, Hanif Nadwi posited that Islamic prescriptions were not merely a matter of mindlessly obeying God but were based rather on the pursuit of human

interests (masalih), and that these interests were discernible through human reason.[446] This was an argument against literalist readings of the sacred law but also, by the same token, for the adaptation of that law to changing circumstances and needs. Not everything in the sacred law was amenable to change, and Hanif Nadwi distinguished, as others had before him, between divinely mandated ritual practices (‘ibadat), which must remain immutable, and laws governing human interaction (mu‘amalat), which were subject to modification in changing circumstances. In the latter case, particular rulings could be set aside in light of the general principles embedded in the foundational texts, he said, even when the rulings in question were specifically present in those texts. For this would be a case not of ignoring the teachings of the foundational texts in favor of something else, but rather of reinterpreting some legal rulings in those texts with reference to others of a broader import.[447] This was precisely where ijtihad came into play, which he defined, following the thirteenth-century jurist Sayf al-din al-Amidi (d. 1233) via the nineteenth-century Yemeni scholar Shawkani (d. 1834), as “the exertion of one’s utmost effort, beyond which no further effort seems possible, to arrive at the most plausible view in legal matters.”[448] To this, Hanif Nadwi juxtaposed the following “nontechnical” definition of his own:

<quote>

Given that Islam is a sagacious (hakīmana) system of thought and practice, there are subtle strengths (ustuwariyan) in the form of [legal] rationales and [human] benefits that are built into its structure. Delicate meanings and interconnections lie behind its rulings; and a vibrant and comprehensive philosophy underlies its laws. A mujtahid is one whose gaze is fixed on the totality of its intellectual system, one who is able to discern the strengths that are concealed within it, one who discovers the meaning and connections that are hidden yet present in it.… He is then able to find the solution to new problems in light of the rationales behind the rulings, their meaning and their interconnections, and to apply the results to new circumstances.[449]

</quote>

That Islam was a “complete religion” meant only, Hanif Nadwi said, that “it provides guidance on all facets of life, not that it takes society itself to be static … or that it does not envision society’s progression beyond the levels

at which it found itself in the time of the Prophet."[450] The task of Islam was to provide guidance to its adherents as they moved through changing times,[451] and the mujtahid was at the forefront of those who did so. The Prophet himself was a mujtahid, Hanif Nadwi said, and he made clear that more was at stake in this assertion than to elevate the later mujtahids' pedigree and the significance of their intellectual endeavor. What it meant was that the Prophet was not merely the deliverer of the divine message but also its interpreter, one continuously engaged in applying it to particular circumstances and deriving broad principles from it.[452] Not to see the Prophet as actively engaged with the divine message in some such way was, Hanif Nadwi said, to take a "mechanical view of prophethood." A skilled physician was one, he said, who did not merely apply received knowledge to the ailments he treated; rather, he possessed an ability and an understanding that went beyond the sum of his acquired knowledge. The same was true of a musician or an architect. But if we were willing to take this view for such practices, he rhetorically asked, "why should we take a mechanical view of prophethood, viz, that it does not produce the insight of a mujtahid, or that the prophet only remembers the text of the Qur'an and is appointed to disseminate it rather than also reflecting upon it and undertaking ijtihad in its light."[453]

This extraordinary position fell well short of Fazlur Rahman's view of the Prophet's role in the making of revelation, though it did go considerably beyond that of the traditionalists in how it visualized the Prophet's active interaction with the text of the revelation. Hanif Nadwi was at pains to emphasize the authority of the Prophet's teachings, against Orientalist skepticism about their authenticity and the arguments of the (unnamed) Ahl al-Qur'an, and this included the authority of his ijtihad as well.[454] Yet, in seeing some of the Prophet's teachings as his ijtihadic extrapolations from revelation, he did leave the distinct impression that they were not necessarily any more binding on succeeding generations than was the ijtihad of a distinguished scholar. For someone with Salafi leanings, this was a quite remarkable stance.

The modernists have always had strong aspirations toward implementing their vision of Islam in Pakistan and of reforming Islamic law to that end. Hanif Nadwi's work sought to facilitate the path to such reform or, as he put it, toward "the codification of a new fiqh."[455] The book exuded a clear

sense not only that a rethinking of the law was imperative in modern conditions of radical change but also that the newly established state had the opportunity to lead the charge in that direction.[456] Two examples of what such rethinking might look like are worth mentioning. First, in a discussion of the qualifications for ijtihad, Hanif Nadwi noted the view of the aforementioned Shatibi (d. 1388) that, provided he met other conditions, a non-Muslim, too, could undertake ijtihad. This went against the common juristic view that being a Muslim was a necessary condition for ijtihad. With some agility, Hanif Nadwi argued that there was no contradiction between Shatibi's view and that of the generality of other jurists. For while only a Muslim could be a mujtahid, properly speaking, a non-Muslim could participate in a more inclusive activity of ijtihad. Consequently, non-Muslims, too, could be part of a modern legislative assembly engaged in ijtihad. This was to say that such an assembly could be the site of ijtihad without having to lose its democratic credentials, which it would if the state's non-Muslim inhabitants were given no representation in it.[457]

A second example, which occurs near the very end of the book, relates to the question of private property.[458] Developing his earlier argument that norms relating to matters of human interaction were subject to change while those concerning worship were not, Hanif Nadwi observed that property ownership fell into the former category and "the shari'a has no interest in whether it is permitted or disallowed—this is a purely worldly matter."[459] This, again, was a significant departure from the received tradition. From the perspective of the traditionalist 'ulama, just because particular norms fall into the category of human relations rather than that of worship did not necessarily mean that they could be reordered at will, and, as historians of Islamic law have often noted, the right to property is among the most sacrosanct in the world of the medieval jurists.[460] Why those jurists had protected the right to private property is, Hanif Nadwi said in an uncharacteristically romanticized vein, because the sort of evils that now attend upon it did not yet exist: "Today private property does not mean what it did then. There was no complexity about it earlier. The life and rights of any group or class were not affected by it to the degree they are now. It was not the case then that a group had the right, on the basis of feudal practices, to monopolize all luxuries while ceaselessly enlarging the circles of poverty and deprivation for others. Nor was the current uneven system of elections and representation prevalent then, one that entrusts the reins of government and the control over all sources of power to those who are already in

possession of unlimited amounts of it.”[461] This view was in accord with the socialist-leaning writings of Khalifa Abdul Hakim, the institute’s founding director. It was very far from the views of many Deobandis, though scarcely from all of them.[462]

Ideas similar to those of Hanif Nadwi were articulated by Muhammad Ja‘far Nadwi Phulwarwi (d. 1982), who was also associated with the Institute of Islamic Culture from the time of its inception until 1973. He, too, had been educated at the Nadwat al-‘Ulama and was, in fact, the son of one of the Nadwa’s founders—a locally influential pir from Bihar in eastern India. In a book aptly titled The Religion Is Easy (al-Din yusr), first published in 1955, Phulwarwi argued at length that Islam promoted human welfare in all conceivable forms but that the ‘ulama had imposed unwarranted constraints on things permitted to people by God and His Prophet. The most effective way of reclaiming this easy-to-live religion was for Muslims to return to their foundational texts.[463] But even within those texts, a distinction was to be made between universal, eternal norms and those that were of a “provisional” nature. The teachings of the Qur’an regarding the fair treatment of slaves were not to be taken to mean, Phulwarwi said, that it envisaged the existence of this institution for all time. Qur’anic injunctions on the welfare of the poor did not presuppose that conditions of poverty should be preserved in order to then apply those injunctions. The same was true of the rules governing warfare. “There is so much on jihad and the preparation for it in the Book [of God] and in the sunna, and our intellectuals have so idealized it as a goal, that all Islam appears to have been encompassed by it. There is no denying the importance of warfare, yet this, too, is a provisional matter, a means toward a higher end. The true purpose [of such teachings ultimately] is to eliminate warfare from the world, to establish such peace and security that no trace of fighting remains.”[464]

Phulwarwi proposed a further, and related, distinction between what he called shari‘a and din. The latter, he said, was an abstraction comprising “eternal values” (he used the English words here). Shari‘a, on the other hand, was a specific embodiment of those values, and it was not unalterable. For example, he said, God has repeatedly enjoined ritual prayer (namaz). “The essence of this injunction is to express [human] servitude” to God. The actual practices that constituted ritual prayer were,

on the other hand, a facet of the shari‘a. While servitude to God was an unchangeable value, the particular manner in which it had been given expression was not. Thus, the ritual prayer is performed not only while standing upright but also, in case of the infirm, while sitting or even lying down; sometimes it has four cycles, sometimes two or even just one; sometimes one faces the Ka‘ba while performing it, and at other times it can be undertaken irrespective of direction, and so forth. Yet, such variation had no bearing on the fundamental value it was meant to articulate.[465] Phulwarwi was aware of the significance of his chosen illustration: “We have adduced the most important element of religion (din) as our example here. It should not be difficult to extend this [idea] to all of religion.”[466] But there was more to it than he stated. As seen with Hanif Nadwi, even those who eagerly endorsed the adaptability of religious and legal norms often tended to exclude matters of ritual worship from that purview. To Phulwarwi, on the other hand, it was not such rituals but certain universal values that lay at the core of religion, and they alone were eternal.

To say that particular religious and legal norms ought to remain receptive to change was not, however, to make them dispensable at will. Rather, ‘ulama like Hanif Nadwi and Phulwarwi were considerably more cautious in how they understood the dialectic of continuity and change than was true of many a Western-educated modernist. A useful example relates to the hudud, which Phulwarwi discussed toward the end of his book and to which I will return in another context later in this chapter. In juristic parlance, the hudud refer to punishments—for such infractions as theft, brigandage, drinking, and unlawful sex—that are specifically mandated in the Islamic foundational texts and, unlike many other punishments, are considered to be nonnegotiable. They are also draconian, and authoritarian regimes have sometimes advertised their Islamic zeal by embracing them, as did General Zia al-Haqq with his Hudood Ordinances. The punishment for theft under hudud laws is the cutting off of a hand; one of the punishments for brigandage is the cutting off of a hand and a foot; for unlawful sex between an unmarried man and woman it is a hundred lashes; and for those who are (or have previously been) married it is stoning to death. Phulwarwi could conceivably have taken the tack of arguing that such punishments no longer had a place in the modern world. That, however, is not what he said. Rather, he argued that even the hudud could be interpreted in a way that revealed Islam’s concern with facilitating things for people. “Hudud absolutely do not mean that you go out of your way to find excuses for imposing punishments and be on the

lookout for ways to impose the severest penalties. The spirit behind the hudud is just the opposite of this—it is finding reasons to ignore [wrongdoing] and forgive it, giving preference to erring on the side of forgiveness than to erring on that of penalty."[467] The Prophet, he said adducing the relevant traditions, was often reluctant to impose the hudud punishments, and so were the first caliphs.[468] He argued further that the Qur'anic injunction to cut off the thief's hand could be interpreted metaphorically, too, in the sense of cutting off all that induces or compels people to steal. And, he suggested, if the Qur'an notes several alternative punishments for the more serious crime of brigandage, including capital punishment but also exile, it stood to reason that the lesser crime of theft be also amenable to less severe punishments, such as exile or imprisonment.[469] What the Qur'an referred to as brigandage was itself to be understood as a crime whereby someone tries to "sabotage" the social order, he said, and it was this feature of such crimes, rather than a fixed and specific act, that called forth the severest penalties in particular circumstances.[470]

The consumption of alcohol, though part of the hudud crimes, was also to be evaluated according to the specificities of circumstances, Phulwarwi said. He cited a telling anecdote from Ibn Taymiyya in this regard. Passing by a company of Tatars who were drinking, a companion of Ibn Taymiyya's condemned them for it. But Ibn Taymiyya reprimanded him for this censoriousness. God had forbidden alcohol because it obstructed people from prayer and the remembrance of God, Ibn Taymiyya said. But, in case of the Tatars, their drinking distracted them from killing, enslaving, and looting people.[471] Phulwarwi also adduced a hadith in which the Prophet asks his companions not to curse a man who had been repeatedly caught drinking for, as the Prophet put it, "he loves God and His messenger." What this hadith suggested, Phulwarwi said, was that "such criminals might do [great] things that pious and sinless people cannot. You have surely seen scores of instances in which a dissolute (fasiq) man has endangered his life for the sake of a wronged person, whereas the pious man sits aloof; a sinful man gives away his savings for some noble cause whereas the devout person sits like a serpent on his wealth. An ignorant person preserves his integrity (khudi) at all costs while the scholar is bought off by the unbelievers. Hence a man defines his place through his overall character, not by the externals of some of his actions."[472] No names were named, but it is tempting to see these last sentences of the book as something more than an argument for a flexible

and differentiated view of the hudud. It was also a defense of the Pakistani modernists, frequently maligned by the ‘ulama and the Islamists for their Westernized lifestyles.

Just as it is not hard to buy into modernist stereotypes of traditionalist ‘ulama, it is easy to dismiss ‘ulama like Phulwarwi and Hanif Nadwi as simply toeing the modernist lines of argument—the more so, of course, because they were employed at a modernist research institute.[473] Yet, their views represent serious arguments, arrived at through careful engagement with the Islamic scholarly tradition. Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, their positions sought to remind their readers that the Islamic tradition was more varied than the traditionalists would have them believe, that important voices from the hallowed past could be mustered in support of departures from the conservative mainstream as well. At the same time, for all their very substantive differences with the traditionalists, there were limits to how far even Phulwarwi and Hanif Nadwi would go in backing the modernists. One example of this deserves notice here. In discussing the qualifications for ijtihad, Hanif Nadwi made it clear that anyone who did not have a mastery of the Arabic language had no business engaging in ijtihad: “People who dabble in ijtihad as a pastime (mashghala-i ijtihad) without being able to read Arabic should, for God’s sake, take stock of their limitations. They need to see if they possess enough knowledge to move forward in its light. [Ijtihad] is not a trivial task such that everyone can undertake it. Rather, it is the final station of knowledge and understanding/gnosis (ma‘rifat), one whose frontiers intersect with those of prophethood.”[474] With some notable exceptions such as Fazlur Rahman and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, English-educated Pakistani modernists are not well-known for their knowledge of the Arabic language. Persian was a different matter. Muhammad Iqbal was a distinguished poet in that language, and Khalifa Abdul Hakim had written his doctoral dissertation on the metaphysics of Rumi. But a knowledge of Persian, though central to the Sufi tradition in the eastern Islamic lands and to Islamic ethics, cut no ice with the ‘ulama when it came to demonstrating expertise in Islamic law. Elsewhere in his book on ijtihad, Hanif Nadwi referred derisively to “ignorant mujtahids,”[475] which again was plainly meant to deflate the modernist hubris on matters of ijtihad.

*** Legal Reform: Transgressing God’s Limits?

Given that such criticism as a Ja‘far Phulwarwi or a Hanif Nadwi had of the English-educated modernists would be dismissed as toothless by the traditionalist ‘ulama, it is now worth asking how the latter have sought to take on modernist initiatives. Their responses to state-sponsored legal reform provide some useful illustrations of their misgivings toward its authors and backers but also of the ambiguities that characterize all sides of a fraught relationship.

In 1956, shortly after the promulgation of Pakistan’s first constitution, the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws had submitted its recommendations to the government for reform in this core area of Islamic law. The commission was headed by Mian Abdul Rashid, a retired chief justice of the Supreme Court; Khalifa Abdul Hakim served as its secretary and the moving spirit behind it. The sole representative of the ‘ulama on the commission was Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi (d. 1981), whose polemics against Fazlur Rahman were noted in the previous chapter. The commission’s report and Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi’s note of dissent are both documents of considerable interest for our purposes here.[476]

The report exuded great assuredness in the modernist enterprise. It quoted Iqbal’s famous lecture on ijtihad and implicitly staked out a claim to the only kind of new legal thinking that Iqbal had been interested in discussing, viz, “ijtihad as complete authority in legislation.”[477] Like Iqbal, the report lamented the tendency of the religious scholars to rigidly adhere to the views of earlier jurists and it attributed the decline of Islam to such rigidity.[478] True Islam, on the other hand, was anything but opposed to progress:

<quote>

No Muslim can believe that Islam is an outworn creed incapable of meeting the challenge of evolutionary forces. Its basic principles of justice and equity, its urge for universal knowledge, its acceptance of life in all its aspects, its world-view, its view of human relations and human destiny, and its demand for an all-round and harmonious development, stand firmly like a rock in the tempestuous sea of life.[479]

</quote>

It was not just the medieval jurists and their latter-day followers who had made the shari‘a unresponsive to people’s needs, however. The colonial courts and the Anglo-Muhammadan law of British India had also contributed to making the law both cumbersome and static. It was now for the new state to embark upon the project of legal reform in light of Islam,[480] and remedying problems in the laws of personal status was just the beginning of this larger project: “If the reforms proposed by the Commission are welcomed by the liberal and enlightened section of the public and receive legislative sanction they will form an important contribution to the scheme of reconstruction demanded by all who are not fossilized by tradition or blinded by sheer authoritarianism.”[481]

Among other things, the commission recommended that all new marriages should be recorded on standardized marriage certificates and registered with local representatives of the government.[482] It proposed the legal age for marriage as sixteen years for women and eighteen for men. Where all major schools of Sunni law recognized that a couple was irrevocably divorced if the husband had pronounced certain words to that effect three times, even if he did so in a single sitting, the commission recommended that a divorce become final only after the husband had declared his intention of ending the marriage three times over the course of three months. While there are few constraints in Sunni law on a husband’s authority to repudiate his wife, the commission required a matrimonial court to be part of the divorce proceedings. It also recommended severe restrictions on polygyny: a matrimonial court had to approve the request, on grounds of “an inescapable necessity,”[483] for a second marriage, and the court had to be convinced that the husband could equitably provide for his wives.

Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi was unsparing in his response to these recommendations. In a note of dissent that was longer than the report itself, Thanawi ridiculed the commission’s pretensions to ijtihad and bitingly observed that its members lacked even the most elementary acquaintance with the Islamic juridical tradition.[484] This was far more derisive than anything Hanif Nadwi had said on the matter of unqualified mujtahids. Thanawi was especially bitter in complaining that a long introductory note

spelling out the need for legal reform had been included with the recommendations but that there had been no consultation on its contents.[485] He then proceeded to show how all of the major recommendations of the commission were in contravention of Islamic law. The shari‘a stipulated no minimum age for marriage, and ‘A’isha, one of the Prophet Muhammad’s wives, was six or seven at the time of her marriage.[486] While recognizing that child marriage was an undesirable custom, he insisted that to impose a minimum age for marriage constituted “interference in religion.”[487] The British, too, had tried to legislate against it, but they had faced severe opposition. Indeed, he insinuated that the modernist Muslims may have been behind that colonial initiative as well.[488] Thanawi was equally opposed to the proposal that the utterance of the divorce formula three times in a single sitting should be counted as only one of the three times a husband needed to say the relevant words, that the divorce could take effect only over the course of three months, and that a matrimonial court had to officiate over the process. This went against the consensus of the scholars, he said, and it again meant interfering in religious matters.[489] So did the proposed restrictions on polygyny, which he saw simply as an expression of the modernist desire to conform to Western expectations. It was a mark of “blind imitation” of the West that the report recommended legislation against polygyny but said nothing against extramarital sex. To Thanawi, such legislation would only make society more promiscuous.[490]

The commission’s report had claimed that it “proposed no new rights for women which the Qur’an and Sunnah had not already granted them.”[491] Thanawi disputed this, arguing that the commission had illegitimately taken upon itself to “make the shari‘a.”[492] Repeatedly, he also accused the commission of having distorted (tahrif) the Qur’an in trying to find a warrant for its recommendations.[493] In Islamic theology, tahrif is often viewed as one of the more grievous sins of the Jews and the Christians, viz, their distorting of scriptural texts in order to make them conform to their own whims. Besides constituting a tampering with God’s law, such distortions had made them averse to accepting the truth of Islam; without them, they would have seen that their scriptures already testified to Islam’s truth. From Thanawi’s vantage, the modernists were guilty of the same kind of distortions as had earned God’s displeasure toward the recipients of the earlier scriptures.

It would have been difficult to come up with a stronger public indictment of the work of the modernists.[494] Yet, two things are worth noting. First, objections such as Thanawi's could be answered and many of them were by none other than Ja'far Phulwarwi, indeed before Thanawi had articulated them. In a short tract on the question of reform in Islamic family law, published under the auspices of the Institute of Islamic Culture in 1955, Phulwarwi invoked his aforementioned distinction between shari'a and din to challenge the idea that shari'a norms were necessarily immutable or that a modification in them constituted an interference in religion.[495] On the sensitive question of the precedent from 'A'isha's age at the time of her wedding, Phulwarwi denied that she was in fact quite as young as some reports asserted. But he also made the larger point that "the permissibility or impermissibility [of marriage at a very young age] rests on social conditions at any given time rather than on mere precedent. Adhering to the sunna does not consist in literally accepting something that had taken place in the Prophet's time. Rather, true adherence to the sunna means adopting a rule in light of the common good (masalih) and the rationales behind particular rulings (hikam)."[496] Phulwarwi had also taken a swipe at the 'ulama's frequent invocation of the binding authority of consensus. Responding to the traditionalist view that the permissibility of polygyny could not be set aside since it was a matter of the Muslim community's continuous practice, he denied that this was a compelling argument:

<quote>

Is there any reprehensible innovation (bid'a) which is not a matter of continuous inherited practice (mutawaris) in this community? Monarchy, lineal succession, the existence of harems, slavery and concubinage, the selling of captives, despotism—which of these things accords with an Islamic temperament? And yet, because of some misunderstanding [of Islamic teachings], they have continued to be practiced widely and without interruption (tawatur o ta'amul ke sath) by the community. How bad can it be if polygyny, too, is included in this list [of falsely justified practices]?[497]

</quote>

Such arguments were meant to bolster modernist positions though they were not necessarily identical, in either tone or substance, with those of the English-educated modernists. Ironically, and this is the second point to note

about Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi’s rejoinder to the marriage commission report, the modernists themselves seem to have given greater credibility to such strident views than they did to their own allies among the ‘ulama. Yet, not all even among the traditionalists took stringent positions in conformity with modernist expectations. There are instructive illustrations of this in the testimony of witnesses called before the Court of Inquiry investigating the anti-Ahmadi disturbances of 1953. In one instance, the court wanted a religious scholar, ‘Abd al-Halim Qasimi, the founder and head of a Deobandi madrasa in Lahore and an active participant in the anti-Ahmadi agitation, to concede that any effort to implement Islamic law in Pakistan would entail severe restrictions on non-Muslims. The scholar, who taught the medieval compendium Hidaya—among the most authoritative expressions of Hanafi law not only to the ‘ulama but also in British colonial courts—would have none of it, however:

Q. Will you allow the Christians and the Jews to construct new churches and synagogues?

A. Undoubtedly yes.

Q. […] What do you say to the view expressed at page 219 of the second volume of Hedaya that in an Islamic state Christians and Jews cannot be permitted to build new places of worship?

A. Hedaya is merely a book of jurisprudence, and it is open to one to have different views on the subject, unless the exposition of law in the Hedaya is based either on Qur’an or true Traditions.[498]

It has often been remarked that Thanawi was the only member of the ‘ulama to have been appointed to the marriage commission.[499] What is equally significant is that he was the ‘alim appointed to it, though he was hardly the most eminent of the Pakistani ‘ulama. As Fazlur Rahman had sarcastically noted in 1963, in responding to Thanawi’s charge that he was trying “to ‘modernise’ Islam by exploiting the Central Institute of Islamic Research in collaboration with foreign Christian missionaries”: “I only wish

that a dignitary like Maulana Ehtashamul Haq would produce some academic works of a standard comparable to some produced by non-Muslims on our problems."[500] If Thanawi's choice as the sole 'ulama-representative on the marriage commission suggests an effort on the part of the governing elite to hold traditionalist voices at bay, it equally points to a modernist recognition that some among such 'ulama needed to be heard, even cultivated. Thanawi's views had the merit of fitting modernist stereotypes better than those of many others, which may be at least part of what recommended him to a governing elite otherwise as hostile to him as he was to them. Not long after the imposition of martial law, it was the madrasa Thanawi had founded in Tando Allahyar, Sindh, that Ayub Khan visited to harangue the 'ulama along modernist lines. And in 1960, when the Ayub Khan regime formed the board of governors for the then recently established Central Institute of Islamic Research, Thanawi was the one member from among the 'ulama appointed to it.[501] It was the recognition that the government had bestowed on Thanawi that had enabled him to later go on to publicly challenge Fazlur Rahman on his wayward views.

Thanawi's career may have owed something to the ambiguous embrace[502] of the governing elite, but his critique of the marriage commission's majority report did nothing to sway the commission's recommendations. If anything, it would have confirmed the modernists in their dim view of the 'ulama. In March 1961, Ayub Khan, considerably less hesitant to take on conservative sentiment than the parliamentarians of the mid-1950s had been, promulgated the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. In almost all respects, it followed the recommendations of the marriage commission while specifying penalties for the violation of particular provisions.[503] The 'ulama and the Islamists opposed the ordinance vociferously, as they still do. The modernists knew this very well, but, already by 1961, they seemed to be having trouble recalling the specifics of what the traditionalists had said about it. In an editorial in March 1961 praising the ordinance, Pakistan's national daily Dawn posed a challenge to the 'ulama that would have left many among them incredulous: "Is a single one of these provisions contrary to any explicit and unambiguous injunction of the Quran? If so, they are welcome to point it out.... If our Ulema can find no such fault with the new Law they will be well advised to support it or, at any rate, to accept it as the inevitable fulfillment of the demands of the contemporary age in which mere dogma and blind orthodoxy can no longer hope to sway the minds of men."[504]

Around the same time, Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, the founder and head of the Dar al-‘Ulum madrasa of Karachi and an important voice among the ‘ulama in the early constitutional debates in Pakistan, had written a letter to President Ayub Khan, pointing out the several ways in which the ordinance contravened express injunctions of the Qur’an and the sunna as well as the agreed-upon views of the early jurists.[505] The jurists in question, he said, were not just those of the Hanafi school, to which most Sunnis of South Asia adhered. That would be bad enough; what was worse was that no jurists of any of the recognized schools of Sunni law held the positions that the ordinance had come to implement.[506] This, of course, was an argument that Phulwarwi had anticipated and refuted, but it remained a weighty argument.

Shafi‘’s tone was more restrained than Thanawi’s. Even so, he too noted the damning irony that even the British had left the marriage and family laws untouched, since they were “purely religious laws,” and the post-partition government of India had likewise left them alone. Yet, such core Islamic laws were now in peril in an Islamic country.[507] Coming from a figure who had played an active role in giving religious legitimacy to the Muslim League’s case for Pakistan, Shafi‘’s letter conveyed a palpable sense of betrayal. In an understated yet ominous manner, he also warned the government that such infractions of the shari‘a would not be tolerated by the people, who would “find themselves utterly oppressed in their own Islamic country. In these circumstances, even if they are silenced through some legal pressure, their religious sentiments would have been very badly bruised. Always seeing themselves as oppressed, they would lead restive lives, which could pose a danger to the country at any time.”[508] Rather than make a public statement in response to the numerous queries he was receiving on the provisions of this ordinance, he said, he had written privately to the president precisely to avoid adding to popular anxiety on this matter.[509] He concluded his letter by outlining three options for the government: cancel the ordinance and appoint a new commission comprising ‘ulama trusted by the people as well as those capable of translating shari‘a norms into the language of modern legislation; cancel the ordinance and defer the matter until the parliament was convened (under the yet-to-be-promulgated constitution); or, to save face, neither implement nor cancel this ordinance but instead put it in cold storage.[510]

This was a powerful indictment of the government’s modernism. What lent it greater force was Shafi‘’s scholarly stature. In contrast with Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi, Shafi‘ was a major figure in the traditionalist Deobandi camp and he had served as the head mufti of the Dar al-‘Ulum madrasa in Deoband for many years in prepartition India before immigrating to Pakistan to found an identically named madrasa in Karachi. Yet, Shafi‘, too, was far from being irreconcilable to the government or averse to receiving its patronage. He had been a key member of the Ta‘limat-i Islamia board and he went on to serve on many other government committees. His madrasa had begun its life on “evacuee property” [511]—left behind by those fleeing the country at the time of the partition and often requiring political connections to be allotted to new claimants. Though a good deal of the support for the madrasa came from private donations, including the sprawling 56 acres on which it has stood since 1957, those associated with its early administration were influential people. Among them, around 1960, was Hakim Muhammad Sa‘id (d. 1998), the owner of a business empire in traditional—“Greek”—medicine and a prominent philanthropist; he was the madrasa’s treasurer. A former military accountant-general was also on its board of administrators.[512] One of Shafi‘’s best known works, a large commentary on the Qur’an in Urdu, was itself the product of a governmental initiative. The making of this commentary merits a brief digression before proceeding further.

Taking its inspiration from the efforts of the Nasser regime in Egypt to regulate mosques in that country as well as the content of sermons that were delivered on the occasion of the Friday congregational prayers, the government of Pakistan, too, had contemplated in the early 1950s the preparation of a volume of standardized sermons to be distributed to mosques around the country. That effort did not go very far. Echoing the Report of the Court of Inquiry on the anti-Ahmadi disturbances in the Punjab in 1953, bureaucrats at the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting took the view that “no two Ulema would agree to the reproduction of their khutbas [sermons] in one volume, nor would they hold one opinion on a given subject.” Even if a volume of sermons were somehow produced, “the mullas cannot be expected to adopt them for their sermons, and very few persons will read this publication…. [A]ny attempt at prescribing a standard book of khutbas is more likely to raise religious controversies and release forces of dissension than to promote national

unity.”[513] Instead, the ministry proposed airing select sermons on the radio each week, and this is what was soon put into effect in the form of “a special programme called ‘Maarif-ul-Quran’ broadcast every Friday. This programme is based on the Holy Quran and Hadith, the special aim being to impress the need for national unity.”[514] Shafi‘ was the ‘alim chosen for this task. He would continue to deliver his talks each Friday for the next twelve years. The commentary on the Qur’an that he began publishing from the early 1960s was based on these talks and it carried the same title—Ma‘arif al-Qur’an (“Knowledge of the Qur’an”)—as his program on Radio Pakistan. Upon completion, it comprised more than 5,500 pages in eight volumes.[515] This is the commentary that the literary critic Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari would begin translating into English toward the end of his life.[516]

Shafi‘’s standing as a scholar and his willingness to work with the government may well have made it difficult for the ruling elite to ignore him. Yet, they did ignore him, for the most part. The letter Shafi‘ had sent the president was forwarded for a response to Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, the government’s modernist ally.[517] Parwez wrote a spirited defense of the family laws ordinance, arguing that it was not the ordinance but rather the ‘ulama’s view of Islam that was in conflict with the teachings of the Qur’an.[518] Nothing in that tract would have convinced Shafi‘ or Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi, however, and Shafi‘ complained afterward that his objections to the ordinance had remained unanswered. He also complained of bad faith on the part of the government, which had proceeded to publish Shafi‘’s letter to the president but not the content of the substantive objections to the law that Shafi‘ had appended to it.[519] The family laws ordinance remained in effect, as it does to this day. There was no popular unrest either. It would continue, however, to be a bête noire of the ‘ulama and the Islamists. And it is not the only one.

My second illustration of the fraught relationship between the ‘ulama and the state relates to legislation under the Musharraf regime to reform the Hudood Ordinances of General Zia al-Haqq. Though the implementation of the ordinances had always lagged far behind their rhetoric, many people, men and women, had nonetheless been charged over the years with hudud offenses, especially in matters relating to fornication, adultery, and rape. Indeed, much of the attention that Zia al-Haqq’s Hudood Ordinances has

received from scholars and civil rights activists has had to do with sexual crimes, and it is on this aspect that I, too, will focus here.

‘Ulama and religio-political leaders belonging to different doctrinal persuasions had welcomed the Hudood Ordinances warmly.[520] Critics of these laws frequently pointed out, however, that they were unsuited to a modern state, that they caused great hardship to women, and, indeed, that they misconstrued Islamic criminal law itself. For instance, the ordinance relating to zina did not make a clear distinction between the legal consequences of unlawful but consensual sexual intercourse (zina) and rape, with the result that a woman alleging sexual assault could find herself charged with sexual impropriety if she failed to produce the requisite witnesses testifying to the assault. The fact that women (and men) were often acquitted in court, especially on appeal to the Federal Shari‘at Court (FSC) and the Shari‘at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, did not prevent people from being brought to court on zina-related charges. According to the noted human rights lawyer Asma Jahangir, “Between 1980 and 1987, the FSC heard 3,399 appeals in zina cases. Statistics collected in 1988 showed that around 46% of all female prisoners were accused of zina.”[521] The ordinances had tended also to become an instrument of social control. As political scientist Charles Kennedy observed in 1988, there was “seemingly widespread use of the Zina Ordinance to file nuisance or harassment suits against disobedient daughters or estranged wives.”[522]

Benazir Bhutto, who became prime minister shortly after the death of Zia al-Haqq in 1988, was well-known for her opposition to the Hudood Ordinances. Yet, during her two terms in office (1988–90, 1993–96), she had remained under intense pressure from the religious and center-right parties to demonstrate her Islamic commitments. This obviously meant that any effort to amend, let alone to repeal, the ordinances was deemed impolitic. Nawaz Sharif, who twice succeeded Benazir Bhutto as prime minister (1990–93, 1997–99), did not do much more to implement the laws than she had, but they firmly remained part of the criminal justice system. It was only in the final years of General Pervez Musharraf that the laws relating to sexual crimes were amended through parliamentary legislation in the form of the Protection of Women Act of 2006.

Some years earlier, in 2002, a particularly shocking case had helped galvanize women and human rights groups against the Hudood Ordinances. Ruling under those laws, a district court judge in Kohat in the Frontier province had sentenced a twenty-six-year-old illiterate woman to death. The woman, Zafran Bibi, had been repeatedly raped by her brother-in-law while her husband was in jail. The resulting pregnancy was viewed by the court as proof that she had engaged in unlawful sex; the brother-in-law was released for lack of evidence. As she awaited her punishment—stoning to death—in solitary confinement, there were protests by women's groups and extensive bad press within and outside the country. The Federal Shari'at Court eventually overturned the decision in light of the new facts presented to it. Zafran Bibi's husband had come forward to say that his wife had visited him in jail and that he was the newborn's father; Zafran Bibi had been persuaded to concur with that statement and to deny the rape. This had given the Shari'at Court enough grounds to set aside the lower court verdict, though not without a distinct sourness:

<quote>

This is an unfortunate case, which received much publicity in the national/international press. It also gave rise to several controversies. On account of disinformation, misunderstanding, lack of knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the case, some organisations resorted even to take out [sic] processions and demand repeal of the Hudood laws itself without realizing that it was not the laws of Hudood … but its misapplication that resulted in miscarriage of justice.[523]

</quote>

Already before the Shari'at Court decision, the government had referred the Hudood Ordinances to the National Commission on the Status of Women, which President Musharraf had established not long after coming to power. It was then headed by Majida Rizvi, a retired judge of the Sindh high court. Under Justice Rizvi's leadership, the commission issued a report in late summer 2003 calling for the repeal of, rather than merely an amending of, the ordinances.[524] As Justice Rizvi observed, writing for the special committee that her commission had established to examine the ordinances, their "enforcement has brought about injustice rather than justice, which should be the main purpose of the enforcement of Islamic law."[525] The

government would content itself with their amendment, however. And it would be some years before it had mustered the political will to do so.[526]

The ‘ulama and the Islamists were generally hostile to any significant change in the Hudood Ordinances, which they rhetorically equated with God’s own law. The opposition alliance in the parliament, the Muttahida Majlis-i ‘Amal (MMA; United Action Front), which included many ‘ulama and was led by the Taliban ally Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, repeatedly threatened that it would resign en masse if the government embarked upon legislation that contravened the Qur’an and the normative example of the Prophet. Rectifying the excesses of the ordinances was important to the government’s self-image, however, and even as frequent public assurances were offered that “nothing would be done contrary to the Holy Quran and Sunnah,”[527] efforts continued apace to persuade the conservative camp to support the initiative. To this end, a group of prominent ‘ulama from outside parliament was mustered to help negotiate with the MMA. Mufti Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, the vice president of Karachi’s Dar al-‘Ulum madrasa, was the most prominent among them.[528]

Like his father, Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, Taqi ‘Usmani, too, had a long history of association with the government. For more than a decade and a half, until 2002, he had served as a judge on the Shari‘at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. It was in that capacity that he had written a detailed legal opinion in support of banning all interest-based transactions in the country.[529] His elevation to this judicial position, and to the Federal Shari‘at Court prior to that, had much to do with his impressive scholarly productivity and his ability to speak and write in a manner that people of a Western intellectual formation were able to understand, including judges trained in the common law tradition. Such appointments served, in turn, to consolidate his standing, in Pakistan and abroad, as an ‘alim who could masterfully draw on his scholastic tradition to address the legal and economic problems of the contemporary world. All this had also earned him lucrative positions on the “shari‘a boards” of several international financial institutions in the Middle East and the West, including the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, the Saudi American Bank, HSBC, the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, and the Robert Fleming Oasis Fund in Luxembourg.[530] Taqi ‘Usmani’s position on the question of financial interest meant, however, that the Musharraf regime could not rely on him to help overturn the

Shari‘at Appellate Bench’s earlier verdict against it. In order to get this done, he was removed from the bench in 2002, with the government citing his membership on the corporate boards as the reason: “the fact that he had financial interest in holding that ‘all interest-based banking is un-Islamic’ disqualified him from sitting on the bench.”[531] Four years later, the same government found itself turning to Taqi ‘Usmani for help with the Protection of Women Bill.

Members of the “government’s ‘ulama team”—as Taqi ‘Usmani and others on the committee were often characterized in the national media[532]—had many misgivings about the proposed bill. While the Hudood Ordinances mandated the punishment of stoning to death for those convicted of rape, the proposed bill made this crime punishable only under the somewhat less stringent provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code. The ‘ulama on the government team were strongly opposed to moving rape out of the list of hudud crimes. These ‘ulama also insisted that, in case the requisite four witnesses were not available to testify to an act of adultery or fornication, the act in question should still be subject to some form of what Muslim jurists call “discretionary” punishment (ta‘zir)—that is, something less than the hadd-punishment but sufficiently severe to deter such acts. For its part, the proposed bill made it difficult to punish anyone for consensual premarital or extramarital sex. Nonetheless, for reasons that are not altogether clear, the ‘ulama had come away with the impression that their demands for modifications in the bill were acceptable to the government. Taqi ‘Usmani was quoted as saying at one point that “all issues had been settled unanimously and there was delay in preparing the revised draft [only] because every clause was considered in light of Quran and Sunnah.”[533] Leaders of the MMA had had significant reservations about the proposed bill, but the provisional endorsement of the government-appointed ‘ulama seemed to ease many of their concerns, too.

The bill that was actually passed by the National Assembly and the Senate and ratified by President Musharraf in late 2006 was, however, significantly different from the version the government-appointed ‘ulama had apparently consented to. Rape was no longer a hadd-crime, that is, not subject to the penalty of stoning to death. Consensual sex remained a punishable offense but accusations in this regard now had to be lodged in the relevant court rather than with the police, thereby making it more difficult to file such

complaints, and it was left to the court's discretion whether or not to admit the complaint. Perhaps the most important achievement of this new law was to ensure that women victims of sexual assault could not themselves be accused of sexual misconduct and punished for it.[534] The 'ulama did not object to this last-mentioned aspect of the new legislation. They did, however, vociferously denounce other key provisions of the Protection of Women Act. As Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, the leader of the opposition MMA in the National Assembly put it, this law was intended to turn "Pakistan into a free-sex zone."[535] And Musharraf's appeal to the nation, in the wake of the passage of the bill by the National Assembly, to support the "progressive elements" against the "extremists"[536] was interpreted by the MMA leadership as "a declaration of war against Islamic culture and civilization."[537]

Ironically, it was Taqi 'Usmani, a key member of the team of 'ulama the government had appointed to help win over the MMA leadership, who emerged as by far the most articulate critic of the Protection of Women Act. He had been writing on the proposed legislation in leading Pakistani newspapers while the bill was being considered by parliament, and he was scathing in his criticism after it became law.[538] Offering a detailed, point by point analysis of the bill, Taqi 'Usmani argued that it clearly contravened the teachings of the Qur'an and the hadith, and he cited many examples to illustrate this point. But he also built his case against this legislation on other grounds:

<quote>

I myself have been directly hearing cases registered under Hudood Ordinance, first as a Judge of Federal Shariah Court and then for 17 years as a member of Shariah Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. In this long tenure, not once did I come across a case in which a rape victim was awarded punishment because she was unable to present four witnesses. [539]

</quote>

That criminal charges could be filed and verdicts given against women under these laws—as in the case of Zafran Bibi—was largely ignored in this

unforgiving commentary, except by way of a brief acknowledgment of the laws' abuse at the hands of the police. If men could misuse the Hudood Ordinances against hapless women, as has frequently been argued, Taqi 'Usmani claimed that women, too, had used them for their own interest. In a move calculated to address the English-educated members of his audience, Taqi 'Usmani cited the work of the aforementioned Charles Kennedy to suggest that some women entering adulterous relationships had alleged in court that they had been raped by their sexual partner—in such instances, the courts had tended to convict the man but to exonerate the woman.[540] The point of this testimony from "an unbiased non-Muslim scholar who has got no sympathies toward the Hudood ordinance" was to demonstrate Taqi 'Usmani's own familiarity with Western scholarship. It sought to show as well that women's oppression under the Hudood Ordinances was largely a matter of malicious propaganda. But Taqi 'Usmani's point was also that if some women could already use the ordinances to avoid being punished for consensual extramarital sex, the new law would provide men and women greater opportunity to do so. At the same time, he argued, the protections that the ordinances had provided to women—for example, by prescribing a draconian punishment for rape—had been weakened. As the title of one of his online articles on the subject had it, the new law amounted to "making Pakistan safe for rapists."[541]

The language some of the 'ulama used to denounce the Protection of Women Act of 2006—turning Pakistan into a "free-sex zone," making the country "safe for rapists"—plainly illustrates the degree of their hostility to this measure and, more broadly, to what they see as the Westernizing policies of the ruling elite. Yet, once again, such stridency did not necessarily translate into a complete break with the government pursuing such policies. Though the MMA had repeatedly threatened to resign from the National Assembly in the event the Hudood Ordinances were amended along the lines they eventually were, they did not resign. There was a serious rift within the MMA on this issue: the Islamist Jama'at-i Islami, the party that Mawdudi had once led, was in favor of resigning, while Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, the MMA general-secretary and the leader of the 'ulama-led Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-i Islam, was opposed to this. Mawlana Fazlur Rahman seems to have believed that staying in the National Assembly gave the religious parties greater influence than leaving it, though the elected 'ulama have often also been insecure about whether they would be reelected. By the time of the next general elections, in early 2008, there no longer was an alliance of the

religious parties. The Jama‘at-i Islami boycotted those elections, and the other religious parties won few seats in the National Assembly. It was the mainstream political parties—the Pakistan People’s Party of the recently assassinated Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League faction led by Nawaz Sharif—that were the big winners in those elections.

If, in practice, the ‘ulama and the religious parties have often been considerably more pragmatic than their rhetoric would suggest, the effects of their rhetoric can scarcely be discounted. This rhetoric has arguably contributed toward delegitimizing Pakistani governments on Islamic grounds. Much like Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi and Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘ a generation earlier, Taqi ‘Usmani did not mince words in asserting that the bill which later became the Protection of Women Act “blatantly violate[d] the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah.”[542] This would be a serious charge in any Muslim society, but it was especially grave in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, where the government is constitutionally mandated to ensure that no legislation is repugnant to the Islamic foundational texts.

The ‘ulama’s arguments did not remain altogether unchallenged. Already in 2003, as has been seen, the National Commission on the Status of Women had issued a report calling for a repeal of the Hudood Ordinances, helping pave the way for the 2006 legislation. As Justice Rizvi put it later, “I myself studied the Quran and Sunnah to analyze how far these [Hudood] laws are derived from these sources.… [The 2003] report … made people realize that these laws were man-made. We made people think.”[543] Religious intellectuals like Javed Ahmad Ghamidi tried as well to educate public opinion on the many inadequacies of the ordinances, and the Council of Islamic Ideology—of which Ghamidi was a member—did the same in a detailed report on them.[544] Such challenges had serious limits, however. Justice Rizvi was not a religious scholar, and her committee was an eclectic group of lawyers and retired higher court judges, bureaucrats, members of non-Muslim minorities, civil society activists, and a few scholars of Islam. Taqi ‘Usmani, too, had been appointed to it, but he had declined to participate in the proceedings.[545] He did not go out of his way to discredit the work of the committee, as he would in the case of the Protection of Women Act of 2006. Yet, in refusing to take any part in the committee’s work, he had made clear what he thought of it. For their part, as observed earlier, Ghamidi’s views on hudud are not devoid of equivocation, and his appeal in some

circles scarcely matches the national and international standing that Taqi ‘Usmani has come to enjoy as an authority on Islamic law. Ironically, in calling upon a team of conservative ‘ulama to help make the case in 2006 for reforming the Hudood Ordinances, the government had itself lent further credibility to those who soon emerged as the severest critics of this initiative. Ghamidi, for one, saw the government’s overtures toward these ‘ulama as a slight to the Council of Islamic Ideology, whose raison d’être, after all, was to advise the government on precisely such issues. In protest, he had tendered his resignation from the council, though he, too, was soon induced to resume his membership of it.[546]

*** Madrasa Reform: Challenge and Opportunity

Apart from the specter of modernist tampering with Islamic law, few issues have tended to arouse greater misgivings among the ‘ulama than the question of madrasa reform. The need to modernize these institutions, to bring them closer to the educational mainstream, to better regulate them, and to make their products useful to society and the state are familiar motifs in modernist discourses on Islam in Pakistan. For their part, many ‘ulama have seen governmental initiatives not as reforming madrasas but as seeking rather to undermine these last bastions of authoritative Islamic learning, diluting the “purely religious” instruction offered in them and thereby undercutting the ‘ulama’s ability to reproduce and replenish their ranks.[547] This extravagant rhetoric does not illuminate very much, however, either about what the governmental reforms have actually sought to accomplish or about the impact they have had on the madrasas. Both issues merit a brief examination.

Major governmental initiatives aimed at reforming madrasas have taken place in the early 1960s, in the late 1970s, and in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. On the first occasion, in 1962, a government-appointed committee (with a number of prominent ‘ulama, including Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, but dominated by government officials) had called for the teaching of English, mathematics, general science, and social studies in the madrasa.[548] In order to create space for these disciplines without excessively overburdening the curriculum, the report had recommended a drastic reduction in the “unnecessary and out of date … nonreligious” materials, by

which it primarily meant not only medieval Islamic discussions of natural science, but also of philosophy and logic.[549] The “strictly religious subject matter” was, for its part, to be emphasized,[550] and this entailed “an increased emphasis” on the Qur’an and hadith.[551] Ironically, the very effort to find space in the madrasa for modern forms of knowledge was premised on a sharp divide between the religious and the nonreligious. In another irony, by locating religious authority and authenticity not in an evolving tradition but squarely in the Islamic foundational texts, the committee had found itself in inadvertent agreement with a defining tenet of the much disliked Islamists. The larger goal of this reorientation simultaneously toward the foundational texts and modern knowledge was to enable the ‘ulama to “address modern educated masses in a convincing manner,” to “present Islam in a rational manner so that it can be really understood and devotionally practiced.”[552]

The second major set of recommendations on reform, put forward in 1979, was the work of a committee constituted for the purpose by General Zia al-Haqq. Although produced under a regime distinctly more friendly to the ‘ulama than Ayub Khan’s had been in the 1960s, the 1979 report was no less concerned than its predecessor with the unstated aspiration of bringing madrasas under government supervision. But it went further in the effort to integrate the public school or “general” curriculum into the madrasas, and it offered a new and important incentive for the ‘ulama’s consent in this regard: the degrees awarded by madrasas were to be recognized as the equivalent of university diplomas provided particular portions of the general curriculum were also taught in madrasas. Thus, madrasas were to teach the entire general curriculum at the five-year-long primary-school level; they were to devote one-third of the time to this curriculum during the next five years, culminating in matriculation; and they were to have English, politics, and economics as electives during the following four years, whereupon the successful student would receive the madrasa’s equivalent of a bachelor’s degree. This was to be followed by two years of further study, amounting to work at the master’s level. Completion of studies at the latter two stages was to be recognized by Pakistani universities, as well as prospective employers, as the equivalent, respectively, of a bachelor’s and a master’s in Arabic or Islamic studies from a public university. In turn, the universities’ own master’s curriculum in Arabic and Islamic studies was to be the same as that of the madrasas.[553] Since the late 1950s, madrasas belonging to different sectarian orientations have had their own boards to coordinate their

educational activities throughout the country. The 1979 report sought to build on that development by recommending the establishment of a single national organization to oversee those boards, thereby to further facilitate the standardization of madrasa education and its equivalence with mainstream public education.

That many of the recommendations of the 1979 report for the introduction of the modern disciplines into the madrasa curriculum were similar to those of the 1962 committee suggests not merely a shared bureaucratic understanding of what needed to be done with the madrasas but also the limits on the government's ability to implement its reforms. Two decades after the 1979 report, the government of General Pervez Musharraf continued—in the third major initiative toward madrasa reform—to urge the introduction of modern, secular, disciplines into the madrasa. But in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, this initiative was much more directly focused than its predecessors on bringing the madrasas under government monitoring.[554] Having a madrasa officially registered with the government was now required not merely to have its advanced degrees recognized by the public universities but as the very condition of the madrasa's legitimate functioning.[555] Even in this changed atmosphere, however, the government was not notably successful in implementing its stated policy—that is, in shutting down madrasas that failed to register with it. The new initiative also envisaged establishing certain government-supported "model" madrasas where secular learning could be fully integrated with the religious sciences.[556] But given that all registered madrasas were supposed to be imparting a religious education together with elements of the public school curriculum, precisely what would set these model institutions apart from other madrasas remained uncertain. The resolve toward the "registration and regulation" of madrasas was reaffirmed as part of the National Action Plan adopted by the government in the immediate aftermath of the horrific massacre of more than 130 children at a school in Peshawar in December 2014. That resolve, too, has yielded uncertain results so far.[557]

As might be expected, the 'ulama have offered much public commentary, sometimes at considerable length, on government-sponsored initiatives to reform and regulate their institutions. One brief illustration will have to stand for many others here. This was in response to the reforms proposed in 1979,

and it came from the Deobandi scholar Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianawi (d. 2000), a professor of hadith at the Jami‘at al-‘Ulum madrasa in Karachi.

Ludhianawi argued that to integrate madrasas into the educational mainstream, as the 1979 report had proposed, meant nothing less than destroying Islam itself. The government of an Islamic state would thereby achieve, he said echoing a familiar motif, what the British never could.[558] Madrasas were the “defenders of the religious sciences” in society; their integration into the state-sponsored system of education would signify nothing but to “prevent them from their purely religious services and to subordinate them to the modern [Western] sciences.”[559] Further, a “mixed” curriculum, with something from both the religious and the modern sciences, would not produce men who “combine the medieval and the modern…. [Rather], the products of such a system would be useless equally for religion and the world.”[560] What the reform sought to create was not ‘ulama, Ludhianawi concluded, but “only loyal government servants.”[561]

Contrary to what one would expect from such broadsides, madrasas have, in fact, adapted themselves to governmental initiatives at reform. Leading madrasas of Pakistan have come to provide for instruction precisely along the lines proposed by the 1979 report. For instance, in addition to departments for the memorization of the Qur’an, Taqi ‘Usmani’s Dar al-‘Ulum in Karachi has long had a primary and a secondary school, thus serving both to prepare students for the traditional Dars-i Nizami curriculum and to offer instruction in the public school curriculum. In July 2016, it was announced that the boards overseeing the madrasas belonging to different doctrinal orientations had agreed to teach the same high school curriculum as that followed by the Islamabad-based board of public education.[562] This seems merely to have ratified a development that had already been materializing for some time.[563]

The results of such adaptation have not been detrimental to the ‘ulama’s interests. For instance, the equivalence between the degrees awarded by madrasas and those of the public universities has created new possibilities for them, notably in terms of employment. It has allowed madrasa graduates to teach Arabic and Islamic studies in public schools and colleges. Not content simply with mere equivalence, some ‘ulama have gone on to receive

academic degrees directly from the universities. Taqi ‘Usmani has bachelor’s degrees in the humanities and in law from the University of Karachi and a master’s in Arabic from the University of the Punjab in Lahore, though he had earned these degrees long before the 1979 proposals. Mukhtar Allah Haqqani, the compiler of a six-volume collection of fatwas issued during the second half or so of the twentieth century by the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya—the madrasa best known in the West for the fact that several members of the Afghan Taliban leadership had once studied in it—has a master’s degree in Islamic studies from the University of Peshawar.[564] Some ‘ulama have also been able to proceed to doctoral programs by virtue of the formal recognition of their prior degrees. For instance, Nizam al-din Shamzai, the chief jurisconsult and professor of hadith at the Jami‘at al-‘Ulum al-Islamiyya madrasa in Karachi at the time of his death in 2004, had a PhD in Islamic studies from the University of Sindh.[565] Mas‘ud Baig, who headed the girls’ section of the Jami‘a Bannuria al-‘Alamiyya in Karachi and was assassinated by sectarian rivals in 2014, also had a doctorate from Karachi University and he taught there as well.[566] Both a son and a nephew of Taqi ‘Usmani have earned PhDs from Pakistani universities, in addition to degrees from the Dar al-‘Ulum madrasa. Their dissertations, now published, are concerned with showing how modern economic problems are to be addressed from the standpoint of Islamic law.[567]

Even when the ‘ulama lack degrees from colleges and universities, as most still do, the rhetoric and, as the case may be, the practice of their openness to public education facilitates their interaction with those schooled in them. It is worth noting, for instance, that the desire of segments of the population for a deeper grounding in Islam than is provided to them by the mandatory public school courses in Islamic studies has sometimes brought them to madrasas for part-time religious instruction. As Matthew Nelson has observed with reference to attitudes toward Islamic education in contemporary Pakistan, “the overwhelming majority do not approach their educational options (for example, religious versus non-religious education) as a zero-sum game. Instead … most families are inclined to construct a careful balance of sorts, including both types of education at the same time.”[568]

Though I speak in this book in terms of particular facets of Islam, ordinary believers are not classifiable, of course, as ‘ulama, Islamists, modernists, Sufis. They do tend to follow various orientations—Sunni or Shi‘i; Deobandi,

Barelawi, Ahl-i Hadith, among the Sunnis—but it has often taken much work by interested parties to make their contours sufficiently distinct for those who are supposed to belong to them. The receptivity of ordinary believers to particular ideas and claims to authority is the prize for which the leaders of the various religio-political facets and orientations compete. However, even when they incline toward some claimants to authority rather than others, many ordinary believers have tended to combine ideas of varied provenance, just as they would combine religious with a worldly education. To take one example, the ‘ulama often lament divisiveness in the Muslim community, yet they have tended to take the existence of rival doctrinal orientations more or less for granted.[569] On the other hand, the Islam of the modernists professes to brook no sectarianism. To Iqbal, as would be recalled, “[t]here are no Wahabies, Shias, Mirzais or Sunnies in Islam.”[570] In explaining his approach in Islamic Ideology, Khalifa Abdul Hakim had observed likewise that “[a]ll sectarian controversial matter has been eschewed [in the book] and Islam is presented in its broad basic principles.”[571] In positing a single, true Islam that transcends sectarian and other commitments, many—perhaps most—ordinary educated believers are closer to the modernist view than they are to the ‘ulama’s.[572] But this has not stopped them from also recognizing the ‘ulama’s authority in particular areas of their lives or from turning to them for guidance and to their madrasas for some of their education.

The ‘ulama’s madrasas are not, however, the only institutions providing Islamic education. The influential Islamist organization, the Jama‘at-i Islami, has long had its own madrasas, though they have functioned on a much more limited scale than the Deobandi or the Barelawi madrasas.[573] Since the early 1980s, an educational and religious movement called the Minhaj al-Qur’an—“the path of the Qur’an”—has come to spawn a substantial number of schools across the country, with aspirations to bridge the gap between traditional Islamic and modern, Western education and to bring to people “a [human] nature- and Sufi-based approach to individual reform.”[574] This is an educational movement led by a university-educated Sufi of Barelawi leanings, Muhammad Tahir al-Qadiri, whom we will meet again in chapter 6. Since the mid-1990s, a movement called al-Huda (“Guidance”), has also organized highly structured study groups focused on the Qur’an for middle- and upper-middle-class urban women. Founded by Farhat Hashmi, who has a PhD in Islamic studies from the University of Glasgow and was once associated with the Jama‘at-i Islami, al-Huda study groups have sought to

cultivate a pious personhood among college- and university-educated women in light of Qur'anic teachings. Though it is very conservative social norms that are inculcated among them in the process, Islam is presented as a "rational" religion well suited to the lives of well-educated, often English-speaking people.[575] This Islam is also billed as resolutely nonsectarian.[576]

It is not lost on the traditionalist 'ulama that the likes of Farhat Hashmi are a challenge to their authority.[577] Yet, insomuch as they can be characterized as representing an "innovative traditionalism,"[578] movements such as hers serve paradoxically to also foster a kind of religiosity that other traditionalists can build on—once, that is, they have made some necessary adjustments in how to package their own wares. Openness to modern forms of education is a crucial part of that adjustment. That, however, is not the only or even perhaps the most important reason why madrasas have continued to grow in Pakistan.

*** The Madrasa: Growing Numbers

Although the bureaucrats leading madrasa reform in the early 1960s had envisioned new generations of imams with whom "true religious values would flourish" in the country,[579] they would have been hard pressed to see why the institutions producing such people would need to multiply. After all, any unregulated, parasitical growth could not but add to a poor nation's burdens. An exasperated General Pervez Musharraf put it this way almost a half century later: "I ask these seminaries how many mosques … there [are] in the country to accommodate all these 1 million students as imams."[580] Unforeseen or not, madrasas have in fact steadily grown in number throughout much of the history of Pakistan, at times at an extraordinary pace. In this final section of this chapter, I propose to briefly examine this development and the conditions in which it has taken place.

A significant part of the context in which madrasas have continued to exist and to grow has to do with their ability to meet needs that the Pakistani state often does not. The state's promise to provide education to all its citizens has remained unrealized. In 2013–14, nearly 29 percent of primary-school-age

children were receiving no schooling.[581] Of those who did, about 10 percent, or around 1.8 million, studied in madrasas (which here includes institutions of primary education as well).[582] The actual figures may be higher because many madrasas remain unregistered and many others uncounted. In contrast with madrasas, the growth of public schools has often remained stagnant. For instance, the student population in public primary schools hardly grew between 2011–12 and 2013–14 and that in high schools declined during those years.[583] Aggravating matters further in recent years, the Pakistani Taliban and allied insurgents have targeted public schools—a key symbol of government authority—in the tribal areas of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, while madrasas have continued to stand and to grow. According to a 2014 report, in one such tribal area, the Khyber Agency, “where militants have destroyed 85 schools since 2005, disrupting the education of 50,000 children, over 56 percent of six- to sixteen-year-olds attended private schools or madrasas in 2013.”[584] It is also worth noting that, unlike many other schools, a madrasa typically provides an education that is free of charge and students receive free food and lodging. Ironically, by equipping their students with the knowledge that allows them to act as prayer leaders and preachers, to officiate over a variety of other religious functions, and in many cases to establish their own mosques and madrasas, these institutions might offer more secure prospects of a job to their graduates than do many public schools and colleges to their students. Some of the larger madrasas have come to impart new skills to their students. The national organization coordinating the madrasa boards claimed in 2009 that “dozens of seminaries registered with its five boards are offering courses on banking, journalism, computer science and other modern subjects which appeal greatly to students.”[585]

The failure of successive governments to provide basic amenities to the citizens of the state is not the whole context, of course, in which the growth of madrasas is to be understood. Directly or indirectly, government policies have sometimes also paved the ground for their growth in other ways. The most notable instances of this belong to the Zia al-Haqq era. As part of its Islamization campaign, the government had begun in 1980 to collect the religiously mandated zakat tax from the people, and a portion of these funds was made available to the ‘ulama. This was important financial inducement to support the military regime. It would have helped relieve some of the financial burdens on existing madrasas, but it also provided an incentive to establish new madrasas to receive the promised funds.[586]

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the resulting influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan also contributed to the growth of madrasas during those years. Many madrasas in the North-West Frontier and in Baluchistan were established, and others grew in size, specifically to cater to the Afghan refugees. Some became part of the war effort, with students regularly participating in the Afghan jihad, madrasas adjusting their calendar to accommodate them, and the government and the military helping, presumably, with both finances and logistics.[587] It was from madrasas in Pakistan that the Taliban, too, would emerge, with one of the largest of the Frontier madrasas—the aforementioned Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya—providing several of those who came to comprise the movement’s leadership.[588] Decades earlier, too, and for all their suspicion of the ‘ulama, government officials had seen traditionalist religious institutions as a potential barrier against regional separatism and leftist subversion. Already in December 1947, just months after the establishment of Pakistan, the finance minister had submitted a memorandum to the prime minister on the “Bengali–Non-Bengali Question in East Bengal.” “Rural areas of East Bengal are saturated,” the memorandum had stated, “with Ulemas, Madrasah educated people who look up to Deoband, Saharanpur, Jaunpur, Rampur as their spiritual home. But the contagion has undoubtedly spread among a considerable section of the English educated intelligentsia who thinks that morsel [sic] is being taken out of their mouth by outsiders. Politicians, Muslim communists, fifth columnists are all exploiting the situation for their own purpose. There is potential danger of disruption of the solidarity of Pakistan State.”[589] Among possible remedies, the memorandum had suggested that “Ulemas, public men and propagandists should be mobilized to propagate the message of Muslim solidarity throughout the urban and rural areas of East Bengal.”[590] In 1949, the interior minister thought likewise that the ‘ulama could be helpful against Communism, “the most serious threat to the peace and internal security of Pakistan.”[591] Although specific evidence is usually lacking, it seems reasonable to assume that the government saw the establishment of madrasas and related institutions not merely as an acceptable price to pay for the support of the religious conservatives but also as a bulwark against the leftist intelligentsia. A religious menace tended, moreover, to be seen, and not just in Pakistan, as more amenable to eventual control than one represented by secular activists. In the Egypt of the 1970s, for instance, the government of President Anwar Sadat had not merely tolerated but actively cultivated Islamist groups as a way of taking on the leftists.[592] In the 1980s, a similar

logic would help underwrite the alliance between the Afghan mujahidin, the Pakistani military, and the CIA.

Socioeconomic change in Pakistan has also contributed to the growth of madrasas over the decades. Though poverty is frequently seen today, even by the madrasa leadership, as fueling this growth,[593] it is arguably a relative affluence in society that had helped increase their numbers during the 1970s and the 1980s.

Pakistani labor had unprecedented opportunities to work in the Gulf states of the Arab Middle East between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. The revenues of the petroleum-producing Arab states had skyrocketed in the wake of the Arab oil embargo and so did their development projects in subsequent years: Saudi Arabia's petroleum revenues rose from $4.3 billion in 1973 to $22.6 billion a year later and to $102.2 billion in 1980; those of Kuwait from $1.7 billion in 1973 to $6.5 billion in 1974 to $17.9 billion in 1980; and those of the United Arab Emirates from $0.9 billion in 1973 to $5.5 billion in 1974 to $19.5 billion in 1980.[594] As seen in the previous chapter, Bhutto was keen to cultivate ties with the Arab and Islamic world and, indeed, to position Pakistan as an intermediary between the West and the Arab states.[595] Pakistan was a beneficiary of the effort by Saudi and other oil-rich Arab states to extend their influence in the Muslim world, and calculations about Saudi patronage could not but be a factor in moving Bhutto away from some of his party's hardline socialist ideologues. This was small price to pay for what the economic possibilities in the Gulf region could mean for Pakistan. According to political economist Omar Noman, "[a]pproximately 10 million people or 11 percent of the total population (a figure that includes dependents) … benefited directly from the exodus to the Middle East. The vast majority of the beneficiaries came from low-income households. On average, their salaries increased between 600 and 800 percent."[596] Unsurprisingly, this dramatic upward mobility brought about a significant growth in the ranks of the lower middle and middle classes in urban Pakistan, especially in the Punjab, which had contributed nearly 70 percent of the expatriate labor.[597] Already in 1953, a good deal of the support for the anti-Ahmadi agitation had come from the petit bourgeois.[598] By the 1980s, thanks to the labor influx, there was a new depth and breadth in their ranks. As many returning migrants and their families moved from ancestral villages to small towns and cities, they often sought new,

more self-conscious and heightened expressions of religious identity, a sharper sense of what separated their putatively universalistic Islam from what would now have looked like the muddled beliefs and practices of village life. Support for up and coming mosques and madrasas, and for sectarian organizations ready at hand to teach them what their piety must consist in if it was to be credible, were important markers not just of religious but also of socioeconomic change in the 1980s and beyond.[599] Though these militant organizations began to emerge in the mid-1980s, the madrasas had already begun to grow at a dramatic pace in the Bhutto years. Table 1 makes this clear.

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-10.jpg][Table 1. Madrasas in Pakistan, 1960–79]]

Sources: Nazr Ahmad, Ja’iza-i madaris-i ‘arabiyya-i Maghribi Pakistan (Lyallpur: Jami‘a Chishtiyya Trust, 1960), 797–811; Nazr Ahmad, Ja’iza-i madaris-i ‘arabiyya-i Maghribi Pakistan (Lahore: Muslim Academy, 1972), 688; Report qawmi committee bara’i dini madaris-i Pakistan (Islamabad: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1979), 210–13.Note: The figures for the years prior to 1971 refer to West Pakistan only. For the madrasa figures, also see Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 198.

As table 1 suggests, while they had increased 19 percent (from 472 to 563) between 1960 and 1971, madrasas had grown about 210 percent over the course of the 1970s (from 563 in 1971 to 1,745 in 1979). Much of this growth had clearly preceded the advent of Zia al-Haqq’s martial law regime and its Islamization campaign.[600] It is unlikely that the Bhutto government was actively encouraging the establishment of madrasas. Rather, some of the aforementioned socioeconomic processes were presumably at work in paving the way toward their growth during those years. The anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1974 had also mobilized conservative religious sentiment across the country, and that, too, is likely to have had some effect on the growth of the ‘ulama’s influence and of their institutions. Despite the government’s efforts to highlight its religious commitments, the religio-political parties tended to be highly suspicious of it, which probably also impelled them both to resist

perceived government encroachments on their turf and to pursue their activities more aggressively. An example is worth noting here. Denials by the Bhutto regime notwithstanding, many ‘ulama feared that the government intended to take over their madrasas. It did attempt to do so in some instances—notably, in case of the Deobandi Nusrat al-‘Ulum madrasa in Gujranwala in 1976, though that had to do not with a broader policy regarding madrasas but rather with the local administration’s wish to punish political opponents associated with the institution in question. The manner in which the latter resisted this move is instructive in showing something of the relationship between political opposition and religious action. Realizing that leaving the madrasa vacant during the summer holidays in the Islamic months of Sha‘ban and Ramadan would allow the local administration to occupy it for good, the madrasa’s president, Mawlana Sarfaraz Khan Safdar (d. 2009), began a series of lectures on the Qur’an during those months. These would continue for the next twenty-five years.[601] An opportunity soon arose for such localized acts of resistance against the government to become part of a country-wide agitation. The religious and center-right parties had formed an electoral alliance in 1977, and they subsequently launched a massive movement to protest what were widely seen as rigged elections. The movement, which eventuated in the martial law of General Zia al-Haqq, was launched in the name of establishing “the Prophet’s system” (nizam-i Mustafa) in the country, to replace corrupt, godless regimes like Bhutto’s. Such powerful shows of force in the name of Islam, the patronage the new military regime was all too keen to offer, and the effects of the Afghan war could only facilitate the growth in subsequent years of institutions the ‘ulama viewed as bastions of a beleaguered Islam. Table 2 provides some indication of the growth of madrasas in Pakistan’s most populous province.

The available figures on the growth of madrasas also shed some light on a related question, viz, how the various doctrinal orientations have fared in relation to one another. The data in tables 3 and 4 are again limited only to the Punjab, and the figures reported by different sources often show considerable and often hard to reconcile divergence among them. Despite these caveats, the data are suggestive of some broad trends.

Table 1 suggests that the Deobandis have come to dominate the religious landscape in Pakistan. However, as it also shows, Barelawi madrasas grew at

a considerably faster rate in the 1960s and the 1970s than did those of the Deobandis. The latter grew 24.89 percent from 1960 to 1971 and 21.64 percent from 1971 to 1979. Over the entire period, 1960–79, they grew nearly 52 percent. By contrast, Barelawi madrasas grew by 26.5 percent from 1960 to 1971 but an extraordinary 115.3 percent from 1971 to 1979; over the entire time span covered by table 1, they grew about 172 percent. The Ahl-i Hadith madrasas grew 168 percent between 1971 and 1979 and 129 percent over the entire time period shown in table 1. Shi‘i madrasas, for their part, grew 173 percent from 1971 to 1979 and nearly 128 percent over the entire period. This means obviously that all madrasas benefited from the socioeconomic processes outlined earlier. The Ahl-i Hadith madrasas may have benefited also from being able to garner a larger proportion of international Salafi patronage—emanating primarily from Saudi Arabia—though that often came to the Deobandis as well. What table 1 suggests about the growth of the Shi‘i madrasas is especially impressive because it precedes the impact of the Iranian revolution of 1979. As will be observed in chapter 5, the revolution galvanized the Pakistani Shi‘a and contributed to the rise of sectarian militancy in the country. Yet, that sectarian radicalism may itself have been fueled by the growing numbers of madrasas during the 1970s.

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-11.jpg][Table 2. Growth of Madrasas in the Punjab, 1975–2001]]

Sources: Zindagi, February 17, 1995; News, March 7, 1995; News, May 26, 1997; Dawn, January 22, 2002.Note: Figures for the Faisalabad division were not available prior to 1994.

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-12.jpg][Table 3. Madrasas in the Punjab, 1994 (Estimated Number of Students in Parentheses)]]

Source: Zindagi, February 17–23, 1995.

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-13.jpg][Table 4. Madrasas in the Punjab, 2001 (Estimated Number of Students in Parentheses)]]

Source: Asif Shahzad, “Over 250,000 Students in Punjab Seminaries,” Dawn, January 22, 2002.Note: These figures, which do not always add up, are based on police reports.

[[m-q-muhammad-qasim-zaman-islam-in-pakistan-14.jpg][Table 5. Madrasa Students in the Punjab, 2005]]

Source: Sajjad Shafiq Butt, “441,565 Students Are Enrolled in Punjab Madaris,” News, January 2, 2006.Note: These figures are based on a report by the Punjab Police.

So far as the Barelawi madrasas are concerned, two additional factors may account for their growth. First, most of the labor migrants to the Middle East in the mid-1970s had a rural background,[602] where Sufi-inflected beliefs and devotional practices broadly identifiable as Barelawi have long been at their strongest. This means that the mosques and madrasas such migrants would have supported were more likely to be those of a Barelawi than of a Deobandi orientation. Second, the growth in question may well be the effect of how particular madrasas were reporting their affiliations. Of all the doctrinal orientations not just in Pakistan but in South Asia more broadly, the Barelawis have tended to be the most loosely organized. They had formed their madrasa board in 1960, but it had remained largely inactive until revived in January 1974.[603] The increase in Barelawi madrasas that table 1 shows between 1971 and 1979 may well reflect not only a growth in absolute numbers but also the listing of previously unaffiliated, even undocumented, madrasas on the Barelawi roster. The fact remains, in any case, that the Barelawis and the Deobandis have had the lion’s share of madrasas and of their students in the Punjab, as tables 3, 4, and 5 indicate. And according to some estimates, the Barelawis had maintained an edge until recently. In the country as a whole, however, Deobandi madrasas outstrip Barelawi ones, and probably do so now by wide margins. The Deobandi madrasa board claimed in 2016 to have approximately 18,600 affiliate madrasas, with a student body of over 2,000,000. By contrast, the Barelawi board put the

number of affiliate madrasas at about 9,000, with around 1,300,000 students.[604] While allowing for the possibility of inflated numbers, the difference between the two estimates is nonetheless worth noting. In more general terms, too, that is, apart from the sheer number of madrasas, the Deobandis have cast a much larger shadow over religious and political life in Pakistan than have any of their doctrinal rivals.

In some measure, the prominence of the Deobandis vis-à-vis others continues a trend already in evidence in late colonial India. Pakistani governments have contributed in turn to a further consolidation of that trend. Given the crucial support Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani had given toward bolstering the Muslim League’s Islamic credentials in the run-up to the partition of India, it is not surprising that he became the most influential of the ‘ulama after the state’s inception. His associates had even wanted him buried next to Jinnah, though that request was denied by the government.[605] Significantly, many of the other ‘ulama who played an influential role in Pakistani politics and society in subsequent decades were also Deobandi. These include Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘ as well as Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi and Taqi ‘Usmani. Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, the head of the Ta‘limat-i Islamia board, though not a Deobandi by training, had become a disciple of Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi by the end of the latter’s life. Mawdudi was closer in doctrinal orientation to the Deobandis than he was to any of their rivals. Even the modernist Fazlur Rahman was the son of a Deobandi ‘alim.

Deobandi influence in Pakistan cannot be reduced, however, to government patronage and there is more to it than even the fact that its textualism—blending scripturalism and the legal tradition as it does—appeals to people drawn to the idea of an authentic Islam cleansed of its accretions. The Deobandi orientation is also buttressed by the Tablighi Jama‘at, a proselytizing movement that had originated in colonial India and has come to have a global presence. Though people associated with this movement are not known for their intellectual pursuits, being focused instead on inculcating pious living at the grassroots, the upper echelons of the Deobandi ‘ulama do remain notable for their often vibrant intellectual concerns. Indeed, this is much more the case with the Deobandis than it is with the contemporary Barelawis, and the intellectual output of prominent Deobandis has inevitably helped further their influence, in Pakistan and abroad. Even a casual visit to the Urdu Bazar of Lahore, which houses many publishers and sellers of books

on Islamic topics, should suffice to show the Deobandi dominance in this area. The works of Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi have continued to be reprinted in Pakistan. Mahmud Hasan’s translation of the Qur’an has remained influential in South Asia since its publication in 1925. Significantly, it was this rather than some other competing translation that the Saudis chose to publish in a new edition in 1993 as part of their program to disseminate the Qur’an in reliable local translations throughout the world.[606] Mahmud Hasan’s translation comes with a brief commentary by Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, whose separate commentary on the Qur’an has also been published.[607] Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘’s exegetical work has already been discussed earlier. And Taqi ‘Usmani is among the most prolific of ‘ulama anywhere in the Muslim world today.

Although Islam in postindependence India falls outside the purview of this book, Taqi ‘Usmani’s account of a visit to India in 2010 sheds useful light on some of the things touched upon in this chapter, and it is with that account that I conclude. Taqi ‘Usmani was invited for a lecture tour by a Muslim businessman from Chennai and he addressed people in that city, in Bangalore, Deoband, and elsewhere.[608] He notes with satisfaction that “the economic conditions of Muslims are much better than before,”[609] an assessment that may reflect the privileged company he kept on this visit more than the actual state of the Indian Muslim community at large. Foremost among his audience were Muslim businessmen and members of the intelligentsia, after all, who wanted their questions about banking and other economic matters answered in relation to Islam.[610] Yet, he also drew large crowds in Deoband, the bookish but economically depressed town that houses the original Dar al-‘Ulum after which Taqi ‘Usmani’s own madrasa in Karachi is named.[611] In this town, in particular, but also at the other madrasas he visited, he was seen as someone who had brought distinction to the Deobandis by his religious learning and his many books but also by his ability to bridge traditional and modern learning, his recognition in both the Arab world and in the West.[612] Far from conjuring up stereotypes of mullas at a loss in their changing environs, he represented the forward-looking yet authentic face of contemporary Islam. As someone introducing him on one occasion had put it, he was “the interpreter of the Dar al-‘Ulum of Deoband throughout the world.”[613] The fact that he is the son of Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, the original Deoband madrasa’s leading jurisconsult prior to the partition of India, and that he was born in the town of

Deoband itself, had made for an even stronger basis on which to claim Taqi ‘Uthmani’s distinction as Deoband’s own.

What this account allows us to see is the continuing appeal of the ‘ulama’s traditionalism in the contemporary world, including among circles of Western-educated and upwardly mobile people. The latter, too, are part of the support base, in Pakistan, India, and in the South Asian diaspora, that has helped sustain madrasas. Taqi ‘Usmani has been able to address their questions with considerable skill; and it was to cater to similar kinds of people in Western societies that several financial institutions had wanted him to serve on their corporate boards.[614] But traditionalism—in this case, a demonstrated mastery of Islamic law and a facility with age-old juridical and exegetical approaches to seemingly arcane texts—needs to be translated into a language that an audience lacking those assets could readily understand. Taqi ‘Usmani is skilled in that language, too. The dividends of the ‘ulama’s accommodation to modern forms of knowledge are in full evidence in his case. This accommodation is nonetheless very much in the service of a traditionalist understanding: his Islam is closer to that of his father Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, whom he invoked at every conceivable opportunity during this Indian tour,[615] than it is to the modernist ‘ulama’s —the likes of Hanif Nadwi and Ja‘far Phulwarwi. This arguably is precisely what gives it a sense of authenticity among many Muslims of a modern upbringing.

Traditionalism is also a matter, of course, of being able to show that one’s understanding of Islam is not merely one’s own, that revered figures from the recent and remote past have held similar views.[616] During his visit to India, he took time to argue against those who claim that “the Book of God is enough for us. We need nothing [or no one] else. We will study the Book ourselves, understand it on our own, and follow the path that this study and understanding point to us.”[617] Such views are as characteristic of the modernists as they are of the Islamists. To Taqi ‘Usmani, though, they betray “a lack of understanding of the Qur’an. In its very first chapter, al-Fatiha, God has clearly stated that the straight path is not the one that you will arrive at through your intellectual effort and your reading of the Qur’an. Rather, the ‘straight path’ is that which has been adopted by those whom God has blessed.”[618] Drawing ideas straight from the Book of God has an appeal,

however, that is not easily countered. The Islamists have been masterful at it, but others are not immune to it either.

** Chapter Four: Islamism and the Sovereignty of God

THOUGH WE WILL OFTEN SEE the ‘ulama and the Islamists sharing many goals, rhetorical motifs, and practices when it comes to undermining the modernists as well as in other respects, the Islamists need to be viewed in their own right, too. The present chapter is an effort in that direction. I take a somewhat unusual approach in this instance, however. Rather than providing a broad overview of some major trends in relation to a particular facet of Islam, as in much of this book, my focus here is on one very particular idea—the sovereignty of God. More, perhaps, than most other ideas, the assertion that sovereignty belongs exclusively to God has come to be associated with Islamism everywhere, in South Asia and the wider Muslim world. Yet, this idea has had a purchase well beyond Islamist circles, and it is not among the Islamists that its origins lie. An exploration of this idea, of its ramifications, and of the contestations over it allow us a unique vantage from which to observe Islamist thought and practice in colonial India and in Pakistan, their relationship with the medieval tradition, with Islamist trends in the wider world, and, not least, with representatives of other facets of Islam.

The Qur’an speaks repeatedly of the power, the authority, and the majesty of God. As the Qur’anic Joseph reminds his fellow inmates, “Authority (al-hukm) belongs to God alone” (Q 12.40), and we are told elsewhere that it is God’s prerogative to give authority (al-mulk) to whom He will and to take it away at His pleasure (cf. Q 3.26).[619] From passages to this effect, it is not a big leap to the idea of the sovereignty of God. Some translators have, indeed, rendered the Qur’anic mulk as sovereignty. A notable example of this is Marmaduke Pickthall (d. 1936), the English convert to Islam who published his translation of the Qur’an while in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad, one of the many Indian princes recognized as quasi-independent by the British colonial regime.[620] Yet, it is no mere quibbling to observe that the idea of sovereignty has a very particular history in European political thought and that it emerged in tandem with the rise of the modern state. Whatever terms like al-hukm and al-mulk had meant to medieval commentators of the Qur’an, they could not have meant what

“sovereignty” meant to, say, Jean Bodin (d. 1596) or Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679).[621] To many Muslims of the twentieth century, writing under the threat or the promise of the modern state, the idea of sovereignty does, however, evoke precisely the sort of things that a Bodin or a Hobbes had theorized about, and the question for them has often been whether such sovereignty can belong to a mere human being, a collectivity of people, the “artificial person” of the state, or whether it properly belongs only to God.[622] In influential formulations, twentieth-century Islamist ideologues like Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) of Egypt have argued that anything less than exclusive submission to God’s law and all that it entails in religious and political terms is idolatry—the most heinous of sins in a monotheist’s universe. Before examining how this idea became such a crucial part of Islamist discourses, we need to take a quick measure of the sort of things premodern commentators discussed when they explained passages that Islamist ideologues take as central to the idea of the sovereignty of God.[623]

*** The Medieval Tradition

As might be expected, medieval exegetes understood the mulk of Q 3.26 and other such passages in a variety of ways. It refers, according to some, to God’s response to the Prophet Muhammad’s prayer that dominion over Persia and Byzantium be given to his people.[624] Others glossed it as the faith and the ability to submit to God (al-islam) that He grants to whom He wills, or as prophetical authority,[625] whereby God honors those who follow the prophet and debases those who do not.[626] Some commentators reported, in discussing Q 3.26, that the ‘Abbasid caliph Ma’mun (r. 813–33) had seen an inscription in a Byzantine palace which read, in Arabic translation: “In the name of God: With the alternation of the day and night and the rotation of the celestial bodies in the heavenly sphere, felicity (al-na‘im) passes from a king whose rule has ended to another king. But the king possessing the [real] throne is everlasting; He does not die and has no partner.”[627] As the hadith scholar and Qur’an commentator Baghawi (d. 1122) noted in explicating Q 3.26: “God has said in one of His books: ‘I am God, the king of kings and the master of kings. The hearts of kings and their forelocks are in my hand. If my servants obey me, I make the kings a mercy for them; and if they disobey me, I make the kings a punishment for them. So do not concern yourself with reviling the kings but

turn instead towards me and I will dispose them favorably towards you.’”[628] Though God’s granting of political authority might be foregrounded, as it was in these instances, al-mulk, at its broadest, could be construed to mean possession and control of all kinds of desirable things that God bestows upon select people: “the endowment of prophethood, the possession of knowledge, intellect, health and praiseworthy dispositions, power and the ability to implement [things], the power of love, and the possession of wealth.”[629] Yet other things could be and were often added to this already expansive list, for instance, the mystical powers that God grants to His saintly “friends.”[630]

As will be seen, the Qur’an’s affirmation that “authority (al-hukm) belongs to God alone” (Q 12.40) receives keen attention from modern Islamists, but the medieval exegetes are not equally excited by the idea. The influential tenth-century historian and Qur’an commentator Tabari (d. 923) interpreted it to mean simply that God alone is to be worshipped;[631] and the noted Andalusian exegete Qurtubi (d. 1273) offered a gloss—God “is the creator of everything”—and quickly moved on.[632] The phrase reappears in the same chapter (Q 12.67), and this time Tabari glossed al-hukm as “judgment” and Qurtubi likewise explained it as “command and judgment” (al-amr walqada) but neither took more interest in it than he did earlier.[633] The historian and Qur’an commentator Ibn Kathir (d. 1373), for his part, explained al-hukm as “the power of disposal, will, and authority (al-tasarruf wal-mashi’a walmulk), all of which belongs to God.”[634]

For some exegetes, Qur’anic passages such as the foregoing also raised important theological questions. The aforementioned Baghawi has already shown us a glimpse of this. The theologian Fakhr al-din al-Razi (d. 1210) understood the Qur’an’s affirmation that “authority belongs to God alone” to argue against the idea of free will and to affirm that all possibilities are determined exclusively by God rather than by human agency.[635] He held likewise that it was not because of a person’s merit that God granted him royal authority but rather that all authority came from God, irrespective of the virtue of the one holding it.[636]

Theological issues are also foregrounded in medieval juridical discussions of the idea that “there is no authority (al-hakim) other than God,

the exalted, and that there is no command other than what God has commanded." To the jurist Amidi (d. 1232), this entails that "the intellect cannot characterize anything as good or bad nor does [the intellect suffice to] demonstrate the necessity of showing gratitude towards a benefactor. There is no command prior to the advent of the divine law."[637] The eighteenth-century Indian scholar Muhibb Allah Bihari (d. 1708) brought out more clearly the theological stakes of the idea that "there is no command (al-hukm) except from God." He wrote:

<quote>

There is no disagreement on whether an act is rationally good or bad in the sense of its having perfection or deficiency or of its being suited or unsuited to a worldly matter. The disagreement is only on whether [the intellect itself can tell us if] the act deserves God's praise and reward or, conversely, His condemnation and punishment. According to the Ash'aris, it is only through the divine law … [that one knows this]. What God commands is good, what He forbids is bad. If the situation were reversed, so would the values in question. To us [Maturidis] and to the Mu'tazila, this can be known through the intellect, that is, it does not depend on the divine law. However [in contrast with the Mu'tazila and some others], we do not believe that God must command the humans in accordance with what the intellect suggests; rather we believe that what the intellect prefers is what deserves to be commanded by the wise God, for He does not prefer the less desirable. Yet there is no command unless God commands it.[638]

</quote>

In short, God's authority and power, as the medieval and early modern exegetes, jurists, and theologians understood them, could mean a whole range of things. As should be clear from the foregoing illustrations, the point is not that kings and rulers were outside the purview of this authority, but rather that God was seen to be the source of everything and, by that token, of political power as well. This range continues to be well-represented in the work of many traditionally educated scholars of modern times. For instance, the early twentieth-century Urdu commentary of the Indian scholar Amir 'Ali Malihabadi (d. 1919) gave pride of place to Sufi understandings of Q 3.26 without, however, neglecting varied other ways of understanding this

passage, including God’s statement “in one of His books” that he is “the king of kings and the master of kings.”[639]

Yet, there were signs of change, too, and this was illustrated by the aforementioned Rashid Rida in his unfinished but influential commentary on the Qur’an. Rida interpreted Q 3.26 in a manner that foregrounded the political in speaking of God, “the wielder of supreme and unrestricted power” (sahib al-sultan al-a‘la wal-tasarruf al-mutlaq).[640] God gives power to people as He wishes—by way of descent from a prophetical lineage, as in case of the descendants of Abraham, or, Rida said in evoking Ibn Khaldun, through the working of sociological laws. And God takes it away from people when they begin to violate the principles of good rulership.[641] Like many of his predecessors, Rida noted that al-mulk could also refer to prophetical authority, and he added that, when it did, the authority in question was superior to others since it involved power not merely over bodies but also over souls.[642] In a biting swipe at the many Muslim rulers propped up in his time by their colonial masters, Rida noted furthermore that there was no necessary correlation between authority and glory (al-‘izz), for it was possible for one to pretend to be a king while being at the mercy of others—rather like those assuming such roles in a theatrical performance.[643] All this could be rephrased to say that real sovereignty and mere pretensions to power were very different things and that true sovereignty belonged only to God. Rida did not, however, use that language, which indeed is “completely absent in [his] Tafsir al-Manar.”[644] But it was not long before the Islamists began to use it, and to spell out the implications of God’s authority and what was entailed by the imperative to submit to it.[645]

*** Islamist Discourses

With Sayyid Qutb, it is indeed possible to speak of God’s power and authority in terms of sovereignty, and Qutb did so with great rhetorical effect. Commenting on Q 12.40, which he took to be of key significance in elucidating the Qur’anic conception of God, Qutb wrote:

<quote>

Authority belongs to the exalted God exclusively by virtue of His divinity. For sovereignty (al-hakimiyya) is among the characteristic features of divinity. Whoever lays a claim to sovereignty—whether it is an individual, a class, a party, an institution, a community or humanity at large in the form of an international organization—disputes the primary characteristic of His divinity. And whoever does so is guilty of unbelief in the most blatant manner…. Laying claim to this right [to sovereignty] does not necessarily take a particular form, which alone might be deemed to remove the claimant from the fold of 'the true faith' (al-din al-qayyim [Q 12.40])…. Rather, one lays claim to it … simply by … deriving laws from a source other than [God]…. In the Islamic system, it is the community that chooses the ruler, thereby giving it the legal right to exercise authority according to God's law. But [this community] is not the source of sovereignty which gives the law its legality. God alone is the source of sovereignty. Many people, including Muslim scholars, tend to confuse the exercise of power and the source of power. Even the aggregate of humanity does not have the right to sovereignty, which God alone possesses. People only [have the right to] implement what God has laid down with His authority. As for what He has not laid down, it has neither authority nor legality.[646]

</quote>

This is a decidedly modern view of God's supreme power and authority. For one thing, the very term Qutb used for sovereignty—al-hakimiyya—is a neologism, though it is derived from the aforementioned Qur'anic term al-hukm, which is usually rendered as authority or judgment.[647] Second, as the passage just quoted makes clear, Qutb really did have sovereignty as a political concept in mind when he spoke of God as the exclusive locus and source of all power. This idea of the sovereignty of God lies at the heart of Islamist conceptions of the state, of the law, and of Islam itself. Thus an Islamic state is one that is based on a recognition of God's sovereignty; this recognition entails that no law other than God's is to have any claim on people, that any failure to submit to this conception of the sovereignty of God is unbelief. The Qur'an does say that "those who do not judge according to what God has revealed are unbelievers" (Q 5.44), "wrongdoers" (Q 5.45) and "ungodly" (Q 5.47). But medieval scholars had been far from clear on precisely what it meant not to judge or rule according to God's law. And in the first years of the twentieth century, Rashid Rida had been of the view that it was legitimate for a Muslim judge to rule according to

British colonial laws. In other words, even if Rida had some hazy notion of the sovereignty of God, he did not think that it entailed the illegitimacy of all “man-made laws.” The query to which Rida was responding in this instance had come from India. In his answer, Rida had invoked the idea of the common good (maslaha) to argue that a Muslim judge could advance the interests of his coreligionists better by serving under the British than by refusing to do so, and that working in this capacity was not covered by the Qur’anic prohibition in the aforementioned verses.[648] Sayyid Qutb and other Islamists clearly had a very different view of the matter.[649]

It has often been observed that Qutb’s ideas on the sovereignty of God are much indebted to those of Mawdudi.[650] Mawdudi had begun his career as a journalist and religious intellectual in colonial India, and he had started speaking of the sovereignty of God from the late 1930s. In a work on “the political concept of Islam” first published in 1939, Mawdudi adduced passages like Q 12.40 and Q 5.44 to argue that “sovereignty (hakimiyyat) rests only with God. God alone is the law-giver. No human being, not even a prophet, has the right to command and prohibit on his own.”[651] To leave no doubt about exactly what he meant, but also perhaps to flaunt his familiarity with Western political thought, Mawdudi here gave the words “sovereignty” and “law-giver” in the original English. In a work published two years later, Mawdudi developed the idea of the sovereignty of God further. He argued that “power (iqtidar) is the true spirit of divinity,”[652] that this power is indivisible,[653] that its “indivisibility entails that all forms of sovereignty and rule (hakimiyyat wa farmanrawa’i) should be concentrated in one supreme being,”[654] and that no one can have any say in His “kingdom’s organization” (intizam-i sultanat).[655] Mawdudi continued:

<quote>

If a person considers anyone’s command to be binding without its carrying the support of God’s command, then that person is guilty of associating partners with God in the very same manner as does someone who directs his prayers to other than God. If anyone claims in a political sense to be “the holder of all control” [(malik al-mulk) Q 3.26], the sovereign (muqtadir-i a‘la) and the absolute ruler (hakim ‘alal-itlaq), then his is a claim to divinity in just

the same manner as the claim of someone, in metaphysical terms, that he is that person’s [ultimate] master, deity (karsaz), support, and protector.[656]

</quote>

This was well before Qutb had begun speaking in this vein. How Mawdudi’s ideas were transmitted to the Arab world is a point I will take up later. First, however, it is worth examining how Mawdudi may have come upon this idea of the sovereignty of God. This is a question that seems not to have been asked either by scholars of Islamism or by those who have studied Mawdudi’s thought. Most scholars have taken it for granted that the idea had originated with Mawdudi himself. In posing this question, my concern here is not with trying to determine who may have been the very first to begin speaking of the sovereignty of God in modern Islam. Rida, as has been seen, comes close to it. A case could also be made that the Young Ottoman ‘Ali Suavi (d. 1878), who had had a traditional Islamic education but also substantial exposure to Western ideas, was among the first to invoke this idea. In an article in the Ulum Gazetesi published in 1869, he had sought to refute the idea of the sovereignty of the people, a view popular with the Young Ottomans, and argued that God was the true sovereign.[657] Suavi was in exile in Paris at the time, and this short-lived journal was itself published from Paris. The traditional resources he had drawn upon in trying to refute his opponents had little to do with the sovereignty of either God or the people. Instead, the jurists and theologians he had fleetingly referred to spoke of God as the ruler, by which they meant that God was the source of the commands that human beings had to submit to.[658] Suavi’s innovation, if that is what it was, consisted in placing this idea in a political context, to deny that human beings could be considered to possess sovereign power.

Leaving Suavi and Rida aside, my concern before proceeding further is to draw attention to some overlapping ways in which ideas related to the sovereignty of God had come to find expression in early twentieth-century India, at a time when Mawdudi (b. 1903) was coming of age. A new awareness that the Muslim population in India, despite its large size, was nonetheless an increasingly disadvantaged minority in relation to the Hindus, memories of centuries of Muslim rule, and deep anxieties about the future of Islam not just at home but in the world at large had combined to make

colonial India a particularly fertile soil for reflections on the sovereignty of God.

*** The Indian Background

A key figure to articulate this idea in the early twentieth century was Abul-Kalam Azad, whom we met in chapter 1. A firebrand journalist before he gained national prominence as a politician, Azad was the editor of the Urdu weekly al-Hilal, which had begun publication from Calcutta in mid-1912. It brought him a wide readership, but its uncompromising hostility to colonial rule and its stridently pan-Islamic tone and content also spelled its end within less than three years. Those were years of great turmoil, and the Muslims of India, with help from the likes of Azad, were keenly attuned to events in the wider world. Indeed, Azad had taken it upon himself to not only report on the crises that faced Muslims everywhere but also to put them into a very particular interpretive framework. An article titled “Authority Belongs to God Alone,” published in al-Hilal in July 1913, made the clearest case for the irreconcilable claims upon Muslims of British rule, on the one hand, and of “God’s government,” on the other. Azad wrote:

<quote>

Today, an intense war is taking place between the government of God (khuda ki hukumat) and human kingdoms (insani padshahaten). Satan’s throne has been placed over the largest portion of the earth. The inheritance of Satan’s household has been distributed among his worshippers and the army of the “great deceiver” (dajjal) has spread everywhere. These satanic kingdoms seek to utterly destroy God’s government. On their right side is the bewitching paradise of worldly pleasure and honor, and on their left rages the clearly visible hell of hardship and corporeal punishment. These unbelieving and dark deceivers open the doors of their sorcerous paradise for any son of Adam who denies the kingdom of God (khuda ki padshahat) … and they push anyone who affirms God’s kingdom into the hell of their satanic torments and corporeal punishments.[659]

</quote>

Azad’s government or kingdom of God is not yet the sovereignty of God that we find in Mawdudi, though it is hardly a big leap from the one to the other. It is significant, too, that Azad naturalized the idea of God’s government by reading it directly into the Qur’an. For instance, in the same article, he translated the Qur’an’s reference to the Day of Judgment (Q 82.17–18) as “the day of God’s kingdom” (khuda ki padshahat).[660]

Such renditions were not peculiar to him. For instance, Shah ‘Abd al-Qadir (d. 1813), a son of Shah Wali Allah and one of the first translators of the Qur’an into Urdu, had rendered the key portion of Q 12.40 to mean that “hukumat does not belong to anyone but God.”[661] In the early years of the twentieth century, the ethicist Nazir Ahmad had likewise translated the passage in question as “hukumat belongs only to the one God.”[662] Significantly, hukumat, the standard term for government in Urdu and commonly also in Persian, had been rendered, inter alia, as “sovereignty” in John Richardson’s influential Dictionary of Persian, Arabic and English, which had been prepared for the benefit of overseas British officials and merchants of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries.[663] Readers of ‘Abd al-Qadir and later of Azad and Nazir Ahmad could have understood hukumat as authority or government, but they could also have begun to understand it as sovereignty in the modern sense of the term.[664] Unlike Azad, Nazir Ahmad was no rebel, however. He was an official in the colonial bureaucracy, had translated an English work on the law of evidence into Urdu, and, in 1902, was awarded an honorary DLitt by the University of Edinburgh, of which Sir William Muir was then the principal.[665]

One of the readers of Nazir Ahmad’s translation of the Qur’an was Azad’s contemporary and fellow journalist, Muhammad ‘Ali (d. 1931), who would emerge as the single most prominent leader of the Indian Khilafat movement. Already during World War I, the government had seen him and his brother, Shaukat ‘Ali, to be enough of a threat to limit their movements to a small town, Chhindwara, in the Central Provinces (now Madhya Pradesh). Unlike Azad, who had native fluency in Arabic (his mother was an Arab woman and he was born in Mecca) and had received a traditional religious education, neither Muhammad ‘Ali nor Shaukat had had much exposure to Islamic learning, and it was during their confinement that they “discovered” the Qur’an. It was in the translation of Nazir Ahmad that they did so.[666]

As Muhammad ‘Ali came to see it, “the main theme of the Qur’an and … of the sayings of the Prophet as perceived in authentic Traditions is the Kinghood of God and the Service of Man as His Agent and vicegerent.”[667] He may have been aided in this understanding by some of the language used in an English translation of the Qur’an that had been published in 1917 and that Muhammad ‘Ali had also been reading while in confinement. This was the work of his namesake Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali (d. 1951), a Lahore-based scholar who was a prominent figure in the Ahmadi community. (Though both are often referred to as “Maulana” Muhammad ‘Ali, I will use the honorific only for the Qur’an translator in order to distinguish him from the Khilafat leader.) As will be seen further in the next chapter, the Ahmadis came to be formally excluded from the fold of the Muslim community through an amendment to the Pakistani constitution in 1974. Attitudes toward the Ahmadis were not so stringent in the early decades of the twentieth century, however, especially in the case of the Lahore-based group, who viewed Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer rather than a prophet. The future leader of the Khilafat movement would not have had to make any apology for consulting Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali’s translation.

The Ahmadis have always been keen proselytes for Islam, and a good deal of that effort has long been aimed at Western societies. To this end, but also to refute Western Orientalist and missionary criticisms of Islam, Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali had been especially attentive to explaining the Qur’an in light of Christian scriptures. For instance, he translated Q 3.26–27 as follows: “Say: O Allah, Owner of the Kingdom, Thou givest the kingdom to whom Thou pleasest, and takest away the kingdom from whom Thou pleasest…. Thou makest the night to pass into the day and Thou makest the day to pass into the night; and Thou bringest forth the living from the dead and Thou bringest forth the dead from the living.” More illustrative for our purposes is the explanatory note he added to this passage. These verses, he wrote, “apparently refer to the fact that kingdom and honour shall be given now to another nation, whose night shall be made to pass into a day of triumph…. The Jews had already been warned by Jesus that ‘the kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof’ (Matt. 21: 43). A living nation of Muslims was brought forth from among the dead Arabs, and the living nation of Israelites was represented now by a people who were spiritually dead.”[668] Echoes of the New Testament are

even more explicit in his rendering of Q 67, whose title, al-Mulk, he translated as “The Kingdom” and to whose first batch of verses he gave the subtitle “The Kingdom of God.”[669]

By his own acknowledgment, the poetry of the modernist philosopher Muhammad Iqbal also exercised some influence on Muhammad ‘Ali during his confinement in Chhindwara.[670] He read two of Iqbal’s long Persian poems, The Secrets of the Self (1915) and the Mysteries of Selflessness (1918) during this time and found Iqbal to be confirming what he, Muhammad Ali, had begun to discover about Islam: “it was a commonplace of Muslim religious literature that Islam meant submission to God’s Will and that He was Supreme Ruler of the Universe, but this truth had been allowed by the theologians to sink into the insignificance of a truism, so that we all passed it by, thinking we were fully familiar with it, when in fact, we were entirely ignorant of its true valuation.” Much to Muhammad Ali’s satisfaction, Iqbal was once again making people aware of the implications of this truth.[671]

A more surprising influence on Muhammad Ali came from the English novelist H. G. Wells (d. 1946). He had met Wells some years before, and he read Wells’s wartime novel, Mr. Britling Sees It Through, while in confinement. First published in 1916, this novel is an extended meditation on the senseless death and destruction that the war had brought to all sides. Mr. Britling lost a son to the war, but he was also pained by the death of a young German whom he and his family had come to know before the war and to whose father he addresses some of his reflections near the end of the book. The novel concludes with the discovery by Mr. Britling of the presence of God in and around himself, which helps him deal with his anguish even as it points toward the emergence of a “world republic”:

<quote>

God was with him indeed, and he was with God. The King was coming to his own. Amidst the darkness and confusions, the nightmare cruelties and the hideous stupidities of the great war, God, the Captain of the World Republic, fought his way to empire…. “[God] is the only King…. And before the coming of the true King, the inevitable King, the King who is present whenever just

men foregather, this bloodstained rubbish of the ancient world, these puny kings and tawdry emperors, these wily politicians and artful lawyers, these men who claim and grab and trick and compel, these war makers and oppressors, will presently shrivel and pass—like paper thrust into a flame."[672]

</quote>

The God that Mr. Britling finds, and of whom Wells also spoke in some of his other writings, is very much a personal and immanent God rather than one who is absolute and "comprehensive."[673] Commenting on Wells's God the Invisible King, Muhammad 'Ali observed later that "there is much in … [it that one] would have to outgrow before he could become a Muslim." Yet, he felt that there was a basic affinity between what Wells was describing and what he, Muhammad 'Ali, understood to be true Islam.[674]

Some of what Muhammad 'Ali had imbibed during his confinement in Chhindwara, from the translations of the Qur'an available to him and from Wells, would find powerful articulation at his trial in the port city of Karachi. The 'Ali brothers had been released from Chhindwara in June 1919, but they were arrested once again in September 1921 and charged this time with inciting Muslim soldiers against serving in the colonial military. Greece, supported by the British, was then at war with Turkey and, anticipating the possibility that Indian Muslim troops might be called upon to participate in the war, a fatwa had been issued that prohibited Muslims from fighting fellow believers. Muhammad 'Ali and other Khilafat leaders had made their own statements to similar effect, and this is what had led to the new charges against them.[675] At the hearings in Karachi, first in the court of the city magistrate and then in that of the judicial commissioner of the province of Sindh, Muhammad 'Ali expounded at great length on what he took to be the teachings of Islam that had required him to take the position he had.[676]

Much like Azad, Muhammad 'Ali argued that the king's law and God's law were in manifest conflict. The colonial administration expected its Muslim soldiers to serve wherever they were needed, but Islam forbade them from fighting other Muslims. They could obey their worldly rulers, but only if such

obedience did not conflict with obedience to God. As Muhammad ‘Ali, speaking in English, told the city magistrate, “Islam recognizes one sovereignty alone, the sovereignty of God, which is supreme and unconditional, indivisible and inalienable.” He then proceeded to quote the famous passage, Q 12.40, in which Joseph tells his fellow inmates that “there is no Government but God’s.”[677] The English translation is presumably his own, though he drew on Nazir Ahmad’s Urdu rendering (“hukumat belongs only to the one God”).[678] Addressing the jury in the court of the judicial commissioner of Sindh, he also invoked Mr. Britling to make the point that one’s “only allegiance—his only duty—is to God.”[679]

In the aftermath of the Mutiny of 1857, Queen Victoria had proclaimed that her Indian subjects would enjoy complete freedom of religion. The British, Muhammad ‘Ali said, now had a choice to make. They could either allow Muslims to follow the dictates of their faith, which meant the refusal by Muslim soldiers to fight fellow Muslims, or they could admit that there was, in fact, no freedom of religion in India and, indeed, declare that people serving in the military should be ready to violate the most basic dictates of their faith.[680] The British could not have it both ways. He concluded, sounding very much like Mr. Britling: “You pray now ‘Thy Kingdom come.’ But gentlemen, His Kingdom has come. God’s Kingdom has come. God’s Kingdom is here even today. It is not the kingdom of king George, but God’s and you must decide on that basis and I must act on that assumption. That is why I say I will follow the law of king George so long as he does not force me to go against the law of God.”[681]

Muhammad ‘Ali and his coaccused were sentenced to a two-year imprisonment at the conclusion of this trial. In prison, he embarked upon writing a book that was to introduce Islam to a Western readership. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the book was to be called “Islam: Kingdom of God.” It was never completed.[682]

Mawdudi had participated in the Khilafat movement and had apparently come to know Muhammad ‘Ali.[683] He had even written a biography of Gandhi, a rather remarkable fact in view of Mawdudi’s later politics. According to Mawdudi’s own account, this biography was confiscated by the

police prior to publication.[684] It was around the time of the Khilafat movement that Mawdudi also learned English,[685] which may have given him access, in the original English, to Muhammad ‘Ali’s powerful rhetoric on the occasion of his trial. There is good reason to think that Mawdudi’s idea of the sovereignty of God was at least influenced by Muhammad ‘Ali’s. Mawdudi never acknowledged this for, to him, this idea had come to be the most natural way in which to think about God. Anyone who did not think in those terms could scarcely be a believer.[686]

Even Jesus, Mawdudi later wrote, was committed to the idea of the sovereignty of God, and in this and other respects, there was no difference between his “mission” and that of Moses, Muhammad, and the other prophets. That Jesus had affirmed the sovereignty of God would have come as no surprise to John Calvin—for all that he never used the phrase himself[687]—and to generations of Christian theologians. Mawdudi’s point was, however, that this was no mere religious or spiritual sovereignty but one that governed all aspects of life. The present versions of the Gospels, having been corrupted by later Christians, were less clear on this score than was the Qur’an, but various indications to this effect could still be retrieved from them. Quoting, among others, Matthew 6.10 (“Your kingdom come. Your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven”), as Muhammad Ali had done at his trial, Mawdudi observed: “The Messiah has made his goal very clear in [this] last verse. It contradicts the widespread misconception that, by the Kingdom of God, he had meant merely a spiritual kingdom. His goal clearly was that the law of God, His legal decrees (hukm-i shar‘i), be implemented in the world just as God’s laws of nature (qanun-i tabi‘i) are in effect in the universe.”[688] The idea of the sovereignty of God comes full circle here: from its putative New Testament origins to the leading Islamist ideologue of the twentieth century via an anti-colonial agitator, and then back not merely to the Qur’an but to what the Gospels themselves preserve of the teachings of Jesus on this crucial matter.

The sovereignty of God is not the only idea that may have carried over from Muhammad ‘Ali to Mawdudi. Mawdudi’s stark contrast between God’s law and man-made law is also reminiscent of the Khilafat leader’s discourse,[689] though the vivid image of worshipping God rather than mere slaves of God has deep roots in the tradition.[690] And even Muhammad ‘Ali’s challenge to the British to make a choice between either allowing Muslims to

live by the commands of their faith or acknowledging that they had no freedom of religion in India is echoed in Mawdudi's powerful challenge to the Muslim modernists of Pakistan's first years. They needed to decide, Mawdudi had told them, what their "moral values" were. If they wanted to live by Islamic values, then they had to follow all that Islamic law demanded of them. But if it was Western values that were to continue guiding them, then they ought to stop calling themselves Muslims.[691]

I have focused principally here on the likely and hitherto neglected influence of Muhammad 'Ali on Mawdudi, but the latter had encountered other influential voices as well in the crowded public sphere of colonial India. I have already mentioned Iqbal in connection with Muhammad 'Ali, but his influence on Mawdudi is also worth considering. The two men knew each other, and Iqbal was associated with a plan to set up an educational institution in Pathankot, in eastern Punjab, which is what had brought Mawdudi to the Punjab shortly before Iqbal's death. The extent of their relationship is a matter of disagreement among people who have written on it; given Iqbal's subsequent stature in Pakistan, the Jama'at-i Islami has had an interest in magnifying the poet-philosopher's high regard for Mawdudi.[692] In any case, Iqbal does seem to have left a mark on Mawdudi. One illustration of this is relevant to our discussion here.

In a significant departure from conventional Muslim discourses on the caliphate, Mawdudi argued that the caliphate the Qur'an speaks of belonged to all believers. It is, he said in also supplying the English terms, "popular vicegerency" ('umumi khilafat). "Every believer is a caliph of God in his particular place. As caliph, he is individually answerable to God."[693] To Mawdudi, since the Qur'an reserved sovereignty exclusively for God, it could only speak of vicegerency when it came to human beings.[694]

Iqbal, too, had spoken of the vicegerency of God (niyabat-i Ilahi) in some of his verse.[695] This does not sound promising at first, for Iqbal seemed to evoke the Nietzschean Superman in describing this vicegerent. Yet, he had also suggested elsewhere that the sort of qualities he had in mind were potentially available to everyone: "The Democracy of Islam … is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that

every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebian material Islam has formed men of the noblest type of life and power. Is not, then, the Democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of Nietzsche?"[696] Though Iqbal did not specifically speak of the sovereignty of God, so far as I am aware, Mawdudi's conception of popular vicegerency is closer to Iqbal's than either is to medieval discussions of the caliphate.[697] And for Mawdudi, at least, this popular vicegerency was inextricably tied to divine sovereignty.

An additional source of likely influence on Mawdudi's early political thought, so far as the question of sovereignty is concerned, also merits attention before proceeding further. This takes us back to the princely state of Hyderabad, where he was born and raised. The largest and richest of such principalities, Hyderabad was viewed by its rulers to be a "sovereign" entity, except in matters of foreign affairs, which were to be handled by the government of British India. The British, however, disputed this understanding, and saw the Nizam of Hyderabad, like the rulers of other such states, as subservient to their government. The matter had come to a head in the early 1920s, with the Nizam insisting on being treated as a sovereign power on par with the British in negotiating the return of a part of his territory that had previously been leased to the British. The viceroy of India, however, had quickly disabused the Hyderabad government of any such pretensions. In 1928, no longer living in Hyderabad but still thinking like a loyal subject of the Nizam, Mawdudi published a treatise in which he catalogued instances of British ingratitude for the financial and moral assistance the Nizam had given to them at various critical moments while making a case for Hyderabad's sovereignty vis-à-vis the British empire.[698] The issue of sovereignty was very much in the air in the political climate of Hyderabad at the time; its swansong would come soon after Indian independence, when the Nizam's government lodged what proved to be an ineffectual protest with the United Nations against the "police action" that had extinguished any remaining pretense to sovereignty by forcibly bringing the state into the Indian union.[699]

While the question of sovereignty occupied center stage in Mawdudi's treatise on the relations between the British and the Nizam's polity, Islam was strikingly absent from that discussion. When he used terms similar to

those he would in his later writings, such as “complete and absolute sovereignty” (kamil hakimiyyat-i mutlaqa), it was with reference to the Nizam, not to God, that he did so.[700] The debate on sovereignty seems nonetheless to have provided him fertile ground on which to think about its true locus. Soon, it was no longer a matter of Hyderabad’s sovereignty in relation to the British crown, but God’s in relation to humankind.

*** Debating the Implications of the Sovereignty of God

How did the sovereignty of God and related ideas figure in the discourses of some of Mawdudi’s contemporaries other than those we have met so far? In addressing this question, my concern is not to trace a genealogy of this idea in each of the instances I discuss here, but to show rather that it was very much in the air in late colonial India and that it could mean quite different things in different quarters. I begin with a posthumous and incomplete work, Divine Government (Hukumat-i Ilahi), by Abul-Mahasin Muhammad Sajjad (d. 1940), a traditionally educated religious scholar from Bihar in eastern India.

Sajjad, a founding member of the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind, is best known for spearheading an initiative toward establishing nongovernmental courts that would rule according to the shari‘a in colonial India. These courts, a response to the same crisis to which Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi had responded with his treatise on the dissolution of marriage, were envisioned as comprising a network presided over by an amir, a head, to whom all would defer on questions relating to Islamic law. This idea of “shari‘a governance” (imarat-i shar‘iyya) was a response as well to the impending demise of the Ottoman caliphate, to which the Muslims of India had looked as the religious and political symbol of Islam and of the global Muslim community. At least at the level of India, the imarat-i shar‘iyya was meant to stand in for the caliphate, and there was more than one Muslim leader—the aforementioned Azad among them—who had entertained hopes of being recognized as the head of some such institution.

Sajjad’s Divine Government sought to offer an intellectual justification for this structure of judicial and religious authority. He argued that the proper fulfillment of basic human needs—material welfare and the safeguarding of life, progeny, and honor—required the existence of an institutionalized and collective system (jama‘ati nizam).[701] Muslims exposed to Western education did not dispute the need for such a system, but, he said, they looked exclusively to the West for its prototypes. It was such people that Sajjad sought primarily to convince that the teachings of Islam provided the only system for collective human existence that was truly workable. The fundamental reason why other systems were inadequate was that they were based on man-made laws. People had to be bribed or coerced to obey laws that were made by their fellow humans and even then they broke such laws at the first opportunity. And precisely because some people made them for others, the laws in question could not be said to uniformly secure everyone’s interests; some would always be at the losing end of this bargain. God, however, is a disinterested party, so that everyone could be on the same plane vis-à-vis His law. He is also omniscient, which meant that the law would genuinely cater to people’s interests in a way that no mere human laws could. It was through a prophet that God’s law came to be known, and the institutional structure Sajjad envisioned was meant to continue what the Prophet had instituted.[702]

Sajjad did not speak explicitly of the sovereignty of God, though the idea of divine government seems to come close to it. The provenance of this idea is difficult to determine in his case, though Muhammad ‘Ali’s rhetoric may have had some role here, too. Sajjad’s argument also rested on the strong contrast between God’s law and human laws, which likewise was well-represented in Muhammad ‘Ali’s rhetoric. The latter had little interest in affirming the authority of the ‘ulama, however.[703] Sajjad’s project, on the other hand, was nothing if not an initiative toward giving institutional shape to the ‘ulama’s authority. Irrespective of whether Mawdudi may have been influenced by Sajjad and Sajjad by Muhammad ‘Ali, the sovereignty of God and related ideas were being harnessed in each case to quite different ends.

The preface to the first edition of Divine Government, published in 1941, is further illustrative of the different purposes to which such ideas could be put in late colonial India. It was written by Hifz al-Rahman Seoharwi (d. 1962), a leader of the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind. In keeping with Sajjad’s

views, Seoharwi underlined the inadequacy of man-made political systems, but he then went on to make the distinctive point that the universal values of peace and equality could only flourish when they came from a divine rather than a merely human source.[704] This is what “divine government” seems to mean to him. Writing during World War II, Seoharwi did not need to call up all his rhetorical powers to highlight the inadequacies, the vacuous moral authority, and the interminable conflicts of man-made systems. But that was only part of the context. Another part surely was his support for the secular Indian National Congress, which claimed, unlike the communalist Muslim League, to represent the interests of all Indian people. He acknowledged that some leaders of the Khilafat movement had retained the goal of establishing “Islamic sovereignty or divine government” (Islami iqtidar-i a‘la [hukumat-i Ilahiyya]), but, he said, they had amended that goal to first focus on bringing together different Indian communities on the shared platform of anti-colonial struggle.[705] It was on this platform that much of Seoharwi’s own political career would play out. Though he wrote, like Sajjad, in an unabashedly Islamic idiom, his larger point was not about the political supremacy of Islam but rather about the universally applicable moral foundations that religion, and specifically Islam, provided to politics.

To Seoharwi, Islam also had some very specific teachings on economic matters, and one of his earliest books, first published in 1939, was devoted to a detailed explication of those matters. That book falls outside our purview here, except on one crucial point. In its second edition, published in 1942, Seoharwi invoked Q 12.40 (“authority belongs to God alone”) to observe that God is not only the creator of the universe but also its ruler and that no individual or community could lay claim to sovereignty (hakimiyyat). A caliph or an amir was merely a deputy of this divine government on earth; accordingly, it was not for him or the community to legislate, for that prerogative belonged only to God. This much would seem to be in line with Sajjad. In an explanatory note, Seoharwi clarified, however, that for legislative authority to belong to God did not mean that the caliph and his associates—those who loosen and bind the public affairs of Muslims, in the language of medieval constitutional theory—could not adapt the law to changing needs. For otherwise, he said, the door to the articulation of new legal norms (ijtihad) would be barred, which could hardly be the case if the law was to remain receptive to changing needs. But the laws that were to be devised by human beings, he said, were to be

framed in light of the fundamentals of God’s law and of their underlying principles, which admitted of no change.[706]

The next edition of this book, published in 1946, repeated all this, but another note was added to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding the implications of Q 12.40. Here Seoharwi wrote: “This does not mean that the amir or caliph is not a ruler (hakim) and that his command (hukm) is not a command. That is a false doctrine, a product of the Kharijis. What it means is [only] that the basic and fundamental devising of the laws is in the hands only of God,”[707] which is to say, as the next note again clarified, that human beings can continue to adapt God’s law to evolving circumstances. Though Mawdudi was nowhere mentioned in this book, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was some of the implications Mawdudi was then busy deriving from the sovereignty of God that Seoharwi sought to correct. Mawdudi was, moreover, a fierce opponent of the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind, savaging Husayn Ahmad Madani for a very imperfect grasp of the implications of a united nationalism that he was recommending to the Muslims of India as an alternative to Pakistan. This could not have endeared his ideas to Seoharwi any more than it did to Madani.[708]

Mawdudi had founded his Jama‘at-i Islami in 1941 and the party’s constitution has remained explicit ever since in its affirmation of the sovereignty of God. According to the Jama‘at’s creedal statement, one is to “accept no one other than God as the king, the holder of all authority (malik al-mulk) and the supreme power (muqtadir-i a‘la), nor see anyone as capable of commanding, forbidding, and legislating on his own, independent authority…. For no one except God has the right to ownership and sovereignty (malikiyyat awr hakimiyyat).”[709] Unsurprisingly, the first goal of the party is to strive for “the instituting of religion” which, we are told, is synonymous with “divine government” (hukumat-i Ilahiyya) and “the Islamic system of life.”[710]

By the 1940s, many more voices were appealing to the sovereignty of God in South Asia. In a letter to Jinnah, who was about to embark upon his campaign for Pakistan, the Chishti Sufi master Sayyid Muhammad Zauqi Shah (d. 1951) wrote that “fundamentally, there can only be two conceptions

about forms of government: 1) sovereignty of God, [and] 2) sovereignty of man." He went on to remark on the inadequacy of "man-made constitutions" and to assert that Muslims are "the only true exponents of the sovereignty of God and … alone … capable of giving to the world that peaceful atmosphere which [is] the crying need of the hour."[711] Though the language is similar to Mawdudi's, a more likely source of inspiration here is again the Khilafat leader Muhammad 'Ali, with whom Zauqi Shah shared his modernist alma mater, Aligarh College.[712] Zauqi Shah wrote this letter just two months before Jinnah formally articulated the demand for a separate Muslim homeland at the annual session of the Muslim League in Lahore. The immediate context of this letter was, however, the conduct of the Congress-led ministries in a number of British Indian provinces, which had tended to exclude the Muslim League from a share in the government. In speaking of the dangers of man-made systems, including majoritarian democracy, Zauqi Shah's point was not to affirm Mawdudi's Islamist ideology—to which he was hostile[713]—but rather to sound the alarm against Hindu political domination of India.

Zauqi Shah's usage was also influenced by Marmaduke Pickthall, the English convert from Hyderabad. In letters to him in 1932–33, which were subsequently published under the title "Divine Sovereignty and Divine Messengership," Zauqi Shah had sought to correct Pickthall's understanding of Islam on some crucial issues.[714] Pickthall had argued elsewhere that one's salvation depended exclusively on belief in God and the Day of Judgment and, further, that religion meant "the full and glad submission to the will of Allah as present in men's consciences." Both claims seemed to Zauqi Shah to undercut the role of prophethood in guiding people aright and he was deeply disturbed at this prospect. "Everybody's conscience is not a safe guide," he wrote to Pickthall. "If it is a safe and reliable guide, why did God keep on sending messengers after messengers for the guidance of all sorts of people?"[715] Zauqi Shah could see no shades of gray between the two fundamental and mutually exclusive categories of the believer and the unbeliever.[716] Unbelievers were those who did not submit to Muhammad even though God had commanded them to do so. "How can you be consistent with yourself if you profess belief in Allah but refuse to obey Him? How can you be loyal to the King-Emperor if you reject his viceroy, governors and other petty officials? Defy a petty policeman in the street and you defy the king."[717] He continued in a similar vein in a subsequent letter to Pickthall: "There can be no surrender

without obedience, and there can be no obedience without obeying, in a true Muslim spirit, all the commandments of Allah which have come to us through the ‘proper official channel.’”[718] Leaving aside the language of the colonial bureaucracy that Zauqi Shah had imbibed, the implications of his argument went beyond an assertion of the authority of Muhammad. They included as well the mediatory role of the saints, as one might expect from a Sufi master. And they underlined the superiority of Islam over everything else. To properly affirm the sovereignty of God was to recognize this superiority. Unsurprisingly, as Zauqi Shah would put it to Jinnah in 1940, Muslims were “the only true exponents” of this idea.

Though there is nothing in Zauqi Shah’s usage to suggest that the sovereignty of God was an unusual idea by the 1940s, it was only at the end of that decade that it would find its most important modernist articulation. This, of course, was in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the constituent assembly in March 1949, laying down that “sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.”[719] The modernist assumption clearly was that the state would determine the parameters of the sovereignty of God rather than the other way round. Though the ‘ulama have often tried to take credit for the Islamic sentiments enshrined in the Objectives Resolution,[720] as indeed did the Jama‘at-i Islami,[721] the traditionalists among them could not have missed the implications of any such assumption, let alone consented to it. Despite the nod to the “limits” set down by God, it was not news to anyone that the modernists wanted a more or less free hand to legislate under the imprimatur of God’s delegated sovereignty. As Khalifa Abdul Hakim had put it in his Islamic Ideology, not quite in line with the Objectives Resolution, “According to Islam sovereignty does not belong to any monarch or a class nor does it rest with the people in general. Sovereignty belongs to God…. To men of character and integrity that sovereignty is delegated.”[722] And to the extent that the limits in question mattered to the modernists, they did so in ethical rather than strictly legal terms.[723] As seen earlier, Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani’s endorsement of the Objectives Resolution was not quite the same as the prime minister’s. Indeed, the ‘ulama had begun to express their concerns on this score already before the establishment of Pakistan.

In an essay published in 1946 and titled “The True Ruler Is God Alone,” Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, one of the most distinguished of his generation’s ‘ulama, had affirmed once again that, as the ruler of the universe, God is the source of the law.[724] The real interest of the essay lies, however, in two “doubts” that Nadwi addressed in concluding this short piece. The first of these had to do with the question of how a law revealed a very long time ago could properly meet the needs of people at later times and places. This, of course, is a familiar modernist objection to ‘ulama and Islamist demands for the implementation of Islamic law in the modern world. Sulayman Nadwi argued in response that the fundamentals of God’s law were timeless and that changing circumstances did not have any bearing on the applicability of these core fundamentals.[725] Elsewhere in the essay, he did however grant that while the core principles were eternal, legal scholars could continue to derive subsidiary rules from them in accordance with changing needs.[726] In other words, given that this law was from an omniscient God, its antiquity was irrelevant to the question of its applicability. And it was not enough to be guided by the ethical principles of Islam, as the modernists would have it; the law itself needed to be implemented.

The second doubt he addressed also related to the modernists, though he did not say so explicitly in this instance either. The question here was about the mujtahid, the master-jurist, articulating the law in changing conditions: should such activity not be seen as new legislation and, if so, what did that mean for the claim that God is the sole legislator? Sulayman Nadwi responded that ijtihad was not a matter of making new laws but rather of demonstrating how God’s existing law can be extended to encompass new situations.[727] This again kept the law responsive to change while preserving its core principles intact. While modernist conceptions of ijtihad envisaged both setting aside older laws and making new ones, all in light of the putative spirit of the Qur’an, Nadwi’s view of ijtihad was a decidedly constrained and conservative one. And his goal, unannounced but unmistakable, was not merely to set forth this view but to also caution the modernists against their legislative excesses. There could be no better framework in which to strike this cautionary note than that of the sovereignty of God. Sulayman Nadwi did not use this English phrase, though that is what the readers of his essay would have understood by it. And it is hardly surprising that the English translation of this essay, first published in 1948 and reprinted in 1953, is indeed titled “the sovereignty of Allah.”[728]

For all their misgivings about the sovereignty of God being put to the wrong use, the idea had found its way into the discourses of the Pakistani ‘ulama. In January 1951, they had convened a conference to set forth the principles that should serve as the foundation of an Islamic state and they have always pointed to the statement produced on that occasion as a testament to the clarity of their thinking on this matter and to their ability—much doubted by their critics—to come to an agreement on key issues. The conference was presided over by Sulayman Nadwi, and the “ultimate sovereignty” of God “over all nature and all law” was the first of the twenty-two principles enunciated on this occasion.[729] Or so, at least, according to the English translation of this document—a point to which I will return. Two years later, in 1953, Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘ published Qur’anic Constitution, a tract setting out the teachings of the Islamic foundational text in the form of mock articles of the constitution. Article 2 stated that “the true ruler” (hakim-i haqiqi) is God, and the tract later affirmed that the “highest authority (iqtidar-i a‘la) in the state belongs exclusively to God.”[730]

For their part, the modernists would continue to use the language of the sovereignty of God, but with particular inflections that seemed calculated to challenge the ‘ulama and the Islamists. Two examples are worth noting, both from the 1960s. The first relates to Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, who had spent a great deal of time during that decade trying to cut Mawdudi and the ‘ulama down to size. Writing less than two years after Ayub Khan had brought Pakistan’s first experiment with democratic governance to an end, Parwez argued that divine sovereignty consisted in the unified authority (wahdat-i iqtidar) that belonged only to God,[731] with the palpable though unstated implication that such authority was best exemplified in the real world by a strong government. One of the implications that Parwez did explicitly draw from it was that sovereign power did not belong to the people any more than it did to a king or a dictator.[732] (He obviously did not consider Ayub Khan to be an instance of the latter.) Taking his cue from the Qur’an’s instruction to “return things entrusted to you to their rightful owners” (Q 4.58), he argued further that the affairs of government should be entrusted only to those who were capable of running them.[733] But if the sovereignty of God allowed no room for kings and dictators, or for an uncontrolled democracy, it

did not have any space for a theocracy either, which is to say that “religious leaders can have no existence in such a dispensation.”[734]

It is, Parwez said, through a recognition of God’s sovereignty, and the ethical values articulated in the Qur’an, that all humanity could come together on a shared platform. The values in question—human dignity, justice, benevolence, individual responsibility, right to livelihood, and patriotism, among others[735]—were timeless, but the community enjoyed “complete freedom” to operate, and to enact laws, within the boundaries demarcated by them.[736] Pakistan, Parwez thought, could lead the way toward the goal of establishing this ethically grounded universal brotherhood. It would thereby put its own house in order but it would also help rescue the world from the destructive divisions that threatened its very existence. Among the ‘ulama, Seoharwi would have agreed with this foregrounding of Islam’s ethical ideals. But leaving aside the fact that he had been a bitter opponent of Pakistan, he, no less than other ‘ulama, would have been deeply suspicious of anyone having a free hand within the playing field demarcated by the Qur’an’s ethical signposts. [737]

The second example relates to Fazlur Rahman. Where Mawdudi had affirmed that God is not merely the object of worship (ma‘bud) in a religious sense but also the sovereign in the legal and political sense,[738] Rahman saw it as “the greatest mischief … to confuse the religio-moral and political issues.” Taking issue explicitly with Mawdudi, Rahman continued: “Any student of political history knows that the term ‘sovereign’ as a political term is of a relatively recent coinage and denotes that definite and defined factor (or factors) in a society to which rightfully belongs coercive force in order to obtain obedience to its will. It is absolutely obvious that God is not sovereign in this sense and that only people can be and are sovereign, since only to them belongs ultimate coercive force, i.e., only their ‘Word is law’ in the politically ultimate sense.”[739] Yet, even as he implicitly disagreed with the likes of Abdul Hakim and Parwez on the sovereignty of the people, Rahman did not dispute the idea of the sovereignty of God. But what it means, he said, is that the Qur’an’s moral principles “are objective and do not depend on or even necessarily conform to the subjective wishes of a people.”[740] Once this element of subjectivity was curtailed, through a proper understanding of the Qur’an and presumably under the tutelage of a resolute ruler like Ayub Khan, the community at large decided what

expression to give to the Qur’an’s moral norms: “the Muslim Legislature is the supreme body unencumbered by any limitations except such as are accepted by the Muslim community, viz, the principles of justice as enunciated in the Qur’an and as illustrated in the life of the Prophet. God neither acts as political Sovereign nor as a law-maker. The Muslim people themselves are the Sovereign and the law-maker.”[741]

Although the modernists were not quite on the same page, it is nonetheless at points like these that the differences between them and Mawdudi stand in sharpest relief. As will be observed, Mawdudi too, unlike many other Islamists, had come to allow considerable scope for human legislation. But the idea that the Muslim community was itself the arbiter of what limitations to impose upon itself was, to him, the very negation of the sovereignty of God. It was tantamount to the cardinal sin of setting up partners with the one God.

*** The Sovereignty of God in Practice

While the importance of the idea of God’s sovereignty as a theoretical principle should be clear so far as the ideology of Mawdudi and his Jama‘at-i Islami are concerned, how has it worked in practice? What has it enabled the Jama‘at to do in Pakistan’s political life? And what has it prevented the party from doing?

What it has done for the Jama‘at is, quite simply, to justify its participation in the political process. In late colonial India, Mawdudi had been bitterly opposed to Muslims standing for election and entering legislative assemblies. In arrogating to themselves the authority to make laws, such assemblies trespassed on a privilege that, he believed, belonged to God alone.[742] By the same logic, he could see the colonial judicial system as nothing but illegitimate on Islamic grounds. His response to a juridical query he had received sometime in the last years of colonial rule is instructive here. The questioner had asked whether the decision of a non-Muslim judge on matters of divorce had any religious validity if the judge had been following the prescriptions of Islamic law. Mawdudi argued in response that the question was poorly formulated, for the decision even of a Muslim judge

acting under man-made laws had no Islamic legitimacy and that those serving in such courts were themselves criminals.[743] By way of context, it should be recalled that the colonial judicial system was based on the idea that any judge—Christian, Hindu, Zoroastrian, Muslim—trained in the English common law could rule according to the shari‘a as encapsulated in a small number of Islamic legal texts that had come to be officially recognized. It was about the legitimacy of this judicial practice that Rashid Rida had been asked early in the twentieth century, and he had endorsed it with much enthusiasm. Mawdudi could have had no time for Rida’s view. But he would also have been disdainful of Abul-Mahasin Sajjad’s effort to create an informal sector of shari‘a courts or of Thanawi’s legal initiative regarding the dissolution of Muslim marriages, for the overall political system at whose pleasure such courts and laws existed was still one based on something other than a recognition of the sovereignty of God.

In his response to the aforementioned query to him, Mawdudi had also directed his readers’ attention to the proceedings of a trial in 1945–46, in which three officers of the British Indian Army had been prosecuted for joining the anti-colonial Indian National Army during World War II. The officers had been serving in Burma when it fell to the Japanese forces, and it was under Japanese patronage that this nationalist army had been created. Upon being recaptured by the British, the Indian officers were charged, inter alia, with “waging war against the King”; they and their attorney argued to no avail that they were a legitimate force seeking to secure the freedom of their homeland and that they were acting under the authority of the Indian National Army Act that their government in exile had enacted. As the advocate general of India put it in his opening remarks, “[n]o authority purporting to be given under that Act can be recognized by this Court or indeed by any court of this county. The assumption of any such authority was illegal from the beginning. Any tribunal or authority purporting to be established under that Act would be in repudiation of the allegiance which is inherent in a court of the country. Those who instituted or took part in the proceedings were themselves liable to be punished for offences against the State.” The advocate general’s speech was “worth reading carefully,” Mawdudi wrote, “for what it describes as the legal position of the Government of India vis-à-vis these so-called ‘rebels’ is exactly the position of the kingdom of the Lord of the universe vis-à-vis all genuine ‘rebels.’”[744]

Westernized Muslims, too, might be rebels against God, but Mawdudi's position on the matter of legislation became considerably more nuanced once he had moved to the new state of Pakistan that was governed by such Muslims. Already in January 1948, he had told his law school audience in Lahore that Islamic law had its eternal rulings, as enunciated in the Qur'an and the sunna, and its unchangeable principles, but it also had mechanisms for interpreting this law, for adapting it to changing needs, and for devising subsidiary new laws.[745] The Jama'at had split into a Pakistani and an Indian organization upon the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, and it would take the latter decades before its leadership agreed, under intense grassroots pressure, to enter electoral politics.[746] This, too, was in marked contrast with the case in Pakistan, where the Jama'at entered electoral politics, albeit indirectly at first, from the early 1950s.[747] As Mawdudi saw it, the Jama'at could not enter electoral politics so long as the people rather than God were recognized as sovereign. Perhaps more egregiously, Pakistan's dominion status as part of the British Commonwealth meant, as an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations explained to the country's high commissioner in the UK in 1948, that "King George VI is not only the King of England but is also the King of Pakistan."[748] King George was not usually referred to in Pakistan in this way, however, and Mawdudi does not appear to have made much of it. In any case, once the sovereignty of God was affirmed, as it was by the Objectives Resolution in 1949, it became possible for the party's members to live as full citizens of the state. The Jama'at's consultative assembly, which stands next to the party head (amir) in authority, put it this way:

<quote>

With Pakistan becoming an Islamic state in principle [with the passage of the Objectives Resolution], all forms of relationship with the state have become permissible, except those that involve acting in a manner that is opposed to the shari'a. Government employment is now open to the members of the Jama'at; they are permitted to go to court in pursuit of their legitimate rights; and they are allowed to participate in elections to [legislative] assemblies and in other democratic institutions.[749]

</quote>

To turn to our second question, what has the idea of the sovereignty of God prevented the party from being able to do in Pakistani politics? Critics of the Jama‘at as well as other observers have long pointed out that its political practice has tended to be far more pragmatic than its ideology would seem to allow. Thus the Objectives Resolution was embraced by the Jama‘at even though the resolution had affirmed the sovereignty not only of God but also of the people of Pakistan. The Jam‘at also accepted the constitution that was promulgated in 1956, applauding it for its recognition of the sovereignty of God.[750] The Objectives Resolution formed the preamble of this foundational document and it contained a number of provisions signaling the state’s Islamic orientation. For the most part, however, it was a document that had built on the colonial-era Government of India Act of 1935 and it was guided by the example of Western, liberal constitutions.[751] After it was abrogated by the martial law regime in 1958, the Islamists would continue to refer to it as an Islamic constitution and to call for its restoration. When the country received new constitutions, in 1962 and then in 1973, these too were accepted by Mawdudi and his followers, though they were no closer to Mawdudi’s vision of an Islamic state than had been the case with the first constitution.

Furthermore, for all of Mawdudi’s strictures against the false assumptions underlying Western political systems, his organization has participated in most of the elections that have been held in Pakistan’s checkered electoral history. This has meant entering into alliances with parties that are far from being godly, and accepting the legitimacy of a political system many of whose premises Mawdudi thought contravened core Islamic principles. The general-secretary of the Jama‘at, Mian Tufail Muhammad, had even praised General Yahya Khan (r. 1969–71), while he was in power following the end of the Ayub Khan regime, as the “champion of Islam.” This was presumably on account of hopes that the Jama‘at would be a major winner once the military ruler had successfully combated the leftists represented by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s People’s Party and the separatists led by East Pakistan’s Awami League.[752] But it made no allowance for the fact that Yahya Khan had a lifestyle that was fundamentally at odds with the sort of ideas that the Jama‘at represented. As the official inquiry committee constituted to look into the causes of the fall of East Pakistan under Yahya Khan’s watch would observe, “there is evidence to show that the General was addicted to heavy drinking, and was extremely friendly with a number of ladies of indifferent repute who took a lot of his time even during the critical days of the war

[with India].”[753] The party would later enter into an alliance with the military regime of General Zia al-Haqq, who did have the merit of cultivating a devout persona and who, of course, oversaw the most vigorous campaign of Islamization that the country had seen thus far. Yet, the Jama‘at would have had to be extremely indulgent toward Zia al-Haqq’s policies to see them as a realization of divine sovereignty. Were the sovereignty of God and ideas anchored in it merely a strategic means, then, to maximize gains in the political marketplace, to find allies who had traveled at least some distance toward the positions the Islamists purport to represent?

As might be expected, the Jama‘at has had its share of ideological conflicts within its ranks, and the question of ideological purity vs. political pragmatism has often simmered under the surface of such conflicts.[754] The most important of these took place in 1957. Some influential members of the organization were convinced that the time was not right for it to enter the political arena: this was a corrupt, and corrupting, field and the sort of work Mawdudi had initially envisioned to form cadres of righteous believers who would take the lead in bringing about a moral and political revolution had just begun. To become part of the political process in such circumstances was to legitimate the very structures the Jama‘at had made it its mission to replace with a godly order. Mawdudi, however, took a strong position against that view. In a marathon six-hour address to party members in February 1957, he argued that there was no neat division of labor between moral formation and political participation, between ideas and practice:

<quote>

The virtues (akhlaq) needed for a particular task are only acquired by embarking upon that task. The virtues required for preaching are developed only through preaching; those needed in trade will only come about in the shop and the market. You can do [theoretical] exercises in your cells for a full decade, but the moment you actually enter the field of preaching or of trade, you would realize that, in moral (akhlaqi) terms, you are a mere novice in the face of the [real] challenges you face. The case of politics and of elections is similar. In view of their moral problems, their perils and their drawbacks, you may well decide that you should remove yourself from this field for ever. But to aspire to eventually return to this arena and yet move away from it now on grounds that you will train yourself for some years in the virtues that are

needed for proper participation in it is sheer immaturity…. The moral force that is needed in this arena cannot be brought to it upon being manufactured somewhere else. It can only develop within this field, through contestation with its satanic forces.[755]

</quote>

Ideas were a necessary complement to political change, but this did not mean, as Mawdudi saw it, that an “intellectual revolution” needed to precede one in politics. The two could occur in tandem, as long as a committed body of people was at hand to work toward both. The career of the Prophet Muhammad showed this, but there were other illustrations of it, too. After attaining political power in Egypt, the prophet Joseph had used it in the service of his religious ends.[756] “In our own country, the British had first taken over power through purely political stratagems, and then, utilizing the country’s own resources, they had transformed its thought, morality, customs, culture and civilization according to their own conceptions of life.”[757]

Given that moral and political ideas were inextricably intertwined in Mawdudi’s thought, as were ideology and political action, the question of what the sovereignty of God has meant in the Jama‘at’s political practice may not be the best one to ask. As a moral-political idea, at least some of the significance of divine sovereignty lies in its undergirding all action, which is to say that even the compromises that are routinely made in politics are made with the intention to change the political system in the desired direction. By this logic, though Mawdudi did not put it this way, until a righteous political order was in place, the practices of an organization like the Jama‘at-i Islami could not be properly judged in terms of its guiding principles any more than the shari‘a itself could be judged before it had had the opportunity to govern all facets of peoples’ lives.[758] Needless to say, such a position leaves people dissatisfied on all sides. There are those who remain suspicious that the Islamists’ willingness to work with the constituted political system is insincere and that their goal is ultimately to change it in accord with their long-standing ideological commitments. For their part, many among the Islamists would lament, as they did in 1957, that their organization was going too far in making compromises with an iniquitous world. Yet, others have argued that there is

no compromise that one cannot try to justify with a religious veneer, and that Mawdudi had a masterful ability to do precisely that.[759] For all that, the sovereignty of God was not an ineffective way of claiming the moral high ground while putting others on the defensive for their failure to live up to its imperatives.[760]

*** Why Mawdudi?

Given that the sovereignty of God is not an idea that has been invoked exclusively by the Islamists and, indeed, that it did not even originate among them, why should it have become so intimately associated with the Islamists and specifically with Mawdudi? Two factors seem to have played a role in cementing this association. First, while many among the ‘ulama have adopted the language of the sovereignty of God, as observed, there has always been a certain awkwardness to their embrace of it. This has had much to do with the fact that it is not a concept indigenous to the Islamic tradition, though their adoption of it does provide an illustration of the ‘ulama’s ability to work with concepts previously foreign to them. Seoharwi had used it in the 1942 edition of his book, and it was invoked in a work composed around the same time by a religious scholar tasked by the Muslim League with creating a blueprint for an Islamic government.[761] The contemporary ‘alim Taqi ‘Usmani also uses it in the lectures he delivered on comparative political theory for the benefit of madrasa students in 1995.[762] Yet, when Sulayman Nadwi had sought to offer some correctives to modernist views on legislation and its scope, the phrase he had used referred to God as “the true ruler” (hakim-i haqiqi). Similar phrases appear in the Urdu and Arabic texts of the 1951 resolution adopted by the ‘ulama on the principles of an Islamic state.[763] The official Urdu translation of the Objectives Resolution itself refers to God as “the absolute ruler of the universe, without any partner,” which is not quite the sovereignty of God that the English version affirms.[764]

In contrast with the ‘ulama, Mawdudi’s eclectic formation, which included a substantial amount of traditional Islamic education but also a knowledge of English—rare among the ‘ulama of his generation—and his readings in Western thought meant that this concept could be integrated into his thinking in a quite seamless manner.[765] There was little awkwardness or

ambiguity to it when Mawdudi used it. When he referred to hakimiyyat, there is no mistaking that he meant sovereignty, and sometimes he even glossed the Urdu neologism with the English word.[766] This has made for a clearer identification of this idea with him than with anyone else.

Second, we can scarcely neglect the significance of Mawdudi's ability to introduce his ideas into the Arab world. In 1951, the Jama'at-i Islami had established an office to translate Mawdudi's writings and other party literature into Arabic and to disseminate this material in the Arab and the wider Muslim world.[767] Soon Mawdudi's books were being published in several Arab countries, notably Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, including early works in which he had expounded on the sovereignty of God and related ideas. Some of Mawdudi's works were also serialized in the Islamic press in the Middle East during those years; and associates of the Jama'at-i Islami such as Mas'ud 'Alam Nadwi (d. 1954) were regular contributors to Arab periodicals. It was through such channels that Islamists like Sayyid Qutb were introduced to Mawdudi's thought.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of the relative newness of the idea of God's sovereignty in Qutb's thought is provided by the sixth and last edition of his Social Justice in Islam (1964). The idea is ubiquitous in this edition; the phrase was entirely absent in the previous five editions, published between 1949 and 1958.[768] It would have been self-defeating to acknowledge a specific debt to Mawdudi for this idea, but it is his influence that looms large here. And some of the Jama'at's literature itself credits Mawdudi with having introduced Qutb, and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, to the sovereignty of God.[769] The writings of Qutb, and of Mawdudi, served in turn to popularize the idea in other circles. Its simplicity and power also helped it cross sectarian boundaries. Though Mawdudi and Qutb were both Sunnis, it has come to resonate in Shi'i circles, too, and it features, as articles 2 and 56, in the constitution framed in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979.

To return to Pakistan, it is worth noting that Mawdudi's recognition abroad served also to enhance his influence at home, rather like it would in case of Taqi 'Usmani later. A grudging acknowledgement of this was provided by the

modernist Ghulam Ahmad Parwez in a letter to President Ayub Khan in January 1968. Fazlur Rahman's Institute of Islamic Research was then busy organizing an international conference on the Qur'an to which Mawdudi had been invited. Parwez was worried that Mawdudi's ties with the 'ulama—a term he used broadly, to refer to conservatives of different stripes—from abroad would enable him to dominate the proceedings and to shape them in directions detrimental to the government's interests. The same thing had happened, Parwez cautioned Ayub Khan, on the occasion of the international colloquium on Islam that the University of the Punjab had convened in 1957–58: "Maudoodi had full grip on this group [of religious intellectuals from abroad] and he made them all to express his own views on every subject. This gave him a good handle to propagate that all the Ulema of Islamic world supported him in his views. Maudoodi is sure to play the same game this time as well."[770] The paper Mawdudi had given at the 1957–58 colloquium was on the scope of legislation in Islam, and it had begun by affirming that God's sovereignty was not just a religious matter but extended equally to law and politics.[771] But he had allowed some room for human legislation as well.[772] Other Islamists had a much stricter view of the implications of God's sovereignty. Yet, such concessions may have made Mawdudi's position not less but even more influential. They served to reassure people that a recognition of God's legal sovereignty did not preclude adapting His law to changing circumstances, but they also made the point that this was to be a far more disciplined exercise in legal change than the sort of blanket mandate for legislation that the modernists seemed to want.[773]

That Mawdudi was not the originator of the idea of the sovereignty of God should not obscure the stamp that he was able to put on it. His formulation also had the virtues of simplicity and comprehensiveness: it made much better sense for an omnipotent God to have a sovereignty that extended to all areas of life, including the political; even Jesus had preached the same gospel. Such ideas might be mischievous, as Fazlur Rahman saw it, but they did not lack appeal, as he acknowledged himself.[774] Rival conceptions of divine sovereignty—undergirding, as some Muslim modernists had it, a global community that would be united on a platform of shared ethical norms—were too idealistic and too abstract. They also seemed too closely tied to visions of an authoritarian state that was not above bending Islam to its Westernizing will. Once Mawdudi's formulation of the sovereignty of God had gained traction, inside and outside Pakistan, it was very difficult to argue against it. It is remarkable that few have even tried to do so. To many others, including

Ahmadis, it has seemed the most natural thing to read it in the Qur’an. As Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan had put it in March 1949, in the course of a spirited defense of what the constituent assembly soon adopted as the Objectives Resolution: “To the … statement … that sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to God Almighty alone, I do not conceive that any person believing in God could take exception.”[775]

Zafrulla Khan was speaking on the occasion as a Muslim member of the assembly, and he was keen to reassure the non-Muslims, including the Hindus and the Christians, about an understanding of Islam in which religion and the state were not separate.[776] Ironically, his own status in the Muslim community and in a state that gave official recognition to Islam was anything but secure. Already in 1924, Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, the most valuable of the government’s ‘ulama-allies during Pakistan’s first years and Zafrulla Khan’s colleague in the constituent assembly, had published a tract in which he had sought to show that the Ahmadis were apostates and that they merited the death penalty that the Afghan government had meted out to one of them.[777] Though ‘Usmani had died by the end of 1949, a powerful movement was just beginning to take shape to have the Ahmadis declared non-Muslims in the new state. Zafrulla Khan’s name would figure prominently in that movement. So would Mawdudi’s, as one of its key ideologues.

** Chapter Five: Religious Minorities and the Anxieties of an Islamic Identity

ONE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT that a country that came into being in order to enable the Muslim minority of South Asia to live in accordance with its religious norms would be especially sensitive to the insecurities of minorities. But majorities can have their own insecurities, perhaps never more so than on becoming a majority. In his very first speech as governor-general, Jinnah had gone out of his way to reassure religious minorities that they would be safe in Pakistan.[778] The country’s first prime minister was likewise keen to affirm the government’s liberal commitments, which he saw as compatible with his idea of an Islamic state. As the Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, reported in 1950, after a series of meetings with his Pakistani counterpart, “Liaquat Ali was at pains to point out that all that was meant by the Islamic State was that Muslims should have their personal law etc. In no sense should they or could they

have special privileges. His State was an ordinary democratic State like England. He was prepared to make this perfectly clear at any time.... But he could not denounce the Islamic State phrase for obvious reasons, as this would give a handle to the reactionary elements in Pakistan."[779] This chapter seeks to uncover and to understand some of the anxieties that the "reactionary elements" have had vis-à-vis the religious minorities in the country.

The population of Pakistan—207.77 million in 2017—is and has always been overwhelmingly Muslim. Though a substantial minority before the secession of East Pakistan, official estimates for 1998—the last complete census prior to the one conducted in the spring and summer of 2017—put the Hindus at less than 2 percent of the total population. The Christians, for their part, comprised a little over 1.5 percent of the country's population.[780] Though Jinnah had referred in his August 11, 1947, speech to minorities within the ranks of Muslims as well, it was non-Muslim minorities that he and Liaquat Ali Khan had sought primarily to reassure. The "reactionary elements" have been particularly interested, however, in Muslim minorities, and it is on two of these—the Ahmadis and the Shi'a—that I will focus here.

A close-knit and well-educated community, the Ahmadis comprise a very small group—reckoned in 1953 to be only about 200,000 people in a country of 34 million, though subsequent Ahmadi estimates of their numerical size were considerably higher.[781] Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the community, did not dispute Muhammad's prophethood, or the revelation to him that took the form of the Qur'an, or the authority of the religious law that Muhammad had brought forth. But his own claims—that though a "shadow" of Muhammad's more perfect prophethood and while belonging to the umma Muhammad had founded, he too was a prophet—are held by others to leave no room for the Ahmadis within the Muslim fold. The Punjab saw serious anti-Ahmadi riots in 1953, followed by the imposition of a martial law in the provincial capital. And there was a country-wide agitation in 1974 that culminated in a constitutional amendment declaring the Ahmadis to be non-Muslims.

There are those among the Sunnis who view the Shi'a with grave misgivings, too. And though there is a long history of Shi'i-Sunni hostility, in and outside

South Asia, Pakistan has witnessed especially intense sectarian violence since the mid-1980s as well as concomitant calls upon the government to declare the Shi‘a, like the Ahmadis, a non-Muslim minority.

This chapter does not seek to narrate the history of these Muslim minorities in Pakistan or even to document instances of their persecution. Nor is it my concern here to examine how members of these minority communities see themselves in relation to the Sunni majority. My purpose is instead to explore some of what may underlie the hostile attitudes of the ‘ulama as well as of Islamist ideologues and activists toward these minority communities. I will also touch upon instances of the conflicted ways in which Muslim modernists have viewed the Ahmadis. Needless to say, the point of exploring these attitudes and the anxieties that underlie them is not to try to explain away the manner in which these minorities have been treated in the country. It is instead to better understand some of the uncertainties, ambiguities, and conflicts that have continued to characterize definitions of an Islamic identity in Pakistan. What exactly is the nature of the challenge that a tiny community, the Ahmadis, has posed to conservative Sunnis, apart from what their doctrines represent? How did this Ahmadi challenge become implicated in wider contestations on Islam in the public sphere? What anxieties have the Shi‘a—comprising around 15 percent of the country’s population—provoked in particular Sunni circles, again apart from the perceived incompatibility of some of their doctrines with those of the Sunnis?[782] And how do the anxieties that each minority community generates compare with those produced by the other? These are among the questions I address in this chapter.

*** The Ahmadi Question

Though I argue in what follows that we need to go beyond doctrinal issues in order to understand the severity of the conservative Sunni response to the Ahmadis, it is important nonetheless to begin with some key doctrinal matters. For we would appreciate little of the scope and depth of the anti-Ahmadi sentiment in Pakistan or of the ability of the ‘ulama and the Islamists to harness it to particular goals if we do not recognize how Ahmadism unsettles the long-established ways in which Muslims have viewed the authority of their prophet and the theological edifice that rests upon that

authority. To those who revere the person of Muhammad and seek to guard his honor more ardently than even God's, Ahmadi prophetology is an affront.[783] It is in defense of Muhammad's honor that the anti-Ahmadi sentiment has often been galvanized.

As it happens, there is in fact significant difference of opinion within the Ahmadis on how to view the claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. The larger of the two groups among them is often referred to by opponents as Qadianis—with reference to Qadian, the birth place of the community's founder, now located in the Indian Punjab—and it is best known for the belief that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet of some sort. In Pakistan, the members of this group founded a new town, Rabwah, in the Punjab, where the head of their community resided until relocating to London in the mid-1980s. The other group, called the Lahoris with reference to their base in Lahore, views Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer but not as a prophet. Though the Ahmadis themselves are keenly aware of the difference, their opponents have come to view both groups as almost equally unacceptable, the Lahore-based group being damned by association with a man venerated in putatively outrageous terms by his other followers. Both groups were declared non-Muslims in 1974.[784]

Although the idea of reform and of periodic "renewers" (mujaddidun) of the faith has a long history in Sunni Islam, Ghulam Ahmad's claims were larger and thus more difficult to accommodate within that genealogy. To those not well-disposed to them, these claims also implied that the Islam of Muhammad was not good for all times, that it needed to be continually retooled to new demands at the hands of figures like Ghulam Ahmad. This is a point that the modernist poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal had made in some hard-hitting polemics against the Ahmadis toward the end of his life.[785] The Ahmadis also question the obligatoriness of jihad, a position that the 'ulama see as contravening explicit Islamic injunctions. There was the allegation, too, that such views were tailored to the interests of British colonial rule and, by extension, that the Ahmadi movement was little more than a child of the colonial effort to divide and weaken Islam. Then there was the nagging suspicion that the Ahmadis did not consider other Muslims as properly Muslim at all and wished to have nothing to do with them in religious and social matters. As Iqbal had put it, "Any religious society historically arising from

the bosom of Islam, which claims a new prophethood for its basis, and declares all Muslims who do not recognize the truth of its alleged revelation as kafirs [unbelievers] must … be regarded by every Muslim as a serious danger to the solidarity of Islam."[786] He had proposed that the colonial government "declare the Qadianis a separate community … and the Indian Muslim will tolerate them just as he tolerates the other religions."[787]

The severity of the Ahmadi challenge would lead one to think that no one would ever consider them as fellow Muslims. Influential voices had, indeed, been raised against them, as in the case of Iqbal.[788] In 1932, Anwarshah Kashmiri, a Deobandi luminary, had testified, along with several other scholars, in favor of a woman plaintiff who wanted her marriage dissolved on grounds that her husband had become an Ahmadi. Kashmiri argued at length on this occasion to show that Ahmadi beliefs constituted apostasy from Islam, which entailed the dissolution of a marriage.[789]

Yet, part of the reason why the 'ulama were so vehement in having the Ahmadis declared non-Muslims was precisely that not everyone viewed them as such. Early in his career, Iqbal himself had had "hopes of good results following from this movement," as he would acknowledge with some discomfort later.[790] And he had once referred to the founder of the Ahmadi community, while the latter was still alive, as "probably the profoundest theologian among modern Indian Muhammadans."[791] In a 1923 fatwa published in the Lahore newspaper Zamindar, Abul-Kalam Azad had characterized Ahmadi beliefs as severely misguided but had held that the Ahmadis could not be considered unbelievers, or excluded from the Muslim community, or subjected to a social boycott.[792] 'Abd al-Majid Daryabadi, a devotee of none other than Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi, likewise thought that the Ahmadis were best characterized as wayward Muslims rather than as outright infidels.[793]

In part at least, Iqbal had come to take a hostile view of the Ahmadis on account of the pressure exerted on him by the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam. The Ahrar did their best to make other modernists fall in line, too. In late colonial India, they wanted candidates standing for election to the Punjab legislative assembly on the ticket of the Muslim League to pledge that they would work

toward excluding the Ahmadis from the Muslim fold. Though the parliamentary board of the Muslim League did make an announcement to that effect,[794] Jinnah continued to block any such move, which was obviously bad for his effort to forge a united Muslim front against the Congress.[795] In his famous 1940 address as the president of the Muslim League, Jinnah gave no inkling that his Muslim "nation" had any divisions within it or that anyone claiming to be a Muslim was in fact not so. Asked in 1944 by one of the Ahmadis if there was any impediment to their becoming members of the Muslim League, Jinnah, who had previously given an Ahmadi leader private assurances to this effect, responded with a lawyer's answer. He directed the questioner to the League's constitution, according to which "every candidate for membership of a primary branch of the All India Muslim League must be a Musalman [Muslim]."[796] This left unresolved the question of whether the Ahmadis were Muslims. But it was enough to continue allowing the Ahmadis to associate with the League. Its most high profile Ahmadi was Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, a member of the viceroy's executive council and subsequently Pakistan's first foreign minister. The demand for the removal of Zafrulla Khan from the latter position would be at the heart of the anti-Ahmadi agitation in the Punjab in 1953.

The Punjab disturbances had a political context, the relevant parts of which may be recalled from chapter 2 and briefly supplemented here.[797] In 1950, the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) appointed by the constituent assembly had submitted initial recommendations for how the provinces were to be represented at the center. It had proposed that the country would have two houses of parliament, with the upper house giving an equal number of seats to the five provinces—Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier, Baluchistan, and East Bengal; membership of the lower house was to be based on adult franchise. The two houses were envisioned as having equal powers. The Bengalis saw this as nullifying the numerical majority of their province and objected strenuously to it. The religious groups had their own grievances, seeing the interim report as inattentive to their vision of an Islamic state. Having been forced back soon afterward to the drawing board by the hostility that had greeted this report, the BPC submitted a revised set of recommendations toward the end of 1952. The report was now premised on the principle of parity between Pakistan's western and eastern wings. Each was to have an equal number of representatives in both the lower and the upper houses of the parliament, though the upper house lacked any effective power this time around. Within the western wing, however, the smaller

provinces were to have greater representation than their population warranted, and a number of other small units were envisaged as well. All this was meant as a way of preventing the much-feared domination of the Punjab—the largest of the west Pakistani provinces—over the smaller units, but also over the country as a whole. The Punjabis, led by their chief minister, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, predictably saw it as denying their province its legitimate voice at the center. For their part, the religious groups resented the lack of attention to their increasingly aggressive demands regarding the Ahmadis.

With relations between the center and the Punjab becoming unhappier by the day over the shape of the future constitution, the Oxford-educated Daultana found in the Ahmadi issue a potent means of undermining the federal government. He encouraged the anti-Ahmadi camp to take their demands—of relieving high-ranking Ahmadis of their positions and declaring the community as outside the Islamic fold—to the center, for they bore on constitutional issues that only the federal government and the constituent assembly could resolve. The prime minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin (who had succeeded Liaquat Ali Khan on his assassination in 1951), was known for personal piety and for good relations with the ‘ulama. But the demands of the Majlis-i ‘amal, the committee of action spearheading the anti-Ahmadi movement, were too extreme even for him, let alone for the Westernizing bureaucratic and political elite at the center. When the Majlis-i ‘amal presented him with an ultimatum, Nazimuddin refused to give in.[798] This was followed by widespread agitation in the Punjab in late February and March 1953. Lahore, the provincial capital was especially hard hit, with the city paralyzed by the protestors in the first days of March and lower-ranking government functionaries going on strike. Martial law was imposed in Lahore on March 6, though the agitation would continue for several more days elsewhere in the province. Some months later, Iskandar Mirza, the governor-general, dismissed the Nazimuddin government and appointed a new prime minister.

The 1953 disturbances also had an economic context. There were food shortages in parts of the country, with a corresponding rise in the price of wheat.[799] Unemployment was also a serious problem. In Sialkot, those who had previously been associated with the manufacture of sporting goods—an important local industry—were drawn to the agitation;[800] in Gujranwala, it was out of work metal and textile labor that had gravitated to

it.[801] In Lahore, it was the support for the agitators in the public services—the railways, the electricity department, the telephone and telegraph department—that had caused some of the greatest nervousness in the higher echelons of government and may have precipitated the imposition of martial law in the city.[802] Communists, too, had become part of the agitation.[803] Conversely, some of those who stood on an explicitly Islamic platform had a history of activism in the socioeconomic realm as well. This was the case with the Ahrar, in particular, whose success in galvanizing the movement and trying in the process to rehabilitate themselves in Pakistani politics had something to do with their well-known advocacy of causes relating to social justice. It is telling, for instance, that the son of ‘Ata Allah Shah Bukhari (d. 1961), the most spellbinding of all Ahrar public speakers active in this agitation, was named Abu Zarr[804]—in honor of the companion of the Prophet Muhammad more closely associated than anyone in early Islam with protests against social inequalities. And the base of an influential preacher in Rawalpindi, who led the movement before eventually helping the government bring it under control, had once been memorialized as “the laborer’s mosque” (mazdur ki masjid).[805] Unsurprisingly, it was not just symbols of government that were attacked during the agitation, but also those of affluence: the list of things damaged included an air-conditioned railroad coach, “one of the few that Pakistan had.”[806] In Lahore, the “faces of people travelling in cars were blackened.”[807]

There was more, however, to the Punjab disturbances than the machinations of the provincial government, the demagoguery of the Ahrar, or even the perceptible decline in people’s standards of living. From the perspective of the ‘ulama and the Islamists, there was something deeply troubling about the fact that the government of what was meant to be an Islamic state had a non-Muslim for one of its most visible members. This was as clear an indication as any that the modernizing governing elite were not sincere about anchoring the state in proper Islamic norms or, what to them was the same thing, about following the ‘ulama’s counsel in matters relating to Islam. That the foreign minister was held in high regard in Western capitals made matters worse, for it suggested that the government was more keen to cultivate its ties with the West than it was to fulfill its Islamic obligations.[808]

The challenge that Zafrulla Khan posed to the religio-political groups as an Ahmadi was more serious than he would if he had been a Hindu or a Christian. Pakistan's first law minister, Jogendra Nath Mandal, was in fact a Hindu from the scheduled castes, though that appointment had not ended well either.[809] The conservative camp knew that Zafrulla Khan was not a Muslim, but many others either did not know or did not care. As Mawdudi had observed in explaining the need for his tract on "the Qadiani problem" in March 1953, "a vast number" of the educated and even the ordinary believers did not understand the grounds for the demand that the Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority.[810] It was bad enough that the person introducing Pakistan at international forums and highlighting its Islamic commitments should have been a non-Muslim. It was much worse that he was masquerading as a Muslim, thereby unsettling some of the boundaries that the new state was supposed to guard.

Then there was the fact that Zafrulla Khan did not merely happen to be an Ahmadi but was rather a committed and active member of that community. He sometimes delivered Friday sermons at Ahmadi congregations.[811] The 1953 agitation was itself precipitated by his decision to speak at a public gathering organized by the Ahmadi Association (Anjuman-i Ahmadiyya) in Karachi, Pakistan's capital at the time. The prime minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin, had advised him against attending that event, but he had refused and threatened to resign as foreign minister if he was prevented from speaking at it.[812] From its inception, the Ahmadi community had been keenly interested in proselytism. Zafrulla Khan would later claim, in fact, that it was "the most active missionary movement in Islam."[813] In his testimony before the Court of Inquiry regarding the Punjab agitation, Nazimuddin, for his part, had expressed the view that "the root cause of the trouble … [was] the proselytizing tendency of the Ahmadis."[814] To opponents of the Ahmadis, this proselytism has sought to promote the interests not of Islam but rather of the Ahmadi cause. Ahmadi proselytism served, on this view, to strengthen the heretical community at the expense of Islam; more insidiously, it brought unsuspecting people to Ahmadism under the façade of converting them to Islam. Once again, the specter of a high-ranking government official advancing the cause of his wayward religious orientation was disquieting to his opponents.[815]

Three other things are worth noting in regard to Zafrulla Khan. First, to many ‘ulama and Islamists, he would have typified not just Ahmadism but also Muslim modernism, complete with its dim view of them. In his speech at the constituent assembly defending the Objectives Resolution, Zafrulla Khan was clearly thinking of the ‘ulama and the Islamists when he had cautioned against those who might “substitut[e] tinsel imitations and narrow bigotries” for Islam’s higher ideals.[816] Pakistani modernists did not have to be Ahmadi to be contemptuous of conservative demands regarding this community. A. K. Brohi (d. 1987), the advocate-general of the province of Sindh, a prominent modernist intellectual, and later the country’s law minister, had put it this way in 1952 in speaking of the still elusive Pakistani constitution, less than six months before the anti-Ahmadi agitation flared up in the Punjab:

<quote>

Lately we have brought before us a very unusual and senseless question of declaring the Ahmadis to be a minority community and it has been pressed by a section of our countrymen in Pakistan not only that we do declare this position but also to incorporate this declaration into the Constitution of Pakistan. I, for one, cannot see how anybody except a court of law can give a declaration of status. I cannot see the wisdom of the suggestion that such a trivial matter should be included in the future Constitution of Pakistan, which document … ought only to deal with very important and fundamental questions.[817]

</quote>

This was far from being a senseless question, a trivial matter, of course, for the ‘ulama, the Islamists, and those receptive to their discourses. But such words would surely have alerted them, if they needed a reminder, that Muslim modernists were themselves an impediment to the resolution of the Ahmadi issue.

Second, Zafrulla Khan was considerably better versed in Islam than many of his modernist peers. He could quote the Qur’an freely and in the original Arabic[818] and, over the course of his long life, he would write a number of books on Islam. The contrast with the more meager intellectual resources of

many other contemporary modernists was probably not lost on the ‘ulama. Zafrulla Khan irked the ‘ulama and the Islamists not only because he was a heretic in power, but also because he was an articulate and very literate heretic. The fact that he was also a modernist made things worse, though, in the end, it was not Ahmadi modernism as such that provoked the conservative opposition so much as the manner in which the Ahmadi issue had become implicated in the conservatives’ poor view of Islamic modernism as a whole.[819] We will observe instances of this point as we proceed.

The third thing to note here is the persistent allegation that Ahmadis like Zafrulla Khan were more loyal to the head of their own religious community than they were to the government or the country. It was often suggested that the Ahmadis had carved out a “state within a state,” or that they wanted to do so,[820] and that orders received from Rabwah trumped all other commitments.[821] Such allegations are far from unusual when it comes to minorities anywhere. Yet, once again, there may have been more to it than the charge, with all its subversive implications, that the Ahmadis thought themselves accountable to an authority of their own. There are traces here of some resentment toward the modernists, too: whereas the modernist governing elite were busy forcing Islam upon the procrustean bed of Pakistani nationalism, the Ahmadis allegedly put their false religion above all else. Adherents of the true religion might have been expected to do at least as much.

The leaders of the anti-Ahmadi movement had considerable street power at their disposal and, in March 1953, they were able to create significant unrest in the Punjab. The military, however, put down the agitation with a heavy hand, with no concessions to the movement’s demands. Mawdudi was condemned to death for his role in the agitation, though the verdict was soon commuted to a lesser sentence. The judicial report that was produced on the agitation by justices Muhammad Munir and M. R. Kayani of the Lahore High Court remains, for its part, unsurpassed as a modernist indictment of the wrong kinds of Islam. But the Ahmadi question had not gone away. It would reemerge just over two decades later, in 1974.

That year was a particularly bad one for the Bhutto government. Significant rifts had emerged by then within the ruling party. University teachers went on a country-wide strike in May 1974 to press their demands for a standardized system of salaries;[822] so did schoolteachers in Sindh,[823] and educational institutions in the Punjab had to be closed prematurely for the summer that year, with the examinations cancelled.[824] There were shortages of flour and cooking oil in the Punjab,[825] and 600,000 transit workers were threatening a strike.[826] On top of everything else, India undertook its first ever nuclear test on May 18, causing great anxiety in Pakistan, which now found itself staring at a new level of vulnerability vis-à-vis its arch rival.[827] There were also reports of Hindu-Muslim riots in Delhi around this time, which always made headline news in Pakistan. Then, on May 30, the newspapers reported that a group of medical college students returning to Multan, in the Punjab, from a vacation in the Frontier province had been severely beaten by a mob while their train was passing through the Ahmadi town of Rabwah.[828]

The students had apparently said derisive things about the Ahmadis while en route to the Frontier, and the Ahmadi mob was waiting for them on their return. The Ahmadis may have overreacted on this occasion, though hardly without reason. They had overreached before. In the mid-1930s, they had gone toe-to-toe in their conflict with the Ahrar and had tried, as some government officials saw it, “to goad the Ahrars into attacking them so that Government [would] have to defend the Ahmadis and so make the matter a war between the Ahrars and Government instead of between the Ahrars and Ahmadis.”[829] Around the same time, they had provoked Sikh villagers by claiming that Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh community, had in fact been a Muslim.[830] The result, as a police report had put it in early 1935, was that “the increase of feeling against the Ahmadis has been very marked and is not confined to any one community.”[831] In his testimony before the Court of Inquiry in 1953, Khawaja Nazimuddin, too, had noted that speeches at events organized by the Ahmadis could be as provocative as those of the Ahrar.[832] Nonetheless, few could have expected that the response to the Rabwah incident of 1974 would assume the proportions that it did. The incident acquired nationwide significance almost as soon as it had occurred, with much outpouring of public anger. There were well-coordinated general strikes in major cities, instances of arson directed at Ahmadi homes and businesses, and a number of deaths.[833] The government appointed a commission, headed by K.M.A. Samdani, a judge of the Lahore High Court, to

investigate what had transpired at Rabwah. Though the testimony of those called before the commission received extensive coverage in the press, the murkiness of the events surrounding the “Rabwah incident” would remain unrelieved, not least because the commission’s report to the Punjab government has never been made public.[834]

In view of the foregoing catalogue of troubles Bhutto was facing early in his administration, it is not unreasonable to think that he would have looked favorably upon something like the Rabwah incident to draw people’s attention away from more pressing issues. Some did claim to see the ruling party’s hand in staging the event, among them the head of the Ahmadi community.[835] Yet, it is unlikely that Bhutto had a direct role in it. Having the Ahmadis declared non-Muslims was an old demand of the ‘ulama, after all, and a recommendation to similar effect in April 1974 by the Muslim World League, a pan-Islamic body sponsored by Saudi Arabia, had given it added force.[836] Though the decision by the Pakistani parliament to follow suit and to classify the Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority won some momentary praise for Bhutto from conservative circles, it was only under intense pressure from them that the government had acted. And the whole episode may have weakened Bhutto vis-à-vis the ‘ulama and the Islamists, who would spearhead a mass movement against him on charges of rigged elections less than three years later.

The Bhutto era had, in fact, begun auspiciously for the Ahmadis, and this returns us to some of the anxieties people have had about them. There were reports that the Ahmadis had contributed generously to Bhutto’s political campaign in order to ensure his government’s favorable disposition toward them. And as the British ambassador to Islamabad reported in a confidential note, “when Bhutto on coming to power sacked the chiefs of the three Armed Services and appointed two reputed Ahmadis to head the air force and navy, with Ahmadis in command of at least two of the five army corps, … they seemed to be reaping their reward.”[837]

In the wake of the Rabwah incident, the names of high-ranking military officials who were Ahmadis appeared in some magazines, reflecting and reinforcing concerns about an influential Ahmadi presence in the most powerful of Pakistan’s institutions. There was much uncertainty and

innuendo about who was or was not an Ahmadi; the days when the Pakistani foreign minister could embrace his Ahmadi identity at public gatherings were long gone. But the uncertainty created even more unease about how many of the “key positions” of the state—and not just in the military—were in fact occupied by members of this tiny community.[838] Even as the Ahmadis continued to be accused in 1974, as they were in 1953, of running a state within a state, it was easy to play upon fears that they could—might even be plotting to—take over Pakistan itself.[839] For a country that had lived for many years under martial law or other forms of authoritarian rule, it would not have taken much imagination to conjure up such fears. And those paying attention to international developments would have known that Hafiz al-Asad, the Syrian strongman who had risen to power just a few years ago in 1970, came not from that country’s Sunni majority but rather from what was widely seen as a heretical minority.

As the anti-Ahmadi movement took shape in 1974, it was repeatedly mentioned that there was an “Ahmadi mission” working in Israel. The Ahmadis asked about it by the Samdani commission clarified that this Ahmadi presence in Haifa predated the partition of India[840] and that the proselytizing center in question was run by local Arabs.[841] Even so, in the immediate aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the mere suggestion that the Ahmadis had a presence in Israel would have sufficed for many to confirm their worst suspicions about an Ahmadi conspiracy against Islam and not just against Pakistan. There also were insinuations that Ahmadis were working for a reunited India, since their original center, Qadian, was now in India. Mawlana Yusuf Bannuri (d. 1977), a respected religious scholar of the Deobandi orientation and the convener of the anti-Ahmadi alliance, had little doubt that the Ahmadis were working in both Israeli and Indian interests.[842]

Questions about loyalty could, however, cut other ways, too, and some of the ‘ulama were themselves vulnerable on this score. In his testimony before the Samdani commission, Mawlana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarawi (d. 1981), a leader of the Deobandi Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam, acknowledged, for instance, that he had been opposed to the establishment of Pakistan. But, he explained, once Pakistan had come into existence, he and like-minded ‘ulama had decided that working against its interests would be wrong.[843] Yusuf Bannuri had belonged to the same camp. He was a student of Anwarshah

Kashmiri, and he had taught for many years at the madrasa Kashmiri had established in Gujarat, in western India, in the late 1920s. He was originally from the Frontier province, though it had taken him some years after the partition of India to come to Pakistan. This was not unusual in the early years of partition.[844] It had not been clear to everyone that the borders would eventually become virtually impassable or on which side one wanted to reside permanently. Things looked decidedly different a quarter century after partition, however. Even as Bannuri led the charge against the Ahmadis, front page advertisements were published in several national newspapers in early July 1974, questioning his credentials as a loyal citizen of Pakistan. Taking the form of queries addressed to him, these advertisements asked whether it was true that Bannuri had continued to live as an Indian citizen even after Pakistan had come into being, that he had once been the provincial president of the anti-Pakistan Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind, that he had maintained ties with India even after coming to Pakistan. There were also rhetorical questions about whether his entry into politics on the Ahmadi issue was at India’s bidding, in order to create chaos (fitna), even foment a civil war, in Pakistan and whether he was not getting a “purely religious issue” entangled with politics and thereby making it more difficult to resolve. The advertisements were sponsored by Members of the Association of Devotees of the Prophet [Muhammad], a hitherto unknown group.[845] That the Ahmadis were behind these advertisements might have been a natural inference, though the leading opposition lawyer involved in cross-examining those testifying before the Samdani commission thought that it was rather the government that had sponsored them, not least because they were published in newspapers then controlled by it.[846]

Whether or not the government was complicit in these advertisements, it would have benefited from this effort to discredit a politically influential religious scholar. In any case, it would not have been difficult for the ‘ulama to see things this way, or to interpret them as yet another instance of the governing elite’s derailing of people’s religious aspirations. Since coming to power, Bhutto government officials had made a number of statements showing that they were no friends of the ‘ulama. At almost exactly the time the Rabwah incident took place, a federal minister whose portfolios included the regulation of charitable endowments (awqaf) had stated that the government was planning to introduce legislation that would prohibit the use of mosques for political purposes.[847] To the ‘ulama, let alone the Islamists, there are no sharp distinctions to be made between “religious” and

“political” purposes, so far as mosques go. What such statements meant to them was simply that the government expected them to endorse its policies or at least to stay clear of views critical of it. Some weeks later, the Punjab’s minister of education had declared that the People’s Party–controlled provincial government was preparing legislation to take over the madrasas.[848] So far as the ‘ulama are concerned, as has been observed, these are some of the last “bastions of Islam,” and they have often equated their ability to resist governmental regulation of these institutions with the autonomy and integrity of their prized religious tradition. Khurshid Hasan Mir, a federal minister with strong leftist leanings, was among the most combative. “Now that the Ahmadi question is under consideration by the National Assembly,” he said in late August 1974, “the mullas need not make all this noise…. These so-called ‘ulama are using mosques for political ends. If they don’t put a stop to their charges and allegations [against the government], their tongues will be pulled out.”[849] Even without such intemperate language, the government and many of its policies represented a serious challenge to the ‘ulama.[850] From the latter’s perspective, then, any backing down on the Ahmadi issue would be a victory not only for that community but also for a government intent on undermining the conservative camp. Such anxieties may not have triggered the anti-Ahmadi agitation, but they surely underlaid some of the ‘ulama’s determination to see it through to success.

One further node of possible anxiety is also worth considering, and this concerns the students of the medical college who had been beaten up at the Rabwah train station. Some of those testifying before the Samdani commission had vaguely suggested that the violence at the train station may have had something to do with bad behavior toward local women.[851] Ahmadi or not, rural and small town Punjabis are often quite conservative when it comes to gender norms, and matters of honor have long been important in people’s sense of self-worth. It would not be surprising if some Punjabi Ahmadis had reacted violently in defense of their women. Some reports suggested that a student of the medical college had gone so far as to expose himself at the station.[852] If true, this could not but have provoked deep anger in the local community, indeed more than anti-Ahmadi slogans by themselves would. Members of the anti-Ahmadi campaign put their own spin on such embarrassing reports. Apart from denials that anyone had misbehaved with women,[853] it was alleged that the Ahmadi administration in Rabwah had “reared some girls” specifically for the purpose of being able

to accuse unwanted people of harassment and to have them punished accordingly.[854] This may have sufficed for those who would put nothing past the Ahmadis. Yet, it is not hard to imagine that at least some among the ‘ulama would have been deeply troubled by the alleged behavior of the medical college students.

The long history of suspicion, even hostility, between the products of modern education and those schooled in madrasas is worth briefly recalling here. A generation before the Rabwah incident, current and former college students had been at the helm of the movement for Pakistan, and the ‘ulama opposing the demand for a separate Muslim homeland had come in for some vitriolic attacks by them. The words of one religious scholar bitterly lamenting to Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani the hooliganism he had witnessed at a pro-Congress rally led by Husayn Ahmad Madani in late 1945 are especially poignant in this regard:

<quote>

It felt like all the people [disrupting Madani’s speech] had not just bid farewell to their religiosity and morals but had also turned from human beings into demons and animals…. They hurled filthy curses [at Madani] and shamelessly displayed a bestial and satanic behavior…. Then they resorted to mercilessly showering the gathering with rocks, which injured fifty or more people, some of whom remained unconscious all night…. Those engaging in such acts were no mere ignorant commoners. They were led by people educated at [English] colleges and universities who, at present, are the moving spirit and the lifeblood of the Muslim League.[855]

</quote>

As ‘ulama like Bannuri, the convener and head of the anti-Ahmadi coalition, faced embarrassing reminders about having been on the wrong side of the movement for Pakistan, they would have recalled as well the vitriol of those earlier years. For all its contribution toward bringing the Ahmadi issue to the very center of national attention, the alleged behavior of the medical students could scarcely have done much to put to rest the ‘ulama’s caricatures of people of this ilk.

By early September 1974, a constitutional amendment had declared the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority. This had followed an in-camera session of the National Assembly, the lower house of the Pakistani parliament, during much of August.[856] It would be another decade before the Ahmadis came back into the spotlight. On this occasion, the issue had to do with whether, being non-Muslims, the Ahmadis could refer to themselves as Muslims, their places of worship as mosques, their call to prayers as azan, and so forth. The answer was no, and in 1984, the president, General Zia al-Haqq, issued an ordinance amending the Pakistan penal code and making it an offense for the Ahmadis to “pose” as Muslims or to employ terms commonly used for the early caliphs and for the companions (sahaba) of the Prophet Muhammad to refer to associates or successors of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Such Ahmadi usage “outrage[d] the religious feelings of Muslims” and it was henceforth subject to criminal prosecution.[857] These regulations—sections 298-B and 298-C—of the penal code are part of what are commonly known as the blasphemy laws, which have been repeatedly invoked to target all perceived sacrilege, by Ahmadis as well as others. Other blasphemy laws include sections 295 (on defiling holy places), 295-A and 298 (insulting religious sensibilities), 295-B (desecrating the Qur’an), 298-A (insulting holy personages), and 295-C (insulting the Prophet Muhammad).[858] Already in 1952, the governor of Sindh had suggested to the prime minister that the government invoke the relevant provisions of the penal code in order to prevent the Ahmadis from propagating their belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, “which necessarily wounds the religious feelings of the rest of the believers in Islam who constitute the bulk of the population.” The governor’s point was that freedom of conscience and expression was necessarily subservient to the law and to apply the legal provisions in question to the Ahmadis would therefore not jeopardize the government’s liberal credentials.[859] In explaining the decision to declare the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority, Bhutto, too, had been concerned to present it as an expression of the democratic will of the people.[860] Zia al-Haqq was perturbed by no such worries in 1984.

The draconian 1984 ordinance points to anxieties of its own, principally that the 1974 constitutional amendment had failed to effectively exclude the Ahmadis from the fold of the Muslim community, that in passing themselves off as Muslims they were continuing to undermine Islam from within while

injuring Muslim sensibilities. However, no nationwide anti-Ahmadi movement had preceded the 1984 ordinance, as had been the case with the 1974 amendment. Instead, it was preceded by the recommendation of the Council of Islamic Ideology that the Ahmadis not be allowed to call their places of worship mosques or their calls to prayer azan, for these were “Muslim symbols.”[861] Many among the ‘ulama seized on this recommendation and pressured the government to implement it.[862] To furnish the regime with Islamic symbols of its own, the council had also recommended that men not attending the Friday congregational prayers be fined, that women be required to cover themselves in public, and that women athletes not be allowed to participate in sporting events abroad.[863]

As with the 1953 agitation in the Punjab and the 1974 countrywide movement, the 1984 ordinance should also be seen against a wider political context, again without reducing it to that context. Things were not going well for General Zia al-Haqq. Since coming to power in 1977, he had promised several times to hold general elections and had put them off each time. Eleven political parties had come together in 1981 to organize the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a powerful challenge to the regime, and even some of the religio-political parties that had initially been excited by the military regime’s program of Islamization had begun to grow weary of Zia al-Haqq’s promises. The Jama‘at-i Islami had lent valuable support to the regime in its early years, but not everyone in the party was happy about this. In 1983, the regime banned student organizations, of which the Jama‘at-affiliated Islami Jam‘iyyat-i Talaba was among the most powerful. This led to new, internal, pressure on the party’s leadership to adopt a less accommodating course toward the government.[864] Though the ‘ulama had benefited much from the patronage that came with Zia al-Haqq’s Islamization, they, too, had misgivings about what this Islamization entailed in terms of greater governmental regulation of the religious sphere. Many among them applauded the anti-Ahmadi ordinance. But it did little in the long run to shore up the regime’s religious credentials, let alone its legitimacy. Nor did it put to rest anxieties about religious minorities.

*** The Shi‘a

Shi‘i imprecations against ‘A’isha, a wife of the Prophet Muhammad who had gone to war against ‘Ali, their first imam, or their hostility to ‘Umar, the second caliph, can be at least as offensive to Sunnis as the Ahmadi practice of referring to the head of their own community as a caliph, or his associates as companions, or his wife as the mother of the believers. In Pakistan, with a population that is overwhelmingly Sunni, the ‘ulama have often demanded restrictions on Shi‘i Muharram rituals, when such imprecations tend to find formal expression. As a religious scholar observed at a national conference of the ‘ulama convened by Zia al-Haqq in August 1980, “if, today, anyone publishes insulting literature about the government, the president, or some other high official, he is immediately prosecuted for it. The only person who is not prosecuted is the one who insults God and His Prophet, the noble companions, the pure members of the [Prophet’s] household, and the Rashidun caliphs. There is no provision in the law to bring such a person to court.”[865]

That would change later the same year. Significantly, the first of General Zia al-Haqq’s blasphemy laws was directed not against the Ahmadis but rather against the Shi‘a. The legislation did not mention any group in particular, in marked contrast with the 1984 ordinance, which would single out the Ahmadis. Yet, there could be little doubt that, in making any insult to the companions and family of the Prophet a criminal offense (section 298-A of the Pakistan penal code), the intended target was Shi‘i ritual revilement of figures venerated by the Sunnis.[866] It was also a way of settling scores with a community whose leadership had publicly challenged the regime earlier that year, as we will observe.

A deeper anxiety had to do, as it did in case of the Ahmadis, with the perceived outsized influence of the Shi‘i minority in political life and the religio-cultural sphere. Jinnah was a Shi‘i.[867] For the most part, he was keen to stay clear of sectarian entanglements. This was in line, of course, with the modernist view that true Islam had nothing to do with such things. But it was also good politics, since any sectarian trappings would have been fatal to his aspiration to be recognized, by the British, the Indian National Congress and, indeed, by the Muslims, as the exclusive voice of a unified Muslim community. His fleeting attendance in 1938 of the annual session of the All India Shi‘a Conference was an exception.[868] As he put it a year later, the sectarian conflict in Lucknow was nothing less than “the

surreptitious machinations of the enemies of the Musalmans [to] create and exploit the differences between them."[869] Accordingly, Jinnah kept his Muslim League firmly out of any engagement with the Madh-i sahaba conflict in Lucknow. Indeed, as the governor of the United Provinces reported to the viceroy in May 1939, "Jinnah had threatened excommunication to any Muslim Leaguer who should try to intervene."[870] Jinnah's critics among the Sunni 'ulama thought nonetheless that if nothing else disqualified him from establishing a Muslim homeland, his Shi'ism sufficed to do so. His nemesis, Husayn Ahmad Madani, was most blunt on this score. He had been a key figure on the Sunni side in the Madh-i sahaba agitation in Lucknow, and he could never get past the fact that Jinnah was a Shi'i.[871] Using a derogatory term for the Shi'a in a letter written weeks after the establishment of Pakistan, Madani referred to Jinnah as a "self-described Rafidi" and observed that his new state was ruled by "heretics and apostates." One could hardly pray for such a state, though its Sunni inhabitants did merit one's sympathy.[872] The letter went on to quote Raja Muhammad Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad (d. 1973), a rich Shi'i philanthropist and politician, as telling a Shi'i gathering some years earlier: "Our great leader [Jinnah] is fortunately a true Shi'i. The history of Islam is undergoing change. Today, all the Sunnis of India have bowed their head in obedience to a descendant of the [first Shi'i] imam and they are willing to lay down their lives at his command."[873] It is taken for granted by Madani that any self-respecting Sunni would be disturbed by such words. The irony, however, which could not have been lost on the modernists, is that 'ulama like Madani were far more open to living together with non-Muslims than they were with Muslims of the wrong kind.

Besides Jinnah, two Pakistani heads of the state—Iskandar Mirza (1955–58) and Yahya Khan (1969–71)—were Shi'is. Neither is remembered kindly in the country, though this has nothing to do with their Shi'ism. Iskandar Mirza, the last governor-general of the country and, with the adoption of the constitution in 1956, its first president, was the person who imposed martial law in 1958 before being forced to relinquish power to General Ayub Khan. It was to General Yahya Khan that Ayub Khan would, in turn, hand over the reins of the government. Yahya Khan declared another martial law, and it was under his watch that the province of East Pakistan seceded to become Bangladesh. General Muhammad Musa, Ayub Khan's commander-in-chief and subsequently his governor of West Pakistan, was also a Shi'i.[874] So was Nusrat, the wife of prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. More recently, Yusuf Reza Gilani, prime minister from 2008 to 2012, was a Shi'i.[875] Though

most estimates put the Shi‘a around 15 percent of the country’s Muslim population, Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto were reported in 1980 to claim that the Shi‘is accounted for as much as 40 percent of the armed forces. No one seems to have taken this claim seriously,[876] but it could be grounds for the sort of anxieties provoked by insinuations about Ahmadi influence on the government and their disproportionately large presence in the military. Worth noting, too, is the fact that Pakistan’s highest military honor, the Nishan-i Haydar, evokes the gallantry in battle not of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, or ‘Uthman, all revered companions of Muhammad, but rather of ‘Ali, the first Shi‘i imam. Shi‘i symbolism has also been prominent in the political rhetoric of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a Karachi-based party that draws its support from the migrants (muhajirs) who had relocated to Pakistan following its birth. Some of the regions from which the Urdu-speaking muhajirs had emigrated were centers of Shi‘i culture in colonial India. Since its founding in the mid-1980s, the MQM’s often violent struggle—against the native population of Sindh; against the Pashtuns who have come to settle in large numbers in a city, Karachi, that the MQM sees as its own; against a Punjabi-dominated state seen as indifferent to its claims—has often featured Shi‘i motifs.[877]

In local contexts—for instance, in rural southern Punjab—the nexus of Shi‘ism and political power has been most visible not in the person of an occasional president, prime minister, or a military official, but rather in that of the area’s landlord. As the example of Yusuf Riza Gilani suggests, however, these are not mutually exclusive positions. A number of the “feudal” magnates in the Punjab—as they are sometimes referred to in the Pakistani political lexicon—have tended to be Shi‘i. Syed Abid Hussain Shah (d. 1971), a politician and pir from Jhang in the Punjab, had owned 5,300 acres; his daughter, Abida Hussain, has owned somewhat less on account of sales as well as periodic land reforms, but still enough to make her one of the biggest landowners in the country.[878] In the decades following the establishment of Pakistan, much of the leadership of the Shi‘a came from the Shi‘i landowners, who also provided financial backing to the country’s Shi‘i organizations.[879] The peasantry, by contrast, remained largely Sunni—if, for a long time, rather unselfconsciously so. Besides being at the mercy of those wielding great political and economic power, the vulnerability of this putatively disenfranchised Sunni majority was exacerbated in local contexts by other factors, too. Like the Ahmadis, and by their own acknowledgment, Shi‘i ‘ulama have often been active proselytes for their faith.[880] While in

case of the Ahmadis, this often meant proselyting to non-Muslims, a good deal of the target audience of the Shi‘i preachers comprised fellow Muslims. Many Shi‘i preachers viewed this audience as people who really were Shi‘is in some sense, and they sought accordingly to awaken among them a proper Shi‘i identity anchored in authoritative beliefs and norms.[881] For their part, Sunni activists and preachers have been no less active in trying to win followers to their own orientations. From the latter’s perspective, it was unsuspecting Sunnis that Shi‘i preaching targeted and they needed help to be able to guard against such efforts. In this narrative, an oil-rich revolutionary Iran had come to pour unprecedented resources into this proselytism, which meant that the stakes had never been higher.

But it was not just local Shi‘i preaching against which downtrodden Sunnis had to be protected. There was the lure of Shi‘ism itself. For all the potential of the Muharram processions to become flashpoints of sectarian conflict, they have long attracted Sunni participation. Indeed, in Lucknow in the early twentieth century, the issue was not so much Sunni rejection of such processions as it was the demand to put Sunni devotion to the Prophet’s companions on public display, as a counterpoint to Shi‘i revilement of them.[882] The Ahrar had taken the lead in the Madh-i sahaba controversy, yet, in 1953, even they were recruiting Punjabi villagers to the anti-Ahmadi agitation by promising them that “Imam Hussain [the third imam in the Shi‘i reckoning] would be waiting to receive those who sipped the cup of martyrdom in this crusade against infidelity.”[883] Though accompanied by much public weeping and self-flagellation, the Muharram rituals can have a carnivalesque look to them, providing much colorful entertainment, besides food and drink, to participants and onlookers. The closest some Sunnis come to rivaling such events is when they commemorate the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad or the death anniversaries of some Sufi saints. But the Shi‘is, too, celebrate the birthday of the Prophet and not a few of the Shi‘i rural magnates double as hereditary guardians of major Sufi shrines in the Punjab. For their part, many Sunnis of the Salafi and, to a lesser extent, Deobandi orientations frown upon devotional practices associated with the Prophet’s birthday or the saints’ shrines, leaving their common fellow travelers exposed to the appeal of Shi‘i commemorations.

Besides its local lure, Shi‘ism—its iconic figures, its symbolic imagery—has had a strong hold on Indo-Islamic high culture as well. Many Shi‘a of colonial India did not consider the early modernist Shibli Nu‘mani to be a friend of their religious orientation, yet Shibli had written an important book comparing the literary merits of two major elegiac poets who had made their name writing about the tragedy of Husayn.[884] In his Urdu poetry, Mawlana Muhammad Ali of the Khilafat movement had summoned up Husayn’s challenge to an iniquitous regime to frame his own anti-colonial struggle. The symbolic power of Husayn’s martyrdom at Karbala is also palpable in Iqbal’s Persian and Urdu verse, and Shi‘i preachers in Pakistan have frequently laced their discourses with his poetry.[885] In the Pakistan of the 1960s, even the great leftist poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz (d. 1984) wrote an affecting elegy for Husayn.[886] In the 1980s, Parvin Shakir, too, regularly featured Shi‘i motifs in her work, which were often intertwined with searing social criticism. The following poem, which must stand for others, evokes the tribulations of Husayn’s sister, Zaynab, in the aftermath of the massacre at Karbala. The voice is Shakir’s, with the suggestion that the afflictions are as much hers, or any harassed woman’s, as they are Zaynab’s:

<quote>

From the tent of innocenceAs soon as I proceeded towards the city of justiceFrom their ambushMy killers also emergedWith ready-to-shoot bows, targeted arrows, loaded pistols …In the city square, the judge armed with a daggerStreets dotted with daggers hidden in sleevesEvery resident of the city in waitingListening to the sound of my solitary litterWeaving the web around me with spidery skillSomeone seeking my bannerAnother wanting my headYet another desirous of my cloak …My helplessness!Covering the face with my hairHands foldedHead bowedThere was only one thing on my lips—O Forgiver, O Merciful!O Forgiver, O Merciful! [887]

</quote>

At a time when the electronic media was largely controlled by the government, as it was in Pakistan till the early years of the twenty-first century, there were added anxieties about the state media becoming purveyors of an outsized Shi‘i influence. Special programming was scheduled on radio and television in Muharram, and as the ‘Ashura—the tenth day of the month, on which Husayn was martyred—approached, the state television

bore a strikingly somber look, complete with telecasts of Shi‘i ritual gatherings (majalis) at which the travails of Husayn and his family were recounted to great emotional effect. While many Sunni viewers watched such programs with an interest that could verge on devotion, for they too venerate the memory of Husayn, some Sunni groups worried that the Shi‘a were receiving an unjustified amount of airtime. A public appeal to the prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in January 1977 on behalf of a number of Sunni associations of Karachi reflects such sentiments:

<quote>

In this democratic age, institutions of the media are people’s institutions. They are supported through taxes by the entire populace, the majority and the minority. A particular way of thinking cannot therefore be foisted upon them…. Discussing historical events and religious beliefs without taking care to present them in their proper perspective has deleterious effects…. The month of Muharram is worthy of our respect in every way. Two great instances of martyrdom took place that month [the second being that of ‘Umar, the second successor of Muhammad]. In honoring the practice of Moses, the Prophet [Muhammad] fasted on the tenth day of this month…. Khadija, the mother of the believers, got married this month. Noah’s ark came to rest at Mt. Judi this month and God chose Abraham as his “friend” this month. Jacob saw his beloved son Joseph after forty years this month, David was forgiven [by God], Solomon’s kingdom was restored to him, Job’s travails came to an end, Jonah emerged unharmed from the belly of the fish, the Pharaoh drowned in the Nile, and Jesus was born—all in this month. It was in this month that the [caliphate’s] Islamic secretariat [sic, in Urdu transliteration] was inaugurated during the caliphate of ‘Umar, and [his successor] ‘Usman’s great caliphate began this month. To ignore such momentous events in the media’s programming is to forget one’s historical heritage, which leads to the destruction of nations.[888]

</quote>

The question of whether everything mentioned in this passage did indeed take place in the month of Muharram is best set aside here. What is relevant is rather the rhetorically powerful point that one single event—the martyrdom of Husayn—had come to completely overshadow the sacred history, and prehistory, of Islam and even that one event was being

presented by the national media in inaccurate ways. In other words, a Shi‘i view of history was being relayed through radio and television, and it was not just people in local neighborhoods that were exposed to the lure of Shi‘i beliefs and practices but the nation at large.

Then there was the question of how to teach Islam in schools. The Shi‘a had long demanded that their distinctive doctrines be presented separately in textbooks of Islamic studies (Islamiyyat)—a required subject in the public school system. The Ayub Khan regime had conceded this demand in principle in late 1968, but it was not until 1975 that separate textbooks of Islamic studies were instituted for Shi‘i students by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.[889] These textbooks, which were later discontinued, [890] had a shared section on the Qur’an, the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, and ethics (akhlaqiyyat); but other sections were tailored to the separate needs of students, with Shi‘i textbooks detailing matters of ritual according to Shi‘i law and outlining the lives of the Shi‘i imams. The Sunni ‘ulama had resisted this Shi‘i demand bitterly. In August 1973, on the very day the new constitution of Pakistan was promulgated, a number of ‘ulama had addressed an appeal to the prime minister, of which the first item was a call upon the government to reject this Shi‘i demand. The Shi‘a could have their own syllabus in their denominational schools, the statement said, since the constitution guaranteed religious freedom to all people inhabiting the country. But to allow them a separate representation on the public school curriculum meant that “the minority Shi‘i sect was being placed on par with the predominant Sunni majority.” And if this was being done for the Shi‘a, the signatories of the statement asked rhetorically, what was to prevent the teachings of the Ahmadis, the Christians, and the Hindus from also being included in the syllabus?[891] They went on to demand restrictions on Shi‘i ritual practices and on Shi‘i programming on radio and television and sought, as a preview of what was to come the following year, to have the Ahmadis declared a non-Muslim minority.

Worries that a minority was standing in the way of the majority’s ability to realize its aspirations would arise most forcefully when General Zia al-Haqq began his campaign of Islamization in 1979. Among its highlights, as would be recalled, was the state’s collection of zakat, which Muslims of means are required by the shari‘a to pay annually on their wealth and property. Though

zakat has sometimes been collected by the state—the first caliph, Abu Bakr, had gone to war against Arab tribes that had refused to send the proceeds of zakat to the central government following the death of the Prophet—Muslims, for the most part, have tended to informally disburse it among the needy in their local circles. Zia al-Haqq's implementation of zakat laws was a departure from that practice. It was also based on the norms of the Hanafi school of Sunni law, to which most Sunnis in South Asia have long adhered. The implementation of zakat laws in 1980 was an extension of state power in a new direction, presided over by a regime that had only recently executed the former prime minister. It immediately invited challenges. There were many among the Sunnis who complained bitterly about being deprived by state-owned banks of a portion of their hard-earned savings in the name of zakat. But it was from the Shi'i quarter that the most organized resistance to these laws came. Shi'i leaders argued that their religious law had its own specifications about zakat and they contested the government's right to collect it according to religious norms they did not recognize. Emboldened by the example of the street power that had helped topple the Iranian monarchy in early 1979, the Shi'a held massive sit-ins in the capital, Islamabad, in mid-1980 to press for their demands. The government—a martial law administration, no less—was taken aback by the determination of the protestors and forced to capitulate. The Shi'a were to be subject to their own laws, as administered by their religious authorities, when it came to zakat.

This was an embarrassing moment for the government, but it was also a deeply unhappy time for those Sunnis who had long had misgivings about unwanted Shi'i influence. Issues much larger than the immediate controversy over zakat were at stake here. To the extent that people believed that Zia al-Haqq was really trying to implement Islamic law in Pakistan rather than to justify and prolong his rule by invoking Islam, the Shi'i challenge to him revived the specter of a silent majority held hostage by a rowdy minority. But there was more. From the time of Pakistan's inception, 'ulama and Islamists had been trying to counter modernist objections that a state whose inhabitants belonged to many different Islamic orientations could not possibly implement Islamic law in a way that would satisfy them all. Their usual response had been that, while people were free to follow their legal norms in matters of personal status (notably marriage, divorce, and inheritance), Islamic public law had to be guided by the school of law followed by the majority of the country's population.[892] It was to that idea that the Shi'a now represented a challenge.

The Shi‘a wanted full recognition of their separate religious law in all respects. As Mufti Ja‘far Husayn (d. 1983), the most influential leader of the Shi‘i community at the time, put it in a defiant speech at an ‘ulama convention presided over by General Zia al-Haqq in 1980,

<quote>

No one can eliminate juridical disagreements. They are a reality and one should not shut one’s eyes to them. Instead, we should acknowledge their existence and give people the liberty to act according to their various juridical orientations. This is what justice demands and only in this way can we succeed in the implementation of Islamic law. If, on the other hand, the views of one school of thought are imposed upon others, success [in implementing Islamic law] would not be possible for us.[893]

</quote>

Such statements hinted darkly at the Shi‘a’s ability to derail Islamization. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Shi‘i groups would, indeed, be vocal opponents of the various “shari‘at bills” that promised to bring Pakistan closer to its elusive Islamic ideals. Represented at the time by the Movement for the Implementation of Ja‘fari (that is, Twelver Shi‘i) Law (Tahrik-i nifaz-i fiqh-i Ja‘fariyya, or TNFJ), the Shi‘a were not alone in such opposition. Yet, the loud Shi‘i challenge to such initiatives would have done nothing to assuage anxieties that it bore some responsibility for preventing the implementation of Islamic law in Pakistan. The TNFJ’s very name created suspicion that the only law the Shi‘a wanted to see implemented was their own.[894]

Though the Shi‘a of Pakistan had been mobilizing with unusual intensity since the late 1960s,[895] the new ring of defiance in their collective voice had much to do with the success of the Iranian revolution. This was not lost on their Sunni rivals. As with the Ahmadis, there were anxieties that the Pakistani Shi‘a were more loyal to their own religious guides—in this case, Ayatollah Khomeini—than they were to Pakistan. As it happened, neither the Shi‘i leadership in Pakistan nor the revolutionaries in Iran did much to allay such fears. Shi‘i leaders in Pakistan were sometimes caught saying that they

would “take orders only from Ayatollah Khomeini.”[896] And they urged their countrymen to see Khomeini as the leader and the “hero” not just of the Shi‘a, but of all Muslims.[897] Iran, for its part, made no bones about its desire to see its revolution exported to other regions of the Muslim world. ‘Ali Khamene’i, the president of Iran, was quoted by Pakistani newspapers as saying in 1984 that “Iran’s Islamic revolution had spread in every direction and no power could succeed in stopping it.”[898] Such statements were not designed to bring comfort to Arab capitals or, for that matter, to Sunni religious circles in Pakistan. It was not uncommon for the Iranian embassy and cultural centers to also sponsor cultural and religious events in Pakistan, again creating considerable discontent in some Sunni circles.

There were at least two other ways in which the case of Iran raised uncomfortable questions in Pakistan. First, though there is a Sunni minority in Iran, it has never enjoyed the sort of recognition in terms of state law that the Shi‘a of Pakistan were claiming for themselves from the Zia al-Haqq regime. This was brought home pointedly after the revolution of 1979, when the Iranian regime took it upon itself to implement Islamic law in its Twelver Shi‘i form. Prominent Sunnis were not slow, sometimes tongue in cheek, to point to the example of Iran as something Pakistan ought to emulate. At the ‘ulama convention of 1980, Zafar Ahmad Ansari (d. 1991), who was associated with the Jama‘at-i Islami and had played a key role in the parliamentary proceedings on the Ahmadi issue in the summer of 1974, referred to the recently ratified Iranian constitution as a beacon for other countries. The Iranians have decided, he said,

<quote>

that the state religion will be Islam and the [official] school of law is that of the Twelvers, which is the school adhered to by the vast majority of Iran’s Muslims. The [majoritarian] argument on the basis of which they have made the Twelver school the official school [of the state] is just, reasonable, realistic and practical. Different sorts of dispute would have arisen if they had allowed any form of ambiguity here. With this decision, they have shut the door to any such conflict.… They have also provided that other schools of Islamic law—the Hanafi, the Shafi‘i, … the Maliki, the Hanbali, the Zaydi—will be entitled to full respect and that their adherents would be free to perform their [personal] religious rites according to their own laws.[899]

</quote>

In other words, the Twelver Shi‘is of Iran had made it clear to their non-Shi‘i compatriots that, while enjoying their rights, they would have to live as a religious minority. The implication, left unstated by Zafar Ahmad Ansari but frequently enunciated by others, was that the Shi‘a of Pakistan were overstepping acceptable limits in demanding more than Iran, to which they looked up for guidance, was willing to give to its own Muslim minorities. And Iran was guilty of double standards in implicitly supporting Pakistani Shi‘i demands.

Second, in the years following the revolution, Iranian authorities did not flinch when it came to the implementation of Islamic criminal law, the hudud—the starkest marker, so far as the Islamists and many ‘ulama are concerned, of a state’s Islamic identity. Hands were amputated for theft and people were stoned to death for unlawful sexual intercourse.[900] Though Saudi Arabia had long implemented such punishments, their incidence was considerably less frequent there than it was in Iran in the 1980s.[901] The real contrast was with Pakistan, however. As the headline of one national newspaper had giddily announced on the occasion of Zia al-Haqq’s promulgation of the Hudood Ordinances in February 1979, “the thief’s hand will be chopped off, the person committing adultery will be publicly stoned to death.”[902] Yet, until the end of his rule in 1988, or in subsequent years for that matter, no thieves had their hands cut off and no adulterers were stoned to death. The Pakistani Taliban would later do such things, as will be seen, but they would do it as a challenge to the state’s authority, not on its behalf. Flogging was the closest the state itself came to maintaining the symbolism of hudud, but even that was meant more to intimidate political opponents than to meet any traditional juridical specifications.

Idiosyncratic punishments in the name of hudud were already too much for human rights activists at home and abroad. They were too little for many Islamists and ‘ulama, however, for they could hardly mistake them for the real thing. Here is what Ihsan Ilahi Zahir (d. 1987), a religious scholar of the Ahl-i Hadith orientation and a politician, had to say in 1980 about the nonimplementation of the hudud, with General Zia al-Haqq in attendance:

<quote>

With apologies to those convinced of gradualism [in the implementation of Islamic law] … this process of gradualism has remained unfinished for thirty-two years since the inception of Pakistan…. A [real] beginning does have to be made one day. When it is, it will have to be marked by the cutting off of the thief's hand and the stoning of the adulterer to death and the flogging of the person who drinks. Some people say that Islamic laws ought to be implemented only after the society has reformed itself [literally: become good]. But once the society has reformed itself, are we to flog [our fellow scholar] Mawlana 'Abd al-Rahman! … After all, it is to reform society that people are flogged. It is to eliminate people who rob others of virtue that they are stoned to death. It is the hands of those plundering the property of others that are cut off…. Mr. President, with respect, we do not doubt your intentions. But as one says [in such situations], there are things that are done with good intention but without enthusiasm. I do not want it to be said about the chief of the Pakistani military that he did something listlessly. We want [to be able] to say that the military chief has taken a step with the same determination that has always been characteristic of the Pakistani military and of which the nation is proud. There is nothing to be ashamed of here.[903]

</quote>

In view of this mock deference of Zahir toward General Zia al-Haqq, it is not surprising that he eventually became one of the military ruler's more ardent critics, not only in the name of democracy but also in that of Islam, which he took the president to be cynically manipulating for his own ends.[904] Yet, the contrast with Iran would have perturbed even those less critical of Zia al-Haqq.

Pakistani Shi'i 'ulama played up such contrasts. In an article written shortly after the Iranian revolution, Safdar Husayn Najafi (d. 1989) commented approvingly on the desire of many Pakistani 'ulama and intellectuals to revive the practice of ijtihad in readying Islamic law for implementation by the modern state. But since ijtihad had been defunct for centuries in the Sunni world, it would, he said, take a long time for the Sunnis to develop the

requisite ability for it. The Shi‘a, on the other hand, had had a continuous tradition of ijtihad, and Pakistan ought to seek the guidance of scholars from Iran and Iraq. Najafi, the head of the Jami‘at al-muntazir, a major Shi‘i madrasa in Lahore, and the translator into Urdu of some of Khomeini’s key works, continued:

<quote>

If you really want to see the establishment of an Islamic system in Pakistan, you ought to request Grand Ayatollah Khomeini to send one or more mujtahids to Pakistan. All issues, individual or collective, political, economic or social, should be placed before them and they should look into them. Lawyers, judges, and ‘ulama should also benefit from these [mujtahids], so that a purely Islamic system can be established here. For otherwise, the laws that are enacted in the name of Islam by the non-mujtahids and by those who are not ‘ulama [of the requisite standard] will have nothing to do with Islam. For God’s sake, consider this matter with a cool head! If you like this advice, then do not let sectarian prejudice or a false ego prevent you from acting upon it.[905]

</quote>

Such swipes simultaneously at Pakistani nationalism—only by looking to the scholars of Iran and Iraq could Pakistan hope to establish a properly Islamic system at home—and at traditions of Sunni scholarship reveal much about Shi‘i self-confidence during these years in Pakistan. They could not have endeared the Shi‘i leadership to increasingly jittery Sunnis.

What made such remarks especially odious was the fact that the Sunnis, too, were going through a religious revival, which would have primed them to view the Shi‘a as not only taunting them but as also standing in the way of realizing their own aspirations. As seen in chapter 3, socioeconomic changes from the mid-1970s had been fueling a new religiosity in the country, with a concomitant growth in mosques and madrasas. The articulation of sharp sectarian boundaries often accompanied this process. By the mid-1980s, with significant help from the effects of Zia al-Haqq’s Islamization, militant sectarian groups had begun to emerge in the Punjab. The first of these to come to nation-wide attention was a Deobandi organization, the Sipah-i

Sahaba. As its name announced, it was an “army” (sipah) mobilized to defend the besmirched companions (sahaba) of the Prophet. It also stood for defending the interests of the common man against the rapacious rural magnates. It is no accident that it was founded in Jhang, a town in an identically named district whose majority Sunnis had long been dominated by a Shi‘i landed elite. The organization’s founder, Haqq Nawaz Jhangawi, was a small-time mosque preacher with a reputation for spending long hours in local courts helping illiterate litigants. In 1988, he went on to challenge the aforementioned Syeda Abida Hussain, a Shi‘i, in elections to the National Assembly. Hussain was never apologetic about her “feudal” power base. For, as she later put it in an autobiography, “[i]n my opinion, feudalism is a mindset: anybody powerful can come under the ambit of ‘feudal.’ … Feudal, in the context of rural Pakistan, only means flowing from a tradition, often upholding values of courtesy and kindliness, caring for those less privileged, sharing your bread, and nurturing relationships that are not always transactional.”[906] Needless to say, Jhangawi and his supporters did not share that view. He lost the election, but his unusually strong showing at the polls was seen by his followers as a moral victory. After his assassination in 1990, his successors to the Sipah-i Sahaba leadership would win a series of elections, with substantial support not only from the rural peasantry but also from the urban Sunni bourgeoisie. The Shi‘a responded with militant organizations of their own, with much bloodletting on all sides.[907]

Though the Sipah-i Sahaba did not put it this way, it was premised on the view that an Islamic state of the sort that General Zia al-Haqq was proposing —one in which all Islamic orientations could find a place by virtue of their shared allegiance to Islamic law—was unacceptable. Instead, in a mirror image of what post-revolution Iran had achieved, it wanted Pakistan to become a Sunni state, not just by way of its demographic weight, which made it one already, but by constitution and law. Not an undefined Islam but Sunni Islam was to be the religion of the state; the Shi‘is, like the Ahmadis, were to live as a non-Muslim minority, and the Muharram commemorations were to be limited to their devotional centers as private affairs, if not proscribed altogether. The guiding examples in all matters of the state would be those of Muhammad’s first successors, the Rashidun, and their death anniversaries were to be national holidays.[908] In an echo of the modernists’ aspiration to bring the fruits of Islam to all humanity, but also as an alternative to the US-led global order, the Sipah-i Sahaba leadership sought to make the example of the Rashidun the basis of a “caliphal world

order.”[909] This would also be an antidote, of course, to Iranian aspirations to “export” their Shi‘i revolution.

The Sipah-i Sahaba was banned by General Pervez Musharraf in January 2002, alongside a number of other militant organizations.[910] The core group has continued to exist under other names, however. Its most notorious splinter group, the Lashkar-i Jhangawi (“the battalion of [Haqq Nawaz] Jhangawi”), though also banned, has worked closely with groups affiliated with the Pakistani Taliban. Its members are sometimes also referred to as the Punjabi Taliban, to distinguish them from other, predominantly Pashtun, Taliban of the Frontier province.

The sort of anxieties the Ahmadis and the Shi‘a have provoked in at least some Sunni circles have tended to revolve around rather different issues. In some ways, the difference is obvious, of course. Despite Ahmadi professions to the contrary, they are taken by the Sunnis to deny a fundamental tenet of the Muslim faith—the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood—whereas the Shi‘a are not, and it would be safe to say that far more Muslims have come to consider the Ahmadis as beyond the pale of Islam than have ever held a similar view as regards the Shi‘a. Yet, the fact remains that many among the ‘ulama consider the Shi‘a to be unbelievers, too. It was not clear even to Jawaharlal Nehru, as he had put it in commenting on a statement on the Ahmadis by Muhammad Iqbal, why the Ahmadis should have had greater trouble being accommodated into the community of Muslims than the Shi‘a.[911] Nehru was referring to the Isma‘ili Shi‘a, who, as he saw it, “ascribe certain divine or semi-divine attributes”[912] to their imam, rather than to the more restrained Twelvers; but many Sunni scholars see even Twelver views of their imams as grievously trespassing on things that properly belong only to God and to His Prophet. In 1952, not long before the anti-Ahmadi agitation in the Punjab, the prominent Pakistani modernist Khalifa Abdul Hakim had warned darkly about what awaited the Shi‘a at the hands of the Sunni religious leadership:

<quote>

The vice chancellor of a Pakistani university recently told me that he asked a leading religious scholar, who … had migrated from India to Pakistan some

time ago, about an Islamic sect. He gave the fatwa that the extremists (ghali) among them are liable to the death penalty and the non-extremists are subject to other punishments. Asked about another sect, whose members included many millionaires, he said that they were all liable to capital punishment.... Another prominent religious scholar remarked that for now we have declared jihad against one sect, but, God willing, we shall deal with the others after we have succeeded in this [venture].[913]

</quote>

What then might be said to be different, apart from matters of doctrine, about the Ahmadi and the Shi‘i challenges to conservative Sunni sensibilities in Pakistan?[914]

Misgivings about modernism have loomed especially large among the kinds of anxiety the Ahmadis have aroused in particular Sunni circles. This is not only because the Ahmadis themselves hold certain modernist positions, notably a derisive attitude toward the ‘ulama and the Islamists, an insistence on adapting Islam to changing conditions, and doubts about the state’s implementation of Islamic law.[915] The Islamists and the ‘ulama have also seen the failure of successive Pakistani regimes to remove the Ahmadis from “key positions” in what professes to be an Islamic state as a stark illustration of the modernists’ unwillingness to live up to their Islamic commitments. And the anti-Ahmadi agitation has tended to flare up in Pakistan at times of especially intense confrontation between the modernists, on the one hand, and the ‘ulama and the Islamists, on the other.[916] Some ‘ulama seem to have recognized as much, though not quite in these terms. In a conversation with the modernist Fazlur Rahman in the summer of 1974, Muhammad Yusuf Bannuri, who was leading the anti-Ahmadi agitation at the time, “admitted that the Ahmadi question was primarily socio-political rather than strictly religious (otherwise, he admitted, one would also have to declare several other sects, e.g., the Isma‘ilis, as non-Muslims).”[917] In making this extraordinary remark, Bannuri appears to have been thinking primarily of the Ahmadis running a “state within a state.” But it also signals larger apprehensions about a modernist elite that was all too willing to sell the interests of Islam and of Pakistan to a people threatening them both. The Shi‘a, too, have always been well-represented among the modernists, both in colonial India and after the establishment of Pakistan, but they have not

called up the specter of modernism in anything like the way the Ahmadis did. Put differently, Shi‘ism has never been intertwined with modernism the way Ahmadism has been, and in Pakistan—unlike the case of the All India Shi‘a Conference in late colonial India—the leadership of the Shi‘a has tended to be in the hands of traditionally educated religious scholars rather than of the modernists.

Yet, substantial though they were, the anxieties generated by the Ahmadis among the ‘ulama and the Islamists seem to be outweighed in the end by those provoked in particular circles by the Shi‘a.[918] This is not particularly surprising since Ahmadi prophetology is so directly at odds with mainstream Islamic beliefs that it has been a relatively simpler matter to exclude the Ahmadis from the fold of the Muslim community. That they were not formally excluded for so long is, as the ‘ulama and the Islamists see it, an indictment of modernist insincerity in matters Islamic. The Shi‘a are harder to exclude, and this makes for greater unease among their foes. The Shi‘i belief in, inter alia, the sinlessness and the legitimist claims of their imams is anathema to many Sunni ‘ulama, but Sunnis, too, venerate Shi‘i figures from early Islam. They decidedly do not revere Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his successors. The devotional practices of the Barelawis, a major doctrinal orientation among South Asian Sunnis, echo Shi‘i practices, and vice versa, leading many Deobandi reformists and Sunni sectarians to see Shi‘ism as pervading the ranks of unsuspecting Sunnis. By contrast, and despite Ahmadi proselytism, there is little indication of Ahmadi beliefs ever having become pervasive among people. If anything, the Ahmadis have often been castigated, as they were by Iqbal, precisely for setting themselves apart from the larger Muslim community. There is likewise little to suggest any Ahmadi effort to use the national media to broadcast their own religious views. Though there were allegations, during the 1974 agitation, that influential Ahmadis in the Ministry of Information were trying to control how the agitation was being reported, this was a quite different matter than the anxiety that Shi‘i norms were being actively disseminated through radio and television. Then there is the fact that the Shi‘is are much more numerous than the Ahmadis and that they have been willing and able to respond in kind to violent Sunni attacks on them. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, radical Shi‘i organizations were no less active than those of the Sunnis, and it is not just leaders of militant Sunni groups but also some prominent Sunni scholars who were assassinated, often as a prelude to cycles of further violence on both sides.

Although individual Ahmadis and their places of worship continue occasionally to be targeted by militants and vigilantes, worries about Ahmadism appear largely to have receded into the past. Besides what has been said so far, this may be a function of the fact that there is little left to do to this harassed community. Modernism, much weakened as an intellectual force from what it was in the 1950s and the 1960s, continues to provoke conservative anxieties, but no longer in relation to the question of Ahmadism. Instead, apprehensions about modernism have migrated in recent decades to other issues, notably to blasphemy, which merits a brief comment here.

Blasphemy retains its link with the Ahmadis, of course, for it was against them that some of Zia al-Haqq's regulations were directed and they have not quite ceased to be victims of violence on grounds of blasphemy.[919] In 1993, in a majority decision upholding the 1984 ordinance, the Supreme Court had explicitly characterized some of the writings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad on the Prophet Muhammad, and on Jesus, as blasphemous and had appeared even to condone vigilante action against the Ahmadis: "Mirza Sahib could have been convicted and punished, by an English Court, for the offence of blasphemy, under the Blasphemy Act, 1679 [sic], with a term of imprisonment.... Can then anyone blame a Muslim if he loses control of himself on hearing, reading or seeing such blasphemous material as has been produced by Mirza Sahib?"[920]

The net that accusations of blasphemy have come to cast since the 1990s is much wider, however. Besides Muslims, it has ensnared a disproportionate number of Pakistani Christians, mostly of an extremely humble background, who have found themselves accused of defiling pages from the Qur'an or of disparaging the Prophet.[921] Though petty disputes at local levels seem to lurk behind some at least of these accusations, they also have a broader context. Like the Ahmadis, Pakistani Christians are often seen in conservative Muslim circles as a reminder of colonialism's effort to undermine Islam, in this instance through proselytism with promises of material gain. The work of Western charitable organizations in contemporary Pakistan is viewed likewise as a thinly disguised means of seducing Muslims desperate for medical and educational assistance away from their religion.[922] When acts of violence

against members of the Christian community make international headlines, as they often do, the media coverage tends in turn to be taken as proof of Western efforts to embarrass the Pakistani government and to pressure it to rein in the Islamists and the ‘ulama. Needless to say, such perceptions are not a mark of solidarity with the government in question; they serve, rather, to reinforce the conviction that the government’s own sympathies lie with the wrong side—with Western and Westernized liberals rather than the pious local Muslims. Members of the governing elite have sometime paid dearly for being seen as exemplifying this narrative. Around the time that the Taliban were coming to power in Afghanistan with the active support of her government, Benazir Bhutto was assailed by religio-political groups for criticizing a lower court’s verdict of blasphemy against a fourteen-year-old Christian and for helping him find refuge in Germany.[923] In November 2010, Salman Taseer, the governor of the Punjab, was branded an apostate for his criticism of blasphemy laws and his efforts for the release of a Pakistani Christian woman who was in prison for alleged blasphemy. As the protestors put it on that occasion, such efforts represented “a West-sponsored movement against blasphemy laws through Western-funded NGOs and secular lobbies in Pakistan.”[924] Less than six weeks later, the governor was assassinated by one of his own security guards.[925] The question of blasphemy is not reducible to anxieties about modernism, any more than is the Ahmadi question. Nonetheless, both have had a good deal to do with those anxieties.

The Shi‘a, for their part, though also implicated in the question of blasphemy, have tended to call in question the very project of an Islamic state. While the ‘ulama and the Islamists routinely lay much of the blame for the failure to implement Islamic law at the doorstep of the modernizing governing elite, it is Shi‘i political agitation that had most conspicuously thwarted progress on that path at a time when, in the early years of Zia al-Haqq, the country had apparently come closer to it than it ever has. That wound has not healed. What makes it worse is the mostly unacknowledged but very real worry that, even without the Shi‘a, there would be no grand consensus on how to define or implement Islamic law. Such anxieties are deeper than those evoked by the Ahmadis, for they go to the very heart of unresolved issues of Islamic identity in Pakistan.[926]

** Chapter Six: The Contested Terrain of Sufism

SUFI THOUGHT AND PRACTICE have long pervaded life in South Asia, including that of the Muslim minorities discussed in the previous chapter. As observed, many rural magnates in the Punjab are not only Shi‘i but also serve as the hereditary keepers of revered Sufi shrines. Devotional practices at local levels are, moreover, often inflected with norms of Sufi piety, and this has been as true of the Sunnis as it has of the Shi‘a. It is such practices that Sunni and Shi‘i reformers have sought to rein in, and sectarian organizations like the Sipah-i Sahaba and its successors have likewise militated against them in a quest for a more “authentic,” textually anchored Islam. Yet, the symbolism of the Sipah-i Sahaba, too, had an aspect of Sufi devotionalism to it. The Rashidun caliphs were revered in a manner reminiscent not just of the Shi‘i imams but also the Sufi masters of old, whom the leadership sometimes quoted alongside the Qur’an and the Prophet.[927] The Ahmadis, for their part, have tended to view the founder of their community in ways that can accord well with Sufi ways of communicating with God, and with Sufi claims to privileged knowledge and authority. Though we will return to some implications of this point later, the central concern of this chapter is different, viz, how Sufism itself has fared in Pakistan. Addressing this matter requires once again that we take a broad historical view that also encompasses colonial South Asia.

Three sets of questions will guide our discussion here. First, how have Muslim modernists critiqued Sufi thought and practice? How have the ‘ulama sought to curb what they see as the excesses of Sufism? And what challenges have the Islamists posed to Sufi devotionalism? My second set of questions concerns the ways in which Sufism has continued, for all the challenges it has faced, to exert its influence on rival trends. For instance, how has Sufism shaped modernist thought? In what ways have the governing elite drawn on Sufi symbolism in efforts to bolster their legitimacy? What place does Sufi thought and piety still occupy in the world of the Deobandis, who have often been keen to reform what they view as out of bounds Sufism? How have the Islamists, too, sought, as I will argue they have, to calibrate their attitude toward Sufi devotional piety in order to accommodate it into their worldview? My third set of questions has to do with whether one can speak of a certain decline of Sufism relative to other religious trends in Pakistan? What might be some indications of such decline and how are we to account for it?

*** Challenging Sufism

It is well-known that Iqbal’s poetry is suffused with images, motifs, and ideas drawn from Persian Sufism and that the great Sufi poet Jalal al-din Rumi is, arguably, one of the strongest intellectual influences on his thought. Iqbal’s philosophical writings in English also reveal significant engagement with the medieval Sufi tradition. Unlike many other modernists, who have tended to see the intellectual history of Islam as marked by a thoroughgoing sterility at least since the twelfth or the thirteenth century CE, Iqbal took a rather more nuanced view. He, too, saw the legal tradition as moribund since about that time, but Sufi thought remained, for him, a crucial site of intellectual creativity. He also believed, in what he surely saw as a way of highlighting Sufism’s intellectual significance, that some prominent Sufis had hit upon ideas that had impressive parallels with those of modern, Western philosophers. Persian Sufism had, moreover, found the perfect balance between the action-orientation of monotheistic faiths and the proclivity of the Indian Vedantists toward pure thought: “the secret of the vitality of Sufism is the complete view of human nature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and political revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its entirety; and, while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a life of self-denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well.”[928]

Yet, despite the present tense that he used in this instance, which comes from a work published in 1908, Iqbal believed that Sufism—and mysticism everywhere—had largely failed in his contemporary age to cater, as it once did, to varied needs. Instead, to the ordinary believer, it had romanticized a life of “false renunciation and made him perfectly contented with his ignorance and spiritual thralldom. No wonder then that the modern Muslim in Turkey, Egypt, and Persia is led to seek fresh sources of energy in the creation of new loyalties, such as patriotism and nationalism which Nietzsche described as a ‘sickness and unreason’ and ‘the greatest force against culture.’”[929] Indeed, as Iqbal saw it, Sufism had long ago embarked on this path of otherworldliness and had set the “best minds in Islam” on that path. Without the moderating influence of this-worldly Sufism, Islamic law had become increasingly more rigid in its formulations, and the brain-drain caused by Sufism had resulted in the state being “left generally in the hands of intellectual mediocrities.”[930] Iqbal also took aim at the custodians of

Sufi shrines dotting the Indian landscape. Speaking in the voice of a rebellious disciple, Iqbal castigated the exploitative practices of these “Brahmins of the Ka‘ba, who are worshiped like idols” and who deceive their followers on the basis of their inherited claims to religious authority.[931]

Iqbal’s is at best a mixed view of Sufism, but it looks benign when compared with that of Fazlur Rahman. Rahman repeated the idea that medieval philosophical Sufism or Sufi theosophy had “sapped the energies and almost unreservedly claimed the minds of men of the greatest ability and creativity.”[932] And he too lamented Sufism’s otherworldliness.[933] But his indictment was harsher. On the one hand, Sufi theosophy posited a realm of knowledge that rested on a higher plane than the shari‘a—the former being the preserve of a select few while the latter was meant only for those who were not sufficiently advanced on the mystic path. Having been battered by the traditionalists, the medieval philosophers themselves came to find refuge in Sufism, which allowed them not merely to survive but even to “avenge” themselves on Sunni traditionalism.[934] On the other hand, and despite the intellectual elitism of Sufi theosophy, Sufism came to converge with popular religion and to exercise an enormous influence on the Muslim masses. By the thirteenth century, “Islamic society underwent a metempsychosis. Instead of being a method of moral self-discipline and elevation and genuine spiritual enlightenment, Sufism was now transformed into veritable spiritual jugglery through autohypnotic transports and visions just as at the level of doctrine it was being transmuted into a half-delirious theosophy…. Ill-balanced majdhubs (i.e., those in perpetual trance), parasitic mendicants, exploiting dervishes proclaimed Muhammad’s Faith [sic] in the heyday of Sufism. Islam was at the mercy of spiritual delinquents.”[935]

Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, another modernist ally of Ayub Khan, was equally unsparing in his critique of Sufism. “Tasawwuf,” he wrote, using the standard Arabic and Urdu word for it, “teaches escapism from life, so what relation can it have to the religion to God? In Iqbal’s words, ‘tasawwuf is an alien plant (ajnabi pawda) in the soil of Islam.’ Religion causes the blood of life to run through the dead arteries of nations. Tasawwuf causes that blood to freeze in the living arteries. Religion is the spark that burns every false system down to ashes. Tasawwuf dampens the warmth of life to put nations to the sleep of death.”[936]

Rahman and Perwez were almost as harsh in their indictment of the ‘ulama as they were of the Sufis, but that should not obscure the fact that many ‘ulama have themselves been sharply critical of Sufism. In turning to the traditionalist scholars, it is useful to see their views of Sufism along a broad spectrum, which ranges from outright denunciation to a full embrace. In its most unambiguous forms, the denunciation is exemplified by the Ahl-i Hadith, the South Asian Salafis, from whose perspective Sufi devotionalism has no basis in the foundational Islamic texts and it amounts practically to worshipping holy personages and therefore to the cardinal sin of setting up partners with the one God. The fullest embrace is represented, on the other hand, by the Barelawis, who see any impugning of the sanctity or the centrality of holy men and women as blasphemous. For their part, the Deobandis have traditionally stood somewhere around the middle of these two poles. Their doctrinal orientation is marked by a rejection of all practices for which, as they see it, no warrant can be found in the foundational texts. Yet, in colonial India, it would have been very unusual for a Deobandi scholar of any standing not to be affiliated with one or more Sufi orders. Unlike the criticism of many modernists and Islamists, Deobandi critiques of the excesses of Sufi devotionalism were not intended to undermine Sufism itself but rather, as internal criticism, to reform it from within. Such critique could have parallels with that of the modernists. As Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi saw it, many of his contemporary pirs were mere shopkeepers profiting from the gullibility of their ignorant followers.[937] Iqbal would have agreed, though Thanawi’s point in offering this characterization was that people who came to his hospice should expect a strict moral regimen rather than just a pandering to their spiritual tastes, a mere doling out of amulets.

In other respects, there could be a wider gulf between the likes of Thanawi and the modernists. In 1909, Thanawi had published a commentary on the diwan of Hafiz (d. 1390), showing that the ubiquity of wine, the cup-bearer, and the beloved in the great Persian poet’s verse was really his way of talking about the divine beloved and the mystical path.[938] This was not an uncommon understanding of Hafiz at the time, but it was very different from the severe rebuke that admirers of Hafiz would receive from Iqbal some years later:

<quote>

Beware of Hafiz the drinkerHis cup is full of the poison of death.…There is nothing in his market except wineWith two cups his turban has been spoiled.He is a Muslim but his belief is girdled with the unbeliever's beltHis faith is fractured by the beloved's eyelashes.He gives weakness the name of strengthHis musical instrument leads the nation astray.…The sound of his music betokens declineThe voice he hears from on high is the Gabriel of decline.[939]

</quote>

When it came to theosophical Sufism, Thanawi and some of his disciples made serious efforts to show that the doctrines of controversial Sufis like Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 1240) could in fact frequently be shown to conform to proper Islamic norms. Yet, he also believed that Sufi metaphysics was not the kind of thing that people ought to worry much about. That mystics like Ibn al-'Arabi had thought and written a great deal about such matters was incontestable, but ultimately it was irrelevant to the quality of one's religious life. And even Thanawi acknowledged a certain "alienation" with some of Ibn al-'Arabi's doctrines.[940]

For their part, Islamists like Mawdudi were much closer to the modernists in their critique of the Sufis than they were to many among the 'ulama. Asked by a leader of the Jama'at-i Islami to explain his opposition to that organization, Husayn Ahmad Madani had listed criticism of revered Sufis and Sufi practices as one of the grounds for it. With biting sarcasm, Madani had concluded,

<quote>

I am an old-style Muslim, a strict adherent of the Hanafi norms, a servant of the Sufi guides. You [on the other hand] are the bright lamps of a new Islam. I seek to help Muslims tread the path of the pious forbears and see their salvation in it. You gentlemen wish to have Muslims follow Mawdudi's new Islam. You consider his revivalism—which even the likes of the Renewer of the Second Millennium (Mujaddid-i alf-i thani [that is, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, d. 1624]), Shah Wali Allah, and Sayyid Ahmad [of Rae Bareli, d. 1831] were

not fated to accomplish—as the means of salvation for Muslims; and you seek to rid Muslims of the thirteen centuries-long ignorance ([or pagan materialism] Arabic: jahiliyya; Urdu: jahiliyyat), that has continued from the time of the first generations till today and that has afflicted all but a few leaders and imams. With such principled disagreement, there is no hope that you can exert any influence on me or that I can have any on you.[941]

</quote>

This was no mere polemic. As Mawdudi saw it, Sufism’s concern with the “purification of the soul” (tazkiya-i nafs) was not quite in line with proper Islamic teachings, and that divergence had had several results. Sufi institutions and practices had failed to produce individuals who could challenge the forces of jahiliyya or who could resist its inroads into the realm of Islam. The Sufis tended to see the purification of the soul as a means to attaining a vision of God in this world and the privileged knowledge that supposedly came with it, but there was no Qur’anic sanction for such aspirations and no reason why human beings would need that kind of knowledge. Nor did the other forms of spiritual advancement that the Sufis spoke of ever result, Mawdudi said, in the kind of individuals that the Prophet had shaped through his teachings. The closest that the purification of the soul came to the purposes of Islam was in fostering piety—taqwa—among people. But such taqwa tended to remain limited to outward comportment. And where it did shape one’s life more deeply, it did so only at the individual level.

<quote>

This limited conception [of taqwa, and of the purification of the soul] has no place in it for the understanding of larger social issues. Thus the benefit of what even the best of our pious people do in purifying their souls is nothing more than to provide observant subjects and religiously devout servants to governments that themselves are in rebellion [against God]. The subjects and servants that the public education provided by these governments produces may have other qualities, but what they do not have is honesty and righteousness; and that is a cause of considerable harm to these governments. This deficiency is remedied by those of our institutions that exist for the purification of the soul.[942]

</quote>

This remarkable analysis was first published in Mawdudi’s monthly journal, Tarjuman al-Qur’an, in 1953, though a similar view found expression in many others of his earlier and later writings. It is as uncompromising in its castigation of Sufism as anything that Fazlur Rahman or Parwez would ever write on the subject.

Sufi practices have been the object of considerable attention from the state, too, and a good deal of it has been unfavorable. One illustrative example comes from 1942, when the Punjab legislative assembly passed the Music in Muslim Shrines Bill to curb women’s singing and dancing in the precincts of Sufi shrines. As the statement of the bill’s objectives had put it, “To celebrate the anniversaries of such saints with all that is immoral, disgraceful, and vexatious to the noble mind, despicable and repugnant to the law of Shariat, is highly inconsistent not only with the spirit underlying the occasions but is a travesty of the faithfulness and esteem that is shown to the holy saint by his followers and affords a positive slur on the holy name of Islam.”[943] The debate on the bill made clear that the “slur” in question came from the fact that many of those singing at the shrines of “recognized Muslim saints”[944] were courtesans and professional dancers. A few years earlier, the Shi‘a Young Men’s Association of Lahore had tried to prevent “bazaar women”—that is, prostitutes—from participating in Muharram processions.[945] But the reach of the 1942 bill was broader in seeking to make all female singing to the accompaniment of music and all female dancing a punishable offense. Some members of the assembly wanted, unsuccessfully as it turned out, to make it wider still by branding singing even without musical instruments as a cognizable offense.

There were, however, weighty arguments against the bill. Among the most notable of those to articulate them was one Pir Akbar Ali, whose association with the world of devotional, shrine-based Sufism is underlined by his honorific (“pir”). He was also an Ahmadi.[946] If singing was wrong, he said, then it was wrong irrespective of whether men or women did it, and yet the bill singled out only the women.[947] Further, “even a female singer adheres to some sort of belief and faith for her salvation and according to that belief she wants to go and sing at a shrine.”[948] Some of his other objections

raised larger questions, and they are worth quoting together with the recorded interjections of some of the other members of the house:

<quote>

By whom is the “Muslim saint” to be recognized? (An honourable member: “By the Muslim community.”) … [W]hat is meant by recognized? Further, who is a saint? In the whole of Islamic literature, there is no reference to any saint.… Moreover a “Muslim shrine” is nowhere defined. (An honourable member: How do you define Muslim?)[949]

</quote>

The last question, in parentheses, from an unnamed member of the house, would arise forcefully in Pakistan with reference to the Ahmadis, and it may have already been an allusion to Akbar Ali’s faith. In any case, in opposing the bill, Akbar Ali also argued that it constituted government interference in religious matters and, more specifically, that it contravened the authority of the shrine’s guardian to manage it in accordance with the terms of the pious endowments (awqaf<nowiki>; singular:</nowiki> waqf) attached to it. Such objections cut little ice with the supporters of the bill. Instead, there were indications that some members of the house had begun to look forward to a postcolonial era when there would be new and greater opportunities to reshape the religious landscape in more sweeping ways. One legislator cited Q 22.41 (“Those who, when We establish them in the land, keep up the prayer, pay the prescribed alms, command what is right, and forbid what is wrong …”) and continued: “If this is a fact that the Muslims have been enjoined by the Holy Quran to do all these things when they get political power, how does it become him [that is, Pir Akbar Ali] to oppose such bills.”[950]

In Pakistan, the most significant form that state intervention would take vis-à-vis Sufi shrines was the bringing of waqf endowments under its direct control. Sufi shrines were not the only establishments supported by waqfs, but they were by far the most prominent of them. Given that many visitors to the shrines leave donations at them, they are also the most lucrative.[951] In 1938, the North-West Frontier Province had already seen the enactment of the Muslim Waqfs Act. The idea of government regulation of waqfs had been

opposed, however, by leading Deobandi scholars, notably Husayn Ahmad Madani and Mufti Kifayat Allah (d. 1953), the president of the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind, and the bill that was enacted in the Frontier was a much watered down version of what had been proposed by way of government oversight.[952] Around the same time, in late colonial Punjab, the Unionist-led government of Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan (d. 1942) that would later support the enactment of the Music in Muslim Shrines Bill had also attempted to bring the waqfs under its control. In that instance, many of those associated with influential shrines had successfully blocked the initiative.[953] Roughly two decades later, the martial law regime of General Ayub Khan was not willing to brook any such opposition. Accordingly, the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance of 1959 created the position of a chief administrator with the authority to bring waqf endowments under the direct control of the government and to require the custodians of properties not taken over by the government to administer them in accordance with governmental stipulations.[954] An ordinance issued in 1961 reaffirmed the provisions of the earlier legislation.[955] In 1962, another ordinance was promulgated to regulate waqf properties in East Pakistan.[956] These ordinances, and other legislation enacted in the Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Zia al-Haqq years, gave wide powers to the government in regulating the waqf, made it a punishable offense not to register an endowment with the office of the waqf administrator,[957] and imposed a tax on the endowment’s income.[958]

Pakistani governments have also taken measures to inscribe the saints into a narrative of nation-building and social uplift.[959] Visiting the shrine-rich town of Uch in southern Punjab in November 1952, governor-general Ghulam Muhammad had harangued the shrine keepers thus:

<quote>

Your ancestors played a great part in spreading Islam and its ideals of service and in spreading learning. But it appears that all these fountainheads of culture and spiritualism have been converted into small jagirs [fiefdoms]—living on grants and offerings…. It is the duty of all of us to work for the revival of Islamic learning and to pull out from the sloth and stagnation of jagirdars [feudal lords] who trade in the name of their illustrious predecessors and thrive on gifts … and do not fulfill adequately the corresponding obligations imposed on them.[960]

</quote>

Such admonishment, though helping justify official oversight, has seldom been accompanied by notable government success in social uplift through shrines. In any case, the degree to which Pakistani governments have been able to reach into Sufi institutions to regulate their waqfs and attendant affairs has had little parallel when it comes to the regulation of madrasas. I will return to this point later in this chapter.

Finally, though some prominent pirs have been part of anti-Ahmadi agitations,[961] controversies surrounding Ahmadism have ironically added to the already considerable vulnerabilities of Sufism in Pakistan. This owes itself to the fact that it is through strongly mystical interpretations that the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad have tended to explain his claims. Mirza Nasir Ahmad, the head of the Rabwah-based Ahmadi community, invoked the Sufi tradition several times while being cross-examined about his beliefs in the National Assembly of Pakistan in the summer of 1974. At one point, he observed, for instance, that the Ahmadis viewed the prophetical claims of Ghulam Ahmad in metaphorical (majazi) terms, much like the Sufis spoke of certain things as having a metaphorical rather than real (haqiqi) existence.[962] Some of Ghulam Ahmad's statements were, moreover, attributable to a mystical "unveiling" (kashf).[963] Mirza Nasir Ahmad also used the key Sufi term fana—annihilation of the self—in speaking of how Ghulam Ahmad viewed himself in relation to the Prophet Muhammad.[964] And he referred to Ghulam Ahmad as "the founder of the Ahmadi order" (bani-yi silsila-i Ahmadiyya),[965] which is exactly how one might refer to the founder of a Sufi order.

Significantly, some of the debate in the assembly between the representatives of the Ahmadi community and the attorney-general of Pakistan who was leading the proceedings had turned on the legitimacy of Sufi claims to receiving "revelations" from God. The Ahmadis told the house that such revelations could sometimes take the form of a Sufi believing that, in his particular circumstances, a passage that had once being revealed to Muhammad was again being sent down to him. It was in these terms that the Lahore-based Ahmadis tried to explain Ghulam Ahmad's claims

to being the recipient of revelations from God. From the perspective of this Ahmadi group, even his claim to receive revelations did not make Ghulam Ahmad a prophet—which, to them, he was not. The point was, of course, that Ghulam Ahmad's claim should be unobjectionable if some such claim was granted for, say, 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani (d. 1166), the putative founder of the Qadiri Sufi order whose followers are especially numerous among the Barelawis of South Asia, or for Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi.[966] 'Abd al-Mannan 'Umar, the representative of the Lahore-based Ahmadis, observed further that the Sufis had sometimes referred to their masters as "prophets"; Rumi, for instance, had done so. But this was only in a metaphorical sense, intended only to underscore the Sufi master's authority.[967] The attorney-general seemed never to have heard of such Sufi discourses and he was appropriately baffled by them. As he admonished the representative of the Lahore-based Ahmadis at one point during the in-camera session: "Talk about God, the Qur'an, and hadith. Leave Rumi, leave him alone! For only the former [sources] are binding upon us; nothing else is binding."[968]

For many of those, too, who had heard of such things, these were potentially embarrassing, even incendiary, topics to discuss in a milieu in which the image of the Sufi masters had come to be purveyed to people in a highly sanitized manner. As Shah Ahmad Nurani (d. 2003), the leader of the Barelawi-oriented Jam'iyyat 'Ulama-i Pakistan said at one point while Ghulam Ahmad's mystical unveilings were under discussion, "the explanation [sic, using the English word] should be brief, and should be in light of the Qur'an and the hadith."[969] This was a remarkable position to take for the leader of a doctrinal orientation most closely associated in Pakistan with mystical Islam and often most vulnerable to attack precisely on grounds that many of their Sufi-inflected beliefs and practices lacked sufficient warrant in the Islamic foundational texts.[970]

It is worth noting, incidentally, that embarrassing topics like these could be, and sometimes were, treated with more nuance by contemporaries. In a learned discussion of some of Ibn Taymiyya's philosophical and theological writings, the modernist 'alim Hanif Nadwi had briefly commented on the Damascene scholar's critique of Ibn al-'Arabi. Nadwi noted in this context that Ibn al-'Arabi had spoken of "sainthood" (wilaya) as a continuing form of "nonlegislative prophethood," a rank reserved to people of great spiritual achievement and one that Ibn al-'Arabi

took to be higher than that of prophets because the appearance of such figures, unlike the prophets', was potentially open-ended.[971] Without any hint of being scandalized by this, Nadwi observed straightforwardly that Ibn al-'Arabi's reference to the saint's "prophethood" was entirely metaphorical, though it was still wrong; and that Ibn Taymiyya, for one, had been highly critical of such conceptions of sainthood. On Nadwi's showing, there was no ambiguity in Ibn Taymiyya's mind about the limits of the Sufi master's authority, and he had sought to correct Ibn al-'Arabi on that score.[972] Yet, in highlighting Ibn Taymiyya's sustained engagement with the Islamic rational sciences, Nadwi also showed that Ibn Taymiyya was far from being the "reactionary" and the "literalist" that he has been portrayed to be by Orientalist scholars (mustashriqin).[973] What makes Nadwi's commentary especially noteworthy is the fact that he was a scholar of the Ahl-i Hadith or Salafi persuasion, often viewed as the least compromising of modern Sunni orientations in their adherence to the foundational texts and their rejection of things lacking a clear warrant in them. By his own acknowledgment, Nadwi's understanding even of the Qur'an owed something to Sufi interpretations.[974] At the same time, Nadwi, too, could take stringent positions: he is said to be among the first people to have argued in print that the Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority in the then newly founded Pakistan.[975] Though a gifted scholar like Hanif Nadwi could apparently hold these different views in a tense balance, the ability to do so and the space in which to attempt it were in increasingly short supply by the 1970s. This had consequences not only for modernism and for the minorities, but also for Sufism.

*** Appealing to Sufism

The many challenges Sufi thought and practice have faced in recent times have not, however, erased their deep mark on modern and contemporary Islam. Iqbal is not the only modernist whose religious thought is imbued with a Sufi ethos. Khalifa Abdul Hakim, for instance, had written his PhD dissertation on the metaphysics of Rumi. Intellectuals from a wide spectrum shared this engagement with the great poet. Iqbal, of course, took Rumi as his muse, but Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi, too, had discoursed extensively on the Masnawi of Rumi at his hospice in Thana Bhawan. Thanawi's spiritual master, Imdad Allah, who had immigrated to Mecca in the aftermath of the Mutiny of 1857, used to dilate on the Masnawi for the

benefit of his Indian visitors.[976] As observed earlier, Muhsin al-Mulk, a close associate of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, had made extensive use of Rumi in some of his early writings.[977] The point is not, of course, that these intellectuals would have put such classics to similar use. They often did not. It is rather that there was a shared body of texts—mystically inflected texts among others—that they engaged with even as many of them were highly critical of particular aspects of Sufi thought. And the modernists were not necessarily different from the others in this regard.

The modernists have not shied away from the practice of Sufism either. Iqbal, for instance, had been initiated into the Qadiri Sufi order.[978] And governor-general Ghulam Muhammad was a devotee of the teachings of Waris ‘Ali Shah (d. 1905), a modern-day saint buried in the town of Dewa in UP.[979] The latter was a very different kind of Sufi master than, say, the Deobandi Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi. While Thanawi was known for hewing close to the Islamic legal norms, Waris ‘Ali wanted to see religious and other divides among people transcended. His disciples included Muslims of varied orientations as well as non-Muslims, and he liked to participate in Hindu religious festivals.[980] He was not known for a punctilious performance of ritual prayers,[981] and his willingness to allow unveiled women into his presence could scandalize people.[982] It is hard to know what precisely had attracted the anglicized bureaucrat Ghulam Muhammad to him, though the Sufi master’s universalism, which included an attentiveness to the products of a Westernized education, as well as the absence of the kind of legal formalism that figures so prominently in modernist caricatures of the ‘ulama, surely had something to do with it. The modernists have long held that Islam, suitably expressed in the idiom of the contemporary world, could appeal not just to educated Muslims—precisely the sort of people most at risk, from this vantage, of being turned off by the ‘ulama’s lifeless creed and rituals—but also to non-Muslims. Ghulam Muhammad would have seen Waris ‘Ali Shah to be an example of such ecumenical appeal.

General Ayub Khan, while keeping company with some harsh critics of Sufism, was reputed to have a pir of his own—in this instance, the keeper of the shrine of Dewal Sharif near Rawalpindi.[983] Several subsequent heads of government and of the state, including Benazir Bhutto, Asif ‘Ali Zardari (Bhutto’s widower and the country’s president, 2008–13), and Raja Pervaiz Ashraf (prime minister in 2012–13), are known to have had their pirs.[984]

Yusuf Reza Gilani, who served as prime minister between 2008 and 2012, is a member of a prominent family of pirs from Multan in the Punjab. And the Cambridge-educated politician Shah Mehmood Qureshi, who served as foreign minister under Gilani, is the keeper of the shrine of Baha al-din Zakariyya (d. 1267) in Multan. This hereditary position was previously occupied by his father, Sajjad Hussein Qureshi (d. 1997), who was the governor of the Punjab during Zia al-Haqq's last years.

Lived Sufism is nonetheless viewed with considerable ambivalence in many Western-educated circles.[985] Even as the death anniversaries of revered saints buried in Pakistan are commemorated with high-ranking government functionaries in attendance, and more than one head of the state or government has visited the shrines of saints buried in India,[986] a politician's association with a living pir is typically a matter of rumor, of innuendo, and, on the politician's part, of some embarrassment. This is not the case for such other aspects of religious practice as, say, the performance of ritual prayers, the pilgrimage to Mecca, even noninstitutional forms of Sufi-inflected piety.

The strong yet frequently concealed presence of mystical sensibilities in the life of some among the modernist elite is best illustrated, perhaps, with reference to a high-ranking bureaucrat, Qudratullah Shahab (d. 1986). Shahab had begun his career in colonial India as a member of the much coveted Indian Civil Service and later rose to the position of principal secretary to the governors-general Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza and to President Ayub Khan. He served subsequently as the secretary of information and education and, for some years during the Ayub Khan era, as Pakistan's ambassador to the Netherlands.[987] Besides an illustrious career that kept him for many years in extraordinarily close proximity to the centers of power, Shahab was a noted man of letters. His autobiography, published posthumously, is a notable literary achievement as well as an intimate record of hitherto unknown facets of his life. His mystical sensibilities are foremost among those facets.

Shahab's encounters with the paranormal had begun while he was a young member of the colonial civil service posted in the eastern Indian state of Orissa. The house he inhabited there was reputed to be haunted, and he

began to experience strange occurrences in it: stones, rocks, and sometimes bones would rain down on his rooms, windows and doors would open and shut by themselves, the dining table would begin floating in the air, an old gramophone would produce the sounds of a woman sobbing and of someone being strangled to death. In due course, Shahab discovered that a former member of the civil service had had a relationship with a Hindu woman, had murdered her after she became pregnant, and had buried her body in the living room of the house. Once the body had been recovered and cremated according to Hindu rites, the commotion ceased. Instead, on three occasions, Shahab now heard the melodious sound of someone reciting “There is no god but Allah”—the Islamic profession of the faith. Everything was to remain peaceful afterward.[988] These experiences gave him, Shahab later wrote, an insight into matters relating to the spirit (ruh). What he learned about Western writings on parapsychology did not offer much satisfaction, however, and he felt that Eastern—presumably Indian—spiritualists were not much more than mere tricksters. Instead, it was in Islam that the highest forms of this knowledge were to be found.[989] This recognition brought him to Sufism. The mystical path (tariqa) he chose for himself was that of the Uwaysis.[990]

The Uwaysis take their name from Uways al-Qarani, a “companion” of Muhammad who, unlike the rest, had never actually met the Prophet. In contrast with members of the other orders, who are formally initiated into them at the hands of a Sufi master, the Uwaysis, true to their forbear, undergo no formal induction and there is no recognizable structure to this “order.” Already as a schoolboy, Shahab reports having seen the Prophet Muhammad in a dream. Later, after entering government service, he had once listened to a village mosque preacher speak of the affectionate relationship between Muhammad and his daughter Fatima and had prayed to God to let Fatima intercede for him in order to be guided by God to the Uwaysi order. That prayer was answered, and Shahab began receiving written communications, in English, from someone who called himself “a ninety-years-young fakir” and subsequently just “Ninety.” Shahab did not say when those communications began, though they would continue for a good quarter century.[991] One of the people to whom Shahab would dedicate his autobiography is Ninety. His autobiography ends with reflections on the mystical path and some prayers that he had found to be efficacious. As would befit an Uwaysi, the discoveries on the Sufi path were his own, though the language in which he described them was indebted to the Islamic

mystical lexicon, and he did acknowledge his debt to several Sufi luminaries of the remote and recent past—among them ‘Abd al-Qadir Jilani (d. 1166), Shihab al-din Abu Hafs ‘Umar al-Suhrawardi (d. 1234), Qutb al-din Bakhtiyar Kaki (d. 1235), Rumi (1273), Imdad Allah (d. 1899), and Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (d. 1943).

Shahab had the education and the intellectual sophistication to compare his experiences to modern reflections on parapsychology and to articulate the results of his mystical experimentation in the language of Sufism. At least some of what he thought he had heard and seen in the haunted house in Orissa would not, however, have surprised the unlettered people whose lives he governed as a bureaucrat. It is not a little ironic that there should have been so little distance between the beliefs of ordinary people and those of a top bureaucrat working for regimes bent upon eradicating such “superstition.”[992]

Interests such as Shahab’s have been explored in fiction, too. A notable example is a novel Raja Gidh (“Vulture King”), by the respected playwright and novelist Bano Qudsiyya (d. 2017). First published in 1981, it follows the rootless career of a university student in Lahore. It describes his unfulfilling relationship with several women—a fellow student who is in love with another man, a married woman desperate to have a child, an aging prostitute from the city’s red light district—and it chronicles his equally unsatisfying efforts to find spiritual solace. He gets no peace at Sufi shrines and even a seemingly powerful mystic’s promise to put him in touch with the spirit of a dead lover remains unrealized. He does come to understand, however, that there is no distinct line separating the “abnormal” from the “supernormal.” In the end, it is personal spiritual experience rather than institutional Sufism that has guided him to this recognition. This widely read novel is dedicated to Shahab.[993]

Sufism has also shaped modernism in ways other than the belief and practice of particular individuals, of course. Two of these are worth noting. First, as seen earlier, modernism has had strong ethical sensibilities and these are indebted, in no small measure, to Sufi ethics. For all his criticism of Sufism, Iqbal derived his core ethical commitments from the world of the Sufis. As he put it in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in

Islam, “the world of today needs a Rumi to create an attitude of hope and to kindle the fire of enthusiasm for life.”[994] Khalifa Abdul Hakim’s Islamic Ideology, published in the early years of Pakistan to acquaint Western-educated Muslims with their religious tradition but also to demonstrate how Islam was the best hope for a universal brotherhood, is another case in point. The book amply reflects Abdul Hakim’s background in Western Idealist philosophy, but Sufi motifs are unmistakable in his treatment of Islamic ethics. Abdul Hakim wrote:

<quote>

Islam says that the human soul is the Spirit of God Himself and man is created to assimilate more and more the attributes of God. Truth, Beauty, Love, Peace and Happiness are intrinsic values because they are rooted in Ultimate Reality; we conceive them in their relativity but they are absolute as attributes of God. They have to be preserved by man and morality consists in the effort to preserve them.[995]

</quote>

He went on: “The being of God, notwithstanding complete transcendence, is by knowledge and power immanent in entire Nature and in the soul of man. All the three are an integral whole.… Men had cut asunder what God had joined and the main service of Islam was to reunite the sundered parts again.”[996] This integrationist ethics envisaged the unity of the human race, though with the pointed exclusion of the polytheists.[997] It is rare in this book for Abdul Hakim to adduce anything other than passages from the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet, though Sufis make an occasional appearance. In any case, Sufis from ‘Attar (d. ca. 1220) to Ibn al-‘Arabi to Rumi to the Indian mystic and poet Sarmad (d. 1661) would have recognized a good deal of Abdul Hakim’s ethics as their own.[998] Many others would have seen his sharp attacks on the hidebound formalism of the mulla as expressing their own sentiment.

In a brief, undated essay titled “Mullaism,” which was first delivered as a talk on Radio Pakistan sometime probably in the early 1950s (and which is not to be confused with his “Iqbal and the Mulla”), Abdul Hakim took what for the Muslim modernists is a remarkably favorable view of the Sufis.[999] Unlike

the mullas, who have historically done nothing toward the spread of Islam, the Sufis, he said, have been the agents of proselytism in India. Whereas the mulla worships mere externals, the “true Sufi” seeks that which is inside: “acquainted with the spirit of the religion, he looks at core principles and is not disputatious about subsidiary issues.”[1000] Given that a key modernist concern has always been to reinterpret and reform what are taken to be subsidiary legal norms in light of the core values of the Islamic foundational texts, there is a remarkable accord here between the true Sufis and their ethical values, on the one hand, and those of the modernists, on the other. Abdul Hakim did not make this last point explicitly, but it is hard not to see it as animating this analysis.[1001]

Abdul Hakim’s idealized portrait of the Sufi also points to a second facet of modernism’s indebtedness to Sufism, and this concerns the very distinction between the inner and the outer, the true spirit and external form. Beginning at least with Syed Ameer Ali, Muslim modernists have often spoken in terms of the spirit of Islam, which they have taken to be in accord with their own religious sensibilities. If the Islam of the ‘ulama does not agree with that of the modernists, it is, on this view, because the ‘ulama’s formulaic and hidebound interpretations of the foundational texts contravene the true spirit of the religion. The Civil and Military Gazette, a newspaper well-known for its hard-hitting criticism of the ‘ulama, had put it this way in August 1952, as the anti-Ahmadi sentiment was heating up in the Punjab: “Liberation of the soul from the alien bondage of arrogant disdain and fanatical hatred is the sine qua non for the realization of self. Neither the hypocritical cant of self-righteous pietists nor the antics of dogmatic factionists have [sic] any place in a large-minded devotion to religion. Those who preen themselves on the possession of a prerogative to proclaim judgments on the validity of experience not conforming to theirs are the deadliest intruders in the realm of the spirit and must be banished therefrom to save the same from sacrilege.”[1002] It is not just that such characterizations of the ‘ulama would resonate with many Sufis; their key terms and categories are themselves indebted to the Sufi lexicon. As Yohanan Friedmann has observed, this is a vocabulary that is pervasive, for instance, in the writings of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, among the most influential of premodern Indian Sufis. To Sirhindi, the religion of the common people was given over to mere form and externalities, whereas the Sufis were able to penetrate to the essence of things, their true nature. At another level of analysis, particular things could have their own outer and inner—that

is, more real and truer—dimensions.[1003] Such views are standard fare in Sufi discourses, of course, but they are also influential in modernist conceptualizations of an ethically centered Islam. Indeed, they have come to inform the work of the modernists irrespective of the specificities of their attitude toward Sufism itself.

Yet, if Sufi ethics could help rescue Islam from its unenlightened spokesmen, they also had the potential to undermine, when in the wrong hands, the grand narratives of Pakistani nationalism. No one illustrates this danger better, perhaps, than G. M. Syed (d. 1995), a Sindhi politician and Sufi who had once occupied a position of leadership in the Muslim League but had then broken with Jinnah to spend the rest of his long life promoting the cause of Sindhi ethnic nationalism. Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani governing elite saw him as representing the most sinister of threats to the existence of the country. What merits attention in the present context is the fact, however, that Syed's Sindhi nationalism was firmly anchored in his understanding of Sufism. This Sufism was a blend of Ibn al-'Arabi's "unity of being" (wahdat al-wujud)—which Syed took to mean that artificial distinctions resting on race, class, and religion should be abolished, though he did not quite explain what the implications of doing so would be for a specifically Sindhi nationalism—and the ideas of Shah 'Abd al-Latif (d. 1752), Sindh's most revered poet. He combined this with an evolutionary outlook, indebted to modern science, with the implication that religion was in need of constant adaptation to change.[1004] Calls for social justice were also a prominent part of his thought.[1005] Syed's invocation of Sufism could not but be anathematic to the country's rulers: as if a socioeconomically laced appeal to regional sentiment in the name of a particular understanding of Islam was not threatening enough, there also were disconcerting similarities between some of Syed's ideas and those of the mainstream modernists. It is true that most of the latter would not have gone so far as to characterize, as Syed did, core Islamic rituals as merely a holdover from a tribal past. Yet, they, too, shared a suspicion of "mere" ritualism. Social justice had had a place in their discourses, too—from Iqbal to the Objectives Resolution to Abdul Hakim to Fazlur Rahman. And the Sufi saint to whose teachings Ghulam Muhammad, the governor-general, was so devoted would probably have warmed to the sight of G. M. Syed's funeral, at which "[p]assages from the Quran, the Bhagavad Gita, the Bible, the Torah, and the Shah-jo-risalo (the collection of verses of Shah Abdul Latif) were read."[1006] Then there was the fact that both Syed and the

modernists governing the state wanted to enlist Sufism and the saints of old in the nationalist cause.[1007] Syed's just happened to be the wrong cause, and his brand of Sufism was the more perverse for it.

If the modernists' suspicion of Sufi thought and practice sits uncomfortably beside their appeal to it, the Deobandi 'ulama, too, despite particular misgivings, have long drawn on Sufi language and thought in many of their own formulations. A striking example is offered by the way Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmani, the most prominent of the Deobandis to support the movement for Pakistan, justified that support to a baffled interlocutor. Asked how he could side with the Westernized leadership of the Muslim League after having opposed it for many years, 'Usmani responded by quoting a statement attributed to the tenth-century Baghdadi mystic al-Junayd (d. 910): "the truthful person changes a hundred times in a day [in his quest for the truth] whereas the hypocrite [concerned with keeping appearances] sticks to the same position for a hundred years."[1008] The ambivalence of this statement hardly needs underscoring. Though the Muslim League leaders were grateful for any support they could muster, such expressions of it would not have put to rest questions about how much to rely on the 'ulama. The statement also points to the pains the likes of 'Usmani had to take, the lengths they had to go to, in explaining their support for Pakistan. The relevant point here is nonetheless that it was in terms of a Sufi idea that he did so on some at least of such occasions.

Perhaps an even more telling moment, so far as Sufism is concerned, had come two decades earlier. On a visit to the Hijaz to participate in an international conference convened by Ibn Sa'ud in 1926, 'Usmani took the opportunity to urge the newly installed Wahhabi king to show forbearance toward those engaging in devotional practices at revered shrines. At a time when the Wahhabis were busy destroying such shrines in the name of a pristine Islam, 'Usmani argued that the king ought to chart a careful path between strictness and leniency, as the Prophet had in his time. Ibn Sa'ud responded that his government was tolerant in matters on which the various schools of Sunni law had long had disagreements, but that there could be no leniency in upholding monotheism in all its purity. To this, 'Usmani retorted that what was in question was not whether God alone was to be worshipped but what "worship" ('ibada) itself meant. Bowing or prostrating before something other than God was, he argued, not necessarily to worship

it. People prostrating themselves before the graves of holy men could well be punished by the king, ‘Usmani said, but they could not legitimately be treated as polytheists. As ‘Usmani reported it, Ibn Sa‘ud listened politely and then referred the matter to the ‘ulama in his entourage.[1009]

This remarkable exchange did not go anywhere, but it serves to illustrate the significant gulf between the Wahhabis and the Deobandis. Despite the Deobandi criticism of Sufi excesses, ‘Usmani’s position here was unmistakably entrenched in a Sufi worldview. And it had strong similarities with the views of Sufis of a different doctrinal ilk. For instance, Khwaja Hasan Nizami (d. 1955), a journalist and Sufi of the Chishti order, had written a short tract in 1920 in which he had vigorously defended the practice of prostration before one’s Sufi master or his shrine—he was associated with the much-frequented shrine of Nizam al-din Awliya (d. 1325) in Delhi.[1010] Nizami, too, made a distinction here between an act of prostration that amounted to worship and one that was merely a matter of showing respect to another human being. He argued that God himself had set the precedent for the latter practice by commanding the angels to prostrate themselves to Adam; and that it was the refusal to do so that had led to the damnation of Iblis, who would henceforth be Satan. At his moment of triumph, as the Qur’an describes it, the brothers of Joseph, too, “fell down prostrate before him.”[1011] This would be inconceivable for Joseph and Jacob to allow—both recognized as prophets by Muslims—if God did not approve of it. The objection that this practice related to pre-Islamic prophets was disposed of by Nizami on the grounds that any such practice remained allowable to Muslims unless it had specifically been abrogated by Islam. Nizami then went on to provide impressive evidence that a long succession of venerated Sufis had allowed their devotees to prostrate to them—some explicitly on grounds that they had seen their own masters allow it. To disallow it, Nizami concluded in quoting Nizam al-din Awliya, was to either consider such Sufi masters as ignorant of the teachings of Islam or as violating them. Neither option was tolerable for anyone who wished to maintain a relationship with these Sufi masters.[1012]

Hasan Nizami was not the sort of Sufi that the Deobandis would have wanted to associate themselves with. His stance on devotional practices was often at considerable remove from the effort of the Deobandis to promote a scripturalist Islam anchored in hadith and the legal tradition. Yet, as

‘Usmani’s exchange with the Saudi king shows, the Deobandis shared more with their Sufi and Barelawi rivals than they would have liked to admit. It was certainly more than what they shared with the Wahhabis of Arabia.[1013]

The question of venerating tombs is not the only thing that highlights a long-standing Deobandi tolerance of what the Wahhabi-Salafis, on the one hand, and many modernists, on the other, would dismiss as polytheism or, at best, as rank superstition. The use and dispensation of amulets provides another important illustration. Sufi pirs have often been castigated by their critics for dealing in amulets (ta‘wiz), and for milking an illiterate and gullible clientele in so doing. Yet, even as he distinguished himself from shopkeepers masquerading as pirs, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, too, gave out amulets when requested, and it was not only Muslims but also Hindus that he catered to in this respect. Nor was it only illiterate villagers who sought these amulets. So, too, did ‘Abd al-Majid Daryabadi, the aforementioned journalist who went on to produce important commentaries on the Qur’an in both Urdu and English.[1014] For his part, Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, Deoband’s last mufti before the partition of India, did not see anything to be apologetic about when it came to amulets. In a small book he published toward the end of his life, Shafi‘ collected the tried and tested supplicatory prayers he had learnt from his father—who, like Shafi‘, had once been a teacher at the madrasa in Deoband—as well as others his father had passed on to him from Deobandi stalwarts. Also included in this collection were templates for amulets to be used for different purposes—for subduing enemies, overcoming illness, treating someone who had ingested a poison, curing those possessed or afflicted with disturbing thoughts, helping a woman conceive.[1015] If anyone thought that Deobandi reformism led to a disenchanted world, this little book would have served as a useful corrective to that impression. It is not its purpose to do so, however. Rather, it is an altogether unselfconscious work, concerned simply with providing to people what Shafi‘ took to be effective prayers and amulets. It does not seek to defend the Deobandis against the charge that they disdained such things. Nor, by the same token, is it concerned with justifying the practice of dealing in amulets. Rather, it takes the legitimacy of such practices entirely for granted.[1016]

A more recent work by Mas‘ud Azhar (b. ca. 1968), a madrasa-trained Deobandi militant, is no less instructive in this regard. Azhar is the founder of

the Jaish-i Muhammad, a much-feared militant organization active in Indian Kashmir. It was banned by General Pervez Musharraf in January 2002, though it has continued to be implicated in terrorism in India in subsequent years. Azhar was in an Indian jail when an Indian passenger airliner was hijacked in December 1999 to Kabul, then under Taliban rule, and the captors demanded Azhar's freedom as part of their demands.[1017] I will return to him in the next chapter. What bears mentioning in the present context is a short book that Azhar published in November 2001, weeks after the beginning of the American attack on Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11.[1018] The book focuses on God's "beautiful names," often reckoned to be ninety-nine and highlighting one or another of God's attributes—the Merciful, the All-Powerful, the Creator, the Forgiver, the Controller, the Provider, the Guardian, and so forth. The invocation and recitation of these names (zikr) has long had a place in Sufi devotionalism and, though Azhar is highly critical elsewhere of pirs and their practices, this work fits into that devotional genre.[1019] What he tells his readers about the efficacy of reciting a particular name of God a certain number of times over a particular period of time also serves a function similar to that of amulets. Reciting certain names of God helps, he says, to restore health,[1020] benefit crops,[1021] provide for one's material and financial needs,[1022] improve relations between spouses, protect against miscarriages,[1023] and so forth. The names of God are useful in one's dealings with those in power, too. Some help gain freedom from imprisonment,[1024] others are good in relation to the oppressors[1025] or in helping avoid the harshness of a ruler.[1026] But the ruler, too, can invoke them to good effect—for example, by way of making people subservient to himself.[1027] Then there are the names of God whose efficacy is geared to the battlefield, which is what would have made this work relevant for Pakistanis going to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban. Some help defeat the enemy,[1028] others protect the family in one's absence,[1029] yet others have the effect of making one fearless against the enemy[1030] or fearsome to the enemy[1031] and of warding off the enemy's evil in other ways.[1032] This is zikr at its most efficacious, though it can also have the effect of making one privy, as has been the case with many Sufi masters, to hidden forms of knowledge.[1033]

Mas'ud Azhar straddles the boundary between the 'ulama and Islamism. Other Islamists, too, have appealed to Sufism, again notwithstanding their severe criticism of it. In an early autobiographical account, first published in

1932, Mawdudi had noted that he belonged to a family with a long and prestigious lineage in the Chishti Sufi order and indeed that he was named after a Sufi progenitor—Abul-A‘la Mawdudi (d. 1528)—who was the first of the family to have settled in India.[1034] Mawdudi’s father, too, though he had studied for some time at Aligarh College, had become a devout Sufi, with deleterious results for his legal practice.[1035] Mawdudi himself was never a practicing Sufi but, as he wrote in 1951, he had frequented the company of those who were and his critical view of Sufism was not to be dismissed as based on mere ignorance of this phenomenon.[1036]

The criticism itself had needed to be toned down, however. A book published in 1972 by the quasi-official press of the Jama‘at-i Islami presented a collection of Mawdudi’s writings on the subject of Sufism. Some of these were, indeed, critical of Sufi practice, but, as a whole, the anthology made the point that true Sufism was a legitimate facet of Islam and that insinuations about Mawdudi’s opposition to it were false.[1037] The book reproduced the early autobiography that had highlighted Mawdudi’s Sufi lineage. For the benefit of those who may not have gotten the point even then, the book provided a full Chishti Sufi genealogy for Mawdudi, complete with the revered luminaries of this influential order.[1038]

Some years earlier, in 1966, Mian Tufail Muhammad (d. 2009), the general-secretary of the Jama‘at-i Islami and subsequently its head (amir), had published an abridged Urdu translation of ‘Ali Hujwiri’s (d. ca. 1071) Kashf al-mahjub, one of the early classics of Persian Sufism.[1039] Hujwiri—commonly known as Data Ganj Bakhsh, “the lord who bestows treasures”—is buried in Lahore, and his shrine is probably the most frequently visited of all in Pakistan.[1040] Tufail Muhammad’s volume is based on an earlier translation of the Kashf al-mahjub, but the decision to produce it is suggestive both of the enduring appeal of Sufism and of the Islamists’ desire to tap into some of that appeal. It suggests as well that, unlike many other Islamists, in both South Asia and in the Middle East, at least some of those associated with the Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan have sought not only to base their norms in the foundational texts and the practices of the earliest Muslims but also to maintain a sense of continuity with the subsequent history of Islam. In his preface to this book, Tufail Muhammad lamented the fact that the products of an English education had come to see even “the clowns and singers and tricksters” of Europe as worth

emulating while being altogether unfamiliar with their own saints like ‘Ali Hujwiri, Ahmad Sirhindi, and Shah Wali Allah.[1041] It was in order to make such figures familiar to people once again and to show them that Muslim societies had continued to produce such luminaries even in their age of decline that Tufail Muhammad had undertaken this work.[1042] Incidentally, the project also suggests that the Jama‘at-i Islami has drawn its following, and even some of its leadership, not only from people with a strongly scripturalist or even just a Deobandi orientation—to which Mawdudi was personally close—but also from those with a more devotional bent, in the manner of the Barelawis. He had great affection, Tufail Muhammad noted in his preface to this book, for Abul-Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri (d. 1961), a prominent Barelawi scholar who had produced an Urdu translation of the Kashf al-mahjub, and he had wanted to publish that work from the Jama‘at-i Islami’s press. In the end, however, the translation that Tufail Muhammad relied on in producing his own edition was a different one, for that is what was available to him in prison while he was working on it.[1043] ‘Abd al-Ghafur Ahmad, a later vice president of the Jama‘at, also belonged to the Barelawi orientation.[1044] This again shows that at least some in the Jama‘at have had deeper roots in Sufi devotional piety than may have been required simply by the imperatives of broadening their religio-political appeal. Such imperatives, too, cannot be discounted, however. They did have something to do, for instance, with the decision of Qazi Husayn Ahmad (d. 2013), who became the head of the Jama‘at in 1987, to begin his mass-mobilization campaign that year with a visit to the shrine of ‘Ali Hujwiri.[1045]

Even as the modernists, the ‘ulama, and the Islamists have drawn upon Sufism in their particular ways, those recognizable primarily as Sufis have continued, as might be expected, to cultivate their devotional practices. And they have sought to find resources in their hallowed tradition to also bolster their authority and their public presence. Perhaps the most important contemporary illustration of how they have done so is Muhammad Tahir al-Qadiri.

Born in Jhang in 1951, Tahir al-Qadiri received substantial Islamic education though apparently not a formal degree from a madrasa. Instead, he earned a master’s degree in Islamic studies from the University of the Punjab and subsequently a bachelor’s degree in law and a PhD from the same university.

[1046] A scholar and preacher of the Barelawi orientation with strong Sufi leanings, he was a protégé of the Zia al-Haqq regime and of the politically ascendant Nawaz Sharif and his family: he gave sermons at a mosque built by Sharif's father in Lahore and came subsequently to make well-received appearances discussing Qur'anic themes on what in the 1980s was the sole channel of the national television.[1047] His doctoral dissertation, defended in 1984, reflected the sensibilities guiding state-sponsored Islamization at the time. It offered a spirited defense of Islamic criminal law in comparison with "the Western penal system [which] has totally collapsed to check [sic] and curtail effectively the rising graph of crime."[1048] With some help from Sharif, he also founded in the early 1980s his educational and religious movement, the Minhaj al-Qur'an. Not long after the end of the Zia al-Haqq era, Tahir al-Qadiri had a falling out with Sharif, whereupon he established a political party of his own, the Pakistan Awami Tahrik. He later moved to Toronto, Canada, from where he has directed what now professes to be a global Minhaj al-Qur'an while seeking to bring about "revolutionary" change in Pakistani politics. The latter effort has resulted in some high-profile appearances in Pakistan, most notably in the summer of 2014. In concert with the former cricket star turned politician Imran Khan, a sit-in by Tahir al-Qadiri and his followers in the federal capital brought Islamabad to a standstill for several days that summer. Although the core demand of the sit-in—the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif—remained unmet and Tahir al-Qadiri soon flew back to Canada, he had shown an impressive ability to challenge the government.[1049]

Some of that challenge was covertly enabled by a military leadership keen to cut the prime minister down to size.[1050] It surely also had to do with the failure even of popularly elected leaders to address the chronic problems of ordinary people: according to one survey in 2014, "the cumulative inflation since 2007–08 has led to real increase in price of flour (58 p[er]c[ent]); potatoes (241 pc), pulses (93 pc), sugar (27 pc), and milk (60 pc)." Nearly a third of the total population, or sixty-five million people, fell below the poverty line.[1051] But Tahir al-Qadiri also drew on a reservoir of devotional Sufi and Barelawi sentiment, which he has cultivated dexterously over many years and in terms of which he has articulated a good deal of his appeal. For instance, he has published a collection of no less than 2,500 of his short benedictions (durud o salam) in honor of the Prophet. He had composed them in Arabic, and they are said to have been "very well received by the shaykhs, researchers, and 'ulama of the Arab world." One of

Tahir al-Qadiri’s disciples subsequently translated the work into Urdu.[1052] Another of his books, a compilation of hadith on a variety of topics (including faith, rituals, supplicatory prayers, the virtues of the Prophet and his companions, ethical teachings, and so on), carries separate chains of transmission that link him to the eponymous founders of the four schools of Sunni law; to Bukhari and Muslim—the compilers of the most authoritative of the Sunni collections of hadith; and to the Sufi masters ‘Abd al-Qadir Jilani and Ibn al-‘Arabi.[1053] For all the criticism long directed at him by many ‘ulama, Ibn al-‘Arabi remains an immensely influential figure in Sufi circles. So is ‘Abd al-Qadir Jilani. Tahir al-Qadiri’s effort to show that he is an authentic and authorized legatee of religious knowledge from revered Sufi masters, among others, makes him a holy personage in his own right. It was on such veneration that he drew in bringing many thousands—including a large number of women—to his sit-in in Islamabad in the summer of 2014.[1054]

*** A Changing Landscape?

This overview has left us with a rather ambiguous understanding of the place of Sufism in the religious sphere in Pakistan and, before that, in colonial South Asia. On the one hand, the Sufis and their institutions have faced severe challenges from many sides. On the other, Sufism has also exerted a major influence on a variety of religious orientations and their adherents have continued to appeal to it. Large numbers of people still visit Sufi shrines, and not only on the occasion of the saint’s death anniversary.[1055] Sufi sensibilities have never been limited, however, to contact with shrines, which is to say that the incidence of such visits does not give us the full picture of how Sufi thought and practice continue to inform the lives of countless people in local contexts.[1056] And yet Sufism in Pakistan may be rather less vibrant today than it was in colonial India a century ago. Two caveats are in order before proceeding to illustrate this point. One of these is that my observations relate not to devotional practice at local levels, but rather to the intellectual and religio-political dimensions of Sufism—writings by and discourses of Sufis, questions of reform, the impact of politics and the state on Sufi piety, and so forth. The other caveat is that any discussion of decline in case of Sufism—and of other facets of Islam, for that matter—carries with it the interpretive danger of reaffirming the decline narratives commonly encountered in Western histories of Sufism as well

as in the Sufis' own telling of their past, not to mention modernist renderings of that past.[1057] My interest here is not, however, in asking how contemporary Sufism in Pakistan, or in the Muslim world at large, compares with a putative golden age of Sufism in medieval Islam but rather in how contemporary Sufism compares with some facets of it in colonial India, which itself is usually seen as part of a tradition in decline.[1058] While recognizing that the decline of Sufism in contemporary Muslim societies remains a matter of scholarly disagreement,[1059] some indications of what I take to be key indicators of a diminished presence that Sufism has in contemporary Pakistan are worth examining.

First, a significant contrast is to be noticed between the production of Sufi works in colonial India and those that have been published in Pakistan over the past half century or so. For instance, Ahmad Riza Khan (d. 1921), a Sufi of the Qadiri order and the founder of the Barelawi orientation, was a prolific writer with an output that included not only polemical works against rival orientations and countless fatwas but also Sufi devotional works. Barelawis in Pakistan, and in India, have done much to reprint such works, but comparable works have not been produced by later Barelawis, and certainly not on the master's scale. To a Barelawi, this fact would serve only to underscore the incomparable stature of Ahmad Riza, and one would not wish to be seen as competing with the master in this or any other respect. Yet, the fact remains that the intellectual output of the later Barelawis, on Sufi as on other topics, has been significantly smaller than what the founder of their doctrinal orientation had produced in British India.

Much the same could be said about the Deobandis, so far as Sufism is concerned. The figure who looms largest in this regard is of course Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi, who died in the last years of colonial rule. Over the course of a long career, Thanawi had published numerous legal and exegetical works. But he and his immediate disciples had also produced a large corpus of Sufi writing, including the aforementioned work on Hafiz, a multivolume commentary on the Masnawi of Rumi, works on the tenth-century Sufi martyr Hallaj and on Ibn al-'Arabi, books providing guidance to those seeking the Sufi path and, not least, a substantial collection of the master's own spiritual discourses. Deobandis of a Sufi bent have spent considerable energy and financial resources on reprinting and, by way of anthologies, of repackaging these writings, but no Deobandi of either India or Pakistan has produced

anything on Thanawi’s scale when it comes to Sufism. Later Deobandis have produced a great deal by way of commentaries on the Qur’an and hadith as well as varied works on law, but this serves only to highlight the contrast with the meager output on explicitly Sufi themes.[1060]

This is not just a question of intellectual productivity, however. The past hundred years or so have also seen a significant shift in the cultural orientation of South Asian Islam. Irrespective of what Iqbal thought of Hafiz, he was entirely at home in the cultural idiom of the medieval Persian poet, just as he was in the rich tradition of Persian Sufi poetry in general. Similarly, it made sense for Thanawi to discourse on Rumi and Hafiz because there was an audience for it. Three generations later, most educated Muslims in South Asia are no longer literate in Persian.[1061] Ideas traceable to the classics of Persian Sufism still remain part of local discourse in particular contexts.[1062] Even so, the sort of direct access to the mystical heritage that had once been taken for granted is no longer available to most people; and this has had implications for how Sufi thought has fared in contemporary Pakistan.

Second, even as Sufism has benefited much from modern technologies and the unprecedented means of travel, communication, and the dissemination of knowledge made possible by them, modern scientific sensibilities have also undermined the presuppositions of an earlier era. For instance, it was possible for Thanawi to argue that a child born to a woman whose husband had been away for years was legitimate, for it was conceivable that the husband had visited his wife without having been seen by anyone or that he had been transported miraculously to his wife by a saint or a jinn.[1063] As a Sufi master, for whom miraculous deeds were uncontroversial matters, Thanawi would not have had to give excessively free rein to his imagination to make such a supposition. Already in his lifetime, some people were sufficiently perplexed by his views on this score to ask if he had been misunderstood;[1064] and the master himself acknowledged that such occurrences were improbable.[1065] In any case, such fatwas, intended as they were to provide a legal cover to women accused of sexual impropriety, are likely to be accepted less willingly by those seeking them today than they were in an earlier age.[1066] Put another way, legal rulings are often

significantly less rooted in, or tempered by, a quasi-Sufi perspective on things than they were some generations ago.

Third, though one does not notice much defensiveness on Sufi matters in the writings of an Ahmad Riza Khan or a Thanawi, it is unmistakable in some more recent works. The Qur’an commentary of Pir Karam Shah (d. 1998), a Chishti Sufi of Barelawi leanings who, in the Zia al-Haqq era, served on the Federal Shari‘at Court and subsequently the Shari‘at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, provides a telling instance. The commentary, first published in the 1960s, makes a point of defending Barelawi beliefs and practices against the charge that they verge on polytheism, arguing, for instance, that seeing saints and holy men as necessary means to reach God the more effectively is not tantamount to taking them as partners with God.[1067] This strategy is not well-designed, however, to put nagging doubts to rest about whether Sufi practices do indeed conform to scriptural norms. Leaving aside the quality of the defense a Sufi is able to mount against critics, the range of issues on which such defense has had to be offered has continued to grow, and Barelawi Sufis have been rather more vulnerable on this score than others. Conversely, it would be far more unusual for a Deobandi today to defend the practice of prostration to shrines than it was in the 1920s. A greater distance now separates the Barelawi from the Deobandi views on particular devotional practices than it did a century ago. This has meant, to return to my previous point, a certain narrowing of the space for Sufism within Deobandi circles. Thanawi is often credited with enhancing the alignment of Sufi practice with juridical norms, and there is little doubt that this was a concern that animated his reformist vision. Yet, he tended to allow much wider scope for flexibility of interpretation, more room for controversial views, in the realm of Sufism than he did in legal matters. By the same token, he cautioned his disciples and readers against any excessive effort to bring the one into accord with the other.[1068] About three-quarters of a century after his death, the logic of this realignment has gone in a decidedly legalistic direction. Deobandi muftis have arguably come to define the Islam of ordinary believers more often, and with fewer gray areas, than do any competing Sufis of this orientation.

Fourth, as the example of the Pakistani bureaucrat Qudratullah Shahab suggests, some of the vulnerabilities of Sufism may lie, paradoxically, in the very expressions of its appeal. It is significant that Shahab had adopted the

Sufi way not by affiliating himself with any of the institutional orders that one might have expected him to, but rather by choosing the Uwaysi path, which lacks any organized structure, any accredited chain of masters and disciples. When embarking upon his spiritual quest, he had prayed to God to let him be inducted into this order for he was “a seeker of God’s way and lacked the ability to traverse on the straightforward paths.”[1069] The appeal of true Sufism went hand in hand for him with a deep suspicion of institutional Sufism and of what he took to be fake claims to mystical prowess. A much publicized case in 1968 had been that of the so-called Box Pir (dabba pir), who had the reputation for miraculously adding money to the boxes his devotees brought to him with some money already in them.[1070] Shahab’s own experiences on the Sufi path had made it clear to him that

<quote>

there are no hidden secrets involved in Sufism or in traversing the path. Sufi practices (azkar, ashghal awr muraqabat) … are not esoteric things but rather practices that are well-known and altogether clear in their own way in each order. As for what the wayfarer experiences during such practices, discussing them [with others] is meaningless. They are like a marriage. A marriage is not a secret. Everyone understands the purposes, practices, and results of a marriage, but no one talks about what goes on in the bridal chamber…. The Sufi path is a “kindergarten” that helps incline people towards the shari‘a, but it is also full of delight and of extremely enjoyable discoveries. A large number of the wayfarers is so engrossed in this delight as to become immobilized and to lose their way towards the true goal, viz, the shari‘a. Such unfortunate people sometimes emerge as the Box Pir and sometimes they engage, through their fake shops, in the black marketing of Sufism…. The reward of those who escape from falling headlong into such alluring pits is that they are eventually able to start walking on the high road of the shari‘a. Sufism and its path have no goal or meaning other than [being able to do] this.[1071]

</quote>

Sufis like Thanawi would have concurred with Shahab’s insistence on the shared goals of Sufism and the shari‘a, though with the caveats noted earlier. Shahab, however, sought an altogether independent path to Sufi practice. This fit well, though he does not say so, into the life of a

high-ranking government official wary of being seen as submitting to anything other than a governmental hierarchy. It does not, however, fit well with conventional conceptions of authoritative guidance in Sufism. Thanawi, for one, would have seen Shahab's mystical orientation as another expression of modernist hubris.

The Sufi orders from which Shahab had wanted to keep his distance are hardly static, and some have made impressive efforts to adjust themselves to changing times. Though the Sabiri Chishtis of Pakistan—a suborder in the Chishti spiritual lineage—have sought to maintain a sense of continuity in their teachings and practices, as Robert Rozehnal has argued, it is noteworthy that a succession of their Sufi masters was educated exclusively in Western or Westernized institutions of learning. Muhammad Zauqi Shah (d. 1951), whom we met in chapter 4, had studied at Aligarh College. His successor, Shahidullah Faridi (d. 1978), was an Englishman—born John Gilbert Lennard—who had briefly studied at Oxford before coming to live in late colonial India and subsequently in Pakistan. Another master, Wahid Bakhsh Sial (d. 1995), had been an army officer educated at the Dehra Dun military academy in colonial India. The next Chishti Sabiri master, Siraj 'Ali Muhammad, graduated from the Air Force Academy of Pakistan.[1072] Such profiles are far closer to those of many modernists and Islamists than they are to the Pakistani 'ulama's; and they are certainly very different from those of the Chishti masters of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. For all the attraction the recent Sufi masters may hold for a segment of middle-class Pakistanis in showing how Sufi ethics can give meaning to one's life in a changing world, there remain questions about whether a coherent Sufi tradition can, in fact, be maintained outside the framework of a more traditional educational and religious formation.[1073] In the first half of the twentieth century, Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi, also a Sabiri Chishti, could tap simultaneously into the scholarly and Sufi traditions to attract large numbers of disciples. It is difficult to say the same of the latter-day Sabiri Chishti masters.

The case of a contemporary pir, Zulfiqar Ahmad (b. 1953) of the Naqshbandi order, has parallels with the Sabiri Chishtis while also revealing some differences. By training an electrical engineer with no formal religious education, he draws liberally in his discourses on the language of modern science in explaining Islam, the Qur'an, and Sufism to his audiences. A good

part of his appeal clearly rests on that language. Yet, he is also a staunch Deobandi who regales his listeners with edifying anecdotes about the luminaries of that orientation, and he has devoted much energy to establishing and running Deobandi madrasas.[1074] His efforts suggest some recognition of the need to rest Sufi piety on more traditional grounds, though they remain uncertain in their long-term effects.

Fifth, Sufi shrines in Pakistan have been far more vulnerable to governmental regulation than have the madrasas. Despite major governmental initiatives in the early 1960s, the late 1970s, and then in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, to regulate them, most madrasas—and all of the leading ones—have remained autonomous and independent of the government for all practical purposes. Though the ‘ulama have not been averse to benefiting from the largesse of the rich or from government assistance, the organizational model of many among them has been anchored since the late nineteenth century in an informal economy that includes a large number of small financial contributions from ordinary believers.[1075] Almost by definition, such contributions lie outside government control. Many shrines, on the other hand, have historically depended on charitable endowments, typically in the form of land grants. Their scale may be gleaned from the fact that nearly a third of the total revenue of Sindh at the time of its annexation by the British in 1843 had accrued to “ecclesiastical establishments,”[1076] which primarily meant Sufi shrines. Government takeover of such properties was not only financially lucrative, it was also the most effective way of checking the influence of those associated with them. As observed earlier, a succession of waqf regulations has subsequently brought them under government regulation in Pakistan. Significantly, many of the madrasas that the government did succeed in bringing under its control from the 1960s were also those associated with shrines, and bureaucratic officials have often had wide leeway in determining the curriculum of such schools.[1077] By contrast, even as many Pakistani madrasas have come to accept the public school curriculum as part of their education, the ‘ulama have maintained firm control of their institutions and of just how the public school curriculum would be combined with a more traditional religious education.

The political influence enjoyed by large shrine-holders in the Punjab and Sindh could have conceivably enabled them to prevent governmental control

of waqf endowments. It occasionally did so, as in late colonial Punjab. Much of that influence has tended, however, to be focused on preserving local political and economic interests rather than the independence of the shrines as a category of institutions.[1078] Once again, there is an instructive contrast with the madrasas. Since the early 1960s, the ‘ulama have mobilized their considerable energies to organize madrasa “boards” along doctrinal lines to oversee the affairs of these institutions, to standardize the education imparted at them and, above all, through a closing of their ranks, to resist perceived government encroachment. Caretakers of Pakistani shrines have also made occasional effort to close their ranks; but such efforts have been desultory and notably ineffective.[1079]

Finally, while the attack on Sufi practices and institutions has often taken the form of polemics against them or, as the case may be, of government regulation, recent years have witnessed such attacks in a more literal sense, too. They are usually attributable to the Pakistani Taliban and allied groups, and they have targeted Sufi shrines across the country. The much revered shrine of ‘Ali Hujwiri was attacked by a suicide bomber in July 2010, with a death toll of around forty-five people.[1080] That same year, an attack on the shrine of Sakhi Sarwar in southern Punjab killed another fifty people.[1081] Other attacks have targeted the Bari Imam shrine outside Islamabad in 2005 and the shrines of Baba Farid Ganjshakar in Pakpattan, Punjab, and ‘Abdallah Shah Ghazi in Karachi, both in 2010.[1082] Unsurprisingly, Khyber Pakhthunkhwa, the Frontier province that is home to the Taliban, has borne the brunt of such attacks, the most notable of them being on the shrine of the revered Sufi poet Rahman Baba in March 2009.[1083] ISIS, too—the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—has claimed some bombings, notably the one carried out at the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Sindh, in February 2017.[1084]

Such attacks can be viewed from several distinct but overlapping perspectives. As observed earlier, sectarian Sunni and Shi‘i militants have targeted their rivals in a variety of locations, including mosques and in Twelver Shi‘i imambargahs. How does the targeting of shrines compare with those attacks? An obvious similarity is, of course, that both are clearly marked religious spaces. A significant difference is, however, that the mosques and imambargahs have not usually been attacked in their own right but rather to target the people gathered there; the shrines, on the other

hand, are targets of attack for what they stand for in themselves.[1085] In this sense, the shrines are rather more like the public schools that the Taliban have attacked in the Frontier province than they are like the mosques at which they and others have also targeted their rivals. Though in some cases, notably the school massacre in Peshawar in December 2014, the Taliban have, indeed, attacked those studying at schools,[1086] they have mostly sought to destroy school buildings for what they represent—government authority and the perceived encroachment of an alien, un-Islamic culture.

An attack on shrines challenges that authority in some other, related ways, too. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Pakistani governments have made some half-hearted but not inconspicuous efforts to promote Sufi devotionalism as an antidote to religio-political militancy in the country. For instance, in 2009, the government of Prime Minister Yusuf Riza Gilani established the Sufi Advisory Council "with [the] aim [of] combating extremism and fanaticism." Some years earlier, President Pervez Musharraf had set up a National Sufi Council with similar goals.[1087] Representatives of Western governments have sometimes also let themselves be seen as patrons of Sufi devotionalism. For instance, in July 2009, the British foreign secretary David Miliband paid visits to the tombs of several Sufis in Multan in what some saw as an effort to "charm … moderate Muslims."[1088] And in April 2010, it was reported that the US ambassador to Pakistan, Anne W. Patterson, had allocated $149,000 for conservation work on three Sufi shrines in the Punjab.[1089] Insomuch as venerated Sufi shrines have become associated with the War on Terror, it is not surprising that some of that terror has come to visit these shrines.

Taliban attacks on shrines also represent none too subtle efforts to remake the religious landscape. Sufi shrines have long been sites of practices frowned upon by those of a scripturalist bent, and it is some of those practices that the Music in Muslim Shrines Act of 1942 had sought to outlaw in late colonial Punjab. There is little to suggest that that act was effective in curbing them, however. On the contrary, it remains common for important Pakistani shrines to host what are billed as "cultural" events on the occasion of the saint's death anniversary, the 'urs. For instance, a fair held in conjunction with the 'urs of Sayyid Wilayat Shah in Chakwal, in the Punjab, in September 2013, featured sporting competitions, bullfighting, and music.[1090] And at the 'urs of Sachchal Sarmast in Sindh, the chief minister

of the province was reported in 2014 to have given out awards to the best male and female singers.[1091] Pakistani Taliban and allied groups do not take a benign view of such practices. The shrine of Sakhi Sarwar in southern Punjab was attacked by a suicide bomber while “devotees were performing devotional dance at the main entrance.”[1092] This subsequently led the local government to ban the use of musical instruments at the saint’s ‘urs on grounds that it was “a security threat.”[1093] In the case of the shrine of Rahman Baba near Peshawar, the president of the association looking after it reported that “some ‘Taliban-like people’ having long hair and beards used to come there and ask the caretaker why he had not barred women from visiting the shrine.” Some Taliban had reportedly also said that praying in the adjacent mosque was forbidden, presumably given its proximity to the shrine.[1094]

Though relatively new to Pakistan, the targeting of shrines is hardly unheard of in other contexts. In late medieval Iran, Central Asia, and South Asia, rulers and invaders had desecrated the shrines with which their defeated rivals were associated.[1095] For instance, Zahir al-din Babur, who went on to found the Mughal dynasty in India, had commanded the destruction of the tomb of “a heretic wandering dervish” while campaigning in the Bajaur region in the winter of 1519. Coincidentally, this region now forms part of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier and it has been a stronghold of the Pakistani Taliban.[1096] In more recent times, it is worth recalling the Wahhabi destruction of venerated tombs in the Hijaz in the 1920s, which had caused widespread consternation in India and was the immediate backdrop against which Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani had addressed the Saudi king on the question of prostration at shrines.[1097] In the mid-1930s, as relations between the Shi‘is and Sunnis of Lucknow deteriorated, some had warned that it was a matter of time before Sunni extremists, then attacking Shi‘i rituals, began targeting Sunni devotional practices and tombs as well.[1098] In our own times, shrines have been attacked and destroyed in several Muslim societies—for instance, Mali, in West Africa; Mosul, in Iraq; and elsewhere.[1099] Like many of those agitating in the Madh-i sahaba cause in late colonial Lucknow, the Taliban are classifiable as Deobandis rather than as Wahhabis or Salafis. Yet, their targeting of shrines remains atypical for the Deobandis.[1100] As if to underscore this, the Taliban have not spared the Deobandis associated with particular shrines either.[1101] Practitioners of Sufi devotional music have also been targeted on occasion. In June 2016, Amjad Sabiri, a noted qawwali singer, was assassinated in

Karachi; a Taliban group claimed responsibility for it while vaguely accusing Sabiri of blasphemy.[1102]

Dramatic as it is, we should not, however, exaggerate the impact of the Taliban attack on Sufi shrines. Though some are predictably dissuaded by such attacks from visiting the shrines, others have continued to do so. A peasant woman seeking a saint's help to ward off the financial disaster of a failed crop will still come to his shrine, as would those fleeing their land after failing to pay their debts.[1103] Those attracted to a saint's teachings, or to his poetry, would do so too,[1104] and so would homeless women looking for shelter.[1105] At the same time, and though the Taliban have sought to change things in a hurry and in the bluntest possible form, their actions are not always discontinuous with earlier, less violent efforts to refashion the religious landscape. And this gives to them a greater significance, so far as their impact on Pakistani Sufism is concerned, than merely the blowing up of particular shrines in the years following September 2001. Many things separate the proponents of the Music in Muslim Shrines Bill, or their modernist successors in Pakistan, from the Taliban. But the desire to see a particular religious worldview forcibly imposed upon others is not among them.

Yet, if modernism, despite some indebtedness to Sufism, has not been good for it, the decline of modernism has, paradoxically, not been good for it either. The debilitation of Pakistani modernism has meant its ceding a great deal of the initiative in the articulation of Islamic discourses to some highly conservative circles, heightening in turn the vulnerability as well as the defensiveness of the Sufis.[1106] For its part, the declining fortunes of Sufism have made modernist Islam more vulnerable to its challengers. Iqbal had observed long ago that Sufism's otherworldly attitudes had made young Muslims receptive to modern European ideologies.[1107] The noted British orientalist Sir Hamilton Gibb echoed this worry in an influential work of his own.[1108] In the 1960s, Fazlur Rahman, too, made a similar point in cautioning in his book, Islam, against the modern "one-sided legacy of anti-Sufism."[1109] Sufism met many more needs of people than only the religious, Rahman wrote, and if it was made to vacate the space it had traditionally occupied in people's lives without a proper "social reconstruction programme," that space could be vulnerable to Communist movements.[1110] This was a powerful warning at the height of the Cold

War. But in good modernist fashion, Rahman was disdainful of what was on offer in the free world, too. His own, unforgiving, view of Sufism notwithstanding, he concluded his book with the plea that “the genuine inner life of the ‘heart’—the basic élan of Sufism—must be reintegrated in the Shari‘a and can be neglected only on pain, in the long run, of succumbing to the devastating onslaughts of modern secularism.”[1111] In the early twenty-first century, it was neither communism nor secularism but radical Islamism whose onslaughts had come to be the most devastating.[1112] It is to them and to an explication of the context in which they have been experienced in Pakistan that we now turn.

** Chapter Seven: Religion, Violence, and the State

SINCE THE TERRORIST ATTACKS of September 11, 2001, no topic has been debated more often in the international media, policy circles, and among observers of Muslim societies than the question of Islam’s relationship with violence and war.[1113] As a state professing to be an Islamic Republic and one that was closely allied with the Taliban—hosts to Usama bin Laden and many of his associates—Pakistan, too, has received extensive scrutiny in varied circles for its ties with Islamist militant organizations and its role in enabling them to operate within and outside its borders as instruments of strategic policy. Though an examination of developments in the aftermath of those attacks is among the purposes of this chapter, the concerns here are broader. Taking a number of key illustrations from the entire span of Pakistan’s history, this chapter seeks to shed some further light on how we might try to understand the fraught relationship between Islam, the state, and religiously inflected justifications for violence. How have the Pakistani political and military establishments shaped the context in which appeals to jihad have been framed or in which particular groups have taken to violent agitation on what they profess to be religious grounds? What “Islamic” resources have been utilized by such groups? And what difficulties have the modernizing governing elite faced in taking or keeping charge of the narratives whereby the resort to arms has been justified at various points in the country’s history? These are among our questions here.

*** Kashmir, 1947–48

Any discussion of religion, violence, and the Pakistani state must necessarily begin with Kashmir. The denial to the new state of a predominantly Muslim region contiguous with it has always remained high on the list of the injustices done to Pakistan by the departing British and by the government of independent India. The Pakistani political and military leadership has repeatedly sought to right this wrong. The first such effort was made already in Jinnah's lifetime in the form of covert operations in Kashmir. With the active encouragement of the government and logistical support from the military, tribal militias and other volunteers had begun pouring into Kashmir almost immediately after the birth of Pakistan. This was in response to widely publicized reports of atrocities against local Muslims by the Hindu ruler of the state. In turn, this infiltration precipitated the formal accession of Kashmir to India, the dispatch of Indian troops there, and the threat of a full-fledged war between India and Pakistan. By the time a ceasefire took effect in Kashmir in January 1949 through the intervention of the United Nations, about a third of the erstwhile princely state had been "liberated" by the irregular forces fighting on Pakistan's behalf. A plebiscite was promised by the UN to allow the people of Kashmir to decide their future. It never took place, ensuring that Kashmir would remain at the forefront of the disputes between India and Pakistan. What concerns us here is not the political and military history of the conflict in Kashmir, however, but rather some of the ways in which invocations of Islam have featured in this conflict.

The years 1947–48 were not the first time armed bands had entered Kashmir to take on the local government. In 1931, Muslims in the Punjab and elsewhere in British India had begun sending groups of volunteers to aid Kashmiri Muslims in their effort to end what they saw as the oppressive and anti-Muslim policies of the state's ruler. The Deobandi luminary Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi was asked at the time about the legitimacy of such operations and, true to his quietist politics, he had strongly discouraged them. If Muslims had the means to offer effective resistance, he said, they should do so. If not, they ought to bear their hardship patiently, for sporadic agitation or mere shows of force tended to exacerbate rather than relieve the problems they were trying to remedy.[1114] Mawdudi, too, was asked in 1948 about the legitimacy of irregular military operations in Kashmir and whether it constituted a jihad. Startling many people, he had demurred, arguing that they could qualify as jihad only if the government of Pakistan openly

declared it to be such—covertly supporting warfare while maintaining diplomatic and trade relations with the enemy, India, was no way to conduct jihad.[1115] With his history of sharp denunciations of the Muslim League leadership and of its credentials to steward the demand for a separate Muslim homeland, Mawdudi was not a popular figure in government circles in Pakistan. His views on Kashmir confirmed them in their grim view of him. Some prominent religious voices were also heard in opposition to Mawdudi, of which two deserve notice.

In early July 1948, Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani wrote to Mawdudi to correct his “gravely erroneous” position on the Kashmir war.[1116] ‘Usmani argued that India’s actions in violating its earlier understandings with Pakistan—for instance, by forcibly annexing the territory of Junagadh, whose ruler had acceded to Pakistan, or condoning the massacre of Muslims in India—meant that it had already acted in bad faith and that Pakistan was therefore under no obligation to maintain its part of any agreements with it.[1117] He argued further that an agreement between two countries did not necessarily prevent volunteers from each country from engaging, in their individual capacity, in military operations.[1118] In a subsequent fatwa, ‘Usmani also made it clear that a jihad remained valid even if the Muslim government calling for it—in this instance, covertly—was not committed to proper Islamic norms.[1119]

In his response to ‘Usmani, Mawdudi continued to insist that a Muslim government could not engage in jihad against a country with which it maintained treaty relations.[1120] He also showed a rather surer grasp of international law than had ‘Usmani. A treaty between two countries was not automatically nullified if the private citizens of one attacked those of the other, he said, but that hardly meant that the terms of an interstate treaty had no implications for the behavior of putatively private individuals. Such individuals, too, bore “moral responsibility” to abide by the treaty to which their country was a signatory.[1121] In a biting challenge, Mawdudi asked ‘Usmani to declare in a fatwa that that was not the case.[1122] Remarkably for men who had spent all of their lives until that point in regions that were now part of India, neither ‘Usmani nor Mawdudi seems to have worried much—at least not publicly—about how the jihad in Kashmir might complicate the lives of the Muslims still living in India.[1123]

Before this exchange between ‘Usmani and Mawdudi had concluded, a veteran of anti-colonial struggle in the Frontier had busied himself in writing a treatise in refutation of some of Mawdudi’s views. Unlike ‘Usmani, Fazl-i Ilahi Wazirabadi (d. 1951) was not a trained religious scholar, and not even, like Mawdudi, a well-educated religious intellectual. Instead, he owed his credentials to long years of exile in the tribal areas of the Frontier, where he had been part of a militant, puritanical movement—the Jama‘at al-mujahidin—that traced its origins to Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareli in the early nineteenth century.[1124] Shortly after his return from exile in July 1948, an aged Wazirabadi was asked about the burning question of the day, the legitimacy of military operations in Kashmir. He responded in detail, pointedly refuting Mawdudi’s views without however referring to him by name.[1125] Though he shared the gist of his views with ‘Usmani, Wazirabadi was considerably more emphatic in underscoring the obligatoriness of the jihad in Kashmir. Lacking ‘Usmani’s juridical learning, he was also significantly less constrained by any rules of war on which the Islamic legal tradition has long insisted.[1126] Jihad became obligatory, he said, if any one of the following seven reasons for it were to be found in a particular situation: the need to work toward the dominance of Islam; self-preservation; guarding helpless Muslims against unbelievers; avenging oneself against the unbelievers; waging war on account of the unbelievers’ breach of contract; fighting for national liberation; and rescuing Muslims from godless rule. He adduced Qur’anic passages and hadith reports in support of each of these grounds and asserted that all seven were fully operative in case of Kashmir.[1127] Where ‘Usmani had been content simply to cite the enemy’s bad faith as a justification for a Muslim state to consider existing agreements with it void without having to publicly renounce them, Wazirabadi held that the enemy needed to be punished for its bad faith. And he argued that this punishment should take the form of “such general massacre that successive generations, till the Day of Judgment, would remember the consequences of violating agreements.”[1128]

Wazirabadi was also of the view that no taint of mundane—as opposed to religious—considerations could compromise the quality of jihad. Fighting in defense of such “worldly” (dunyawi) interests as life, property, and progeny qualified as jihad;[1129] and those who branded a war fueled by nationalist sentiment as something other than jihad, he said in a

transparent allusion to Mawdudi's well-known views on the incompatibility of Islam and nationalism, were only aiding the enemy.[1130] Conversely, if the government was unable to openly engage in jihad, it should not be pressed to do so, though people ought to continue engaging in the war effort in their individual capacities.[1131] Finally, it was not necessary that those leading a jihad be the most virtuous of people;[1132] indeed, he said, people were obligated to submit even to a leader who was guilty of "major sins."[1133]

The significance of Wazirabadi's treatise lies in the spirited case it makes for the jihad in Kashmir. It consists as well in its enthusiastic embrace of the governing elite, and in this respect it stands in marked contrast with the suspicions and ambiguities that we have observed in earlier chapters in the relationship between the 'ulama and the Islamists, on the one hand, and the modernists, on the other. It also serves as an important early illustration of the shared interests of religious militants—in whose circles this book has remained influential[1134]—and the Pakistani military. Over the course of the country's history, the military has often sought to employ religio-political groups to destabilize the Indian hold over Kashmir. Works like Wazirabadi's have provided the ideological underpinnings for such action, showing in the process how a long-standing religious tradition can be invoked to give weight and authenticity to it.

Mawdudi realized soon enough that his views on the jihad in Kashmir could prove very costly to his Jama'at-i Islami. No nonstate actors then engaged in the fighting in Kashmir would have wanted their actions to be counted as anything less than jihad. The public opinion was decidedly hostile to India and to what everyone saw as the forced accession of Muslim-majority Kashmir to a Hindu-dominated nation. And the political elite were almost as one in seeing Mawdudi in sinister colors. Already by mid-September 1948, less than a week after Jinnah's death, Mawdudi had reversed his position. Writing to 'Usmani, Mawdudi said that the government of Pakistan had come to acknowledge the presence of its forces in Kashmir, which amounted in effect to giving clear notice of its intentions to the enemy. It was now justified for the people of Pakistan to take part in the jihad in Kashmir. Indeed, he said, the Jama'at-i Islami itself intended to do so.[1135]

This volte face did not help Mawdudi very much, not least because he had continued to take uncompromising positions on other issues. His commitment to the idea of the sovereignty of God entailed, for instance, that one could owe allegiance only to God, not to a state that did not recognize His sovereignty. As has been seen, that recognition would come a little later, in the form of the Objectives Resolution of March 1949. In the meanwhile, in the fall of 1948, Mawdudi saw himself and some of his close associates incarcerated and his party's publications proscribed.[1136]

The undeclared war in Kashmir was an easy sell to the country as jihad. Yet, the government had run a significant risk in mobilizing Islam for it. It was never quite in control of the incursions into Kashmir and the fury of the tribesmen on both sides of the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border at reports about the desecration of Sufi shrines in India—itself a prelude to the tribal infiltration—could easily turn against the Pakistani government itself. One tribal leader was reported in September 1947 to have characterized the Muslim leadership "as a body of infidels for favouring Hindus and Sikhs," referring unfavorably to its efforts to protect non-Muslims living in the Frontier region.[1137] Wazirabadi's seemingly full alignment with the government on the jihad in Kashmir also carried a potentially steep price, and not simply in terms of what the religious groups in the country would expect in return for their support. It was also that, with so unambiguous a case for everyman's jihad, the government might not be able to rein in the nonstate actors, or to calibrate the religious appeals that had helped galvanize them, when it needed to do so.

*** Punjab, 1953

Although we have already examined several key facets of the anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1953 in the previous chapters, I briefly return to it here to highlight two additional things: first, some of the complexity of the relationship between latent religious sentiment and its cultivation from outside, and second, the unexpected forms that that brew could take.

For many Muslims, few issues can come close to the rallying power of defending the honor of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet, even in such delicate

matters, it was not without considerable help from forces external to the religious sentiment in question that a full-blown agitation could take shape in 1953. It was easy to characterize this agitation as “madness,” as Daultana, the Punjab chief minister, later did, or, again in his words, as “religious hysteria [that] demanded nothing short of martyrdom.”[1138] Yet, Daultana had an ax to grind against the central government, as has been seen. And the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry investigating the 1953 agitation leave little doubt that he had helped manufacture some of the hysteria in question. Newspapers that his government subsidized were found, for instance, to be feeding the frenzy.[1139] For his part, the prime minister, Nazimuddin, tended to have a more favorable view of the ‘ulama than did most other modernists in the government, but he, too, wanted to put their goodwill to political uses of his own: in mollifying them on the Ahmadi question, he had hoped to secure their support on the shape of the future constitution.[1140] The military had its own interests to promote in handling the agitation. As matters slipped out of government control in the provincial capital, the military had pointedly failed to come to the aid of the civil law-enforcement authorities or to act while those authorities remained in charge.[1141] When it did finally step in, there was no mistaking the message that the military had succeeded where the civilians had failed. At the other end, the Ahrar needed to rehabilitate themselves in Pakistani society and politics, and fueling the anti-Ahmadi sentiment in the name of the Prophet’s sullied honor, and of Islam itself, was a most effective way to do so. None of this is to reduce the agitation to the machinations of particular quarters. There was a strong religious sentiment to be mobilized, a deeply felt religious issue to appeal to. But it was not a new issue, and it would not have become the basis of significant unrest without interested parties working on it, albeit in nonconcerted ways.

To turn to my second point here, if those engaging in jihad in Kashmir could turn against the Pakistani government itself, as they sometimes would in the following decades, it was not long before the anti-Ahmadi agitation did in fact acquire a distinctly anti-government aspect. As the inspector-general of the Punjab police wrote after it had been crushed, “The agitation was very widespread. I don’t think that all these persons had sympathy with the objects of the agitation. What was apparent was that they had no sympathy with the Government.”[1142] The rhetoric of jihad was invoked as well, except that its target was not just the Ahmadis but, shockingly, also what some referred to as the “satanic government.”[1143] A

mosque preacher in Okara was reported to have threatened that people “won’t defend country [sic] if it was attac[k]ed by enemy under present circumstances.”[1144] And a ring leader of the agitation had taunted the government that it should be fighting India rather than its own citizens.[1145]

*** Islam and War: 1965 and 1971

Religious motifs were freely invoked when Pakistan did go to war with India, in 1965 and again in 1971. In 1965, the government of President Ayub Khan had begun covert operations in Indian-held Kashmir with the calculation that the conflict with India would remain limited to this contested territory and that, in this circumscribed war-theater, Pakistan would have a military advantage. India saw no reason to limit its counteroperations to Kashmir, however, and on September 6 it attacked West Pakistan along the international borders.

The war was presented to the nation as the result of Indian aggression and as a jihad. The ‘ulama fully supported the war effort, as did the Islamists. In the weeks preceding September 6, Barelawi and Deobandi organizations had declared the Kashmiris’ struggle against Indian occupation to be a jihad.[1146] So did Mawdudi this time around, observing after the ceasefire that while the actual fighting (qital) had ceased, the broader struggle (jihad) would have to continue until the goal of Kashmiri self-determination had been achieved.[1147] Support for the war was not limited to any one segment of society. It was a moment of patriotic fervor, and almost everyone seemed to be on board.[1148] Though many Bengalis had resented the prominence that Kashmir was given in determining the state’s military priorities and expenditures, just as they were “mortified at the suggestion that … [East Pakistan’s] defence lay in West Pakistan,”[1149] there was much outpouring of patriotic sentiment in the eastern wing, too. The valor of the Pakistani troops was celebrated by poets of all political leanings, and some made a point of also highlighting the contribution of Bengali troops.[1150]

The seventeen-day war had ended in a stalemate, though the state's propaganda machine led people to believe, as many still do, that Pakistan was the victor. Triumph against a much bigger, more powerful aggressor, which had never reconciled itself to the creation of a Muslim homeland, was often explained not just in terms of the gallantry of the Pakistani troops, of which there was impressive evidence, but also of God's special favor on Pakistan. Much myth-making went into the narratives of the war. Evoking Qur'anic allusions to divine help during some of the Prophet Muhammad's military engagements,[1151] stories circulated of white- or green-robed beings coming to the assistance of Pakistani troops on the battlefield, and of deeds that could only be understood as miraculous. Holy men were reported to have seen the Prophet in dreams with the assurance that the victory belonged to Pakistan; the Prophet's cousin 'Ali, a famed warrior and the first Shi'i imam, was likewise seen expressing his intention to assist the country in the war effort.[1152] A religious aura surrounded the war even for those at the highest levels of government. As Qudratullah Shahab, the principal secretary to the president, later recounted it, Ayub Khan was once allowed by the Saudi government to go inside the Ka'ba and to pray there. "He had prayed there to God to not let our head bow down to India." Shahab commented: "A prayer inside the house of God is never futile—the war of 1965 is clear proof of this."[1153] That this view should have been expressed in a posthumous autobiography that is far from being uncritical of Ayub Khan is an indication of the depth and reach of the religious feeling that the war of 1965 had aroused.

In his writings on the war, the modernist intellectual Ghulam Ahmad Parwez was as eager as anyone Ayub Khan could find to highlight its religious dimensions. To Parwez, not only did the troops embody the sort of virtues that the Qur'an extolls, some even exemplified God-like qualities. God's attribute of not being overtaken by slumber or sleep (Q 2.255) was manifested in them, too;[1154] their officers had emulated the Prophet's "excellent example" on the battlefield;[1155] and their valor reminded Parwez that they were the children of a being—Adam—to whom the angels had once prostrated.[1156] As Parwez toured some of these famed battlefields in the Punjab, they constantly brought to mind yet other Qur'anic motifs, which he dutifully passed on to his readers.

Parwez was not content, however, simply to endorse this holy war. He also wanted to correct misconceptions about it. Though the idea of supernatural forces coming to the aid of the soldiers had probably helped the war effort and its legitimacy in certain quarters, it did not accord with Parwez's modernist sensibilities. As he reported it, some soldiers were themselves perturbed by such stories for their implication that all "credit" belonged to the supernatural forces, not to those who had actually laid down their lives in battle.[1157] Parwez assured such soldiers that God did His work in the world not through unseen forces but rather by way of human beings.[1158] "God's succor" likewise meant that to act in accordance with the laws and principles He had established for human conduct was what paved the way to success.[1159] If there was any spiritual power, it lay in the holy warrior's own strength.[1160] Coming upon a shrine that had somehow escaped cannon-fire despite its proximity to a battlefield, Parwez ridiculed the belief that this had had something to do with the saintliness of the person buried there.[1161] The title of this article—"Pakistan's New Pilgrimage Sites"—suggested that people should be revering the locations of celebrated military encounters and the soldiers who had seen action there, not decaying Sufi tombs.

Like many others of Parwez's ventures in the service of Ayub Khan, this extraordinary desire to foster a civil religion for Pakistan did not come to anything. A government's interests are seldom adequately served, after all, by aligning itself exclusively with any single constituency. Though the Ayub Khan regime marked the apogee of Islamic modernism, it needed also to benefit from the "superstitions" of those who could be persuaded that spiritual beings had in fact fought side by side with Pakistani troops in 1965. In such instances, the interests of a Parwez were not in full accord with those of the regime. That did not prevent him from adding his veneer of religious legitimacy to the war effort.

Mawdudi, too, contributed to the effort and he portrayed the war's successful outcome as a mark of God's special favor on the country. In a speech on Radio Pakistan less than two weeks after the cease fire, Mawdudi commented on how the war had impacted people and what lessons were to be drawn from it:

<quote>

In just a matter of days, a great revolution has taken place among the people, leading one to suppose that the nation that now lives in this country is not the one that was here during the past eighteen years [since independence]…. Reports from the battlefront tell us that twenty men of ours defeated two hundred, a hundred of ours defeated a thousand enemy soldiers. Our nation … stood like an iron wall in backing the troops…. In a very short while, the moral condition of the people has been rectified. Crime and sinful actions have come to an end…. Such events show that just as Pakistan had come into existence purely by the grace of God, so too is the grace of God its guardian. This country came about on account of Islam. Islam has made it triumphant [in the war]. It would be gross ingratitude if, with the passage of time, we began to forget the Benefactor who has enriched us with such blessings.[1162]

</quote>

Though the government was willing to give airtime to Mawdudi on national radio, as it did many others, he too had his ax to grind. Mawdudi and the Ayub Khan regime were not friends. Reviving memories of the Jama‘at-i Islami’s opposition to the movement for Pakistan and of Mawdudi’s refusal in 1947 to recognize the operations in Kashmir as a jihad, and alleging that the Jama‘at sought to establish a “fascist regime,” the government had banned the party in January 1964.[1163] After the ban was overturned by the Supreme Court later that year,[1164] Mawdudi threw in his weight in the presidential elections in early 1965 on the side of Jinnah’s sister, Fatima, who was challenging Ayub Khan for the nation’s highest office. Mawdudi’s patently exaggerated sense of wonder at how the nation seemed to have abandoned its waywardness of the past eighteen years was a none too subtle reminder to people that seven of those years had been passed under Ayub Khan. By the same token, the Jama‘at wanted to put pressure on the regime to roll back some of what the religious groups saw as its anti-Islamic measures. The government was not receptive to any such pressure, and it did not help improve relations between the two camps.

The war in 1971 posed challenges of a different order so far as the mobilization of Islam was concerned. Religious motifs could be deployed effortlessly when it came to the war with India, but that war was itself

precipitated by the civil war in East Pakistan. It was one thing for the Awami League to be a secessionist party, and for India to have an interest in providing it with all manner of support. It was quite another for the military of a Muslim state to wage war against its own people. Nonetheless, Islam was invoked in this instance, too, to provide some public justification for what turned out to be a horrendous military action in East Pakistan. Muslim Bengalis had long been seen by north Indian observers as continuing Hindu practices, as too anchored in a Hindu culture, too close to their Hindu neighbors. Such views had continued to find resonance in both political and religious circles in West Pakistan. From this vantage, the Bengalis always seemed to be out of step with policies the government wanted to pursue for the greater good of the country and its culture or, for that matter, with demands emanating from the religious groups. For instance, they had bitterly opposed making Urdu the sole national language of Pakistan, though it was the language in which much of modern South Asia's Islamic literature had been produced. Jinnah had already rebuked the Bengalis for it in March 1948:

<quote>

[L]et me make it very clear to you that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function…. [D]o not fall into the trap of those who are the enemies of Pakistan. Unfortunately, you have fifth-columnists—and I am sorry to say they are Muslims—who are financed by outsiders. But they are making a great mistake. We tolerate the enemies of Pakistan; we are not going to tolerate quislings and fifth-columnists in our State.[1165]

</quote>

The anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1953, too, had made little impression on East Bengal.[1166] It did not take much attentiveness to see, however, that there was no lack of Islamic sentiment in the eastern wing. Rural East Bengal at the time of Pakistan's birth was reportedly "saturated" with 'ulama and madrasas.[1167] Nazimuddin, a prime minister with a distinctly pro-'ulama attitude, was a Bengali. British consular officials had noted during the Suez Crisis of 1956 that pan-Islamic sentiment was especially strong in East Pakistan.[1168] And of the 113 'ulama who had signed a fatwa in early 1970

declaring socialism to be unbelief, 78 were from East Pakistan and 35 from the western wing.[1169] Caricatures about the lack or the inauthenticity of Islam in the region would persist nonetheless. Years later, some of those associated with the muhajir organization, the MQM, would refer to their Sindhi opponents in similar terms: “Sindhis are non-Muslims, like Bengalis.”[1170]

General A.A.K. Niazi, who commanded the troops in East Pakistan from April 1971 until the fall of Dhaka in December that year, treated it as “enemy territory,”[1171] with all that that meant in terms of slaughter, plunder, and rape. Given the aforementioned stereotypes about the inhabitants of the province, which were exacerbated by the Indian involvement in bolstering the secessionist insurgency, the distinction between Bengali and Hindu was easily blurred. As reported by the Hamoodur Rehman Commission that the government had established to look into Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war, “During his visit to formations in East Pakistan Gen. Gull Hassan used to ask his soldiers ‘how many Bengalis you have shot.’”[1172] An officer remembered General Niazi asking members of a military unit “how many Hindus we had killed.”[1173] General Niazi’s appeals to Islam sound jarring in this context, but they were not infrequent. “Islam preaches peace under normal circumstances,” he is reported to have told the troops in August 1971. “But being a realistic way of life it realizes that constant maintenance of peace depends on the ability to repel force.… As Muslims we have always fought against an enemy who is numerically and materially superior. The enemy never deterred us. It was [with] the spirit of jihad and dedication to Islam that the strongest adversaries were mauled and defeated by a handful of Muslims. The battles of Uhad, Badar, Khyber and Damascus are the proof of what the Muslims could do.”[1174] The poetry he recited to them also had strong religious overtones: “What remarkable distinction have the holy warriors received from God / If they die, they are martyrs, and if they live, they are war heroes (ghazi). / They seek only the pleasure of the Lord, not material gain / A Self-sufficient Being has surely endowed them with this manner of self-sufficiency!”[1175] Even as he subsequently denied the allegations against him, General Niazi had himself highlighted his religious turn. Asked by the Hamoodur Rehman commission about what it elsewhere called his “notorious reputation for sexual immorality,”[1176] he responded: “I became very religious during the East Pakistan trouble. I was not so before. I thought more of death than these things.”[1177]

Among the religio-political parties, the Jama‘at-i Islami in particular lent crucial support to the military operation in East Pakistan. Mawdudi did not have very much to say about the havoc wreaked by the army’s action, but he was categorical in denouncing reports of atrocities against non-Bengalis “by Bengali nationalists with Muslim-sounding names.” Most Muslims in East Pakistan had stayed away from such brutal acts, he said. “But those who have joined hands with the unbelievers in oppressing Muslims do not deserve to be considered Muslims or to be given any concession on account of being Muslim.”[1178] In June 1971, Mawdudi also published a “memorandum to the Muslim world,” in which he defended the conduct of the Pakistani troops in the eastern wing.[1179] The Jama‘at, however, went beyond giving moral support to the Yahya Khan regime. Its associates established paramilitary groups that worked in tandem with the military in countering the insurgency. In response, the martial law authorities rewarded the Jama‘at in various ways. Notably, the party was given a substantial portion of the parliamentary seats from which members of the Awami League had been disqualified, in the aftermath of the 1970 elections, on account of their secessionism.[1180] Even by the standards of a marriage of convenience, this was a very peculiar union of an Islamist party whose ideological influence radiated across the Muslim world and a regime whose head—Yahya Khan—was notorious for flouting recognizable Islamic norms. If invocations of Islam did not help the regime in its handling of East Pakistan, it was not for lack of trying. The failure may well have confirmed the governing elite and their newfound Islamist allies in their conviction that the East Pakistani soil was infertile for the cultivation of Islam.

*** The Afghan Jihad and Kashmir: The 1980s and the 1990s

If East Pakistan in 1971 was treacherous territory for jihad, Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in December 1979 was ideally suited for it. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had never been happy and, already in the 1950s, the Pakistani defense establishment had sought to secure British (and American) military aid by raising the specter of a Soviet advance through Afghanistan.[1181] That threat came closest to realization when Soviet troops entered Afghanistan at the “invitation” of its government, putting Pakistan at the frontline of the Cold War. Afghans had begun streaming into

the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, the two provinces bordering Afghanistan, since the socialist overthrow of the government of President Muhammad Daud Khan in April 1978 (the “Saur Revolution”), and their numbers would eventually exceed three million. The Afghan political organizations that soon came to play a prominent role in the anti-Soviet war also set up their base in Pakistan; some of these were being supported by Pakistan as a way of countering Afghanistan’s unfriendly policies toward it already from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s early days in office.[1182] And it was through Pakistan that much of the financial and military assistance from the United States and elsewhere would pass to the Afghan fighters. The idea of jihad provided the central narrative to this anti-Soviet struggle.

Some of the resonance of the idea owed itself to a wider context. As would be recalled, General Zia al-Haqq had come to power in the wake of a popular agitation calling for the implementation of the Nizam-i Mustafa, “the Prophet’s system.” Less than two years later, on the occasion of the Prophet’s birth anniversary, Zia al-Haqq had inaugurated what purported to be the beginnings of such a system. Islamization in Pakistan was one part of the context in which the narrative of jihad found meaning. Another was a change, one that had preceded Zia al-Haqq’s coup, toward greater space for Islam within the military. Quite apart from its willingness to deploy religious symbols as needed, there were signs under Bhutto of a more conspicuous religiosity in the military’s officer ranks. This may have been assisted by changing trends in the recruitment patterns. As Shuja Nawaz has observed, “data from … the Pakistan Army indicate that since the 1970s recruitment moved from the traditional districts to new cities…. The expansion of cities, particularly in the Punjab, created a new base for recruitment to the volunteer army: the children of the lower-middle class, akin to Zia’s own background, who chose the military because of its economic and social advantages rather than military traditions.”[1183] Zia al-Haqq, appointed chief of the army staff (COAS) in early 1976, was a noticeably observant officer, with some affinity for the Jama‘at-i Islami. The scope for Islamic symbolism in the military would grow under him, both as COAS and as the head of the state, though without noticeably compromising the military’s much vaunted professionalism.[1184]

The immediate, and most directly pertinent, context for the articulation of a narrative of jihad was provided, of course, by the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan. From the perspective of a people as jealous of their faith as of their freedom, it was bad enough to be ruled by a communist regime. That it was the puppet of an occupying Soviet force made things much worse. If there was an unambiguous and globally resonant argument to be made for jihad, Afghanistan under Soviet occupation had furnished it. Apart from numerous Afghans, religio-political groups in Pakistan—notably the Jama‘at-i Islami and many Deobandis and Salafis—rallied to the cause. So did people from the Arab Middle East and elsewhere.

Mosques had often played a crucial role in mobilizing religio-political movements in Pakistan, notably during the 1953 and 1974 anti-Ahmadi agitations and in the Nizam-i Mustafa movement that had helped topple Bhutto in 1977. They came to have an active role in shaping public support for the Afghan struggle as well. In Friday sermons, imams expounded at length on jihad and pointed to Afghanistan as the very embodiment of Muslim suffering and of opportunities for Muslims everywhere to pay their dues to a long neglected obligation. Given that madrasas, unlike mosques, often are residential institutions, which meant that—in the Frontier province—they could house male refugees and actual or prospective participants in the jihad, they too acquired an unprecedented importance during the years of the anti-Soviet struggle. None among them matched the aforementioned Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya in Akora Khattak, near Peshawar, in this respect. In 1985, an estimated 60 percent of its 680 students were Afghan.[1185] As Sami‘ al-Haqq, the president of this madrasa and a leader of the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam, put it around the same time, “[s]ince the beginning of the Jihad the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyyah has lifted any rule concerning attendance, coming and going for the Afghan students and for those who … participate in the Jihad. Groups of students leave to participate in the Holy War for a month or two or more and when they come back, others leave.”[1186]

Jihad by then had become part of the dominant discourse in Pakistan. In a speech in December 1987 marking eight years of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, ‘Abdul Qayyum Haqqani, a respected teacher at the Haqqaniyya madrasa, observed as much: “If you look at your country these days, you will see that conferences and seminars on jihad are being held, processions are being taken out, statements are being issued and resolutions [on jihad] are being adopted.” His point was not, however, to express satisfaction at this

state of affairs. It was rather that mere conferences and resolutions were not enough; what would guarantee the success of jihad, he said, was “complete faith and trust in God” as well as Muslim unity.[1187] General Zia al-Haqq would have concurred. As one of his closest associates, General K. M. Arif, the vice chief of army staff, later said of him: “[h]e was convinced of the rightness of the [Afghan] cause and he followed the course relentlessly…. In the process, the [Afghan] Mujahideen developed implicit faith in Pakistan, and they felt assured that the Zia administration would neither waver in its determination to support their cause nor compromise their interests for reasons of expediency.”[1188] It had taken much more, of course, than faith—in God, in the justness of the cause, in Pakistan’s commitment to it—to win the war in Afghanistan. The concerted efforts of the CIA and the Pakistani military intelligence, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); the supply of large quantities of American arms and of American and Arab monetary resources; fighters from across the Muslim world, including Pakistan; and the long unraveling of the Soviet Union itself, which the Afghan war served to hasten, had all contributed to the outcome. The fact remains nonetheless that no event in twentieth-century Islam matches the symbolic power of the Afghan jihad. And its effects continue to reverberate today.

Afghanistan has proved to be fertile soil for jihad in Indian Kashmir, too. Indeed, there was a seamless web between the warfare in Afghanistan and the insurgency in Kashmir in the 1990s—and this both from the Pakistani military angle and from that of the nonstate actors. For the ISI, the anti-Soviet struggle provided opportunities to train fighters for operations in Kashmir, some of whom would rise to prominence in the years following the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It is not an accident that violence in Kashmir began to flare up just when the jihad against the Soviet Union was winding down.[1189] The advantages of having a friendly regime that could provide Pakistan with “strategic depth” on its western frontier in confronting the enemy on the eastern front, not to mention training camps for militants intended for Indian Kashmir, were important considerations in Pakistan’s interest in the rise of the Taliban, too. After the fall of the Taliban in the wake of September 11, 2001, the military would continue to provide covert support to the insurgency led by those claiming that regime’s mantle in Afghanistan. This was a way of countering a US-supported Afghan government that was markedly less friendly toward Pakistan, and on better terms with India, than many among the Pakistani ruling elite thought they could tolerate.

The case of the Markaz al-Da‘wa wal-Irshad, founded in 1986 by Hafiz Muhammad Sa‘id, a Salafi (that is, Ahl-i Hadith) lecturer at the University of Engineering in Lahore, offers us a useful illustration of continuities between Afghanistan and Kashmir at nonstate levels as well. Subsequently called the Jama‘at al-Da‘wa, it has come to adopt a political, charitable, and missionary persona. Its militant wing, focused on India, is the much feared and better known Lashkar-i Tayba, which gained international notoriety for an attack on the historic Red Fort in Delhi in December 2000. Banned by Pakistan in early 2002, it has continued to operate, with its most dramatic terrorist operation taking place in Mumbai in the fall of 2008. For its part, the Jama‘at al-Da‘wa, though indistinguishable in terms of leadership and goals from the Lashkar-i Tayba, has managed to elude proscription.[1190]

Before returning to Hafiz Sa‘id, another instance of the continuities in question merits notice. This relates to Mas‘ud Azhar, whom we met in the previous chapter, and who came of age as the anti-Soviet Afghan struggle was entering its final phases. Born in Bahawalpur in southern Punjab, an arid and poverty-stricken part of the province, Azhar received his advanced religious education at the Jami‘at al-‘Ulum al-Islamiyya madrasa in Karachi. Those associated with the madrasa, founded in 1955 by Muhammad Yusuf Bannuri, have often been at the forefront of religio-political activism, including the anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1974 and sectarian militancy in the 1980s and the 1990s. Its graduates participated in the Afghan jihad as well, and Mas‘ud Azhar, who had begun teaching at the madrasa after completing his education there, was among them. It was not in actual combat, however, but rather as an ideologue propagating the cause of jihad and a leader of militant organizations that he was to come to public—indeed, international—attention. His lecture tours on jihad took him not only to various parts of Pakistan but also to Bangladesh, Central Asia, the Arab Middle East, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Britain. He has published a number of magazines to disseminate his message and to mobilize a support network for it: the Sada-i mujahid, Zarb-i mu’min, and, for a primarily female readership, Banat-i ‘A’isha. Azhar is also the founder of Jaish-i Muhammad, a militant organization best known for its activities in Indian Kashmir; he had previously been associated with Harkat al-mujahidin, a Deobandi organization active in Afghanistan since the mid-1980s.[1191] In 1994, as noted earlier, he had been captured and jailed by the Indian

government and was released some years later as part of a hostage settlement brokered by the Taliban. Azhar’s activities in relation to both Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir were in consonance with the strategic goals of the Pakistani military establishment, and it is not surprising that Azhar has lived in the open, for the most part, even after the state had branded his organization a terrorist group.

A brief sampling of themes, drawn here from a two-volume collection of speeches that date prior to September 11, 2001, help illustrate Mas‘ud Azhar’s worldview. The jihad in Afghanistan receives extensive coverage, of course, and within it there is much that has to do with the miraculous and the otherworldly: a handful defeat large contingents; tanks are destroyed with mere stones;[1192] people see a strangely holy light (nur) emanating from the graves of martyrs;[1193] those about to be martyred see visions of the heavenly maidens (hur) awaiting them.[1194] On a this-worldly plane, jihad is the means of restoring a long-lost dignity to Muslims, of protecting the honor of women, of defending the Qur’an against sacrilege.[1195] It is also a means for the ‘ulama to regain their social standing, to reassert their leadership roles. The lack of respect for their vocation that the ‘ulama have long suffered in society can be remedied by their entering the fray of jihad. As Azhar told his audience at the Bury madrasa in Britain in 1993, it was not just the religious realm that properly belonged to the ‘ulama, and to them alone; they ought to assume leadership roles in the arena of active combat as well.[1196] Another theme relates to Azhar’s conviction that no great piety is required to embark upon jihad.[1197] This point need not be seen as contradicting the previous one about the need for the ‘ulama’s leadership. It is meant simply to refute objections that jihad becomes binding only on those who have first attained a certain level of personal piety. Azhar, of course, sees such objections as bad excuses for not undertaking jihad at all. His position here is also a way of trying to safeguard the reputation of jihad from the notoriously bad behavior of many mujahidin warlords, especially after the Soviet withdrawal.[1198] On another note, though the Deobandi Azhar would not have wanted to show any affinity with Mawdudi, he does seem on occasion to echo the latter. Much like Mawdudi had argued that the moral formation people needed in order to transform the political realm could happen only within the political realm rather than outside it or prior to entering it, so Azhar insists that the ability to wage successful jihad would come only after entering the arena of jihad: one cannot expect to

develop that ability prior to entering the fray any more than one could learn to swim without being in a body of water.[1199]

Hafiz Muhammad Sa‘id is no less emphatic than Azhar in the exhortation to jihad. As a Salafi, his is a more austere and markedly less colorful discourse, however.[1200] Nor is Sa‘id a traditionally trained ‘alim; instead, he has master’s degrees in Arabic and Islamic studies from the University of the Punjab, and, as noted, it was at the University of Engineering in Lahore that he taught Islamic studies for many years.[1201] What he says about the ‘ulama is not by way of affirming their authority, as the Deobandi Azhar does, but rather to point to how they have often been busy turning people away from jihad. As he puts it in a searing rebuke to unnamed doctrinal rivals, presumably the Deobandis and the Barelawis, many ‘ulama refrain from giving jihad its due for fear that people would divert all their donations to its cause and leave mosques and madrasas unfunded.[1202] He also castigates the ‘ulama for playing into the hands of the Western powers by fanning intra-Muslim sectarian conflict and thereby diverting the Muslim focus away from jihad against the infidel.[1203] Sa‘id’s targets in jihad—Kashmir, India more broadly, and the West—are the same as Azhar’s. But there is also a strong sense that the Muslim society itself needs to be cleansed of the quasi-polytheistic beliefs and practices that pervade it. As a Salafi, he is more perturbed by such practices than is Azhar, but not so much, as will be seen, as to want to take up arms against putatively Muslim societies. Though ordinary people gravitating to a militant organization in the name of jihad have not necessarily done so because of its doctrinal orientation,[1204] the dictates of his own orientation and the need to school people in it are never far from Sa‘id’s thinking. Jihad is, he says, “the best university for an understanding of religion.”[1205] His specific point here is that, contrary to the views of many ‘ulama, there is no division of labor between those who study religion and those who fight; jihad itself is a means to imbibing proper Islam.[1206] Yet, the Islam that people are expected to internalize at the Lashkar-i Tayba’s camps carries an emphatically Salafi shape.[1207]

There are significant differences between Sa‘id and Azhar on the proper attitude that is to be adopted toward the government as well. Azhar’s mobilization for jihad would come to suit the interests of the Pakistani military and political establishments less well in the aftermath of September

11, 2001, than it had before that momentous day. Following daring attacks by the Jaish-i Muhammad in Srinagar in October 2001 and on the Indian parliament in December that year, Pakistan banned this organization, among many others.[1208] This signaled a continuation of some of the realignment away from jihad that General Musharraf had initiated under intense American pressure immediately after September 11. The Jaish obviously saw it as a betrayal of Pakistan's long-standing commitment to Kashmir, and it responded in kind. In an effort to reorient the country's priorities and commitments back to a more familiar direction, it masterminded an assassination attempt against General Musharraf in December 2003. The attempt failed, though investigations into it revealed that some within the Pakistan Air Force itself had helped with the plot.[1209] The danger that the military's allies among the militants could turn against it had lurked around this relationship since Pakistan's first forays into Kashmir. It was never closer to taking concrete shape than in the early years of the twenty-first century.

Azhar's expressions of anti-Americanism also became more strident once the United States went about dislodging his ideological allies, the Taliban, from power in Afghanistan. His editorial for Banat-i 'A'isha, the journal for women, from November 2001 offers an illustration:

<quote>

[Like Mullah Muhammad 'Umar and the Taliban], the Jaish-i Muhammad is an organization of God's friends and America's enemies; and hundreds of thousands of Muslim men and women are always ready for its service. As for the friends of America, they are people who have emancipated cinema houses [from any restraint] and have made mosques desolate. They are those who have compelled the daughters of Mother 'A'isha to abandon their veils and dance on stage with men.... They are those who, in the name of enlightenment and modern education, have spread shamelessness (be-haya'i), nationalism, and the love of wealth among Muslims. They are those who, in viewing the poor as worse than dogs, have made them contemptible in society—in the process darkening their own face and their prospects for salvation on the Day of Judgment.... The friends of America are people who, after reading a few Urdu books, give weight in matters of religion to their own opinions [rather than to those of the 'ulama] and try to harm Islam by talking ill of the 'ulama.... They are the cowards who do not go out for jihad

and who consider fighting America as [self-] destructive. Such people give out the appearance of being peace-loving; in reality, they want to impose America upon Muslims.[1210]

</quote>

Jihad, anti-Americanism, social justice, and a strident critique of what are taken to be the fruits of Westernized modernism are all intertwined here. These themes are well-represented in Azhar's pre-2011 discourses as well. The military establishment's putative break with the militants was new, however, and so was the stridency of Azhar's reaction to it.

Hafiz Sa'id, too, has nursed that anger, and he has not been reticent in his criticism of modernizing, pro-American Muslim regimes or of the moral waywardness of Muslim societies under their watch.[1211] Indeed, he has gone so far as to characterize those "prostrating" before America to be guilty of shirk—associating partners with the omnipotent God.[1212] Yet, it is a telling indication of what divides those engaged in jihad from one another that Sa'id has not drawn the same conclusions from a putatively Muslim regime's lapses as have some others. As Sa'id reports it, people objecting to the Lashkar-i Tayba's activities in Indian Kashmir argue that it should target the "idolatrous" (taghuti) government and the "dens of polytheism" at home before engaging in jihad against non-Muslims abroad.[1213] He returns to this and related ideas often,[1214] which suggests that they have some purchase even in his own circles. But Sa'id considers such views misguided. While the Prophet Muhammad was engaged in military hostilities with the Meccan polytheists, Sa'id notes in justifying his own stance, he had been willing to enter into an alliance even with the polytheists and the Jews of Medina.[1215] Bad Muslim rulers might be hypocrites (munafiqin)—a resonant Qur'anic term for members of the Prophet's community in Medina who were busy collaborating with his enemies—but, Sa'id insists, they are not unbelievers. That is to say that though they ought to be reprimanded for their misconduct, it is impermissible to wage war against them.[1216] There is also a pragmatic reason, he says, for showing restraint. Taking on bad Muslim rulers would lead to further repression on their part and a civil war, with adverse effects for jihad against non-Muslims and for the growth of Islamic movements.[1217]

Although some Pakistani Salafis remain highly critical of Sa‘id for his single-minded advocacy of jihad to the exclusion of almost everything else,[1218] he clearly belongs to the strain of Salafism that believes in keeping its peace with the government at home.[1219] Sa‘id claims to have met Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan,[1220] but this is not Bin Laden’s Salafism; it is the Salafism of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz (d. 1999), the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, who was an avid supporter of the jihad in Afghanistan and a pillar of the Saudi establishment. Given the Lashkar-i Tayba’s religious convictions, it has remained much more amenable to a continuing alignment with the Pakistani military, despite the latter’s professed realignments, than have Mas‘ud Azhar and his associates.

The Pakistani Taliban

General Musharraf’s decision, in the wake of September 11, 2001, to provide logistical support to the United States in its military operations against the Taliban created much resentment in the country, and not just in militant circles. Those comprising the Taliban regime were adherents of the Deobandi orientation and many Deobandi ‘ulama—even those embarrassed by the Taliban’s stringent policies regarding women and their education—had tended to view them as well-intentioned and devout Muslims who were on their way to establishing a properly Islamic polity.[1221] Hafiz Sa‘id, too, despite the difference in doctrinal orientation, has had no bad things to say about them. The Deobandis were understandably among those most vexed by Pakistan’s collusion in the destruction of the Islamic emirate next door. A number of scholars had traveled to Kabul under the Taliban regime and had been honored as state guests; this was in accord with how these Deobandi ‘ulama thought they ought to be treated, but very different from their official standing in Pakistan.[1222] Many others, too, saw the visiting of American reprisals on the Taliban to be unjust, given that they had not been proven to be complicit in the September 11 attacks. As the American air campaign began in October 2001, thousands of volunteers from the tribal areas of the Frontier province and elsewhere crossed into Afghanistan to help defend the Taliban regime.[1223] In a reverse movement over the following months and years, remnants of the Taliban regime as well as Arab, Central Asian, and other fighters who had lived in Afghanistan under the Taliban sought refuge

in the Pakistani tribal areas. Usama bin Laden, too, was suspected of hiding in that region. Once again, there was intense US pressure on the Pakistani military to capture these fleeing foreign militants; the new US-backed government that had come to power in Kabul also clamored for action against Pakistan-based Taliban and allied groups that had slowly begun to regroup to launch an insurgency inside Afghanistan. Operations against such individuals and groups were unpopular in Pakistan because they were seen by many as conducted entirely at the bidding of the United States. They also involved the military's going deep into tribal territory whose governance even the colonial-era British had left to local notables, the tribal maliks and khans. The fiercely independent-minded inhabitants of the region proved to be less than understanding of such forays. Further, as became clear repeatedly, such operations often caused considerable collateral damage. Madrasas suspected of being used by militants—as they had previously been, with the encouragement of the government and the military, by the mujahidin—were sometimes targeted by the Pakistani army. In one of the earliest and most notable of such instances, in October 2006, a military airstrike destroyed a madrasa in Bajaur, killing more than eighty-two people; a number of the victims were young boys, some eleven and twelve years old. [1224] In a country where the regulation of madrasas has remained a highly controversial matter, a military attack of this kind could only create deep anxiety about where the country was heading.

It was in this broad context that, from around 2004, groups claiming affinity with the Taliban began to emerge in the tribal areas of the Frontier province. By late 2007, an umbrella organization called the Movement of the Pakistani Taliban (Tahrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP) had established itself, under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud (d. 2009), as a terrifying network of these groups; many others unaffiliated with it operated along similar lines in the province.[1225] Like the Afghan Taliban of the mid-1990s, the Pakistani Taliban stood for the implementation of the shari'a. As in the Afghan case, this too was often a mix of recognizable shari'a norms, notably the hudud punishments, and Pashtun tribal custom. The admixture with other things notwithstanding, the rhetoric of implementing the shari'a was powerful, and it resonated, as had the practices of the Afghan Taliban, well beyond their own territory. Before Pakistani military operations came to disrupt the functioning of the Taliban's judicial system in the tribal areas, the national press had reported with some frequency on incidents in which men and

women accused of adultery were stoned to death and severe punishments were meted out for other offenses.[1226] The killing of women accused of sullying tribal honor is nothing new, of course, in the Frontier province or in other parts of the country. News items appear regularly on such incidents. The most egregious cases are often accompanied by expressions of resolve by members of the government to do something about them. In 2016, a Pakistani documentary filmmaker, Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, won an Academy Award for a powerful depiction of “honor crimes”; the film had been screened at the prime minister’s house following its nomination for an Oscar.[1227] What was different about the Pakistani Taliban’s administering of their punishments, compared to the incidents that take place in, say, rural Sindh or the Punjab, was not just the language of the shari‘a that was employed but also the attendant contrast with the state’s failure to implement Islamic law: as would be recalled, no such punishments had ever been carried out under the Hudood Ordinances of General Zia al-Haqq. And at precisely the time that the Pakistani Taliban were setting up their shari‘a courts, the government of General Pervez Musharraf was busy dismantling Zia al-Haqq’s Hudood laws.

There were other contrasts, too. In a country where the formal judicial system is widely perceived by ordinary people to be chronically inefficient, unresponsive to their needs, and favoring the rich and the well-connected, even the brutality of Taliban-style justice was not enough to offset the appeal of its swiftness, and not just in the tribal areas. The very admixture of Taliban-style shari‘a with tribal custom would have made it intelligible to local people, and the language in which this law was administered was the natural language of those people. The same could not be said of the country’s judicial system, whose official language continues to be English. As a survey of civil case litigants at the district courts in Lahore found in 2010–11, “over half of the overall respondents (55.5%) fac[ed] the predicament of not being able to comprehend the laws and regulations pertaining to their cases at all due to the language used.”[1228]

The Pakistani Taliban also represented rough and ready, Robin Hood-like forms of social justice, though that imagery is not peculiar to them in contemporary Pakistan.[1229] Pamphlets circulated in September 2006 in Miramshah, North Waziristan, inviting people to alert the Taliban “if any incident of robbery, dacoity [banditry] or any other criminal act took place in

the area."[1230] Petty traders and peasants with their particular grievances against a corrupt and indifferent government tended also to gravitate toward the Taliban.[1231] Journalists and other observers have disagreed about whether Taliban initiatives in this regard are better seen as remedying social ills, as facets of organized crime, or some combination of both.[1232] The appeal to social justice was, in any case, a powerful one, and it certainly helped that many of those occupying leadership positions in the Taliban movement had come from humble backgrounds: Baitullah Mehsud was the son of a small-time imam at mosques in the tribal areas.[1233] In an effort to remake the social and political structure in the tribal areas and, of course, to punish those seen as collaborating with the enemy, the Taliban and allied groups had begun, from about 2004, to target the local landed elite deemed to be oppressive and insufficiently Islamic. A 2008 estimate put the number of such notables, the maliks and khans, killed at the hands of the Taliban in the tribal areas at more than 500.[1234]

The Taliban targeted military personnel as well and sought, indeed, to make an example of them. A suicide bomber killed more than forty soldiers just over a week after the attack on the madrasa in Bajaur;[1235] on occasion, they have beheaded captured soldiers and uploaded videos of their execution on the Internet.[1236] It would have taken great restraint on the part of the Taliban to limit their operations to areas under their immediate influence in the tribal areas. They showed no such restraint. Repeatedly, they struck elsewhere in the country, attacking mosques, public gatherings, markets, and military installations. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2006 was widely believed to be the doing of the Taliban, though they denied responsibility for it.[1237] They did claim responsibility for trying, in 2012, to kill Malala Yusufzai, the courageous teenager from the Swat district of the Frontier province who had come to international attention for her public criticism of the Taliban, and especially their closure of schools for girls. Yusufzai survived the attempt on her life and went on to win the Nobel peace prize in 2014.[1238] Among the most horrendous of the Taliban's actions was the attack in December 2014 on a military-run public school in Peshawar in which more than 130 schoolchildren were killed.

Despite repeated professions to the contrary, and long after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military would maintain a relationship with Taliban groups on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan

border. Many in the military and the political establishments, and in religious circles, made a distinction between the “good” and the “bad” Taliban: the former served the interests of Pakistan by undermining unfriendly Afghan governments, notably that of President Hamid Karzai (2004–14); the latter challenged the Pakistani state. From a slightly different perspective, the good Taliban were waging war against the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan, while the bad Taliban were attacking innocent Pakistanis. In the immediate aftermath of the school massacre of December 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared that “there will be no distinction between good and bad Taliban. The nation will continue this war [against them] with full resolve till [the] elimination of the last terrorist.”[1239] Even as military operations against the Pakistani Taliban and allied groups continued, however, it was difficult to be convinced that government and military support for all Taliban groups had in fact ceased. When Mulla Akhtar Mansur, the successor of Mulla Muhammad ‘Umar as the head of the Afghan Taliban, was killed by a US drone in Balochistan in May 2016, he was found to be in possession of a Pakistani passport. Using an alias, he had traveled between Karachi and Dubai on no fewer than eighteen occasions between 2006 and 2015.[1240] This caused much embarrassment to the government, but it did not surprise many people. In June 2016, it was reported that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, led by the Pakistan Tahrik-i Insaf of Imran Khan, had earmarked $2.8 million for the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya in the province’s budget.[1241] This, of course, is the madrasa more closely associated with the Taliban than any other in either Pakistan or Afghanistan.

It is important, however, to keep such patronage in perspective. In Pakistan, it has tended to be available not just to religio-political groups and religious institutions but to “secular” organizations as well. For instance, the vast influence that the MQM has wielded in Karachi since the mid-1980s, indeed, the very continuation of the party in existence, has owed a good deal to various forms of state support. While some of it can take Machiavellian forms —for instance, a government’s desire to mobilize the MQM as a counterweight to political challengers—the support in question can also come from the fact that state functionaries at local levels belong to the linguistic community this party represents, sympathize with its cause, and have been willing to divert state resources to it. The MQM’s ties with and dependence on the state have not stopped it from challenging successive Pakistani governments. Nor have they prevented the law enforcement

agencies and even the military from launching periodic “clean-up operations” against it.[1242] From this perspective at least, the Pakistani Taliban and the state’s inconsistencies toward them are less anomalous than might appear otherwise.

The ‘ulama, too, have wavered in their attitudes regarding the Taliban and their excesses. Given the Deobandi orientation of the Taliban, it is unsurprising that the Barelawis have been consistent in their hostility toward them from the Taliban’s very inception. They have long derided the Deobandis in general as “Wahhabis” or “Najdis”—in reference to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s place of origin—and the instances in which Arab and Pakistani Salafis, on the one hand, and the Taliban and other Deobandi militants, on the other, have seemed to pursue shared goals have only confirmed the Barelawis in their worst fears of them all.[1243] For their part, the Deobandi ‘ulama have found it difficult to take a clear position on the actions of the Pakistani Taliban. Suicide bombing would seem to be a fairly clear candidate for the ‘ulama’s condemnation both because suicide is widely believed to be forbidden by Islamic law and because civilians tend to be the overwhelming victims of such attacks. There is, however, no consensus on whether or how to condemn even this practice, and some have endorsed it without reservation. This is a point that merits a brief detour before proceeding further.

In a four-volume commentary devoted to explicating verses of the Qur’an that bear on the topic of jihad, the aforementioned Mas‘ud Azhar comments several times on the question of suicide bombing, often characterized as “self-sacrificing (fida’i) jihad.” The most explicit of such discussions occurs with reference to Q 8.60, which reads: “Prepare whatever forces you can muster, including warhorses, to frighten off God’s enemies and yours, and warn others unknown to you but known to God.” The word translated here as “frighten off” (turhibun) is commonly used for terrorism (irhab) in modern Arabic, though it is obviously anachronistic to read its modern connotations into Qur’anic usage. Many Muslim commentators have struggled with the proper rendering of this term, but not Mas‘ud Azhar. He writes:

<quote>

The infinitive form of turhibun is irhab, which is called terrorism these days. The word irhabi, in the sense of terrorist, has been turned into a term of abuse. Muslims need to be very careful in this regard. God has Himself commanded that the enemies of religion should be terrorized (dahshat-zada). Consequently, those who undertake irhab, that is, who terrorize the enemy, are acting according to a Qur'anic commandment. To criticize such people or to condemn the blessed practice of irhab is a grievous mistake and a clear sin.[1244]

</quote>

Asking what serves the purpose of terrorizing the enemy, he answers:

<quote>

The enemies of Islam will not be terrorized much if Muslims continue to use [literally: make] only conventional weapons, for the enemy has more powerful weapons of that kind. Consequently, there are three excellent ways of following this Qur'anic command in the present age. First, readying self-sacrificing fighters and finding ever new ways to carry out such jihad. There is no antidote that the enemies of Islam have to this form of preparation for waging war. The self-sacrificing fighters of this age are to be congratulated that their terror (dahshat) has caused tremors in the lofty halls of unbelief. These people of God are undoubtedly the ones to have acted properly in accordance with this verse. Second, efforts should be made to render bomb-making materials (literally: gunpowder [barud]) more effective. Praise be to God, Muslims have sharp and fertile minds in their midst. If people are introduced to this Qur'anic commandment and they are told that preparing for jihad is an obligation and that terrorizing God's enemies amounts to worship, those capable of making more effective and powerful bombs are sure to step up. This is a weapon that turns the tables in battle and gives strength to self-sacrificing attacks. Third, under all circumstances, Muslims should build nuclear weapons and they should invest their abilities and their [material] means into this effort.[1245]

</quote>

Mas‘ud Azhar’s is an extreme position among the ‘ulama, though he is scarcely the only one espousing it. Many others have sought to curb the practice of suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism, though the very effort to forge a consensus on this matter has sometimes revealed the fault lines within their ranks. A statement issued by a group of prominent ‘ulama in 2008 is instructive in this regard. Even as it affirmed the Islamic prohibition of suicide, it acknowledged the belief of “some people” that

<quote>

in the case of genuine need in a legitimate war, it is permissible to resort to a suicide attack provided non-culpable people are not a target. This would be akin to the well-known stories of Pakistani soldiers who had strapped bombs to their bodies when facing Indian aggression at the battlefront of Chawinda in 1965. They had thrown themselves before Indian tanks and thereby stopped their advance. Since this is a matter of juridical disagreement (ijtihadi mas’ala), if a person resorts to such action in defense of his country and community against the enemy in a just war (ja’iz awr bar-haqq jang), it is to be hoped that God will accept his sacrifice on the basis of the purity of his intentions. But all this has to do with a just war against a clear and open enemy. It has nothing to do with a situation in which believing Muslims (kalima-go musalman), or such non-Muslims whose lives and property have been made inviolable by God, are being targeted. A Muslim who professes the faith, however sinful he might be in practice, enjoys the inviolability given to him by God. And the Qur’an and the hadith have characterized the murder of such a person as an unforgivable sin.… A suicide attack that targets Muslims or peaceful citizens of a Muslim state comprises a double sin: that of willfully killing a person … and that of suicide, on whose prohibition there is no disagreement.[1246]

</quote>

Though the language of good and bad Taliban is not used in this statement, it does serve to bring it to mind through the distinction between a just war on behalf of country and community (the good Taliban in Afghanistan) and attacks on fellow Muslims (the bad Taliban). But even as regards the latter, it leaves unresolved the key question of whether the Pakistani Taliban or other militants consider those they target for attack as Muslims at all: the Pakistani Taliban have sometimes characterized the military personnel engaged in

operations against them as “apostates,” punishable by death according to Islamic law.[1247] In the same vein, if the government they are fighting is deemed to be doing the bidding of a Western, non-Muslim power, then it is the Taliban, not the military personnel, that are really fighting on behalf of country and community; it is the military that is fighting fellow Muslims, not the Taliban. Such interpretive niceties are not spelled out in the 2008 statement. But it does not take any great imagination to detect them there. Also worth noting, incidentally, is this statement’s none too subtle reminder that it is soldiers of the Pakistan army who had first used a tactic akin to suicide bombing.[1248]

How the distinction between the good and the bad Taliban serves to undergird that between good and bad suicide bombing is sometimes more explicit. In late 2013, a delegation of the Afghan Taliban’s shadow government visited various Pakistani ‘ulama to put forth their viewpoints and to help cultivate a favorable public opinion in the country. On the matter of suicide bombing (fida’i hamla), the delegation explained that the success of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan had depended on this “greatest of the weapons of the oppressed” and that any fatwa seeking to unequivocally condemn this practice would weaken their struggle. The response to this by Abu ‘Ammar Zahid al-Rashidi, a prominent Deobandi religious scholar and the head of an important madrasa in Gujranwala, is instructive. He recognized, Zahid al-Rashidi told them, that this was a weapon of the weak: “Therefore, we have no objection to its use in a legitimate war or jihad. However, we do not consider legitimate the destruction that is being wrought through it in different parts of Pakistan on residential areas, mosques, imambargahs, churches, and marketplaces. This is in no way acceptable to us…. We have clear reservations about such attacks and we consider it essential to maintain and clarify the difference between legitimate self-sacrificing attacks and illegitimate suicide operations.”[1249] What is significant about this statement is not the distinction itself between good and bad suicide bombing, for that, as noted, is a mere corollary of the distinction between the good and the bad Taliban. Rather, it is the fact that Zahid al-Rashidi is not a radical; he would normally pass for a relatively moderate member of the Pakistani ‘ulama. He has repeatedly opened the pages of al-Shari‘a, his madrasa’s monthly journal, to viewpoints from different religio-political camps and has thereby contributed toward shaping an informed public opinion on religious and political matters in the country. In this instance, his position resonates

with many Deobandi scholars, and others beyond their ranks. And there is little reason to think that it is in any obvious conflict with the policies of the military establishment either, so far as the Taliban are concerned.

*** Changing the Narrative?

In an important book on strategic thinking about war in a world transformed by information technologies, Emile Simpson has argued that war can no longer be viewed in polarized terms as an exclusively military confrontation between two sides. Wars in the contemporary world, of which his prime example is the warfare in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 2001, are best seen in “kaleidoscopic” terms, with many different audiences whose members bring their own perspectives on how to interpret the events of the war and what judgments to make upon them. It is not just that one side’s claims to victory in battle are disputed by the other side; that has frequently been the case for as long as people have gone to war. It is also that many others, who are not direct parties to the conflict in question, are able to draw their own conclusions about victory and defeat, about justice and injustice, and about the moral underpinnings of particular actions. As Simpson puts it, “The proliferation of strategic audiences beyond the enemy means that force no longer has a clear target: one cannot ‘force’ an outcome on a strategic audience that is not the enemy; they may well be free to ignore the war’s military outcome.”[1250] War, he argues, is a language, one that is understood and interpreted differently by different people.

Speaking specifically of the Taliban of post-2001 Afghanistan, Simpson suggests that they are best seen not as a unified movement but rather as a “franchise”: while some groups are motivated by a religious cause, others, guided by self-interest, jockey for power and for a redressal of grievances in local contexts. Much the same could be said, though Simpson does not, of the umbrella movement that purports to represent the Pakistani Taliban. That insurgent groups become part of this franchise for their particular reasons means that those who speak in the name of the Taliban must continually struggle to project an image of an overarching unity of purpose. It also means that any effort to counter the putative appeal of the Taliban would not necessarily carry equal conviction in all relevant circles, for the simple reason that that appeal rests on different grounds for different people.

A key challenge facing a government and a military that seeks to counter insurgencies such as the Taliban's, Simpson says, is to frame a narrative that provides audiences with "a structure through which to interpret action."[1251] This structure must be sufficiently polyvalent to allow different audiences the space in which to understand the actions in question from their particular perspective. Yet, it must have some coherence to it if it is to remain a "strategic narrative" at all: "the strategist has to consider how a narrative can gain purchase on audiences whose political persuasions vary widely, without coming apart."[1252]

For all the difficulties inherent in being able to speak for the franchise, the Pakistani Taliban have been remarkably successful in articulating a broadly coherent narrative. Its shape and content, already alluded to, are summarized easily. This is a war in which simple and devout Muslims are pitted against an arrogant, materialistic superpower and the mercenary troops that illegitimate and godless "Muslim" rulers have provided to that superpower for short-term material gain. Those on the good side of this war seek the implementation of the shari'a. Successive Pakistani governments have promised it, too, but they have never been sincere in such pledges. The Taliban who had come to power in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s had shown to the world that a shari'a-based polity could in fact be created even with the most meager of resources; the latter-day Taliban intend to follow that model, which ultimately is none other than that of the Rashidun caliphs of early Islam. There might be excesses in how the Taliban have gone about their business, but they are so "inflamed" by the circumstances in which they find themselves that one can understand those excesses without having to condone them.[1253] Finally, this is a war of the little man—the oppressed, the weak, the dispossessed—against the big man and all those who stand behind him, whether it is the local landlord, the corrupt political establishment of Pakistan, a military deeply implicated in lucrative businesses, or the United States and "the West."[1254]

The necessity of a narrative against militant Islamists has come to be widely acknowledged at the highest levels in Pakistan.[1255] Why has it been so difficult, however, for the government and the military to give coherent expression to it, in response, say, to the Taliban's? The answer most commonly given to this question is that the military has had a strong interest in nurturing the Taliban—as well as other militant groups—and that even as

military action has been undertaken, with considerable success, against the bad Taliban, the good Taliban remain important to the pursuit of its strategic interests.[1256] There is much truth to this view, as has been seen. Yet, we need to look deeper to account for the absence or at least the tenuousness of a strategic narrative in response to such challenges.

For one thing, and even perhaps with the best intentions, it is not easy to reorient or undo a long-standing, state-supported discourse on jihad. Whether it was the insurgency in Kashmir at the time of Pakistan's birth or in the 1990s, the wars with India in 1965 and 1971, or the Afghan war in the 1980s, the idea of jihad figured prominently in nationalist rhetoric. The notion that a Mawdudi could see the covert actions of the Pakistani military in Kashmir as anything other than jihad was damning for him in this context. Questioning the head of the Ahmadi community during the in-camera session of the National Assembly in 1974, the attorney-general was likewise incredulous that the community's founder could have gone quite so far as to outlaw jihad altogether. That he had allegedly done so in abject submission to the interests of a foreign, colonial, power rankled even more at a time when, in the early 1970s, anti-imperialist and Third Worldist sentiments were in the ascendant in Bhutto's Pakistan.[1257] The identification of the military, and of the state itself, with jihad would only grow in subsequent decades. Militant Islamists and many among the 'ulama may never have put much stock in the sincerity of that identification, but its long history would give them enough grounds for moral outrage at any suggestion that the investment in jihad might need to be scaled back.

The difficulties of forging a counternarrative are also exacerbated in a milieu in which Islamist militants have tended to be significantly more successful than their opponents in aligning themselves with the religious tradition. This rhetorical alignment posits that to be opposed to the militants is to oppose jihad, which is to dispute a key Islamic imperative and to question the words and actions of some of Islam's most revered figures; one could scarcely hold such positions and still be a Muslim. Mas'ud Azhar's commentary on the Qur'anic teachings on jihad provides a useful illustration of how traditional resources are put to use in making this case. Azhar casts a remarkably wide net in the exegetical writings he adduces in this book. From among premodern scholars, his sources include commentaries by Razi (d. 1210), Qurtubi (d. 1273), Nasafi (d. 1310), Abu Hayyan (d. 1344), and Ibn Kathir (d.

1373). Early modern and modern commentators he quotes include Shah ‘Abd al-Qadir (d. 1827, a son of Shah Wali Allah), Alusi (d. 1853), Rashid Rida (d. 1935), Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (d. 1943), Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani (d. 1949), Abul-Kalam Azad (d. 1958), Ahmad ‘Ali Lahori (d. 1962), Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘ (d. 1976), and ‘Abd al-Majid Daryabadi (d. 1977).[1258] Commending some of the writings that he considers to have been most helpful to his own work, he notes that Thanawi “has explicated topics relating to jihad with marvelous learning.”[1259] That may well be so, but it should be recalled that Thanawi had the reputation of being one of most politically quiescent of the colonial ‘ulama. He was a bitter opponent of the Khilafat movement and he had expressed himself in opposition to the infiltration of armed Muslim bands into Kashmir in the 1930s. Azhar acknowledges none of this. Nor does he need to actually cite Thanawi in support of some of his most violent prescriptions. It is enough for Azhar to make the implicit but rhetorically powerful point that his views on jihad are not just his; they carry the full weight of Deobandi thought, which, in turn, is presented as altogether continuous with the Islamic exegetical tradition.

There are contemporary Deobandi scholars who have counseled reason and moderation in response to the actions of the militants. Here is one example, from November 2009. It comes from Mufti Muhammad Zahid, a professor of hadith at a madrasa in Faisalabad:

<quote>

The present time has imposed a great responsibility on the Deobandi leadership…. This responsibility is not best fulfilled by condemning America, the present [Pakistani] government, or the current system (nizam). As commendable as such [criticism] might be, it is considerably less demanding than the task of providing patient and determined leadership to those of our own folk who might be committing errors…. The truth is that the Deobandi leadership will have to come out of its interest-based shell and provide this leadership…. In my estimation, if we were to speak in a proper and reasoned manner, it would not be ineffective. The necessary condition for this is that policy matters should not be given the status of sacred doctrine; they should be open to general debate, and we ought to foster the ability to listen to things that diverge from an established point of view. Today, the setbacks that the US, Britain, and their allies suffer in Afghanistan are the subject of

public debate in the West; policies are criticized, discussions take place, and failures are debated. The truth is: I fear that such openness might well prove to be the biggest strength of the West.[1260]

</quote>

These are bold words, considering that the militants do not take kindly to criticism of their ways.[1261] A combination of the instinct for self-preservation, misgivings about the US-led War on Terror, and the desire not to be seen as allied with corrupt regimes cravenly submissive to the will of Western powers has meant, however, that much of the initiative in the articulation of discourses on jihad has rested with the likes of Mas‘ud Azhar.[1262] The fact that a notorious militant can publish an attractively produced four-volume work on jihad and go largely unchallenged by fellow ‘ulama is also a revealing indication of the difficulties the governing elite face in fashioning, should they so desire, a counternarrative. I will return to this point later.

Counternarratives did not, of course, need to rest on Islamic grounds. In 1959, Qurrat al-‘Ayn Haydar (d. 2007), an emigrant from the United Provinces (UP) and the scion of a distinguished literary family, published a novel that is considered by many to be among the greatest works of Urdu fiction to be produced in the twentieth century. At nearly 800 pages, this monumental text—Ag kar darya (The River of Fire)—encompasses two millennia of Indian history, from ancient times to the decade after the partition of the subcontinent. The characters are indigenous and foreign-born; Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Jewish; Indian and Pakistani. They often shade into one another over the course of time, revealing the shallowness of identities but also the great cruelty such identities can inflict upon people. One of these characters is Abul-Mansur Kamaluddin, an expatriate from Baghdad serving as a courtier to a regional Muslim king in sixteenth-century India. While wandering in Bengal after his patron has lost his throne, Kamaluddin ruminates: “Human beings are not really human beings. They are blood-thirsty wolves…. Should I kill that man ahead because he maintains a tuft of hair on his head and worships the cow? If I didn’t kill him first, would he finish me off because I don’t have that tuft of hair? I should destroy the beautiful Shivpuri because millions of statues adorn the temples there. But what harm do those statues

do to me? Would I cease to be a Muslim if I tolerated those statues? What is Islam?”[1263] Kamaluddin eventually marries an “untouchable” Bengali woman and takes up farming as a profession. Before being killed by the soldiers of a conquering Muslim army, he had come to believe that his adopted home was not, as many jurists would have it, “the land of war (dar al-harb) but rather the abode of peace (dar al-salam). There is no difference between the land of war and the land of peace. It is only a difference of attitude: the wars are not between two religions but rather between two political powers.”[1264] Centuries later, Kamal Riza, a leftist Muslim who emigrates to Pakistan after spending several years in England and failing to find a decent means of livelihood in post-partition India, offers a blistering critique of how Islam was being invoked in the new Muslim homeland:

<quote>

Islam—the mistreatment to which this word has been subjected! If the Pakistani team loses a cricket match, Islam itself is thought to be in danger. Every last problem in the world gets examined with reference to it.… The irony is that those who invoke Islam have no truck with the philosophy of religion. All they know is that Muslims ruled over Christian Spain for 800 years, over Hindu India for 1000 years, and that the Ottomans dominated eastern Europe for centuries. Besides imperialism, no one mentions anything, such as Islam’s great humanistic traditions; no one feels the need to talk about the cosmopolitanism of the Arab philosophers, of the Iranian poets, of the Indian Sufis. No one pays attention to the philosophy of ‘Ali and Husayn. Islam is being presented as an extremely aggressive religion and way of life.[1265]

</quote>

Qurrat al-‘Ayn Haydar’s was a genuine counternarrative, but it was obviously ill-suited to the needs of the new state, for her critique of religious violence was predicated on a questioning of the very foundations on which the ideological state had come to base itself. To compound things further, the novel was published at a very unpropitious time, the year after the rise to power of General Ayub Khan. Though Haydar was well-connected with the Pakistani political and literary elite and worked, ironically, for the federal government’s ministry of information, her novel seems to have made her

stay in Pakistan untenable. In early 1961, she decided to leave the country, going first to England and not long after to India, where she lived for the rest of her life.[1266]

Unlike Qurrat al-‘Ayn Haydar, modernist intellectuals in Pakistan did make some effort from time to time to address jihad on Islamic grounds. A notable example is Khalifa Abdul Hakim, whose discussion of jihad in his Islamic Ideology, first published in 1951, represents a useful articulation of the modernist narrative on the subject. Simply put, “Islam, the Religion of Peace, had to wage war to protect and establish itself.”[1267] Given that it is a “rational” religion, Islam’s teachings on war strike an ideal balance. It does not renounce the resort to arms, for to do so would make it impossible for it to realize its goals—“to reestablish social order, to prevent persecution and to create conditions of the Reign of Law instead of a Reign of Terror.”[1268] But it does rule out the use of force for territorial, political, or economic gain, and even to spread the faith.[1269] Wars waged by Muslims for such ends were not properly Islamic.[1270] The only ones that qualified were those undertaken against oppression, in pursuit of liberty, and for social justice. Indeed, the Qur’anic injunction to “fight … in the way of the Lord means fighting for social justice; it does not mean fighting to spread a certain dogma…. Fight for social justice only is enjoined by Islam; a war for any other purpose would be un-Islamic.”[1271]

Jihad as social justice was a powerful idea, one that Abdul Hakim saw as potentially resonating with the world at large. However, so far as its immediate audience in Pakistan was concerned, it would have had to be accompanied by some concrete efforts to ameliorate the socioeconomic condition of ordinary people. Such efforts would remain in short supply. Sir Firoz Khan Noon, the governor of East Bengal who had wanted to distribute copies of Abdul Hakim’s Islamic Ideology to the ‘ulama,[1272] was, for one, among the major landholders of the Punjab; he would actively work to undo the land reforms attempted by his predecessor in the Punjab when he became the chief minister of that province in 1953.[1273] Published not long after the war in Kashmir, Abdul Hakim’s work did have the merit, though, of helping the state explain and justify its militaristic ventures in the name of fighting oppression and injustice. It also represented an attempt, as one would expect from Abdul Hakim, to wrest control of the discourses on jihad from the traditionalist ‘ulama. Nearly three decades later, Fazlur

Rahman also spoke of jihad as the means to a just social order, but with a rather different inflection:

<quote>

Jihad … is a total endeavor, an all-out effort—“with your wealth and lives,” as the Qur’an frequently puts it—to “make God’s cause succeed” (9:40)…. [T]he concept of the ultimate end of this endeavor (al-akhira) is pivotal to the whole system of Qur’anic thought. The concept of akhira implies that man needs not just economic justice; economic justice itself is for a higher end, for man does not live from hour to hour and from day to day like animals but his vision must see through the consequences of his actions and aim at the end which constitutes the meaning of positive human effort. This is the end which cannot be achieved without jihad, for it is God’s unalterable law that He will not bring about results without human endeavor.[1274]

</quote>

Well before the War on Terror gave new urgency to such matters, but already in cognizance of the nonstate actors operating in Afghanistan and elsewhere, Javed Ahmad Ghamidi had argued for his part that the Qur’anic teachings on warfare were addressed not to Muslims qua individuals but rather to the collectivity—that is, to the state.[1275] Ghamidi further posited that jihad in the Prophet’s time could take two basic forms: it was a way of countering oppression and injustice and it was God’s instrument for punishing those against whom all effort at persuasion had been exhausted. The latter kind of jihad, he argued, was limited only to the prophets, so that the sole surviving form of jihad in the post-prophetical era was the one that fought injustice.[1276]

Such arguments would continue to be made in the years following 2001. In a book of essays on jihad and related matters first published in 2005, Dr. Muhammad Faruq Khan—a psychiatrist by training, an autodidact scholar of Islam, and a close associate of Ghamidi—vigorously defended views similar to his mentor’s. He argued that jihad could be declared and prosecuted only by established political authority, and that nonstate actors were therefore illegitimate on Islamic grounds. He also argued that the Qur’an’s injunction to “fight [the unbelievers] until there is no more persecution and the religion

is God’s alone” (Q 8.39) referred to the Arabian peninsula of Muhammad’s time rather than to the world at large. For to interpret it to mean the latter would entail not only divesting people of the freedom of religion that the Qur’an had promised them, it would also confirm non-Muslims in their worst suspicions of Islam as a war-mongering faith.[1277] Elsewhere in the book, Faruq Khan offered a vigorous critique of the Afghan Taliban’s effort to impose their “village culture” on all of Afghanistan[1278] and he held them responsible for bringing destruction upon the country in the wake of September 11.[1279] He was also critical of the Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan, notably its cynically keeping the Afghan opposition divided during the anti-Soviet struggle in order to ensure that it remained subservient to Pakistani interests.[1280] Faruq Khan had been a member of the committee headed by Justice Majida Rizvi that had recommended the repeal of General Zia al-Haqq’s Hudood ordinances.[1281] Before he was assassinated in October 2010, he was slated to become the vice chancellor of a university the government was in the process of establishing in Swat, until recently a stronghold of the Taliban. It was not his views on the Hudood Ordinances, however, but rather those on jihad that were singled out by the Taliban group that claimed responsibility for his murder.[1282]

The Taliban were not alone in objecting to the views on jihad held by Ghamidi and his associates. Already before the events of September 11, the Deobandi scholar Zahid al-Rashidi had taken issue with Ghamidi’s understanding of the relevant teachings of the Qur’an and his reading of the Prophet’s career as well as the practical implications of those views. In that regard, he had made the none-too-subtle point that they amounted to delegitimizing warfare in defense of the homeland.[1283] On Zahid al-Rashidi’s showing, Ghamidi and his associates were defeatists; their counsel to people whose country—India under the British, Algeria under the French, Afghanistan under the Soviets—had been taken over by an oppressive non-Muslim minority was to never fight back but rather to bow their heads in submission or leave for other havens.[1284]

This sort of criticism, unlike the Taliban’s, steers clear of any threat of violence against those holding the wrong kind of views. It can be damning nonetheless. Yet, even without its discouragement, or of messages delivered through targeted assassinations, writings on jihad by Pakistani modernists have not amounted to a sustained discourse. In this, they contrast not only

with recent militant writings on the subject but, remarkably, even with the work of early colonial-era modernists such as Chiragh Ali, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and Ameer Ali. Consequently, when forced by circumstances to deal with a crisis, Pakistani governments have often found precious little resources at hand, and those mustered have not necessarily made the case for them. Already in 1953, the more perceptive of the government officials who had helped quell the anti-Ahmadi agitation recognized, as the district magistrate of Rawalpindi had observed, that “such a movement cannot be eliminated by repressive methods alone. A vigorous drive must be launched to inculcate sound doctrine and sense into the people’s mind.”[1285] Yet, he had also noted that “it was almost impossible for us to find anybody to join us in the work of publicity.”[1286] A half century later, in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the government of General Pervez Musharraf was not notably more successful in finding religious scholars who would argue on its behalf. While several others were lukewarm to it, one of the most prominent of the ‘ulama the government had sent to Kabul to negotiate with the Taliban on the question of surrendering Usama bin Laden to the United States was decidedly hostile to any realignment in Pakistani policy. This was Mufti Nizam al-din Shamzai, a professor of hadith at the Jami‘at al-Ulum al-Islamiyya in Karachi. In late October 2001, he was quoted as saying: “Musharraf openly supports the US and its allies against the Taliban. And under Islamic laws if any Muslim cooperates with infidels against Muslims, he must be excommunicated from the religion.”[1287] His son even fought in Afghanistan on the Taliban’s side.[1288]

My final example in this regard deserves a slightly fuller account. In early 2007, in the very heart of the nation’s capital, two brothers in charge of the Lal Masjid (“Red Mosque”) and the Hafsa madrasa for women attached to it began engaging in vigilante action to uphold what they regarded as the demands of the shari‘a.[1289] Madrasa students took over a children’s public library to protest the demolition of mosques built on public property without government authorization; the city’s video and DVD stores were threatened with dire consequences if they did not remove objectionable items; massage parlors, alleged to be brothels, were raided and, in one instance, several Chinese men and women working there were kidnapped, causing serious embarrassment to the government; a local shari‘a court was established in the city; and there were incessant demands that the government commit itself to implementing the shari‘a throughout the country and that it repeal

the Protection of Women Act of 2006. The Lal Masjid was said to have large amounts of ammunition, and, on one occasion, the mosque's imam went so far as to threaten "suicide attacks if the government impedes the enforcement of the Sharia and attacks Lal Masjid and its sister seminaries."[1290] The government once again summoned a team of religious scholars to help defuse the crisis, among them, Mufti Muhammad Rafi' 'Usmani, the president of the Dar al-'Ulum madrasa in Karachi and the elder brother of Taqi 'Usmani. Efforts at mediation came to nothing, however, and the mosque was stormed by the military, resulting in the death of more than a hundred people holed up inside. Not unlike Taqi 'Usmani's adverse public commentary on the Protection of Women Act, Rafi' 'Usmani's verdict on the government's handling of the Lal Masjid crisis was severe. He was critical of the Lal Masjid brothers for their vigilantism, but he reserved the most unsparing diatribe for the Musharraf regime, and not just with reference to the Lal Masjid operation:

<quote>

The people of Pakistan have nurtured the military with their taxes and with great financial sacrifice. [The military] is our trust, our savings, our power, the guardian of our borders—and we are proud of it. But you are misusing it in cowardly, unjust, and foolish campaigns…. You are using this military according to the dictates of [our] enemies…. Your courage no longer works in Kashmir. You have withdrawn your troops from Kargil. Nor does your courage help defend the western borders in preventing NATO forces from violating Pakistan's sacred frontiers. Your "courage" is now directed instead against the madrasa in Bajaur and in killing its wronged students. Your bravery is now focused on the boys and girls of the Hafsa madrasa. Such are your cowardly, unjust, brutal acts. Yet you say that peace and security should be established. You do everything to destroy peace and security, and then you tell us that the 'ulama should play their part in restoring peace.[1291]

</quote>

The Lal Masjid episode added much fuel to the activities of the Pakistani Taliban and it was followed by a spate of suicide bombings. There were rumors that many more madrasa students, young men and women, had been killed in this episode than the government had acknowledged, which exacerbated the outrage against the government

response to the crisis. But the relevant point here has to do with Rafi‘ ‘Usmani. The harshness of his criticism was striking precisely because he was not one of the “inflamed” people who had burned all bridges to the government. He belonged instead to a family of ‘ulama, and headed a madrasa, that had enjoyed official patronage for much of Pakistan’s history; they would not break with the government even after the Lal Masjid operation. It was not just the need to maintain some popular credibility that had prompted a reaction like Rafi‘ ‘Usmani’s, however. Rather, it expressed a deep-seated anxiety at what the ‘ulama and the Islamists saw as a foreign-inspired hostility to Islam itself. With scholars like Rafi‘ ‘Usmani and Taqi ‘Usmani to rely on, or Shamzai for that matter, there were severe limitations to what the government could do to fashion a new narrative on jihad.

Even if the government had received robust support from the likes of the ‘Usmani brothers, no strategic counternarrative has much hope of appealing to people at a doctrinal level if, as observed earlier, some of the basic needs of those people at the socioeconomic level remain unaddressed. The Taliban may have ties to organized crime, but their appeals to social justice are meaningful in disenfranchised circles. Unsurprisingly, support for the Taliban, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, is far more likely to be found among landless peasants than it is among the more affluent.[1292] And to the extent that Mas‘ud Azhar’s exegetical arguments carry a sense of authenticity and weight in particular circles, it is not unrelated to the fact that he has also given expression to the economic woes of the poverty-stricken.

I conclude with three points. First, in light of the landscape and trends this chapter has reviewed, it seems necessary to chart a middle path between two commonly encountered positions. One of these—seen frequently in the international media, many Western policy analyses, and some academic circles—takes Islam to be the key factor in shaping particular instances of the Muslim resort to violence. The other, rather more in vogue among foreign and indigenous observers specifically of Pakistan affairs, takes Islamist and other forms of militancy to be the result of the machinations of the state. To revisit the second position first, the state elite have indeed had an important role in defining the context in which appeals to Islam have been articulated. This was so in the Kashmir war in 1947–48, in the wars between Pakistan and India in 1965 and 1971, during Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan jihad in

the 1980s, and in its involvement in the insurgency in Indian Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Yet—and this relates to the first of the aforementioned positions—nonstate religio-political forces have had their own interests and commitments as well. They have had considerable Islamic resources with which to shape the wider context and to make their case in it, even if these resources are not always drawn upon in a manner that others would recognize as above board.[1293] And it is not just pragmatic political considerations but doctrinal constraints, too, that have shaped their stance. Hafiz Muhammad Sa‘id and his Lashkar-i Tayba, for instance, have been guided by their considered religious view that one is to wage war not against a Muslim government but only against outright infidels. This may be small comfort for a regime that could eventually find itself branded infidel, with all that it entails.[1294] Yet, the point is that even when religious convictions are open to interpretation, they are scarcely irrelevant to how particular courses of action are adopted, vis-à-vis the government or toward doctrinal rivals. Even the militant groups allied with the ruling establishment are seldom its puppets. Indeed, they are as likely to use such government patronage as has been available to them, and at least as adroit at doing so, as the government and the military have been in putting such nonstate actors to use for their own ends. A certain convergence between the interests of these groups and particular governmental policies does help explain why these groups have been able to operate at particular times rather than at others, but their action is not reducible exclusively to the policies in question any more than it is to the religious resources they have drawn upon.

Second, even as the relationship between particular religio-political groups and the government has sometimes undergone quite significant change over the years, core disagreements have often continued to simmer just below the surface of particular alliances. Mawdudi and the Jama‘at-i Islami were viewed by the government as dangerous opponents in Pakistan’s early years, and, in 1953, the martial law authorities in the Punjab went so far as to sentence Mawdudi to death for his alleged role in inciting the anti-Ahmadi disturbances. By the time of the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971, however, the Jama‘at-i Islami had emerged as a key ally of the government and the military. That alliance would find another major expression during the anti-Soviet Afghan struggle and in its aftermath. Yet, it is hard to imagine that the concord between the Jama‘at and the Yahya Khan regime could have been very durable; even the rapport with the Islamizing regime of General Zia al-

Haqq had begun to fray after some years. Similarly, the strategic congruence in the 1990s between the Pakistani military and the likes of Mas‘ud Azhar did not do much to resolve the contradictions underlying that relationship: Azhar’s understanding of Islam, and of the ‘ulama’s leadership roles, is decidedly not the government’s or the military’s. Such examples add to those encountered earlier regarding the fraught relationship between the modernists and their religious rivals. They also serve to further illustrate the point that particular religio-political groups have an agency that is not reducible to momentary convergences of interest between them and the government.[1295]

Finally, throughout the history of Pakistan, the state and its institutions have usually been able to meet the challenges that militant groups and other agitators have posed to them in the name of Islam. The agitation of 1953 had brought the provincial capital to a standstill, but that challenge was crushed as soon as the government and the military decided that it was time to do so. In more recent years, despite dire predictions of a creeping “Talibanization,” even of the state falling to Taliban-like groups, the military has been able to make significant inroads into territory controlled by the militants and to restore government writ in many of those areas. Alarmist predictions in some international quarters about the collapse of the state are clearly much exaggerated. Yet, as noted, a resort to force without a counternarrative in terms of which particular constituencies might reasonably be expected to make sense of a governmental response does not add to the legitimacy either of the government or of the measures in question.[1296] As the anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1953 came to a boil, Mawdudi had offered a severe indictment of the government’s failure to explain or justify its position on the issue: “We have given our arguments with full clarity. If anyone has an argument that is opposed to it, he should bring it forth. To insist on something without supporting argument or proof is what the ‘mulla’ is accused of, but now the ones guilty of it will be those who are proud of not being mullas. They should know that the combined power of public opinion and of reasoned argument will eventually defeat them.”[1297] I will return to some related issues in the epilogue. In the meanwhile, a parallel with modernist legislation is worth considering here. From the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 to the Protection of Women Act of 2006, the Pakistani governing elite have been able not merely to enact modernist laws unpopular in conservative circles but also, through the courts, to uphold them.[1298] Yet, the very success of such legislation

has tended to exact a not insignificant cost in terms of religious legitimacy—of the laws and of those backing them. That legitimacy deficit is broad in its effects. It has constrained successive Pakistani governments in efforts toward regulating the country's ever growing madrasas, too, and it underlies the inability of those governments to muster any widespread support in religious circles for countering Islamist militancy. Given how hard this militancy has hit the country—"from 2001 to November 2013, 48,994 people were killed … including 5,272 personnel of the law-enforcement agencies," with all that that means for their families and extended kin—this is an extraordinary deficit.[1299]

** Epilogue

HOW SIGNIFICANTLY HAS ISLAM in Pakistan changed over the course of the country's history? More broadly, how different does the religious landscape look in the early twenty-first century in relation to how it had appeared a hundred or so years earlier? These are the questions with which I conclude this book. I begin, however, with some illustrations of what has not changed very much.

In mid-1960, with Ayub Khan at the apex of his power, his Ministry of the Interior produced a candidly titled memo outlining a "scheme for supervision and control of religious institutions and religious activity."[1300] The scheme was more or less equally divided between a rationale for such control and the means toward it. The rationale was that religion had come to be regulated by the state from the time of the early 'Abbasids and that the Mughals in India were among the dynasties that had continued that practice with notable success. So did the princely states of India, Hyderabad being an especially successful instance. "The complete absence till the day of the Indian occupation [of Hyderabad in 1948] of sectarian controversy or communal rioting which were everyday features of life in British India was in a great measure due to Government control of religious activity…. Maulana Maudoodi during the best part of his life in Hyderabad was no more than a religious thinker and writer. His rise as a politicoreligious figure in Pakistan can be directly attributed to the lack of those inhibitive institutions which prevented exploitation of religion for selfish and political ends."[1301] Put differently, British colonial India—as opposed even to the princely states—

was an anomaly in the history of Islam so far as the failure to regulate religion was concerned, and Pakistan was paying the price of having inherited that anomaly.

The rationale also had to do with the modernist vision of promoting, under government control, an Islam that was “progressive,” anchored in the “fundamentals” rather than in empty ritualism, and concerned with “the virtues of truthfulness, honesty, courage, forbearance and perseverance.”[1302] These would have been important goals for a modernizing regime at any other time, too. What made them especially pressing, from the viewpoint of the Ministry of the Interior, was its sense that the religious groups were coming together not just in their own right but potentially also in opposition to the government. In a foreboding reference to the formation of boards to oversee the affairs of madrasas belonging to various doctrinal orientations, the memorandum noted that “the Deobandis [were] … clubbing together and consolidating themselves” and so were the Barelawis.[1303] The Shi‘a and the Ahmadis were already well-organized communities. And the Ahl-i Hadith, too, seemed to be united in their “reactionary” ways.[1304] No evidence was offered that these rival orientations were about to join hands against the government, but the perception that they were all disgruntled did raise that possibility.

What the ministry proposed on this occasion was the formation of a department of religious affairs at both the central and provincial levels. The central office would provide broad guidelines for the regulation of the religious sphere, while the provincial and local administrations would register and oversee Islamic institutions, credential preachers, administer waqf properties, and take charge both of Islamic research as well as of proselytism abroad.[1305] The idea, much favored by the ‘ulama, that such matters ought to be left to those representing particular doctrinal orientations was dismissed out of hand: “It sounded alright in alien, non-Muslim rule, [but] it has no significance in present conditions.”[1306]

This was not the first time since independence, as the authors of the scheme were aware,[1307] that such proposals had been taken up by the government. Nor would it be the last. The government made a serious effort to reform madrasa education in 1962; there was a secret governmental

initiative toward the end of the Ayub Khan era to tackle the “fundamental conflict” between the conservatives and the progressive forces; the Ministry of Religious Affairs was established by prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1974; and more efforts to reform and regulate madrasas were to come under Zia al-Haqq and Musharraf. Such efforts have not been without results. Yet, as has been seen, the results in question have not necessarily been what successive regimes had intended. The government’s checkered and often undistinguished record of regulating Islam is one key area in which things have not changed very much over the course of the country’s history.

Throughout this book, we have encountered many instances of suspicion, recrimination, polemic, and caricature in the relationship between the modernists and the religious conservatives. That, too, has remained a constant—in this instance, from well before the birth of Pakistan. The difficulties of that relationship did not prevent the modernists and the ‘ulama from joining hands at critical moments, be it during the Khilafat movement in the 1920s or the movement for a separate Muslim homeland in the 1940s; nor did they prevent the Islamists from lending their support to the modernizing governing elite and the military during the wars of 1965 and 1971, the Afghan war in the 1980s, and the insurgency in Indian Kashmir from the end of that decade. Yet, in all of those instances, and in many others, the long history of mutual suspicion and, indeed, hostility has never receded very far into the background and it has resurfaced at every opportunity. The obstacles Pakistani governments have faced in regulating the religious sphere have a direct correlation with this history.

In terms of its key signposts at least, that religious sphere also represents considerable stability. South Asia is a region that has seen enormous upheaval since the mid-nineteenth century: subjection to colonial rule; the massive impact of the two world wars on society and economy; famines and other disasters; the partition of India, with its unprecedented levels of violence and dislocation; the subsequent break-up of Pakistan; the impact of the Iranian revolution, of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and, in more recent years, of global terrorism. It is remarkable, however, that none of the Islamic orientations that existed or were in the process of emerging at the turn of the twentieth century had ceased to exist a hundred years later. Even the Ahmadis, for all the state-sanctioned and other persecution directed at them, survive, and not just abroad but also within Pakistan. The staying

power of these orientations is especially impressive when we remind ourselves that several of them are of relatively recent vintage. By the same token, the ‘ulama representing the various Sunni and Shi‘i orientations have not merely continued to exist in society but have also, in many cases, extended the range of their activities and their reach in the public and religious spheres. This institutional and sociopolitical prominence of the ‘ulama undergirds a good deal of the continuity that is to be observed in Islam in South Asia from the mid-nineteenth century onward. And it is not to be taken for granted, since the ‘ulama have not fared equally well in all modern Muslim societies.

What then has changed in this landscape? Just as the advent of colonialism had begun to usher in major transformations in Muslim religious life from the mid-nineteenth century, including the emergence of new doctrinal orientations, the end of colonial rule and, in particular, the establishment of a Muslim homeland has continued to shape Islam in ways both obvious and subtle. The birth of Pakistan was an opportunity for the modernists to put their ideals into practice—to not only rid Islam of the sectarian squabbles that had rent its fabric and made Muslims weak and petty, but also to demonstrate to everyone that a properly understood Islam had much to contribute to the world at large. To Islamists like Mawdudi, the new state represented the imperative to proclaim the sovereignty of God in all its legal and political implications and thereby to fulfill the terms of the contract that Muslims were party to by virtue of being Muslims.[1308] To the ‘ulama, for their part, the birth of Pakistan was an occasion to assume leadership roles that had eluded them for much of Islam’s history, to reorient people’s belief and practice not just through time-tested activities at the grassroots and by way of teaching and writing, but also through state legislation and public policy. There is much that is new in the ensuing competition among rival trends, but also in their continuing engagement with one another, and it would be inconceivable without the framework provided by what professes to be an Islamic state.

Within it, though building on prior developments, the aforementioned fixtures of the religious landscape have continued to undergo changes of their own. The ‘ulama are a case in point here. Where most religious scholars of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries had been entirely lacking in any formal exposure to Western learning (and even pioneering modernists like

Sayyid Ahmad Khan spoke no English), it is not unusual for leading figures among the contemporary ‘ulama to have had some schooling in the Western sciences. Indeed, some of their success in reaching broader audiences rests precisely on an ability to demonstrate a familiarity with modern forms of knowledge, including the English language. It is no exaggeration to say that the contemporary ‘ulama have done better at acquiring Western learning, and at benefiting from so doing, than the modernists have in developing a credible grounding in the Islamic tradition and in enhancing the religious credentials that go with any such accomplishment. Some contemporary Sufi groups are equally instructive in this regard. The shaykhs of the Chishti Sabiri order in Pakistan have tended to have a modern, Western education—from Aligarh, Oxford, the Dehra Dun Military Academy, the Pakistan Air Force Academy. Zulfiqar Ahmad, a prominent Naqshbandi pir who belongs to the Deobandi orientation, is an electrical engineer by training and vocation. If anything, the Sufis have gone further in this regard than have the ‘ulama, which is owing in part at least to the fact that the ‘ulama are products of what remains a well-structured system of Islamic education while the Sufis are not.

Given that the doctrinal orientations that dot the religious landscape of Pakistan are not abstract entities but are defined rather by the people who adhere to and represent them, we should not be surprised to see that they, too, have undergone significant change while retaining the lineaments of a broad continuity.[1309] Some of the changes in question are internal to these orientations, whereas others relate to their position vis-à-vis one another. An example of the former is the space Sufism now occupies among the Deobandis. As seen in chapter 6, Sufi piety retains its appeal in many circles, and even the militant Deobandi leader of the Jaish-i Muhammad recommends practices with an unmistakable Sufi resonance to his audiences. Nonetheless, devotional piety has less room in contemporary Deobandi thought and practice than it did a hundred or even fifty years ago. And though efforts to revive Sufi practice, as with the aforementioned Zulfiqar Ahmad, are not reducible to an extension of specifically Deobandi influence, they do have an unmistakable aspect of the latter.[1310]

As for the relative standing of particular religious orientations vis-à-vis one another, the most significant change has to do with the leading presence of

the Deobandis in the public and religious spheres. This is a development that has long been in the making, but it has been consolidated in Pakistan, with help from the modernists. Their suspicion of the ‘ulama notwithstanding, the modernists have tended to view the textually anchored Deobandi approach to Islam as closer to their own than, say, the Islam of the Barelawis, let alone that of the Shi‘a. The modernists might be thought to have an even greater affinity with the scripturalism of the Ahl-i Hadith, except that stereotypes about the latter’s “reactionary” ways have long persisted, and the small numbers they command make them less useful for purposes of government patronage. For their part, the Islamists of the Jama‘at-i Islami have often been able to accommodate people of varying doctrinal orientations within their ranks. That, incidentally, has itself been a cause of some suspicion among their rivals, who have taken it to suggest that the Jama‘at is lacking in religious scruples.[1311] For all that, Mawdudi’s understanding of Islam tends to reveal greater affinity with that of the Deobandis than it does with any other doctrinal orientation. And Qazi Husayn Ahmad, a subsequent amir of the Jama‘at-i Islami (1987–2009), was the son of a leader of the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind in the late colonial North-West Frontier Province, and he had, in fact, been named after Husayn Ahmad Madani.[1312] More than others, the Deobandis have been able to combine scripturalism with a continuing fidelity to the Hanafi legal tradition, religio-political activism with Sufi piety, scholarly productivity with populism, and this has paid dividends in terms of a greater reach and influence in state and society. The Deobandis were also the first to develop the model of loosely affiliated madrasas supported by small-time local contributions, and their madrasas have been the greatest beneficiaries of it without yet forswearing more lucrative sources of patronage at home or abroad.

The hardening of boundaries between and among key doctrinal orientations represents another significant change over the course of the past hundred years. It is scarcely unexpected for some such delineation of boundaries to have taken place, of course, as an expression of the very survival and development of the orientations in question. What is worth remarking on is when and how its effects have come to be felt. Though difficult to demonstrate in the absence of large-scale empirical studies, it seems to be far less common in Pakistan today for Sunnis of different doctrinal persuasions to participate in Shi‘i rituals commemorating the martyrdom of their imam, Husayn, than it was a hundred years ago. Initiatives toward the development of a distinctly Sunni symbolism to

compete with that of the Shi‘a had already been witnessed in late colonial India, and they came to find new expressions at the hands of the virulently anti-Shi‘i Sipah-i Sahaba in the 1980s. The context in which this latter-day development has taken place is characterized not merely by a long history of sectarian squabbles or local politics, however, but also by events of a global significance, such as the Iranian revolution and Islamic revivalism more broadly. This new phase in the history of Shi‘i-Sunni relations has been accompanied by sectarian violence on a scale that had little parallel in colonial India or in the first decades of Pakistan. In 1929, to take another example, a prominent Barelawi scholar had written a book extolling Husayn alongside a number of other pre-Islamic and Islamic holy figures. Though he took occasional issue with Shi‘i interpretations of particular events, this book, by Abul-Hasanat Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, could have passed for the work of a Shi‘i preacher. It is difficult to imagine a contemporary Barelawi scholar producing such a work.[1313]

The starkest example of hardening attitudes relates, of course, to the Ahmadis. Their exclusion through the constitutional amendment of 1974 had built on earlier developments, not just those of 1953 but also in colonial India. As would be recalled, Iqbal had felt offended by the Ahmadi refusal to see other Muslims as Muslims and, on this and other grounds, he had urged the colonial government to declare the Ahmadis a separate religious community. Yet, several of Iqbal’s contemporaries had not viewed the Ahmadis as non-Muslim, and attitudes toward the Lahore-based Ahmadis, who did not consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be a prophet, were considerably less strident. Though the decision of Zafrulla Khan to speak at a public meeting of the Rabwa-based Ahmadis had helped galvanize the agitation of 1953, it was still possible in 1965 for the Lahore-based Ahmadis to publish front-page advertisements in the national press to announce their events.[1314] The Rabwah-based Ahmadis were not outcastes either. Justice M. R. Kayani, one of the two judges investigating the 1953 Punjab disturbances, had visited the Ta‘lim al-Islam College in Rabwah as a guest of honor and applauded the fact that about 45 percent of its students were non-Ahmadis.[1315] Students of the college competed in intercollegiate competitions; in March 1970, they were reported to have won the rowing championship hosted by the University of the Punjab.[1316] Things would look decidedly different by the fall of 1974 and different still a decade later, when it was made a criminal offense for the Ahmadis to pass off as Muslims.

The apparent suddenness of the agitation in 1974 should not obscure the deep roots of the anxieties the Ahmadis had provoked among those hostile to them. The government's capitulation to the demands was nonetheless a turning point: it ratified the impulse toward sharper boundaries between what did or did not count as Islam, and it fostered the hope, already expressed by some in Pakistan's first years, that more of such boundaries would be drawn.[1317] On the face of it, the government had acted very differently in 1953 from how it responded in 1974. What the two occasions shared, however, was the government's unwillingness or inability to offer a reasoned defense of its position. As has been seen, that inability would characterize its dealings with the post-September 2001 Taliban and their supporters, too.

In Pakistan's early decades, there existed some promising intellectuals who could not only explain and bolster modernist positions but also help cultivate something of a middle ground between the modernists and the conservatives. From among the 'ulama, we met two such figures, Hanif Nadwi and Ja'far Phulwarwi, in chapter 3. Khalifa Abdul Hakim's Institute of Islamic Culture, where they were both employed, was a semi-official site for the articulation of modernist viewpoints, and it produced a good deal of Islamic literature in the 1950s and the 1960s. Not all of the positions of a Nadwi or a Phulwarwi suited government policy or interests. As observed earlier, Nadwi had been among the first in Pakistan to call for the exclusion of the Ahmadis from the Muslim community.[1318] Yet, he was anything but the "reactionary" that the Ministry of Interior's memorandum of 1960 had led policy makers to expect when dealing with members of the Ahl-i Hadith. Nor did he embody the uncompromising zealotry that "would rest content only if Governmental action supports reversion to conditions obtaining in Arabia 1300 years ago."[1319] The space such intellectuals occupied between rival camps—the modernists, the 'ulama, the Islamists—was nonetheless ambiguous, and this may be further illustrated by a brief look at another figure, Murtaza Ahmad Khan Maikash (d. 1959). A significant contrast between present-day Pakistan and its religious landscape in the 1950s and the 1960s is marked precisely by the absence of such intermediate intellectuals from the contemporary scene.

Maikash was educated at prominent colonial-era institutions, the Government College and the Islamia College of Lahore. A poet—maikash, “wine-drinker,” was his literary name—and a journalist, he worked for about ten newspapers, including the Persian-language Afghanistan, over the course of his life. He also served for some time as a lecturer in journalism at the University of the Punjab and as a member of the editorial board of the Urdu Encyclopedia of Islam, which, too, was housed at the university. Maikash wrote several books, of which two are broad-ranging historical surveys: a world history, “from the flint stone to the atom bomb,” completed in 1945 but first published in 1950, and a history of Islam, which was completed in 1947 and first published shortly thereafter. Both works, for which he drew on sources in Persian, Arabic, Urdu, and English, shed some light on his thinking.

His rationale for writing the world history—dedicated to the Afghans for maintaining their neutrality during World War II—was that people had come to inhabit a globalized world, with events in one part of it affecting lives in another: “in these circumstances, studying the history of just one nation, one group, or one country cannot produce that breadth of thought and vision that is essential to lead one’s life in the present age.” Nor could one properly evaluate contemporary trends and movements of a worldwide reach without viewing them from a global perspective. Such histories existed aplenty in European languages, but none in Urdu, which is why he had proceeded to write one.[1320] He hoped, too, that historical information about the founding figures of the major religions would “save people from that narrow-mindedness of religious prejudice that has afflicted them in the past and does still.”[1321]

Maikash was not reticent about injecting commentary into his survey. Following an account of historical and cultural developments until the time of the Mongol invasions of the Middle East in the thirteenth century, he observed:

<quote>

The Muslims of this age can claim credit for the development of many areas of knowledge. It is surprising, however, that they did not turn their attention to developing or improving the science of politics…. Coming out of their desert and becoming the rulers of other countries, Arab Muslims rapidly fell victim to the old ways of Roman and Persian kingship; only the democratic sensibilities of Islam were able to keep the bitterness of those ways from acquiring intolerable proportions. The establishment of personal [that is, authoritarian] rule among Muslims meant that Muslim intellectuals would fail to develop a science of politics or a form of government that they could have called their own and which would have saved them from recurring rebellions, strife, civil wars, and courtly intrigues.[1322]

</quote>

Another example relates to his derision of Muslim intellectual sterility at the end of the nineteenth century, which he took to stand in sharp contrast to the intellectual and technological advances in the West, even as it evoked for him the condition of Europe in the Dark Ages:

<quote>

Muslim debates in their age of decline had to do with such things as whether it was permissible or impermissible to raise one’s hands as part of the prayer ritual, should the Fatiha [the opening chapter of the Qur’an] be recited at graves, was it legitimate to feed the poor for the spiritual benefit of deceased holy people, was it allowed or forbidden to eat [the meat of] an owl…. The Christians of the age of ignorance characterized every new product of scientific research as reprehensible innovation and heresy. Muslims living in their age of decline, too, had adopted the practice of viewing every invention as reprehensible innovation and heresy simply because the wealth of knowledge had now passed into the hands of the Western Christians.[1323]

</quote>

Maikash was harsh in his criticism of his contemporary West, too. He saw it as materialistic, promiscuous, and increasingly devoid of moral values.[1324] In the aftermath of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations,

the world stood in a balance: the great powers—the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—could come together to reenslave the world or they could help usher in an era of justice and equality.[1325] A globally shared system of education could, he said in concluding his book, promote a better life for everyone, but he was skeptical of the prospects of any such system being instituted.[1326]

The two-volume history of Islam is also an illuminating work. Maikash wrote the preface to the first edition in early 1947, though a subsequent edition took account of developments up to around 1950. He gave his Islamic sentiments somewhat freer rein in this book than he had in his world history. A notable example occurs in his concluding lines:

<quote>

In all non-Muslim states, whether socialist or capitalist and democratic, modern civilization is rebelling against those ethical and social limits that religion and morality seek to impose upon people for their own good. The nations that call themselves Muslim are also being swept away like straws by this raging flood…. The conservative (muhafizkār) groups working in Muslim countries toward the preservation of religious norms are being dismissed as past-oriented (qadamat pasand) by the enlightened (rawshan khayal) votaries of modern civilization. In these storms of transgression and iniquity erupting from one end of the world to the other, there seems to be no escape for those calling themselves Muslims. Yet the truths and virtues of the religion of Islam are so real and so concrete that they are bound to draw some section or the other of the human race to themselves. From within the storms of insolence represented by current trends, there would arise those righteous movements whose flagbearers will again bring glory to Islam and thereby succeed in ridding humanity of its troubles…. The manifest lesson of Islam’s history is that those calling themselves Muslim have succeeded and progressed [in the world] only to the degree that they have been guided by the desire to seek God’s favor and success in the hereafter.[1327]

</quote>

This romantic vision of an eventual Islamic restoration was not, however, characteristic of the book as a whole, which was marked rather by a sober

analysis of historical developments. In his survey of early twentieth-century history, he did speak of the “fever of modernism” when referring to Mustafa Kemal in Turkey (1923–38) and Reza Shah in Iran (r. 1925–41), and he showed how the efforts of King Amanullah of Afghanistan (r. 1919–29) to pursue similar policies had led to the undoing of his once promising reign.[1328] Yet, his tone in this context, to take just this one example, was unsentimental. He observed that, in emulating Turkey and Iran, the Afghan king had failed to realize that his subjects were considerably more traditional than were the citizens of those two countries. Further, British intrigue had helped fan the flames of religious resentment against the king’s policies while also turning the products of modern education against him. Nor did Maikash gloss over the opportunism of the alliance Amanullah’s successors had forged with the religious opposition in the country. He even referred to the religious groups as “past-oriented” and, more strikingly, to the king’s unseating with their cooperation as a “reactionary revolution” (irtija‘i inqilab).[1329]

This is the language of a modernist, but Maikash, who lamented such language elsewhere,[1330] was not a modernist. In 1953, he was a member of the Majlis-i ‘amal—the Committee of Action—spearheading the anti-Ahmadi agitation.[1331] This fact would seem to be enough to inspire modernist misgivings. The inspector-general of the Punjab police was asked by the Court of Inquiry looking into that agitation, after he had defined a mulla as “a semi-educated person who misleads people in the name of religion and opposes all progress [but also] … an educated person [who] … uses religion for an ulterior object,” if Maikash fit that definition. The inspector-general’s response: “Some of the articles written by him were written in the strain of Mullaism.”[1332] Maikash’s testimony before the Court of Inquiry would have confirmed that view. Asked by the court if he had read Jinnah’s famous speech of August 11, 1947 (“in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community … will vanish”), Maikash said, incredulously, that he had not. Having read it at the court’s instance, he told the judges that Jinnah’s idea of the state, as articulated in that speech, was “fundamentally opposed” to his own.[1333] Representing the agitation’s Committee of Action before the court, Maikash also asked some uncomfortable questions about why the sympathizers of the anti-Ahmadi camp did not enjoy the much touted freedom of religious expression to express their core Islamic beliefs.[1334]

For its part, in a backhanded compliment to his historical interests and with reference to his literary name, the court quizzed Maikash on the caliph from early Islam “who used to drink every Friday after divine service,” and whether Maikash knew that “some of the most difficult philosophical questions were discussed by the fuqaha [jurists] in Baghdad and Damascus when they were drunk.”[1335] Though Maikash showed little inclination to play along, such questioning went beyond the court’s entertainment.[1336] Quite apart from showing that intellectuals like Maikash were either not knowledgeable enough about the history of Islam or not honest enough to admit to its seamier sides, the key point being made was the futility of looking up to a romanticized version of that history for present and future models.[1337]

A religious honorific, “mawlana,” accompanied his name, but Maikash was no mere camp follower of the traditionalist ‘ulama. The idea, for instance, that Muslims living under European colonialism were like the Europeans of the Dark Ages in their meaningless religious squabbles sounds extraordinary when one recognizes that some of these issues were precisely what differentiated one doctrinal orientation of colonial India from another. To the Barelawis, the Deobandis, and the Ahl-i Hadith, these were anything but small, ridiculous questions. Maikash himself has been claimed by the Barelawis as one of their own. It is under the auspices of a Barelawi publishing house that his history of Islam was reprinted in 2006.[1338] This should not, however, obscure the critical distance from these orientations to which the remarks under discussion point. As for the anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1953, it is not far-fetched to think that he would have seen it as an illustration precisely of the kind of revivalist movements that the concluding lines of his history of Islam had envisioned some years earlier.[1339] It was not as “religious hysteria,” which is what it was to the chief minister of the Punjab,[1340] but in terms of a historical analysis that Maikash would have wanted to make sense of such events.

Maikash’s analysis had its limits, and these go beyond an occasional romanticism.[1341] The desire he had expressed in his world history to help rid people of “the narrow-mindedness of religious prejudice” had clearly done little to lessen his own prejudices. Yet, for all their unsavory ways, such

intellectuals did have the potential to serve as a bridge between the modernists and the more conservative segments of society.[1342] The 1953–54 Court of Inquiry grudgingly recognized this to a degree by allowing Maikash to represent the anti-Ahmadi agitation's Committee of Action at the court. This was no mean assignment considering that Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, the secular Bengali politician who would go on to serve as the prime minister of Pakistan (1956–57), had preceded Maikash as the counsel for the Committee.[1343] However, it would have taken sustained effort to tame intellectuals like Maikash and to put them to use in the service of modernism. Some rethinking of modernist convictions was needed, too, but there has seldom been much appetite for it among the governing elite.[1344]

In a remarkable contrast with some other Muslim countries, notably Indonesia, few modernist institutions were established in Pakistan's early (or, for that matter, later) decades with the aim of producing Islamic scholarship or of educating people in new understandings of Islam.[1345] There was a Department of Islamiat (Islamic Studies) that existed in the early years under the auspices of the Punjab government's Directorate of Public Relations. But given that it functioned essentially as part of the official bureaucracy, the department had little space within which to formulate credible viewpoints, and it was always subject to the day-to-day interests of the government.[1346] Officials at this department were later found to be feeding articles to the press and patronizing some virulently anti-Ahmadi newspapers, presumably as a way of helping the provincial government in its ongoing tussle with the center.[1347] Further, at least some of those on the payroll of the department had no clear qualifications for the job: as the Court of Inquiry discovered, one of them was an illiterate wrestler from Lahore who had been hired to instruct children living in prison (presumably with their inmate parents) not only in physical education but also in the basics of Islam.[1348] The Islamic Research Institute and the Council of Islamic Ideology, for their part, were high-profile bodies, but they, too, were, and remain, instruments of government policy rather than sites of modernist thought with any measure of independence.[1349] While he was its director, Fazlur Rahman had brought international scholarly attention to the institute, but that had owed largely to his own stature and pains rather than to any particular governmental investment in it. The Institute of Islamic Culture in Lahore had initially shown greater promise, but it too now stands as a shadow of its earlier self.[1350] None of these, moreover, was designed as teaching

institutions. Unlike the traditionalist ‘ulama, the likes of Hanif Nadwi and Ja‘far Phulwarwi produced no successors. Fazlur Rahman, the towering figure of the 1960s and the most gifted modernist intellectual to have been associated with any Pakistani government, was no bridge-builder. And though he had considerable influence on intellectual trends in Turkey and Indonesia, his legacy in Pakistan itself was small.[1351] Colleges and universities would seem to have been the most promising sites for modernist initiatives to put down roots and find distinctive expressions. But the long-standing weakness of public education, including higher education, made that difficult. Further, in an apparent paradox for a state that has always foregrounded its Islamic commitments, the study of Islam has tended to be seen at universities as suited only to the least gifted. Perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of Islamic studies in the university system are the graduates of madrasas, who have been able to add degrees from Westernized institutions to their credentials as ‘ulama. This has enabled them to break down some of the long-standing barriers between the products of the college and the madrasa and to reach broader audiences. But it has done little for the modernists.

What all this amounts to is, of course, a further illustration of the decline of Islamic modernism in Pakistan. That, in turn, is among the starkest contrasts between the religious landscape of Pakistan’s first two decades and the present. The sort of self-confidence that Liaquat Ali Khan had exuded in March 1949 in envisioning Pakistan as a “laboratory” for progressive Islamic ideals in the service of all humankind[1352] has had few parallels in more recent years. It has little in common, for instance, with General Pervez Musharraf’s elusive desire to chart a path of “enlightened moderation” between Islamist radicalism and the failings of particular policies adopted by Western powers. Nor does it have much in common with Benazir Bhutto’s vision, set out in a posthumous book, of tolerant interpretations of Islam that would steer the Muslim world and the West away from a collision course. Democracy, she argued in that book, is the panacea for religious radicalism. It is “dictatorships [that have] tended to favor hardline traditionalist interpretations of religion in return for the theocrats’ providing a fig leaf of religious legitimacy to autocracy.”[1353] While her desire to see the growth of a robust middle class, economic opportunity, the empowerment of women, and a strong civil society was commendable, of course, she gave little sense in this book of how this would be brought about in Pakistan. There was scant acknowledgment, too, of the failures of her two governments in contributing

much in those directions. Some of her proposals would have struck even sympathetic readers as odd. She suggested, for instance, that “the [Persian] Gulf states … jump-start economic and intellectual development in the rest of the Islamic world. This is what my father tried to do for Pakistan, and this is what I tried to do as prime minister in my two terms in office.”[1354] Such suggestions take little account of the fact, however, that the oil-rich authoritarian Arab states of the region are not well-known for fostering intellectual growth, except in tightly delimited spheres, and there is some irony in looking to them as a way of promoting Bhutto’s central concern—institutionalizing democratic norms. Also lost is the further irony that it was under the elder Bhutto, and partly through closer ties with Saudi Arabia and the influx of Pakistani labor in the Middle East during his time, that a new foundation had come to be laid for conservative socioreligious change in the 1980s.

A related contrast between Pakistan’s first decades and today has to do with the modernist elite’s moral authority. As a British consular official saw it in 1951, “[t]o the Prime Minister [Liaquat Ali Khan] and to ‘Islamic Socialists’ of his way of thinking, the authority of Mr. Jinnah or, indeed, of common sense, is enough to justify a particular interpretation of Islam.”[1355] The ‘ulama and the Islamists would not have gone so far in recognizing that authority, though they, too, could not quite defy it. For his part, Liaquat Ali Khan had the backing of the preeminent ‘alim Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani even when the two were not quite on the same page. That sort of authority would soon evaporate. This was not only because subsequent members of the modernizing elite could not point to the kind of accomplishments as the founding fathers or because they often lacked political legitimacy. It also had to do with their failure to put in much effort into providing credible alternatives to the positions espoused by the ‘ulama and the Islamists. For their part, the latter have poured great energy into making their case. Mawdudi’s extensive writings made him the most influential Islamist ideologue in twentieth-century South Asia and one of the most visible of them in the wider Muslim world. Even some of those with a history of hostility toward him drew approvingly on his commentary on the Qur’an.[1356] In more recent years, the Jaish-i Muhammad’s Mas‘ud Azhar has presented his reading of the jihad-related verses of the Qur’an in the form of a very substantial commentary. The Islamists and the ‘ulama have also been adept at actively weakening the moral authority of

the modernists, as seen earlier with reference to Mufti Taqi ‘Usmani, and they have done so while benefiting from the patronage of the governing elite.

Though a good deal of the responsibility for the enervation of modernism rests, then, with the Pakistani governing elite and their intellectual associates, religio-political trends in the wider Muslim world have not been friendly to modernism either.[1357] The defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 war with Israel was a significant contributor to the declining appeal of secular Arab nationalism and the growing prominence of Islamist trends in the Middle East and elsewhere. More or less in tandem with it, the vast financial resources that had become available to Middle Eastern petroleum-exporting countries enabled them to invest in religious causes as never before. Under Saudi patronage, this meant the growth of Salafi mosques and schools, though the beneficiaries were not all Salafis. Mawdudi, who was not a Salafi, had advised the Saudi government on plans for the establishment of the Islamic University of Medina; he was the first recipient of the Faisal Prize for services to Islam (instituted by the Saudi government in memory of King Faisal, r. 1964–75); and some of his followers would later have prominent positions at the Saudi-supported International Islamic University in Islamabad.[1358] The prospects of Saudi patronage had also helped reorient the government of Zulfikar Bhutto away from the harder edges of its leftist leanings. The unprecedented opportunities that the oil wealth had created in the Middle East for labor from countries like Pakistan fostered as well the growth of a petite bourgeoisie that would become the bulwark of conservative religious change in the 1980s. By the beginning of that decade, the impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran and of the mobilization for the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan had begun to have ripple effects of their own across the Muslim world. This was no longer a time when scholars and policy analysts could confidently predict the sweeping march of westernization and secularization.

It was not inevitable that such transregional trends should strengthen anti-modernist currents in Pakistan, but they did, especially because the ground had long been prepared for them within the country. Though the Bhutto regime would have probably capitulated anyway to the anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1974, it did matter that the Saudi-sponsored Muslim World League had taken the lead in declaring the Ahmadis non-Muslim. Two other illustrations are also in order here. Rethinking the hudud in a manner Fazlur Rahman had

tried to in the mid-1960s was a significantly more arduous exercise in the Pakistan of the 1980s not only because it was Zia al-Haqq rather than Ayub Khan who was in power but also because revolutionary Iran was flaunting its commitment to Qur'anic law next door. The winds, internationally, were not blowing in the direction of explaining away the hudud, but rather of implementing them. Islamization could be lucrative, too, and not just in terms of a regime's image. Though Islamists and the 'ulama have long called for the elimination of financial interest from the economy, it was more tempting for a government to heed such demands, even if superficially, at a time when petroleum-rich Muslim countries were helping to underwrite Islamic banking. In this instance, too, the 1980s and the 1990s were not propitious decades for Islamic arguments in favor of financial interest—arguments Fazlur Rahman had made with much learning in the 1960s. In 2002, General Pervez Musharraf did manage to have an impending ban on interest-based transactions overturned by a stacked Shari'at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, but the rushed decision was little more than the affirmation of a military ruler's wishes. There was barely a mention of Rahman's work by any side on that occasion.[1359]

By the 1980s and the 1990s, the 'ulama and the Islamists had come to substantially encroach upon the terrain inhabited by Islamic modernism in colonial India and in the first decades of Pakistan.[1360] Two concluding points are worth noting in this regard. First, despite modernist stereotypes, the 'ulama are not necessarily averse to accommodating themselves and their norms to changing needs. As seen in chapter 3, they and the Islamists of Pakistan's early years had articulated maximalist Islamic positions for the country's constitution, yet they were not unwilling to accept modernist views that diverged significantly from their own. Nor were the 'ulama uniformly opposed to sidestepping stringent rules laid out in works of great antiquity and authority, as the judges of the 1953–54 Court of Inquiry discovered with some discomfort.[1361] So far as the Islamists are concerned, even the powerful idea of the sovereignty of God could be deployed not only to delegitimize modernist legal initiatives but also to legitimize Islamist participation in democratic politics. None of this is to deny that many among the 'ulama and the Islamists are fully capable of living up to modernist caricatures of them. It is merely to note that among the blind spots most damaging to the modernists' own cause has been their unwillingness to see much nuance or internal differentiation among their conservative rivals. The need to recognize such nuance and to build on it is

not a matter of intellectual generosity; it is pragmatic politics.[1362] Second, though tempting to see its decline as the passing of an era, Islamic modernism is not necessarily a thing only of the past. The Pakistani governing elite retain their modernist impulses. And modernism lives on, among other things, in the impact it has had on rival trends over the course of the past hundred years. In not a few cases, that impact has, ironically, strengthened those trends vis-à-vis modernism. For its part, modernism's control of or proximity to the levers of political power has not required a concomitant investment in the bolstering of its intellectual defenses. This need not have been the outcome, of course, and it might yet be different as a result of decisions still to be made. A change in modernist intellectual fortunes would depend, however, upon serious, not wishful, thinking about Islam and on engaging with it as something more than as a tool of political legitimation. It would also depend upon the social, economic, and political conditions in which such thinking takes place.

[1] NonZeroSum (talk) Writing in the early 1940s, Wilfred Cantwell Smith reckoned the Indian modernist Syed Ameer Ali's Spirit of Islam to be "the most widely quoted modern book on the religion" in Egypt. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis (London: Victor Gollancz, 1946), 55. Ameer Ali's Critical Examination of the Life and Teachings of Mohammed (London: Williams & Norgate, 1873) had developed some two decades after its first appearance into The Life and Teachings of Mohammed, or the Spirit of Islam (London: W. H. Allen, 1891), and later still into The Spirit of Islam (London: Methuen, 1967; first published under this as the main title in 1896). On Ameer Ali (d. 1928), see Smith, Modern Islam, 49–55; Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 86–97.

[2] Political histories of Pakistan are, however, more readily available. For some notable examples, see Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994); M. Rafique Afzal, Pakistan: History and Politics, 1947–1971 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001); Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); and

Christophe Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, trans. Cynthia Schoch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[3] For a penetrating critique of such distinctions, see Shahab Ahmed, What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). An important ethnographic study that demonstrates how ordinary villagers in a remote region of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (previously the North-West Frontier Province) bordering Afghanistan sometimes engage in serious debate on religious and related matters, see Magnus Marsden, Living Islam: Muslim Religious Experience in Pakistan's North-West Frontier (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[4] Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, 1953–54, the Punjab Archives, Lahore (hereafter, Court of Inquiry Proceedings). These records were the basis of the Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Superintendent, Government Printing, 1954). Apart from this report, and with one important exception, these records have not been utilized in any study so far. The exception is Ali Usman Qasmi, The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan (London: Anthem Press, 2014), though this work draws on them only with reference to the anti-Ahmadi agitation.

[5] For an overview of British colonial constructions of India, the contrasts it was seen as representing with the world of the colonizers, and the liberal assumptions guiding or, as the case may be, mitigating such contrasts, see Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), especially 28–43. Also see Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[6] Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1908), 2: 184, speaking of Muhammad Bayram (d. 1889) of Tunisia. Quoted

in Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 251.

[7] Sayyid Ahmad Khan, “Islam,” in idem, Khutbat-i Sir Sayyid, ed. Muhammad Isma‘il Panipati, 2 vols. (Lahore: Majlis-i taraqqi-i adab, 1972–73), 1: 508–9; for the full text of the lecture, see ibid., 500–533. For an English translation, see Christian W. Troll, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), 307–32; quotation at 314. I use Troll’s translation with some modifications.

[8] Fazlur Rahman, “Some Islamic Issues in the Ayyub Khan Era,” in Donald P. Little, ed., Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to Niyazi Berkes (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 301–2.

[9] Cf. Smith, Modern Islam in India, 293.

[10] Classic early statements of Islamic modernism include, besides Ameer Ali’s work, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, Aqwam al-masalik fi ma‘rifat ahwal al-mamalik (Tunis: Matba‘at al-dawla, 1867); Syed Ahmed Khan, A Series of Essays on the Life of Mohammed and Subjects Subsidiary Thereto (London: Trübner & Co., 1870); Cheragh Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammadan States (Bombay: Education Society’s Press, 1888); Muhammad ‘Abduh, Risalat al-tawhid (Bulaq: al-Matba‘a al-kubra al-amiriyya, 1897); Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); and Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tafsir al-Qur’an al-hakim, al-shahir bi-Tafsir al-manar, 12 vols., 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar al-manar, 1947–54; first serialized in Rida’s Cairo-based journal al-Manar). For a notable articulation of the modernist position from Pakistan’s first years, see Khalifa Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1953; first published in 1951); all references are to this edition, unless indicated otherwise.

[11] The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 16 vols. (Karachi: Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1947–54 [hereafter, CAPD]), 5/1: 5.

[12] There are not insignificant commonalities between Muslim modernist aspirations and those of what James Scott characterizes as the Western “high modernists” of the late nineteenth and the early to mid-twentieth centuries. “At [high modernism’s] … center was a supreme self-confidence about continued linear progress, the development of scientific and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not least, an increasing control over nature (including human nature) commensurate with scientific understanding of natural laws. High modernism is thus a particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied—usually through the state—in every field of human activity.” James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 89–90. Emphasis in the original. The scientific, technological, and developmentalist aspects of the modernist enterprise fall largely outside the purview of the present work, however.

[13] The most influential instance of this view is Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983; first published in 1962). Also see Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), esp. 221–23; and Charles Kurzman, Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 26.

[14] A handful of the writings of some prominent contemporary or near contemporary figures are worth mentioning here by way of illustration. (Unless they wrote in English, I mention, where possible, a sampling of their writings available in English.) Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an (Minneapolis: Bibleotheca Islamica, 1980); idem, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri,

Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: The Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Abdolkarim Soroush, The Expansion of Prophetic Experience, trans. Nilou Mobasser, ed. Forough Jahanbakhsh (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Muhammad Khalid Masud, Shari'a Today: Essays on Contemporary Issues and Debates in Muslim Societies (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2013); Andreas Christmann, The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Mohammed Abed Jabri, Democracy, Human Rights, and Law in Islamic Thought (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009); idem, The Formation of Arab Reason: Text, Tradition, and the Construction of Modernity in the Arab World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Mafhum al-nass: Dirasa fi 'ulum al-Qur'an (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Misriyya lil-kitab, 1990); idem, Naqd al-khitab al-dini (Cairo: Sina lil-nashr, 1992). A posthumously published book by a former Pakistani prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, also merits inclusion in this list: Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West (New York: Harper, 2008). See, finally, the useful anthology of contemporary modernist writings in Mehran Kamrava, ed., The New Voices of Islam: Rethinking Politics and Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

[15] On some of the constitutive elements of Islamic liberalism, see Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 77–130, especially 121–22. Rutherford characterizes this trend as "Islamic constitutionalism" while noting its affinity with liberalism (ibid., 121–22, n. 204). Also see Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 4–5; Muhammad Khalid Masud, "Islamic Modernism," in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore, and Martin van Bruinessen, eds., Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 255. The transition from modernism to liberalism is suggested, for instance, by the titles of two anthologies edited by Charles Kurzman: Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) and the aforementioned Modernist Islam, 1840–1940. Kurzman's Liberal Islam is not, however,

temporally circumscribed, and includes not just contemporary public intellectuals but also earlier figures such as Muhammad Iqbal.

[16] Hourani, for instance, occasionally refers to some of the intellectuals and activists of his “liberal age” as modernists or as Islamic modernists. See Arabic Thought, 193, 267, 353. In an influential work on constitutional developments in Pakistan’s early years, Binder had spoken of Islamic modernism to refer to things many of which he would later characterize as Islamic liberalism in a study on the Middle East. See Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); cf. idem, Islamic Liberalism.

[17] On the tension in the Indian context between the statist and “communitarian” proclivities of liberalism, on the one hand, and its concern with the individual, on the other, see C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Rutherford, too, stresses the central position of the state in the thinking of those he refers to as the Islamic constitutionalists. See Egypt after Mubarak, 121–28. On the authoritarian dimensions of Islamic modernism, see chapter 2, later.

[18] On the relationship between modernism and Islamism, see Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 9–10; Michael Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern Politics: The Islamic Case in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 393–98; Binder, Islamic Liberalism, 357; Charles J. Adams, “The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi,” in D. E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 371–97.

[19] Sayyid Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, Islam ka nazariyya-i siyasi (Lahore: Markazi maktaba-i Jama‘at-i Islami, 1955; first published in 1939), 34–35. The English words “negative” and “positive” are Mawdudi’s own. For another rendering of this passage, see Sayyid Abul A‘la Maududi, The

Islamic Law and Constitution, trans. Khurshid Ahmad, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), 154.

[20] Mawdudi acknowledges that his Islamic state may also have something in common with communist and fascist states but immediately adds that his state, unlike those others, is not dictatorial. Mawdudi, Islam ka nazariyya-i siyasi, 35.

[21] For a useful overview of the scholarship on the ‘ulama in medieval Islam, see R. Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 187–208.

[22] On the transformations the ‘ulama have undergone in modern times and the claims to authority they have articulated in conditions of momentous change, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[23] By contrast, Muslim modernists would occupy a much smaller space in any broad-ranging study of Islam in post-colonial India. Such a study remains a desideratum. It would be illuminating, too, to compare the development of Islam in Pakistan with how it has evolved in post-colonial India, but this book is not the place for it.

[24] For an influential example for the Middle East, see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958); for South Asia, see Smith, Modern Islam in India, especially 293–98.

[25] For a classic expression of this binary from the first years of Pakistan, see the 1954 Report of the Court of Inquiry. For a discussion of this binary, see Qasmi, The Ahmadis, 22–29.

[26] The modernists would not find much fault, for instance, with Smith’s characterization of late colonial Deobandi ‘ulama: Modern Islam, 295–96. It is telling that Deobandi traditionalists did not find fault with it either. It is favorably quoted, though with some license in translation, in the official history of the Deoband madrasa. See Sayyid Mahbub Rizwi, Ta’rikh-i Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband, 2 vols. (Deoband: Idara-i ihtimam-i Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband, 1977–8), 1: 462–63.

[27] Michael Levenson, “Introduction,” in idem, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Modernism, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3.

[28] On such underpinnings, see Michael Bell, “The Metaphysics of Modernism,” in ibid., 9–32. Also see note 12, earlier.

[29] Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 7.

[30] One notable example is Rahman, Islam and Modernity. He speaks in it of “classical Islamic modernism” and “contemporary modernism.”

[31] For the early history of Deoband, to which I am indebted here, see Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[32] See, for instance, the statement in Deoband’s monthly magazine on the occasion of the imperial darbar, the celebrations in India marking the coronation of King George V: al-Qasim (Deoband), 2/4 (November 1911): “Darbar-i tajposhi” (unnumbered first page), at http://eap.bl.uk/database/results.a4d?projID=EAP566;r=18467 (accessed September 26, 2017).

[33] On the financial patronage received by some Deobandis from the princely states of Hyderabad and Bhopal, see R/1/1/2006: Anti-Government Propaganda by Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, 3–4, 17, 20, 34 (British Library; hereafter, BL). Also see al-Qasim, 6/2 (August 1915): 16–17. The support of the Afghan king Zahir Shah (r. 1933–73) for the Deoband madrasa was acknowledged by its administrators with the building of a monumental gate in his honor, the Bab al-Zahir, which still exists.

[34] On his life and thought, see Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870–1920 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[35] See Muhammad Siddiq Najibabadi, Anwar al-mahmud ‘ala sunan Abi Dawud, 2 vols. (Karachi: Idarat al-Qur’an wal-‘ulum al-Islamiyya, 1986; first published in 1937), 35–36. For the chains of transmissions through which Wali Allah himself was authorized to transmit classic works of hadith onward, see Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, al-‘Ujala al-nafi‘a (Khanewal: al-Maktaba al-sa‘idiyya, 1975), 53–97. On the centrality of chains of transmission (isnads) in Islamic religious culture, see William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23 (1993): 495–522.

[36] On Siddiq Hasan Khan’s networks and the misgivings they created in British circles, see R/1/1/40: “Wahabi Agents Dispatched by Sadik Hassan, Husband of the Begum of Bhopal, to the Soudan, Hodeida, Yemen and Mecca” (BL). Also see Seema Alavi, Muslim Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 267–330. On the writing of hadith commentaries by scholars belonging to this orientation, see Zaman, The Ulama, 40–41.

[37] See Justin Jones, Shi‘a Islam in Colonial India: Religion, Community and Sectarianism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[38] See, for instance, Rudad-i ijlas-i panjum, All India Shi‘a Conference, mun‘aqida … 30 September ta 2 October 1911 ba-maqam Banaras (Lucknow: Mi‘yar Press, n.d. [1912]), 31–58; Rudad-i ijlas-i shashum, All India Shi‘a Conference, mun‘aqida … 18-19-20 October, 1912 ba-maqam Patna (Lucknow: Mi‘yar Press, n.d. [1913]), 142–96. For these and other published reports, see Annual Proceedings of the All India Shia Conference, 1907–40, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, microfilm R-12261–8. Cited hereafter as AISC, Rudad, with the relevant bibliographic information.

[39] Ibid., AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i panjum (1911), 49.

[40] Jones, Shi‘a Islam, 117–20, though he seems to exaggerate the extent of the ‘ulama’s continuing influence on this body.

[41] Muhammad Rashid Rida, “al-Khutba al-ra’isiyya fi Nadwat al-‘ulama li-sahib al-Manar,” al-Manar (Cairo), 15 (1912): 334–35.

[42] For Deoband, see note 2, earlier. For the Shi‘a, see the presidential address by Sayyid Najm al-Hasan at the inaugural session of the All India Shi‘a Conference: in AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i awwal … 6–8 October 1907 ba-maqam Lucknow (Lucknow [name of publisher illegible], n.d. [1908]), 58; also see ibid., 89–90. For the Barelawis, see Sanyal, Devotional Islam, 268–301. And for the Ahmadis, see Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 34–36.

[43] ‘Abd al-Qadir Badayuni, Muntakhab al-tawarikh, ed. Ahmad ‘Ali and W. N. Lees, 3 vols. (Calcutta, 1864–69; reprint, Osnabrük: Biblio Verlag, 1983), 2: 246; quoted from A. Azfar Moin, The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 165.

[44] Akbar Ilahabadi, Kulliyyat-i Akbar (Lahore: Sang-i mil Publications, 2008), 238–39.

[45] Mohammad Iqbal, “Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims,” in Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, compiled by “Shamloo” (Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1948), 97. Iqbal goes on to quote the verse from Akbar Ilahabadi. Ibid., 98. Iqbal’s statement was published in a newspaper, the Statesman, in May 1935 (ibid., 107).

[46] John Hurd and Ian J. Kerr, India’s Railway History: A Research Handbook (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 2. For the growth of route miles between 1861 and 1946–47, see ibid., 3.

[47] Ibid., 148.

[48] Arthur F. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet: The Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of the Mediating Sufi Shaykh (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 195–96.

[49] See ‘Abd al-Majid Daryabadi, Hakim al-ummat: Nuqush wa ta’assurat (Delhi: Sa‘di Book Depot, 1990), for extensive examples of the master’s correspondence. Daryabadi, a journalist and a translator of the Qur’an into English, was in correspondence with Thanawi over the last fifteen years of the latter’s life. See ibid., 599. On Thanawi’s letter writing habits, see ibid., 85, 243. By Daryabadi’s reckoning, Thanawi received thirty to forty letters every day (ibid., 85).

[50] Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, Tabwib-i tarbiyat al-salik, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Thana Bhawan: Maktaba-i ta’lifat-i Ashrafiyya, n.d.); Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi: Islam in Modern South Asia (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 91–92.

[51] Muhammad Rashid Rida, “Muqaddimat al-kitab,” in A. J. Wensinck, Miftah kunuz al-sunna, trans. Muhammad Fu’ad ‘Abd al-Baqi (Lahore: Suhayl Academy, 1987; first published Cairo: Matba‘at Misr, 1934), p. “waw” (front matter pagination in Arabic letters).

[52] Jones, Shi‘a Islam, 37.

[53] See Sajida Sultana Alvi, “Renewal of the Čišti Order in Eighteenth-Century Punjab,” in Denis Hermann and Fabrizio Speziale, eds., Muslim Cultures in the Indo-Iranian World during the Early Modern and Modern Periods (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2010), 216–46.

[54] Christian W. Troll, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (Delhi: Vikas, 1978), 28–34; David Lelyveld, “Young Man Sayyid: Dreams and Biographical Texts,” in Usha Sanyal, David Gilmartin, and Sandria B. Freitag, eds., Muslim Voices: Community and the Self in South Asia (Delhi: Yoda Press, 2013), 253–72, at 267–69.

[55] For the fragment that he translated from this book, see Muhammad Isma‘il Panipati, ed., Maqalat-i Sir Sayyid (Lahore: Majlis-i taraqqi-i adab, 1962–), 5: 430–44.

[56] Altaf Husayn Hali, Hayat-i javid (Aligarh: Muslim University Institute, 1922; first published in 1901), 379–81, 387–92.

[57] Muhsin al-Mulk, Ayat-i bayyinat (Karachi: Dar al-isha‘at, 1960). This work was translated from Urdu into Persian by a noted anti-Shi‘i polemicist of colonial India. For this translation, see Muhammad ‘Abd al-Shakur Laknawi, Baqiyyat-i salihat, tarjama-i Ayat-i bayyinat (Lahore: Suhayl Academy, 1976).

[58] Muhsin al-Mulk, Kitab al-mahabbat wal-shawq (Agra: Matba-i mufid-i ‘amm, 1905). Cf. Muhammad Amin Zubayri, Hayat-i Muhsin (Aligarh: Muslim University Press, 1934), 235–36.

[59] For an overview of some of Muhsin al-Mulk’s religious ideas, see Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, 64–71.

[60] Altaf Husayn Hali, Hayat-i Sa‘di (Lahore: Majlis-i taraqqi-i adab, 1961). This book was first published in 1886. The view that Hali’s biography of Sa‘di was superior to his book on Sayyid Ahmad Khan was Abul-Kalam Azad’s: ‘Abd al-Razzaq Malihabadi, Azad ki kahani khud Azad ki zabani (Delhi: I‘tiqad Publishing House, 2008), 192–93.

[61] Nazir Ahmad, al-Huquq wal-fara’iz, 3 vols. (Delhi: Matba‘-i Qasimi, 1905–6), 1: 6. On Nazir Ahmad, see the studies collected in M. Ikram Chaghatai, ed., Deputy Nazir Ahmad: A Biographical and Critical Appreciation (Lahore: Pakistan Writers Cooperative Society, 2013). Also see Margrit Pernau, Ashraf into Middle Class: Muslims in Nineteenth Century Delhi (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 257–63, 356–61.

[62] On his life and career, see Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, Hayat-i Shibli (A‘zamgarh: Dar al-musannifin, 1943).

[63] Mirza Muhammad Hadi, trans., Hikmat al-Ishraq (Hyderabad: Dar al-tab‘, Jami‘a ‘Usmaniyya, 1925). This is a commentary by Qutb al-din al-Shirazi (d. 1310) on a work by Yahya al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191). The ancient Greek works he translated include the Republic of Plato and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. His translations of contemporary writings included George Frederick Stout’s Groundwork of Psychology (1903) and William McDougall’s Introduction to Social Psychology (1908). These translations were published under the auspices of the Osmania University in Hyderabad, with which he was associated for some years. His novel, Umrao Jan Ada, published ca. 1899, has in turn been translated into English: Khushwant Singh and M.

A. Husaini, Umrao Jan Ada (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1961); it has also been made into films in both Pakistan (1972) and India (1981). On Hadi’s life and career, see Maymuna Ansari, Mirza Muhammad Hadi, Mirza o Ruswa: sawanih hayat awr adabi karname (Lahore: Majlis-i taraqqi-i adab, 1963).

[64] AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i awwal … 6–8 October 1907, 133–34.

[65] Ibid., 146–53.

[66] This view, no doubt shared by many, is expressed by Sulayman Nadwi: Hayat-i Shibli, 290.

[67] David Lelyveld, “Disenchantment at Aligarh: Islam and the Realm of the Secular in Late Nineteenth Century India,” Die Welt des Islams 22 (1982): 85–102.

[68] Hali, Hayat-i javid, 196–99, 389; David Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 141–42.

[69] Cf. Hali, Hayat-i javid, 155, 381.

[70] Sulayman Nadwi, Hayat-i Shibli, 319.

[71] Lelyveld, “Disenchantment.”

[72] Cf. Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation, 134–42.

[73] Hali, Hayat-i javid, 309; Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation, 105. Muir’s biography of the Prophet, The Life of Mahomet, was published in two volumes in 1858 and in four volumes in 1861. Among other high-ranking positions in India, he served as the lieutenant governor of the North-Western Provinces from 1868 to 1874. On him, see Avril A. Powell, Scottish Orientalists and India: The Muir Brothers, Religion, Education and Empire (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2010).

[74] Hali, Hayat-i javid, 300–320. For his attitudes toward the Bengalis, see ibid., 307–8.

[75] Cf. Sulayman Nadwi, Hayat-i Shibli, 295.

[76] For an overview of the events described here, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11–14.

[77] Aligarh’s Old Boys Association was established in 1899, a year after the death of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. See Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation, 332.

[78] M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918–1924 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 25, 30, 47–49.

[79] See Shibli Nu‘mani, Safarnama-i Rum o Misr o Sham (Lucknow: Anwar al-matabi‘, n.d.), 100–104.

[80] Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 4–5.

[81] Abul Kalam Azad, Mas’ala-i khilafat o jazira-i ‘Arab (Calcutta: All India Khilafat Committee, 1920), 140–41. Part of this work was delivered as a speech in Calcutta in February 1920.

[82] Ibid., 109–19, esp. 115.

[83] Ibid., 144. Azad was not alone in such criticism; and Deoband was sensitive to it. For a detailed response from Deoband, see Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, “Tashrih-i waqi‘a-i Deoband: ‘Ata-i i‘zaz ki haqiqat,” al-Qasim 6/2 (August 1915): 1–17.

[84] FO 686/149: Silk Letters Case, Statement by Matlub-ur-Rahman, September 24, 1916, 210. The National Archives, UK (hereafter, TNA).

[85] Mohamed [Muhammad] Ali, My Life: A Fragment, ed. Afzal Iqbal (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1942; reprint, 1946), 108–33.

[86] Azad, Mas’ala-i khilafat, 141–43.

[87] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 104.

[88] For the text of this fatwa in English translation, see P. C. Bamford, Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1925; reprint, Delhi: Deep Publications, 1974), 251–55.

[89] For this fatwa, see Ghulam Rasul Mihr, ed., Tabarrukat-i Azad (Hyderabad: ‘Usmaniyya Book Depot, 1959), 203–6. On the public response to the fatwa and its aftermath, see Qureshi, Pan-Islam, 174–232.

[90] Syed Jamaluddin, “The Barelvis and the Khilafat Movement,” in Mushirul Hasan, ed., Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India (Delhi: Manohar, 1985), 403–4.

[91] Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, al-Ifadat al-yawmiyya min al-ifadat al-qawmiyya, 10 vols. (Lahore: Idara-i ta’lifat-i Ashrafiyya, 1984–86), 9: 109; Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, 40.

[92] For ‘Abd al-Bari’s views on this matter, see Qureshi, Pan-Islam, 104, 125. For Thanawi’s criticism of such concessions, see Thanawi, al-Ifadat, 2: 54. Also see Daryabadi, Hakim al-ummat, 130–34.

[93] Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, 44.

[94] Bamford, Histories, 253.

[95] Mohamed Ali, My Life, 61. Emphasis added. Muhammad ‘Ali did not, however, limit his disdain to the ‘ulama on the wrong side of the political divide. He was equally unsparing of the English-educated Muslims opposed to the Khilafat movement. Ibid., 61.

[96] Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 206–7.

[97] Census of India 1911, vol. 14: Punjab, part 1, report by Pandit Hari Kishan Kaul (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1912), 163, quoting an undated lecture by Iqbal on the “Muslim Community.”

[98] See Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 14–17.

[99] Afzal Iqbal, Life and Times of Mohamed Ali (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delhi, 1978), 381.

[100] This is from an undated but pre-1905 poem titled “Naya shiwala,” included in Iqbal’s first poetic collection, Bang-i dara (1924). Unless otherwise noted, all references are to Iqbal’s verse as gathered in his Urdu and Persian collected works of poetry. For this line, see Muhammad Iqbal, Kulliyyat-i Iqbal (Urdu) (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1997), 115.

[101] Muhammad Iqbal, Rumuz-i bikhudi, in idem, Kulliyyat-i Iqbal (Persian) (Lahore: Shaykh Ghulam ‘Ali & Sons, n.d.), 112. The translation is by A. J. Arberry, The Mysteries of Selflessness: A Philosophical Poem (London: John Murray, 1953), 29. Iqbal himself dated his turn to the kind of themes articulated in this work to 1907. See his letter to Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, November 10, 1919, in Shaykh ‘Ata Allah, ed., Iqbal nama, 2 vols. (Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, n.d.), 1: 110.

[102] Iqbal, Javid nama, in idem, Kulliyyat-i Iqbal, Farsi, 650. Translation by A. J. Arberry, Javid Nama (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), 55 (with some change in punctuation).

[103] For the text of this address, see S. S. Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan, 2 vols. (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970), 2: 153–71; quotation at 2: 154.

[104] Ibid., 2: 169.

[105] Iqbal to Niyaz al-din Khan, December 3, 1920, in Makatib-i Iqbal banam-i Khan Niyaz al-din Khan (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1986), 55; Qureshi, Pan-Islam, 197, 256–58.

[106] Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 149. The book was first published in 1930 as Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Kapur Art Printing Works, 1930). My references are to the 1934 edition.

[107] Iqbal, Reconstruction, 149.

[108] Ibid., 154.

[109] For instance, Iqbal, Javid nama, in idem, Kulliyyat-i Iqbal (Persian), 654; trans. Arberry, Javid Nama, 58 (speaking in the voice of the Ottoman grand vizier Sa‘id Halim Pasha [d. 1921]).

[110] For an overview of this controversy, see Barbara D. Metcalf, Husain Ahmad Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India’s Freedom (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2009), 112–16.

[111] See Husayn Ahmad Madani, Muttahida qawmiyyat awr Islam (Delhi: Qawmi ekta trust, n.d. [1972; first published ca. 1938]), 29–30; cf. 64–68; Metcalf, Husain Ahmad Madani, 116.

[112] Muhammad Iqbal, “Statement on Islam and Nationalism in Reply to a Statement of Maulana Hussain Ahmed Published in ‘Ehsan’ on the 9th March 1938,” in “Shamloo,” ed., Speeches and Statements, 223–39, at 227.

[113] Ibid., 228. This is a rare instance of modernist suspicion of ethical ideals. For the ethical commitments of Islamic modernism, see chapter 2.

[114] “Shamloo,” ed., Speeches and Statements, 233.

[115] Ibid., 239.

[116] Rizwi, Ta’rikh, 1: 446; Metcalf, Islamic Revival, 111.

[117] Francis Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia (London: Hurst & Company, 2001), 71, 106.

[118] FO 686/149: Silk Letters Case, Statement by Matlub-ur-Rahman, September 25, 1916, 221–22 (TNA).

[119] Mahmud Hasan, Hama’il sharif mutarjam (Bijnor: Madina Press, n.d.). On the indebtedness to the translation of Shah ‘Abd al-Qadir, Wali Allah’s son, see ibid., 1–7.

[120] Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, Ahkam-i talaq wa nizam-i shar‘i ‘adalat, ya‘ni al-hila al-najiza-i jadid, ed. Khurshid Hasan Qasimi (Lahore: al-Faysal, 1996). This is a new and retitled edition of the original 1933 work.

[121] As one member of the house from east Punjab had noted during the debate on the bill, “Al Hilatul Najiza was prepared by Maulana Ashraf Ali of Thana Bhawan, who is one of the greatest divines of the present age in India…. [T]his book is most authoritative, being written by that great Mufti … and endorsed by the Ulema of Deoband and Saharanpur.” L/PJ/7/1065: Muslim Dissolution of Marriages Act 1939, extracts from the legislative assembly debates, 5/11: 23 (Ghulam Bhik Nairang) (BL). Saharanpur was the town housing a Deobandi madrasa second in importance to the one at Deoband itself. The mover of the bill, Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi, was also from Saharanpur.

[122] L/PJ/7/1065: Muslim Dissolution of Marriages Act 1939, 76 (BL).

[123] For instance, ibid., 69 (A.A.A. Fyzee [Bombay]); ibid., 1/9: 2–3 (extracts from the legislative assembly debates [Abdul Qaiyum, NWFP]); ibid. 5/1: 17 (M. Asaf Ali, Delhi).

[124] Ibid., 1/9: 12 (extracts from the legislative assembly debates).

[125] Ibid., 5/11: 17–21 (extracts from the legislative assembly debates).

[126] L/PJ/7/943: Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, and amending acts: 7 (BL).

[127] Ibid., 76.

[128] Ibid., 76 (statement of objects and reasons).

[129] David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 171–74.

[130] Hussain Ahmed Madani, An Open Letter to the Moslem League (Lahore: Dewan Publications, 1946), 62; Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, 173.

[131] L/PJ/7/943: Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937: 98.

[132] Venkat Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 48, 51.

[133] See William Gould, Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 201–33.

[134] For the full text of Jinnah’s speech, see Pirzada, ed., Foundations, 2: 327–39; quotation at 337–38.

[135] Ibid., 2: 341 (resolution 1).

[136] “Taqrir ba‘that al-Hind,” Majallat al-Azhar (Cairo), 8/5 (1937): 380–81.

[137] See Rahmat Ali et al., “Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish Forever?” in K. K. Aziz, ed., Complete Works of Rahmat Ali (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), 1: 5–10. Though signed by several others, Rahmat Ali is believed to be the tract’s author (ibid., xx–xxi).

[138] See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[139] For a critique of Jalal along these lines, see Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina. The phrase “bargaining counter” is Jalal’s, Sole Spokesman, 187.

[140] Madani, Muttahida qawmiyyat, 30–31, 38.

[141] Ibid., 63, 68, 70, 75–76.

[142] Cf. Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 242–46.

[143] Iqbal, “Statement on Islam and Nationalism,” in “Shamloo,” ed., Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, esp. 228–39.

[144] For the text of Azad’s speech, delivered at Ramgarh on March 19, 1940, see Malik Ram, ed., Khutbat-i Azad (Delhi: Sahitiya Academy, 1974), 269–300; quotation at 299.

[145] Pirzada, ed., Foundations, 2: 338. Azad’s speech was delivered in Urdu, whereas Jinnah’s was in English.

[146] Z. H. Zaidi et al., eds., Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, 1993–2009 [hereafter, JP]), 3rd ser., 15: 583. On the reaction to this telegram, which was soon made public, see ibid., 593, 594, 611, 635, 637, 650–51.

[147] Jinnah to Raghib Ahsan, April 2, 1941 in JP, 3rd ser., 16: 393. This was in response to a religious scholar’s offer to stay with Jinnah to give him instruction in Islam and the Qur’an. See Raghib Ahsan to Jinnah, JP, 3rd ser., 16: 382–83.

[148] Cf. Jalal, Sole Spokesman, 5.

[149] Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, ed., Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1943), 230.

[150] Ibid., 454 (presidential address to the League’s 30th session, Delhi, April 24, 1943).

[151] Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, 2 vols. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1960–64 [hereafter, Speeches]), 1: 575.

[152] Ibid., 2: 208–9. For the quotation from Gibbon, reproduced with some minor inaccuracies, see Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J. B. Bury, 7 vols., 4th ed. (London: Methuen & Co., 1911), 5: 395.

[153] Jinnah was hardly the first to put it this way. Ameer Ali, for one, had said something similar in his classic Spirit of Islam, 165: “The Islam of Mohammed recognises no caste of priesthood…. Each human being is his own priest.”

[154] Muhammad Ishaq Sandelawi, Islam ka siyasi nizam (A‘zamgarh: Matba‘-i Ma‘arif, 1957). While the title page gives the author’s name as Muhammad Ishaq Sandelawi and introduces him as a professor at the Nadwat al-‘Ulama in Lucknow, the author’s prefatory note is signed as “Muhammad Ishaq Siddiqi.” I draw here on an earlier discussion of this book in Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “South Asian Islam and the Idea of the Caliphate,” in Madawi al-Rasheed, Carool Kersten, and Marat Shterin, eds., Demystifying the Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts (London: Hurst, 2013), 57–79, at 65–67. For another discussion, see Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina, 232–43.

[155] Ishaq Nadwi, Islam ka siyasi nizam, 11.

[156] Ibid., 12.

[157] Ibid., 11–13.

[158] Ibid., 58–68.

[159] Ibid., 67.

[160] Ibid., 202.

[161] Ibid., 198.

[162] Ibid., 186–87.

[163] We do know, however, that the views put forth by some leading religious scholars in 1950 to guide the constitution-making process in Pakistan were quite similar to Ishaq Nadwi’s on a veritable veto that the ‘ulama were to have on the decisions of the head of the state. Mawdudi, on the other hand, clearly favored a head of state who would enjoy decisive authority in the manner of the classical caliph. See Binder, Religion and Politics, 175–76. In his detailed account of the ‘ulama’s recommendations, Binder makes no reference to the work of Ishaq Nadwi.

[164] Muhammad Manzur Nu‘mani to Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, November 26, 1945, in Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 146–55, quotations at 149–51 and 152.

[165] Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches, 233.

[166] See Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 145–71, especially 151–54.

[167] Dhulipala, Creating a New Medina, 311.

[168] Anwar al-Hasan Sherkoti, ed., Khutbat-i ‘Usmani (Lahore: Nazar Sons, 1972), 73–80, at 77–78. Also see “Mukalamat al-sadrayn,” in ibid., 89–109, at 101–2. This is a summary of a conversation between the pro-Muslim League scholar Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani and several pro-Congress Deobandi ‘ulama. And see Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, Hamara Pakistan (Hyderabad, Deccan: Nafis Academy, n.d. [1946]), 63–65.

[169] For a review of Barelawi positions on the question of Pakistan, see Sanyal, Devotional Islam, 302–27.

[170] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, “Relocating the Centers of Shi‘i Islam: Religious Authority, Sectarianism, and the Limits of the Transnational in Colonial India and Pakistan,” PhD dissertation, Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, 2015, 72–88.

[171] The most sophisticated study to date of Jinnah’s elite politics is Jalal, The Sole Spokesman.

[172] For an analysis of the religious rhetoric of the election campaign in the Punjab in 1945–46, on which I draw here, see David Gilmartin, “A Magnificent Gift: Muslim Nationalism and the Election Process in Colonial Punjab,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40/3 (1998): 415–36.

[173] Husayn Ahmad Madani, Mr. Jinnah ka purasrar mu‘amma awr uska hall (Delhi: Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind, 1945), 35–37.

[174] Diwan Sayyid Al-i Rasul to Nawab Ismail Khan, September 6, 1946, Archives of the Freedom Movement, 439: 19–20a (National Archives of Pakistan [hereafter, NAP]).

[175] The statement was quoted in a letter from one Hamid Hasan Qadri to Jinnah, July 22, 1946. See David Gilmartin, “Religious Leadership and the

Pakistan Movement in the Punjab," Modern Asian Studies, 13 (1979), 510. On the support of the Punjab pirs for the Muslim League during the election campaign of 1945–46, see ibid; and Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, 213–22.

[176] For the election results, see Jalal, Sole Spokesman, 150, 161, 167, 170–71. On Jinnah's political maneuverings that made for this success, see ibid., 126–73.

[177] Cf. Pirzada, ed., Foundations, 2: 170–71.

[178] "Draft Extracts from the Speeches of Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani Regarding the Policy and Progress of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind," Archives of the Freedom Movement, 439: 48a (NAP). The last sentence ("religion and political authority are twins") is an ancient Persian adage that 'Usmani quoted in its familiar Arabic translation.

[179] On the support of influential pirs for the anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1953, see Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 352, 354. Even the sajjada nishin of the famed Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's (d. 1624) tomb in the Indian Punjab had presided over an anti-Ahmadi rally in the Pakistani city of Okara; ibid., 3: 235. The mosque adjoining the tomb of the revered Chishti saint Baba Farid (d. 1266) in Pakpattan had posters announcing "the last hiccups of the Yazidi government"; ibid., 3: 367. The resonance of this slogan cannot be appreciated without recognizing that the Umayyad caliph Yazid I (r. 680–83) is an especially reviled figure not just in Shi'i Islam but also to many Sunnis. It was during his rule that Husayn, the Prophet's grandson and the third Shi'i imam, was martyred.

[180] Habib [sic] to K. H. Khurshid, February 3, 1946, JP, 2nd ser., 12: 545.

[181] Muhammad Iqbal, "Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal," in Latif Ahmad Sherwani, ed., Speeches, Writings, and Statements of Iqbal

(Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1977), 103. First published in the Hindustan Review (Allahabad), July 1909.

[182] As Wilfred Cantwell Smith observed in 1951, drawing on his discussions with Pakistani intellectuals, the widespread “demand that Pakistan should be an Islamic state is a Muslim way of saying that Pakistan should build for itself a good society. Not merely an independent or a strong or a wealthy or a modern society; all those things, perhaps, but also a good society.” Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State: Preliminary Draft (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1951), 68; cf. idem, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 239.

[183] Many of the authoritarian dimensions that James Scott highlights for the “high modernism” of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are relevant to Pakistan’s modernist governing elite, too. Cf. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 93–97. Also see Markus Daechsel, Islamabad and the Politics of International Development in Pakistan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Tabinda M. Khan, “Institutions not Intentions: Rethinking Islamist Participation in Muslim Democracies,” PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 2014. On “traditional authoritarianism,” as a leading modernist characterized it, see Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; first published in 1966), 78. For traditionalist anxieties about modernist authoritarianism, see Thanawi, al-Ifadat, 5: 154–55 (#178).

[184] Life, January 5, 1948; enclosed with Altaf Husain to F. Amin, January 29, 1948 in JP, 1st ser., 7: 68.

[185] JP, 1st ser., 7: 116.

[186] Jinnah’s presidential address, August 11, 1947, in CAPD, 1/2 (August 11, 1947), 18–21, at 19–20; Ahmad, ed., Speeches, 2: 399–405, at 402–3.

[187] See Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 155, 210 n. 12.

[188] JP, 1st ser., 6: 220 (speech at a public rally on October 30, 1947).

[189] The speech, delivered on January 25, 1948, is paraphrased in JP, 1st ser., 7: 57–58. It was delivered to mark the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. The ‘ulama had a very different and specific view of what it meant to be guided by the shari‘a. For an example, cf. the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam’s “address of welcome” to Jinnah, Bannu, April 16, 1948, in JP, 1st ser., 7: 419 (citing Q 5.4, 5.52–53, 2.124).

[190] For the text of the resolution as moved by the prime minister, see CAPD, 5/1: 1–2 (March 7, 1949). Emphasis mine. The text of the resolution as eventually adopted by the house was identical to the proposed text. See ibid., 100–101 (March 12, 1949).

[191] On the incoherence of the Objectives Resolution, see Binder, Religion and Politics, especially 147, 149; Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 284–85.

[192] Speaking to the Karachi High Court Bar Association in August 1952, the governor-general Ghulam Muhammed would put it this way: “You have to unearth Islam from under the debris where the dust of despots and corrupt people have buried it during the centuries and you will find that its message is simple and clear in democracy and equality of men and in harmony with the highest ideals known to anybody in the world.” For the text of this speech, see Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan, August 28, 1952, p. 5, in DO 35/3185: Pakistan Internal Affairs (TNA).

[193] See introduction, note 11.

[194] Census of Pakistan: Population According to Religion (Table 6) (Karachi: Ministry of the Interior, Government of Pakistan, 1951), 1.

[195] CAPD, 5/1, 90–91 (speech by Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya, East Bengal, March 12, 1949).

[196] CAPD, 5/1, 93.

[197] Report of the Basic Principles Committee (Karachi: Manager of Publication, Government of Pakistan Press, 1952), 7. The Basic Principles Committee had submitted its initial recommendations in September 1950, but these had been quickly withdrawn in the face of opposition to them. See Afzal, Pakistan, 64–70; also see chapter 5. All references to the BPC report are to its 1952 recommendations.

[198] CAPD, 15/13, 420, 425 (Chattopadhyaya, October 24, 1953).

[199] Report of the Basic Principles Committee, 4–6.

[200] CAPD, 15/17, 589 (Chakraverty, October 29, 1953).

[201] Report of the Basic Principles Committee, 2.

[202] CAPD, 15/19, 640, 644 (Seth Sukhdev, a Hindu member from Sindh, October 31, 1953).

[203] Abdur Rahman, governor of East Bengal, to Khawaja Nazimuddin, the prime minister, August 18, 1952, with enclosed lists of Hindu members of the constituent assembly and the East Bengal legislative assembly allegedly maintaining residences in India. 2 (1)-PMS/52: Correspondence with HE the Governor of East Bengal: 163–69 (NDC). A subsequent letter from the governor to the prime minister tried to disqualify these Hindu parliamentarians on the much more serious charge of being complicit in blaspheming the Prophet. Abdur Rahman to Nazimuddin, August 23, 1952, in ibid., 177–78. Nothing came of the governor’s efforts on this occasion.

[204] See chapter 1, note 122.

[205] Khalifa Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, 227–28, quotation at 228. Hegel is not explicitly invoked here, but he could not have been far from the author’s mind.

[206] Report of the Basic Principles Committee, 4–6.

[207] On its characterization as a “mullah board,” see CAPD, 15/6, 129 (Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan, October 13, 1953). For rebuttals, ibid., 129, 166.

[208] The dissertation was published as a book under the same title. See Khalifa Abdul Hakim, The Metaphysics of Rumi (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1959; first published, by a different press, in 1933).

[209] Khalifa Abdul Hakim, Shrimad Bhagavat Gita (Mumbai: Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, 2001). As far as I am aware, this Urdu translation has never been published in Pakistan. Incidentally, Iqbal, too, had once expressed his wish to render the Gita into Urdu. See his letter to Maharaja Kishan Prashad, October 11, 1921, in Muhammad ‘Abdallah Qurayshi, ed., Ruh-i makatib-i Iqbal (Lahore: Iqbal Academy,

1977), 268; also quoted in the introduction by Rafiq Zakariyya to Abdul Hakim, Shrimad Bhagavat Gita, 10.

[210] Ghulam Muhammed to the prime minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, May 31, 1952, with an extract from a note in Urdu by Khalifa Abdul Hakim. File 1(1)-PMS/52 (Correspondence with the Governor-General of Pakistan): 84–85 (NDC). The situation as Abdul Hakim had described it was grim. The educated Bengalis “say that the West Pakistanis have now become our rulers in place of the English. Their feeling is that the [West] Pakistanis consider them contemptible (zalil) and treat them with contempt” (ibid., 85).

[211] Telegram from Firoz Khan Noon, the governor of East Bengal, to the governor-general, February 16, 1952. File 2 (1)-PMS/52 (Correspondence with HE the Governor of East Bengal): 16 (NDC).

[212] Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, 296.

[213] Iqbal, Reconstruction, 120.

[214] Khalifa Abdul Hakim, Iqbal awr mulla, 8th printing (Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbal, 1952).

[215] Dawn, December 12, 1952, reproduced in Court of Inquiry Proceedings, Appendices, 86–87.

[216] M. Anwar Ali, “Note on the Situation as It Developed from the 5th March 1953,” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 240–41 (pp. 20–21 of the “Note”).

[217] CAPD, 15/14, 471 (Nishtar, Punjab, October 26, 1953).

[218] CAPD, 15/17, 590–91 (Chakraverty, East Bengal, October 29, 1953).

[219] The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Department of Advertising, Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1956 [hereafter, 1956 Constitution]), article 23, clause 1.

[220] Ibid., article 32, clause 2.

[221] Ibid., article 198.

[222] Ibid., article 197.

[223] Cf. Afzal, Pakistan, 129–30, 136–37. On other developments mentioned in this and the following paragraphs, ibid., 117–219.

[224] “Islam—A Dynamic and Progressive Movement,” in Speeches and Statements by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, vol. 1: October 1958–June 1959 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), 110–14, at 110–11.

[225] Ibid., 111.

[226] Ibid., 112–14; quotation at 113. On this speech, cf. Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980; first published in 1979), xvii, 81–83.

[227] Ayub Khan’s visit to the madrasa was apparently an effort to conciliate the ‘ulama after some unfavorable comments on them, and on the place of Islam in the forthcoming constitution, by his law minister. See L. B. Walsh Atkins, UK High Commission, Karachi, to H. A. Twist, Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), May 25, 1959, in DO 35/8962: Influence of Islam on Pakistan Internal Situation. There is not much that was conciliatory in the president’s speech, however, as Walsh Atkins too observed.

[228] Afzal, Pakistan, 228; cf. Qudrat Allah Shahab, Shahab nama (Lahore: Sang-i mil Publications, 1987), 713–19.

[229] Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 188, quoting a note titled “A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan” that he had written in October 1954 while in London en route to the United States. For the full text, see ibid., 186–89.

[230] Ibid., 207–10; Afzal, Pakistan, 231–33.

[231] The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Embassy of Pakistan, 1962 [hereafter, 1962 Constitution]), articles 155–65.

[232] Ayub Khan, Friends, 205. Cf. Fazlur Rahman, “Implementation of the Islamic Concept of State in the Pakistani Milieu,” Islamic Studies 6 (1967), 207: “the Parliamentary system is obviously unsuitable for such a strong executive as is envisaged by the Qur’an.”

[233] 1962 Constitution, article 6 (under “Principles of Law-making”).

[234] Ibid., chapter 2, article 8 (under “Islamic Way of Life”).

[235] Ibid., articles 199–206.

[236] Ibid., article 207.

[237] Compare the respective preambles to the 1956 and 1962 constitutions. Also compare the 1956 Constitution, article 25, clause 1 with the 1962 Constitution, “Principles of Policy,” no. 1.

[238] 1962 Constitution, article 1, clause 1.

[239] Report of the Constitution Commission, Pakistan, 1961 (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1962), 72.

[240] Fazlur Rahman, “Some Islamic Issues in the Ayyub Khan Era,” in Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to Niyazi Berkes, ed. Donald P. Little (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 286.

[241] On Parwez and this movement, see Ali Usman Qasmi, Questioning the Authority of the Past: The Ahl al-Qur’an Movements in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 216–86.

[242] Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, “Minutes of the Committee of [sic] Fundamental Conflict held on Monday the 17th April 1967 …,” 2, Ghulam Ahmad Parwez Papers (hereafter, GAPP), Parwez Memorial Research Scholars Library, Lahore. For Parwez’s membership of the committee, see Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, no. 95/CF/67, April 15, 1967, in file titled “Conference on Fundamental Conflict” (GAPP).

[243] Qasmi, Questioning the Authority, 260–69, makes a case for a direct influence of Parwez on Ayub Khan’s religious views and policy.

[244] See, for instance, Parwez to Ayub Khan, June 18, 1960, 4–5: “The fundamental problem is how to translate effectively Quranic Ideology into constitution without bringing in the reactionary Ulema…. The so-called Ulema would oppose every move to establish a truly Quranic order. They opposed the creation of Pakistan and would now oppose the establishment of a truly Islamic constitution. They exist by turning the clear commands of Quran into an esoteric system of knowledge…. The development of Muslim Law in Pakistan has been in spite of them…. [The] adoption of Quran as the basis of Law will not only provide with [sic] a basic working code and freely given loyalty of the nation, but will also take the wind out of the conspiracies that are afoot to misguide the nation” (GAPP).

[245] For some instances, see Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, Lughat al-Qur’an, 4 vols. (Lahore: Idara-i tulu‘-i Islam, 1960–61), 1: 214–15 (the Qur’anic “Adam” as a prototypical not a historical person, let alone the first prophet of God); 1: 241–45 (angels as natural and psychological forces, following the Egyptian reformer Muhammad ‘Abduh); 1: 343–46 (Iblis, the Qur’anic Satan, as a psychological propensity rather than an actual being); 1: 444–47 (jinn as a reference to the nomads of Arabia); 3: 1123–24 (“worship of God” as government according to God’s law; cf. ibid., 3: 1041).

[246] Ayub Khan to Parwez, July 2, 1960 (GAPP).

[247] Parwez to Ayub Khan, July 16, 1960, 8 (GAPP). Cf. Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, Qur’ani qawanin (Lahore: Idara-i tulu‘-i Islam, 1967), 21–22; Qasmi, Questioning the Authority, 251. Yet, Parwez also held that the punishments prescribed in the Qur’an should be implemented only in conditions similar to those for which they had been devised (Parwez, 49). In effect, this would allow a government to put them in abeyance without denying their “inalterable” character.

[248] Note Parwez’s complaint that the press had largely ignored his responses to the questionnaire of the constitution commission of 1960. Parwez to Ayub Khan, June 18, 1960, 2–3; Parwez to Ayub Khan, July 16, 1960, 1 (GAPP). Parwez attributed some of this ostracism to the “mulla”: “In my literature he sees his own political and economic death. He has therefore made my literature a taboo and myself a wet paint, with the result that the press, public platform, broadcasting, educational institutions, in short every avenue of expression is closed on me. So much so that even in the Army my literature is treated as ‘out of bounds.’” Parwez to Ayub Khan, February 6, 1965, 4 (GAPP).

[249] For the text of the fatwa and the names of its signatories, see Parwez key bare main ‘ulama ka muttafiqa fatwa (Karachi: Madrasa-i ‘Arabiyya Islamiyya, n.d.). Writing to Ayub Khan about it, Parwez objected to its self-characterization as “the unanimous verdict of the Ulema of the umma,” but he did not mention anyone among the ‘ulama who had been opposed to it. Parwez to Ayub Khan, March 15, 1962 (GAPP).

[250] On this initiative, its background, and the conservative opposition to it, see chapter 3.

[251] Khursheed-ul-Hasan, “Fundamental Rights Bill Passed by N.A.,” Dawn, December 25, 1963. For the text of the first amendment, see “Text of Fundamental Rights Bill,” Dawn, December 28–29, 1963.

[252] Ayub Khan, Friends, 210; cf. 1962 Constitution, 2.

[253] “Ayub Elected League President,” Dawn, December 25, 1963.

[254] Even the president’s basic democrats took their guidance from the ‘ulama rather than Ayub Khan when it came to Islamic matters. As Parwez

observed with much frustration in commenting on the proceedings of the basic democrats' convention in January 1962, they "opposed the Family Laws on the ground that they did not enjoy the favor of the Ulema. The plea is indicative of the extent to which the Democrats are influenced by the Ulema." Parwez to Qudrat Ullah Shahab, February 12, 1962 (GAPP).

[255] These biographical details are based, in part, on Rahman's curriculum vitae included with the revised proposal for a project on Islam and Social Change submitted to the Ford Foundation in 1972. See enclosures with L. Binder to R. Frodin, July 21, 1972, Ford Foundation grant # 74–141: Islam and Social Change, reel #3087, Rockefeller Archives Center (hereafter, FF 74–141, RAC). Rahman and Leonard Binder of the University of Chicago were the principal investigators of this project. On Rahman's father, the Deobandi scholar, cf. "Thanvi, Rahman State Their Case," Dawn, October 9, 1963.

[256] Quoted in the mission statement of the institute's journal: "Introducing the Journal," Islamic Studies 1/1 (March 1962): 1–4, at 1.

[257] Fazlur Rahman, "Concepts Sunnah, Ijtihad and Ijma' in the Early Period," Islamic Studies 1 (1962): 5–21. These and subsequent articles in the series were republished as his Islamic Methodology in History (Karachi: Central Institute of Islamic Research, 1965). My references here are to this book.

[258] Rahman, Islamic Methodology, 80.

[259] See ibid., 75: "what resulted from Hadith eventually was not some formalization but a total fixation. The present need undoubtedly is to re-loosen this formalism and to resume the threads from the point where the living Sunnah had voluntarily emptied itself into the Hadith dam" (italics in the original). Also ibid., 188–90.

[260] For a critique of Parwez, though without naming him, see ibid., 69–71.

[261] Cf. ibid., 139–44. Incidentally, there is a strong echo of the idealist British philosopher and historian R. G. Collingwood (d. 1943) in some of Rahman's formulations—for example, when critiquing the aspiration of modern Islamic reformist movements to return to the ways of the first Muslims. "But the big question is: how can a piece of history be literally repeated? The only sense [in which this idea can be properly understood] … is that Muslims must perform and enact in the twentieth century that whose [sic] moral and spiritual dimensions match those of the Muslims' performance in the seventh and eighth centuries. But this means not just a simple 'return' to the Qur'an and the Sunnah as they were acted in the past but a true understanding of them that would give us guidance today." Rahman, Islamic Methodology, 143. Emphasis in the original. I have seen no indication that Rahman was directly acquainted with Collingwood's work. But it is worth noting that Collingwood's Idea of History was posthumously published in 1946, not long before Rahman arrived at Oxford for his DPhil. Collingwood, who was the university's Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy until his resignation in 1941, would have been much talked about at Oxford during those years.

[262] Rahman, Islamic Methodology, 181. Rahman here acknowledges his agreement, at least in part, with Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1950), 224.

[263] Rahman, Islamic Methodology, esp. 1–24.

[264] Ibid., 189.

[265] Fazlur Rahman, "Riba and Interest," Islamic Studies 3 (1964): 1–43. The Urdu original was published in Fikr o nazar 1/5 (November 1963). My references here are to the English version. For a brief discussion, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Religious Discourse and the

Public Sphere in Contemporary Pakistan," Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 123 (2008), 60–62.

[266] Rahman, "Riba," 7.

[267] Ibid., 12–30.

[268] Ibid., 21–22.

[269] Ibid., 21–24.

[270] "Thanvi, Rahman State Their Case"; Rahman, "Some Islamic Issues," 292–95.

[271] "Thanvi, Rahman State Their Case." The book in question was Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958).

[272] "Thanvi, Rahman State Their Case." For a detailed discussion of Rahman and Smith with particular reference to McGill, see Megan Brankley Abbas, "Knowing Islam: The Entangled History of Western Academia and Modern Islamic Thought," PhD dissertation, Department of History, Princeton University, 2015, chapter 2. On Rahman more generally, including the controversy with Thanawi, see idem, "Between Western Academia and Pakistan: Fazlur Rahman and the Fight for Fusionism," Modern Asian Studies 51 (2017): 736–68.

[273] "Thanvi, Rahman State Their Case"; "Questions and Answers," Dawn, October 9, 1963.

[274] “Thanvi, Rahman State Their Case”; Abbas, “Between Western Academia and Pakistan,” 755.

[275] Cf. Rahman, “Some Islamic Issues,” 292.

[276] For Rahman’s views on this matter, see Islamic Methodology, 190; idem, “Religion and Planned Parenthood in Pakistan,” in Olivia Schieffelin, ed., Muslim Attitudes toward Family Planning (New York: Population Council, 1967), 94–97.

[277] “Meetings of the Governors’ Conference held on … the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of February, 1967 at Rawalpindi,” case no. GC8/1/67: The Fundamental Conflict, Minutes: 5 (GAPP). The committee is sometimes referred to as the Committee on Islamic Ideology. Part of its mandate was to examine the matter of the fundamental conflict. It was also to “define the ideology of Islam and to make [the] Mulla useful in the process of nation-building.” See note dated September 2, 1967, by M. Muqaddas, section officer, Cabinet Division, in 97/CF/67: Ruat-i-Hilal Committee and the Moon Controversy: 14 (NDC).

[278] Cf. Craig Baxter, ed., Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1966–1972 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 90 (entry for April 30, 1967). Ayub Khan did not mention that he had commissioned this book, but this is noted by Rahman in the curriculum vitae submitted to the Ford Foundation in 1972 (see enclosures with L. Binder to R. Frodin, July 21, 1972, FF 74–141 (RAC). There, the book is called “Pakistan as an Islamic State.”

[279] See Fazlur Rahman, “The Qur’anic Concept of God, the Universe and Man,” Islamic Studies 6/1 (March 1967): 1–19; idem, “Some Reflections on the Reconstruction of Muslim Society in Pakistan,” Islamic Studies 6/2 (1967): 103–20; idem, “Implementation.” Ayub Khan did not mention the title of the article he read, but it is likely to have been the first one, not only because he calls it the “first chapter” of the book (Baxter, ed., Diaries, 90) but also because that was the

only article from this series that was in print when Rahman met the president to discuss the project.

[280] Rahman, “Implementation,” 205 and 222 n. 22.

[281] Rahman, “Some Reflections,” 117–18.

[282] Rahman, “Implementation,” 212.

[283] Ibid., 206; idem, “Some Reflections,” 118. Parwez had a similar view: Qur’ani qawanin, 31–32. Also Parwez to Ayub Khan, June 18, 1960, 5, characterizing the “establishment of parties [as] shirk”—associating partners with the one God.

[284] Rahman, “Some Reflections,” 107. In support, Rahman adduced Q 22.41 as well as Q 3.104, 110, 114 and Q 9.72.

[285] Rahman, “Some Reflections,” 112, adducing Q 4.82. Cf. Rahman, “Implementation,” 215.

[286] Rahman, “Qur’anic Concept of God,” 17–18, citing Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press [Loeb Classical Library], 1947), 2: 167. Parwez had been no less effusive. Writing to request an audience with the president, he had observed in September 1961: “It seems that your coming to power has been for completion of some Divine scheme and therefore there is no doubt that the enforcement of Quranic principles is bound to materialize through you…. I rejoice to visualize the scene when on the Day of Judgment Islam will advance to greet and bless you for reviving it in Pakistan after a thirteen century long exile from the Muslim world.” Parwez to Ayub Khan, September 15, 1961 (GAPP). The reification of Islam is complete here with Parwez underlining the word.

[287] Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), 43.

[288] Afzal, Pakistan, 323.

[289] N. J. Barrington to R. M. Purcell, January 24, 1967, FCO 37/182: Internal Political Affairs in West Pakistan, 1967–68: 1 (Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, 1972–80, electronic resource, at www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/Introduction/FO_India/default.aspx [hereafter, TNA; Electronic Resource]). Already in early 1965, Parwez, too, had warned the president about the “pitiable” economic condition of the people: “The majority of them cannot get two square meals a day. Wealth is accumulating in fewer hands and the majority of the population is driven to penury. Our economists say that inflation is the natural consequence of the various developments undertaken in the country and, therefore, poor man will have to suffer till the country has fully developed. I beg to differ from this conclusion.” Parwez to Ayub Khan, February 6, 1965 (GAPP).

[290] “The Arrest of the Mullahs,” note by M.F.H. Beg enclosed with R. G. Beer, British High Commission, Karachi, to N. J. Barrington, February 2, 1967, DO 134/32: Correspondence between Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca on Pakistan General Politics, 1966–67, folder 2: 264 (TNA; Electronic Resource).

[291] “Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee of Fundamental Conflict,” April 17, 1967, 1 (GAPP).

[292] “Hilal Body Meeting,” Dawn, January 11, 1967.

[293] N. J. Barrington, British High Commission, Rawalpindi, to R. M. Purcell, January 24, 1967, in DO 134/32: Correspondence between Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca …, folder 2: 257 (TNA; Electronic Resource).

[294] “The Arrest of the Mullahs,” citing Altaf Gauhar, who was then secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and a confidant of the president. A copy of the order issued to the press not to report on these matters is included in a note from N. J. Barrington to R. M. Purcell, February 16, 1967: DO 134/32: Correspondence between Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca …, folder 2: 271 (TNA; Electronic Resource).

[295] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 251.

[296] Ayub Khan to Parwez, July 2, 1960 (GAPP).

[297] Rahman, Islam, 31. For the Urdu translation of this chapter, see Fazlur Rahman, “Qur’an-i majid,” trans. Muhammad Sarwar, Fikr o nazar 5/4 (October 1967): 249–68; for the quoted passage, ibid., 251.

[298] Fazlur Rahman, “Divine Revelation and the Prophet,” Dawn, August 25, 1968.

[299] See Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 237, 316–17.

[300] File 331/CF/68–2620: Controversy on Dr. Fazlur Rahman’s book “Islam”; minutes and decisions of the cabinet meeting on September 4, 1968 (NDC). The cabinet clearly did not know that Urdu translations of the book’s individual chapters had been appearing in the journal of the Islamic Research Institute for more than a year by that time. (See note 116, earlier.) Those translations had probably contributed to the opposition of the ‘ulama, most of whom did not read English at that time. That publicizing those translations would help clear the air was a curious observation.

[301] Baxter, Diaries, 253 (entry for September 5, 1968).

[302] Imroz (Lahore), September 6, 1968: “Idara-i tahqiqat-i Islami ke director Fazlur Rahman musta‘fi hogae.”

[303] See chapter 7, note 53.

[304] For these events, see Afzal, Pakistan, 337–49.

[305] On him, see Peter Custers, “Maulana Bhashani and the Transition to Secular Politics in East Bengal,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 47 (2010): 231–59, esp. 249–52.

[306] “2.5 Million Strike in West Pakistan,” New York Times, March 18, 1969.

[307] Afzal, Pakistan, 376.

[308] Willem van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 124–25.

[309] For the election results, see Afzal, Pakistan, 394–99.

[310] Around 1.5 million people were said to be in India as refugees in May 1971, perhaps as many as 10 million by the end of the year. Schendel, History of Bangladesh, 163–64.

[311] The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War (Lahore: Vanguard, n.d. [2000]), 317; Schendel, History of Bangladesh, 173. There was extensive sexual violence, too, on which see Nayanika Mookherjee, The Spectral

Wound: Sexual Violence, Public Memories, and the Bangladesh War of 1971 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015). Needless to say, the violence perpetrated by the opposing side—notably, the Bengali militia Mukti Bahini—was no less atrocious or extensive.

[312] Muhammad Umar Memon, “Pakistani Urdu Creative Writing on National Disintegration: The Case of Bangladesh,” Journal of Asian Studies 43 (1983): 105–27; Kamran Asdar Ali, Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947–1972 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 200–205; Gary J. Bass, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 328–30.

[313] “Mulk ke liye sab se bara khatra socialism hai,” Nawa-i waqt, February 25, 1970. For the fatwa (in English translation) and its signatories, see New Times (Rawalpindi), February 27, 1970, enclosed with R. E. Escritt, British High Commission, Rawalpindi, to P. J. Priestley, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, March 10, 1970, FCO37/681: Political Parties in Pakistan (TNA; Electronic Resource).

[314] On the event, see Report on Islamic Summit 1974 Pakistan, Lahore February 22–24, 1974 (Islamabad: Department of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, n.d. [1974]). Almost immediately after coming to power, Bhutto had proceeded on a tour of a number of Muslim countries, including Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. This January 1972 tour was followed by a second tour in May that year, which took him to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mauritania, Guinea, and Nigeria. See ibid., 5.

[315] Syeda Abida Hussain, Power Failure: The Political Odyssey of a Pakistani Woman (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 96.

[316] Ali, Communism in Pakistan, 167–94.

[317] See Ghafir Shahzad, Data Darbar Complex: Ta‘mir se takmil tak (Lahore: Idrak Publications, 2004), 32, 41. The door was made in Iran.

[318] Fazlur Rahman to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, December 2, 1974, FF 74–141 (RAC). Emphasis in the original; the words underlined here are added to the typed letter in pen.

[319] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Fazlur Rahman, January 5, 1975, FF 74–141 (RAC). Emphasis in the original. For the speech to which this exchange refers, see National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 5/39 (Karachi: Manager of Publications, n.d. [1974]; hereafter, NAPD), 565–70.

[320] Fazlur Rahman, “A Note on the Task before the Ministry of Religious Affairs,” enclosure, as Annexure B, with “Report of Professor Fazlur Rahman’s Visit to Pakistan in Summer, 1975, in Connection with the ‘Islamic Education’ Project of the University of Chicago,” FF 74–141, 1. The note was written at the request of Kausar Niazi, the minister of religious affairs. See “Report of Professor Fazlur Rahman’s Visit to Pakistan,” 4 (RAC).

[321] “A Note on the Task before the Ministry of Religious Affairs,” 1–2. Emphasis in the original.

[322] Ibid., 2–4; Abbas, “Between Western Academia and Pakistan,” 762.

[323] Fazlur Rahman, “Suggestions for the PPP Election Manifesto (1976) on the Subject of Islam,” enclosed, as Annexure A, with “Report of Professor Fazlur Rahman’s Visit to Pakistan in Summer 1975,” 1–2, FF 74–141 (RAC). Emphasis in the original.

[324] The manifesto did, however, echo Rahman’s recommendation to the Ministry of Religious Affairs to set up an institution to train imams and

preachers. See Pakistan People’s Party Manifesto, January 1977 (Rawalpindi: Pakistan People’s Party Central Secretariat, n.d.), 40.

[325] Ibid., 40.

[326] Cf. Mir Zohair Hussain, “Islam in Pakistan under Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq,” in Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, eds., Islam, Muslims and the Modern State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 47–79, especially 57. Also see Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox, 463–67.

[327] “Report of Professor Fazlur Rahman’s Visit to Pakistan in Summer 1975,” 5, FF 74–141 (RAC).

[328] Quoted, from a May 1946 article, in Aftab Ahmad, Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari, aik mutala‘a: Zati khutut ki rawshani main (Lahore: Sang-i mil Publications, 1994), 37.

[329] Ibid., 17–55. I base my account of ‘Askari’s intellectual transformation on Aftab Ahmad’s interpretation. On ‘Askari, see also Mehr Afshan Farooqi, Urdu Literary Culture: Vernacular Modernity in the Writing of Muhammad Hasan Askari (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Aamir R. Mufti, Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 14–21; Ali, Communism, 103–13. ‘Askari had translated only the first 400 or so pages of Shafi‘’s multivolume commentary till the time of his death: see the foreword by Muhammad Taqi Usmani to Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, Ma‘ariful Qur’an, vol. 1, translated by Muhammad Hasan Askari and Muhammad Shamim (Karachi: Maktaba-i Dar al-‘Ulum, 1996), xvii–xviii. The entire set was published in eight volumes between 1996 and 2005.

[330] On this, see Mark Sedgwick, Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[331] As observed in the introduction, my usage of the term “modernism” is not concerned with what it means in a European and American literary and cultural context. ‘Askari’s work is, however, an example of a critique directed simultaneously at modernism in that sense as well as at Islamic modernism.

[332] Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari, Jadidiyyat (Rawalpindi: ‘Iffat Hasan, 1979). On the date of the composition of this work (ca. 1969) and its intended audience, see Ahmad, Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari, 43.

[333] ‘Askari, Jadidiyyat, 41.

[334] Ibid., 28.

[335] Ibid., 59–60, quotation at 60. Cf. ibid., 101.

[336] Cf. Ahmad, Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari, 40–43. Even as he moved toward the ‘ulama during the Ayub Khan era, ‘Askari had maintained some of his literary pursuits. For instance, in 1968, he had published an Urdu translation of Herman Melville’s Moby Dick. See the advertisement of the book in Nawa-i waqt, February 12, 1968.

[337] For a recent example, see Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, Islam awr hamari zindagi, 10 vols. (Lahore, Pakistan: Idara-i Islamiyyat, 2010). This work, whose title may be rendered Islam and Our Life, is a collection of a number of ‘Usmani’s writings and sermons. The volumes deal with matters of belief, ritual, and other religious practices (vols. 1, 2, 10), good and bad morals and etiquette (vols. 7–9), Sufi ethics (vol. 6), the family (vol. 5), the teachings of Islam on economic matters (vol. 3), and the norms of social comportment (vol. 4). Although this is a work on ethics, ‘Usmani’s interest is overwhelmingly in personal ethics rather than in the ethical dimensions of public and political life. Indeed, as he argues in commenting

on Q 5.105, the best path to the reform of society is through reforming the self. See ‘Usmani (2010, 6:45–62).

[338] All four books—Khushbu, Sad barg, Khud kalami, and Inkar—are part of her collected works: Parvin Shakir, Mah-i tamam: Kulliyyat (Delhi: Educational Publishing House, 1995). The first of these was published in November 1977, in the early months of Zia al-Haqq’s martial law, though the preface to it is dated September 1976. Another collection of Shakir’s poetry was published posthumously: Kaf-i a’ina (Islamabad: Murad Publications, n.d.).

[339] C. M. Naim, “Parveen Shakir: A Note and Twelve Poems,” Annual of Urdu Studies 8 (1993): 181–91, at 184, 185.

[340] This is contained in the last of the collections of poetry published in her lifetime: Inkar (1990), now part of her collected works, Mah-i tamam. For a useful discussion of Shakir’s work, see Imran Hameed Khan, “A Room of Her Own: Romance, Resistance, and Feminist Thought in Modern Urdu Poetry,” PhD dissertation, Department of Asian Studies, University of Texas, Austin, 2015, 185–234.

[341] For a survey of political developments since the death of General Zia al-Haqq, see Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan, 259–396.

[342] See, for instance, two tracts on this question by a noted Deobandi religious scholar: Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianawi, ‘Awrat ki sarbarahi (Karachi: Maktaba-i bayyinat, n.d.). The first was written shortly after Benazir Bhutto’s assumption of office as prime minister in 1988, the second in 1993.

[343] Mawdudi explained this as an instance of having to opt for the lesser evil. See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 41–42.

[344] I refer to him as Mawlana Fazlur Rahman not only to highlight his credentials as one of the ‘ulama but also to distinguish him from the modernist intellectual of that name.

[345] My discussion here of legal developments in the late 1980s and the 1990s draws on Zaman, The Ulama, 89–91.

[346] “Enforcement of Shariah Ordinance, 1988, June 15, 1988,” in All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Central Statutes 29, quoted in Charles H. Kennedy, “Repugnancy to Islam—Who Decides?” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41 (1992): 769–88, at 777.

[347] Kennedy, “Repugnancy,” 778–79.

[348] This was the view of Ghulam Hyder Wyne, then the chief minister of the Punjab. Quoted in Kennedy, “Repugnancy,” 779, n. 44.

[349] The fullest account of the rise of the Taliban and its background is by Ahmad Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). Also see Zaman, The Ulama, 136–43; David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present, trans. John King (London: Hurst, 2005); and Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 225–350.

[350] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Taliban Enforce Islamic Justice,” News, March 1, 1996.

[351] “Pak Agencies Not Backing Taliban: PM,” News, February 19, 1995.

[352] Bhutto, Reconciliation, 115.

[353] Cf. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 236.

[354] Rashid, Taliban, 90. On the role of Bhutto’s interior minister, Naseerullah Babar, see ibid., 27–29, 184–85.

[355] “Text of Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill,” Dawn, August 29, 1998.

[356] For estimates of terrorism and Taliban insurgency-related deaths in Pakistan, see chapter 7, note 187. On the financial cost, a military spokesman stated in September 2016 that the country “had suffered a cumulative loss of $106.98 billion in the war on terror between 2001 and 2015.” Iftikhar A. Khan, “IS Footprints Eliminated from Pakistan: Army,” Dawn, September 4, 2016.

[357] On the 2002 ruling of the Shari‘at Appellate Bench and its context, see Zaman, “Religious Discourse,” 55–73.

[358] Pervez Musharraf, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,” Washington Post, June 1, 2004. Cf. idem, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), 297–99.

[359] Qudssia Akhlaque, “OIC to Discuss Challenges Faced by Muslim World,” Dawn, June 1, 2004.

[360] Khawar Ghumman, “Oct 12 Takeover Made Part of SSC Curriculum,” Dawn, December 30, 2006.

[361] For an overview of Ghamidi’s thought, see Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Rethinking Shari‘a: Javed Ahmad Ghamidi on Hudud,” Die Welt des Islams 47 (2007): 356–75.

[362] Ibid., 368.

[363] Ibid., 370.

[364] Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Mizan, 3rd ed. (Lahore: al-Mawrid, 2008), 491–92.

[365] Sadaf Aziz, “Making a Sovereign State: Javed Ghamidi and ‘Enlightened Moderation,’” Modern Asian Studies 45 (2011): 598–99.

[366] Ghamidi, Mizan, 511.

[367] Ibid., 490–92. He adduces Q 9.5, 9.11 and a hadith report that has the Prophet say: “I have been commanded to fight people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger, establish prayer and pay the zakat.”

[368] See Ghamidi, Mizan, 610–30, esp. 611, 614, 626. Following his mentor, Amin Ahsan Islahi, and the latter’s teacher, Hamid al-din Farahi, Ghamidi argues against stoning to death as the punishment for adultery. See Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Burhan, 3rd ed. (Lahore: Dar al-ishraq, 2001), 34–124, esp. 81–84.

[369] Ghamidi, Mizan, 615, 628–30; idem, Burhan, 81–84.

[370] Fazlur Rahman, “The Concept of Hadd in Islamic Law,” Islamic Studies 4 (1965): 237–51.

[371] Declan Walsh, “Islamic Scholar Attacks Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws,” Guardian, January 20, 2011. On the associate, Muhammad Faruq Khan, who was assassinated, see chapter 7, note 170.

[372] See, for example, Muhammad Shakil Auj, Ta‘birat (Karachi: Kulliyya-i ma‘arif-i Islamiyya, 2013), 215.

[373] Ibid., 315.

[374] Ibid., 201–18.

[375] Ibid., 135–48. The word “coexistence” is his, in English. Ibid., 147. For the argument that the Qur’anic “believers” includes many non-Muslims, see Fred M. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). Auj was, however, not acquainted with Donner’s work.

[376] Muhammad Shakil Auj, Nisa’iyyat: Chand fikri o nazari mabahis (Karachi: Kulliyya-i ma‘arif-i Islamiyya, Jami‘a Karachi, 2012), 37–48.

[377] Ibid., 95–107.

[378] Ibid., 243–64, 301–4.

[379] Ibid., 227–42.

[380] Ibid., 61–71.

[381] Ibid., 62.

[382] Ibid., 19–36.

[383] Ibid., 129–43. Oddly, he does not refer to Thanawi in this discussion.

[384] Ibid., 297–99.

[385] Imtiaz Ali, “KU Dean Shakeel Auj Shot Dead,” Dawn, September 19, 2014.

[386] Ibid.

[387] For the text of this petition, see Haya Fatima Iqbal, “Remembering Dr. Shakeel Auj: The Man Who Wasn’t Afraid,” blogpost, September 18, 2015, at www.dawn.com/news/1207553 (accessed January 25, 2016).

[388] Ziaur Rehman, “A Pakistani Scholar Accused of Blasphemy Is Shot Dead,” New York Times, September 18, 2014.

[389] For the text of the fatwa and of the letter stating that it was fake, see Iqbal, “Remembering Dr. Shakeel Auj.” The alleged fatwa and the letter are from Mufti Muhammad Rafi ‘Usmani, the president of the Dar al-‘Ulum of Karachi. Cf. Ali, “KU Dean.”

[390] On the seeming ubiquity of different kinds of violence in contemporary Karachi, see Laurent Gayer, Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[391] Muhammad Khalid Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study of Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi's Life and Thought (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1977). This book, reprinted several times, is based on Masud's PhD dissertation.

[392] For a useful summary of Shatibi's views, see Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-fiqh (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 164–74.

[393] Muhammad Khalid Masud, Shari'a Today: Essays on Contemporary Issues and Debates in Muslim Societies (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2013), 67–68. Masud has also drawn on Wali Allah to make the point that the normative authority of the shari'a rests in good measure on its ability to accord with social mores, which is to say—though Masud does not say it in so many words—that efforts to impose the shari'a from the top down would be oppressive and counterproductive. Masud also suggests that shari'a rulings need to remain receptive to changing needs and to become receptive to the input of those who have traditionally been excluded from thinking about the law. See ibid., 107–8, 113–16.

[394] Ibid., 67–68.

[395] Ibid., 212. See also ibid., 247.

[396] Auj, Nisa'iyyat, 19–36.

[397] Sa‘id Ahmad Jalalpuri, “Kiya Islam mukammal zabita-i hayat nahin?” Bayyinat 70/11 (January 2008): 3–14, at 6–7. Masud’s remarks had first appeared in Nawa-i waqt, November 7, 2007. They are quoted in Jalalpuri, 5.

[398] Kalbe Ali, “Muslim Women Cannot Object to Husbands’ Marriages: CII Chief,” Dawn, October 22, 2014; Kalbe Ali, “CII Justifies ‘Light Beatings’ for Errant Wives,” Dawn, May 27, 2016. For a brief profile of Shirani, see http://cii.gov.pk/aboutcii/Chairmansprofile.aspx (accessed August 10, 2016). The council had taken some highly conservative positions in the Zia al-Haqq era, too. See, for instance, chapter 5, note 86.

[399] “Senator Seeks Increased Women’s Role in CII,” Dawn, November 21, 2016.

[400] Rahman, Major Themes<nowiki>; cf. idem, “The Qur’anic Concept of God, the Universe and Man,”</nowiki> Islamic Studies 6 (1967): 1–19.

[401] Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., Ethics in Islam (Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1985).

[402] Auj, Ta‘birat, front matter.

[403] See the affectionate obituary of Ghulam Muhammad by Abdul Hakim: “Sabiq Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad nawwar Allah marqadahu,” Saqafat 3/6 (December 1956): 7–18.

[404] Significantly, once his formal association with the government had ended, some of the same ‘ulama who had opposed him most vociferously became, by his own account, considerably more accommodating. Reporting on his visit to the prominent Deobandi scholar Muhammad Yusuf Bannuri in the summer of 1974, both to seek his cooperation for the Islam and Social

Change project and to sound him out on the Ahmadi issue then engulfing the country (see chapter 5), Rahman observed that “he did me the honour of welcoming me and making me sit immediately on his right side!” Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘ of the Dar al-‘Ulum madrasa, whom Rahman met separately, also “welcomed me with kindness, even warmth…. [His] son (Muhammad Taqi [‘Usmani]) was also very kind and, in fact, paid me a visit the next day and again assured me of help.” Fazlur Rahman, “A Report of My Visit to Pakistan,” enclosed with Rahman to Reuben Frodin, October 7, 1974: 6–7, FF 74–141 (RAC).

[405] “Enlightened Moderation Threat to Country: Qazi,” Dawn, March 23, 2005.

[406] Khalifa Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology (Lahore: Publishers United, 1951), chapter 14. The second edition, published in 1953, had already replaced it with a different chapter (“Reconstruction and Renaissance”).

[407] In an effort, perhaps, to salvage his socialist leanings and to distinguish them from the threat of communism, Khalifa Abdul Hakim had written a book in which he had sought to show that Islam met the material needs of people better than did communism. See his Islam and Communism, 3rd ed. (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1962; first published in 1951).

[408] Ali, Communism, 167–94, esp. 171.

[409] Status of Labour Rights in Pakistan: The Year 2014 (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research, 2015), 23. On the effects of privatization, see ibid., 23. Ali, Communism, 61, notes that about one-third of nonagricultural labor was unionized in 1947. He reminds us, however, that “[l]ess than 1 percent of [Pakistan’s] … population were involved in wage labour” at the time. Also see Shazia Hasan, “Only One Percent of Pakistan’s Labour Is Unionized,” Dawn, May 1, 2015.

[410] Report of the Constitution Commission, 75–76.

[411] Even Abdul Hakim, with his noted interest in Hindu scriptures, had a view of polytheism that raised questions about whether the Hindus could be good Pakistani citizens. “Islam considers only polytheism as the root of all evil which degrades Man and God and disrupts humanity by numerous hostile objects of worship. Polytheism is not a mere metaphysical belief, harmless to hold as a speculative hypothesis; it cuts into the lives of those who hold it. It makes them superstitious and lowers their morality and stands in the way of personal and social unity and well-being.” Islamic Ideology, 157. Though he allowed elsewhere that “reformed Hinduism is becoming more and more monotheistic” (ibid., 45), the extent to which Pakistan’s Hindu population was not yet monotheistic was clearly the degree to which it represented a challenge to morality and to national integration.

[412] An important influence on Abdul Hakim’s thought was the work of the Danish philosopher and theologian Harald Höffding (d. 1931), who had argued that “the essence of religion is not contained in the dogmas which have been formulated once and for ever. These may be set aside.” Harald Höffding, Philosophy of Religion, trans. from the German by B. E. Meyer (London: Macmillan, 1906), 352. Instead, religion was concerned with the “conservation of values” seen by its adherents as “the highest.” Ibid., 217–44, especially 218. This was in line with Muslim modernist sensibilities. As Abdul Hakim would put it, “To me it appears that religious belief could not be characterized in better terms.” Islamic Ideology, 50. Yet, Höffding had also highlighted the importance of “[t]he Church as the bearer of a great tradition, of a group of figures in which countless generations … have deposited their deepest experiences of life—everything that they have felt, thought and suffered under the buffetings of fate in small things as well as in great.” Höffding, Philosophy of Religion, 352–53. This did not go well with modernist attitudes toward the millennium-old Islamic tradition, but Abdul Hakim’s initiative to foster a new space for the ‘ulama may well have owed something to it.

[413] “Maulana Usmani Passes Away,” Dawn, December 14, 1949.

[414] CAPD, 5/5, 94–95 (Liaquat Ali Khan, March 12, 1949).

[415] For the original Urdu text, which I follow here, see Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 231–39. For the official English translation, see CAPD, 5/3, March 9, 1949, 43–48. The English translation diverges in some respects from the Urdu text.

[416] In his address to the Karachi High Court Bar Association in August 1952, the governor-general, Ghulam Muhammad, too, had steered clear of any suggestion that the implementation of Islamic law might be expected of public officials professing Islamic commitments. Instead, he had limited himself to calling upon “the educated classes … to inspire people and to inculcate in them those moral and spiritual values conferred by the Quran without which no leadership can achieve moral and spiritual progress.” Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan, August 28, 1952, 5, in DO 35/3185: Pakistan Internal Affairs (TNA). A lack of reference to Islamic law is especially remarkable in that the governor-general was addressing lawyers and jurists.

[417] Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 237–38; CAPD, 5/3, March 9, 1949, 47.

[418] Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 235, 237; CAPD, 5/3, March 9, 1949, 45, 46.

[419] CAPD, 5/1, March 7, 1949, 3.

[420] Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 235; CAPD, 5/3, March 9, 1949, 45.

[421] CAPD, 5/1 (March 7, 1949), 3.

[422] Ahmad, ed., Speeches, 2: 208–9. For this passage, see chapter 1, note 122.

[423] Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 234; CAPD, 5/3, March 9, 1949, 44.

[424] See “The Views of the Board of Talimmat-e-Islamia [sic] on certain items referred to them by the sub-committee on federal and provincial constitutions and distribution of powers” (April 1950) and “Views of the Board of Talimat-e-Islamia” (August 1950), in Binder, Religion and Politics, appendixes A and B, 383–429. I will refer to the two documents, the second a supplement to the first, as Views I and II, and will follow Binder’s pagination for them. For Binder’s discussion of these recommendations, see Religion and Politics, 155–82.

[425] “Views” I, in Binder, Religion and Politics, 394.

[426] Ibid., 385.

[427] Ibid., 387–88; “Views” II, ibid., 417–25.

[428] Ibid., 409–10.

[429] Ibid., 410–12.

[430] “Views” I, ibid., 388.

[431] Ibid., 386.

[432] Cf. “Views” II, ibid., 406–7.

[433] The best instance of this is Binder, Religion and Politics, who points as well to the incoherence of the Board’s views: 154–82.

[434] “Views” I, ibid., 389–91.

[435] “Views” II, ibid., 427–29; cf. ibid., 407–8.

[436] Ibid., 409–10.

[437] Binder, Religion and Politics, 172. Cf. ibid., 343, referring to the Report of the Court of Inquiry into the anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1953 to make the point that the ‘ulama did not accept the idea of human legislation. See Report of the Court of Inquiry, 211–12. Also Qasmi, The Ahmadis, 152.

[438] “Views” I, in Binder, Religion and Politics, 396.

[439] Binder, Religion and Politics, 178–82.

[440] Fundamental Principles of an Islamic State, Formulated at a Gathering of Ulama of Various Muslim Schools of Law under the Presidentship of Allama Syed Suleiman Sahib Nadvi (Karachi: N.p., n.d. [1951]), 2.

[441] Binder, Religion and Politics, 336–37. The modernist Ghulam Ahmad Parwez believed, for his part, that the constitution of 1956 was “un-Islamic.” This was his way of justifying the 1958 military coup. He

also thought that political parties, taken for granted by the 1956 constitution, had as little basis in Islam as did “religious sects.” Parwez to Ayub Khan, June 18, 1960, pp. 1 and 4 of the letter (GAPP).

[442] See the anguished letter of Muhammad Manzur Nu‘mani, November 26, 1945, and ‘Usmani’s response to it, December 29, 1945, in Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 146–55. Nu‘mani was then a member of the Deoband madrasa’s advisory council and the editor of an Urdu monthly. On him, see Rizwi, Ta’rikh, 2: 155–56. Also see ‘Usmani’s exchange, November–December 1945, with Habib al-Rahman Ludhianawi, a Deobandi scholar and politician: Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 155–65.

[443] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 2: 886–87. Mosque preachers, too, had sometimes “accused the high government officials of moral depredations.” “Extracts from Confidential Weekly Diaries, Sialkot,” March 14, 1953, in ibid., vol. 2: 217. On the two judges of the court, see Qasmi, The Ahmadis, 25–29.

[444] For a biographical sketch of Hanif Nadwi by a former colleague and fellow member of the Ahl-i Hadith, see Muhammad Ishaq Bhatti, Qafila-i Hadith (Lahore: Maktaba-i Quddusiyya, 2003), 272–379. Also see the collection of essays in Hanif Nadwi’s honor: Muhammad Ishaq Bhatti, ed., Armughan-i Hanif (Lahore: Idara-i saqafat-i Islamiyya, 1980).

[445] Muhammad Hanif Nadwi, Mas’ala-i ijtihad (Lahore: Idara-i saqafat-i Islamiyya, 1952).

[446] Ibid., 2, 5–6. Cf. Wali Allah, Hujjat Allah al-baligha, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-turath, 1936), 1: 4–5; Marcia Hermansen, The Conclusive Argument from God: Shah Wali Allah of Delhi’s Hujjat Allah al-Baligha (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 11.

[447] Nadwi, Mas’ala-i ijtihad, 163–64.

[448] Ibid., 109, following (slightly inaccurately) Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Shawkani, Irshad al-fuhul ila tahqiq al-haqq min ‘ilm al-usul (Cairo: Muhammad ‘Ali Subayh, 1930), 220.

[449] Nadwi, Mas’ala-i ijtihad, 109–10.

[450] Ibid., 117.

[451] Ibid., 117.

[452] Cf. ibid., 127. Wali Allah, too, had spoken of the Prophet’s ijtihad. See Hujja, 1: 123–24; Hermansen, Conclusive Argument, 357–60.

[453] Nadwi, Mas’ala-i ijtihad, 128–29.

[454] Ibid., 129.

[455] Ibid., 172.

[456] Ibid., 172.

[457] Ibid., 114–16. For the relevant passage in Shatibi, though Nadwi does not give a reference to it, see Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat fi usul al-shari‘a, ed. ‘Abdallah Daraz, 4 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Rahmaniyya, n.d.), 4: 111. Also see Muhammad Khalid Masud, Muslim Jurists’ Quest for the Normative Basis of Shari‘a (Leiden: ISIM Occasional Papers, 2001), 13.

[458] Nadwi, Mas’ala-i ijtihad, 180–82.

[459] Ibid., 180.

[460] Weiss, Spirit, 158–63.

[461] Nadwi, Mas’ala-i ijtihad, 181.

[462] See Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 221–60.

[463] Muhammad Ja‘far Nadwi Phulwarwi, al-Din yusr (Lahore: Idara-i saqafat-i Islamiyya, 1955). For a brief discussion, see Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 207–9. For a biographical sketch, see Muhammad Ishaq Bhatti, Bazm-i arjumandan (Delhi: al-Kitab International, 2005), 351–99.

[464] Phulwarwi, al-Din yusr, 170–71. For the other examples, see ibid., 168–70.

[465] Ibid., 8–9. This part of the discussion also occurs in Phulwarwi’s Izdiwaji zindagi ke-liye ahamm qanuni tajawiz (Lahore: Idara-i saqafat-i Islamiyya, 1955), 96–109, at 96–97. A similar point was made much earlier, in 1884, by Sayyid Ahmad Khan: see “Islam,” in his Khutbat, 1: 530–31.

[466] Phulwarwi, al-Din yusr, 9. For a fuller discussion of ritual prayer, and elements of “ease” that the later tradition has obscured, see ibid., 295–315. Husayn Ahmad Madani, too, had once invoked the example of ritual prayer to make the point that shari‘a stipulations can vary in light of circumstances. See Najm al-din Islahi, ed., Maktubat-i Shaykh al-Islam, 4 vols. (Deoband: Maktaba-i diniyya, 1963), 1: 399–400 (letter to ‘Abd al-Wahhab Gumthallawi, January 18, 1942).

[467] Phulwarwi, al-Din yusr, 350. For the full discussion of hudud, see ibid., 347–68.

[468] Ibid., 352–55.

[469] Ibid., 356–59. For the pains medieval jurists often took to arrive at an understanding of Qur’anic teachings on such matters, which could lead to avoiding the infliction of the harsher penalties, see Weiss, Spirit, 101–12. Also see Intisar A. Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[470] Phulwarwi, al-Din yusr, 358.

[471] Ibid., 366, citing Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I‘lam al-muwaqqi‘in ‘an Rabb al-‘alamin, ed. Muhammad Muhyi al-din ‘Abd al-Hamid, 4 vols. (Cairo: Matba‘at al-sa‘ada, 1955), 3: 16. Also see Nawir Yuslem Nurbain, “Ibn Qayyim’s Reformulation of the Fatwa,” unpublished MA thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1995, 89.

[472] Phulwarwi, al-Din yusr, 367–68. For a poetic expression of a similar idea, see Parvin Shakir, “Aik buri ‘awrat” (“A Bad Woman”), in idem, Khushbu, the first of the four books (each with independent pagination) in her Mah-i tamam, 351–57.

[473] In a letter to Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, who had urged him not to write on “religious” (as distinguished from literary and historical) topics while employed at the institute, Phulwarwi had denied that he was constrained in his work by this employment. Parwez’s point was not, of course, that Phulwarwi had to take undesirable modernist positions by virtue of his affiliation with the institute but rather that he presumably had to water down some of his positions because this government-supported institute did not want to ruffle too many conservative feathers. The letter is undated but

seems to have been written in 1957–58, like several others of Phulwarwi's letters in this collection. In another undated letter, Phulwarwi did concede that he said certain things in the interest of expediency—again, presumably not to excessively agitate the conservative sentiment in society—but insisted that he did not do so at anyone's bidding. Also see Phulwarwi to Parwez, April 23, 1957 (GAPP).

[474] Hanif Nadwi, Mas'ala-i ijtihad, 112–13.

[475] Ibid., 99, 140.

[476] For a discussion of the report, the note of dissent, and the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance promulgated on the basis of the report, see Khan, "Institutions not Intentions," chapter 4.

[477] "Report of the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws," Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary), June 20, 1956, 1197–1232, at 1200; Iqbal, Reconstruction, 141. The other two kinds of ijtihad that Iqbal had identified had to do with the authority to arrive at legal rulings within the parameters of a school of law but without the constraint of earlier views, and the authority to rule on specific issues left unaddressed by the school's founding fathers. Ibid., 141.

[478] "Report of the Commission on Marriage," 1200–1201.

[479] Ibid., 1202. A similar vision is set forth in elaborate detail in Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, especially 214–45.

[480] "Report of the Commission on Marriage," 1203.

[481] Ibid., 1203.

[482] For the commission’s recommendations, which in part were based on the results of a questionnaire to which responses had been elicited from the public, see ibid., 1207–32.

[483] Ibid., 1216.

[484] Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi, “Shadi commission ki report ka ikhtilafi note,” Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary), August 30, 1956, 1505–1604. This note was published both in Urdu and in an English translation. My references here are to the Urdu original (1505–60). On Thanawi, see Abu Salman Shahjahanpuri, ed., Mawlana Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi ki ap biti (Karachi: Mawlana Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi Academy, 1993).

[485] Thanawi, “Shadi commission,” 1505–25.

[486] Ibid., 1527.

[487] Ibid., 1527, 1529, 1530.

[488] Ibid., 1529.

[489] Ibid., 1532–40.

[490] Ibid., 1544–46.

[491] “Report of the Commission on Marriage,” 1232.

[492] Thanawi, “Shadi commission,” 1549.

[493] Ibid., 1528, 1547, 1550, 1557.

[494] The Deobandis, as represented by Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi, were not alone in their criticism of the marriage commission’s report. The Barelawis, too, condemned it. See Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam‘iyyat ‘Ulama-i-Pakistan 1948–1979 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993), 19. So did the Jama‘at-i Islami. See Khurshid Ahmad, ed., Marriage Commission Report X-Rayed (Karachi: Chiragh-e-Rah Publications, 1959).

[495] Phulwarwi, Izdiwaji zindagi, 96–109, esp. 96.

[496] Ibid., 28–29. Also see ibid., 103: “It has come to be asserted in our times that human beings have no right to make the law. If what is meant by this law relates to the limits set down by God (hudud-i Ilahiyya), then this view can be accepted, though only to a certain degree. By if it means ‘by-laws’ [sic], then this view is altogether incorrect. In our view, it would be better to put it this way: The human being has the authority to make law but not to make up religion.”

[497] Ibid., 66.

[498] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 2: 658–59. Also see ibid., 660. The judges’ reference here is to the English translation, which the British had commissioned in the late eighteenth century for use in their courts in India. See Charles Hamilton, trans., The Hedaya, or Guide: A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws, 4 vols. (London: T. Bensley, 1791). Qasimi was educated at two premier Deobandi madrasas, the parent institution in the town of Deoband and the Mazahir al-‘Ulum in Saharanpur (Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 2: 658; on his teaching the Hidaya, see ibid., 659. Among his works is a compilation of some of the discourses of the Deobandi Sufi master Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi. See Muhammad ‘Abd al-Halim

Qasimi, ed., Ashraf al-malfuzat (Lahore: Wifaq Press, n.d. [1976]).

[499] Cf. Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1964), 105.

[500] For both quotations, see “Thanvi, Rahman State Their Case,” Dawn, October 9, 1963.

[501] “Notification: Establishment of Central Institute of Islamic Research: Nomination of the Board of Governors,” March 11, 1960, in 324/CF/1959–2274: Creation of an Islamic Research Centre (NDC).

[502] I borrow this phrase from Charles L. Glenn, The Ambiguous Embrace: Government and Faith-based Schools and Social Agencies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[503] Khursheed-ul-Hasan, “Men’s Right of Divorce Restricted,” Dawn, March 3, 1961. For the text of the law, see ibid., “Ordinance on Family Laws: Text.”

[504] “A Great Step Forward,” Dawn, March 5, 1961. Emphasis in the original. Ghulam Ahmad Parwez wrote to the newspaper’s editor to commend him for “projecting so successfully Quranic principles against dogma and blind orthodoxy.” Parwez to Altaf Husain, March 12, 1961 (GAPP).

[505] Muhammad Shafi‘ to Ayub Khan, April 1, 1961 (GAPP). The letter, typed in Urdu, is three pages long; an annexure, commenting on specific provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, comprises another seven pages. Also see Khan, “Institutions not Intentions,” 297–98.

[506] Shafi‘ to Ayub Khan, April 1, 1961, p. 5 of the annexure.

[507] Ibid., p. 1 of the annexure.

[508] Ibid., p. 1 of the annexure.

[509] Ibid., p. 2 of the letter.

[510] Ibid., p. 7 of the annexure.

[511] Muhammad Rafi‘ ‘Usmani, Hayat-i mufti-i a‘zam (Karachi: Idarat al-ma‘arif, 1994), 166.

[512] Nazr Ahmad, Ja’iza-i madaris-i ‘arabiyya-i Maghribi Pakistan (Lyallpur: Jami‘a Chishtiyya Trust, 1960), 294. The 56-acre gift had come from a South African Muslim. See Muhammad Rafi Usmani’s preface to Azizur Rahman, Introducing Darul ‘Uloom Karachi, trans. Muhammad Shameem (Karachi: Public Information Department, Darul ‘Uloom Karachi, n.d.), 7.

[513] Note by S. Hashim Raza, joint secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, appended to Raza’s letter to A. A. Hamid, joint secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, July 29, 1955, 207-CF-54–2147: Orders of the Egyptian Government Controlling Sermons in Mosques; Preparation of Khutbas (NDC). Cf. Report of the Court of Inquiry, 214–18.

[514] Memo from S. M. Jamil Wasti, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, January 5, 1956, with an appended note by S. Hashim Raza. The quotation is from Raza’s note on “the action taken in the matter for completion of the record,” 207-CF-54–2147 (NDC).

[515] Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, Ma‘arif al-Qur’an, 8 vols. (Karachi: Idarat al-ma‘arif, 1969–73). In his preface to the first volume of this work, Shafi‘ does mention its origins in a radio program but not the background to it, of which he may not have been aware. See ibid., 1: 9–10. The preface is dated July 1963. Shafi‘’s radio program was discontinued in June 1964, though he had reached only the end of chapter 14 of the Qur’an by that time (see ibid., 9 n. 1).

[516] See chapter 2, note 148.

[517] The copy of Shafi‘’s letter in the Parwez Papers has a notation from one M. Ali in the President’s Secretariat asking “Can you produce an answer to this?” (Shafi‘ to Ayub Khan, April 1, 1961, p. 7 of the annexure). Also see Qudratullah Shahab to Parwez, April 28, 1961, asking Parwez to draft a response, presumably to Shafi‘’s letter (GAPP).

[518] A’ili qawanin Qur’an-i karim ki rawshani main (Lahore: Ittihad Printing Press, n.d.). Parwez’s name does not appear on the title page, but the tract was issued under the auspices of his Tulu‘-i Islam and is unmistakably by him. It was written shortly after the first session of the National Assembly convened under the new constitution in June–July 1962 (see ibid., 19). I am grateful to Steve Millier for making this text available to me.

[519] Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, “A’ili qanun par mukhtasar tabsira,” Bayyinat (Karachi), 1/6–7 (March–April 1963): 9–48, at 13–14. Cited in Khan, “Institutions not Intentions,” 297–98. I am grateful to Dr. Khan for sharing a copy of Shafi‘’s article with me. In a move to embarrass the government, this article proceeds to publish not just Shafi‘’s letter to the president but also his full indictment of the 1961 ordinance.

[520] For instance, see the statements in support of these ordinances by Mufti Mahmud and Shah Ahmad Nurani, the leaders of the Deobandi Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam and the Barelawi Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Pakistan, respectively. Nawa-i waqt, February 13, 1979. For expressions

of the support for them by Ihsan Ilahi Zahir of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Jama‘at-i Islami leader ‘Abdul Ghafur Ahmad (who was then a member of Zia al-Haqq’s cabinet), see Nawa-i waqt, February 11, 1979.

[521] Asma Jahangir, “What the Protection of Women Act Does and What Is Left Undone,” Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2006 (Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan), 11, at www.hrcp-web.org/hrcpDetail_pub3.cfm?proID=374 (accessed September 28, 2008).

[522] Charles Kennedy, “Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances,” in idem, Islamization of Laws and Economy: Case Studies on Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies), 64. Cf. Jahangir, “What the Protection of Women Act Does,” 9; Moeen H. Cheema and Abdul-Rahman Mustafa, “From the Hudood Ordinances to the Protection of Women Act: Islamic Critiques of the Hudood Laws of Pakistan,” UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 8/1 (2009): 15–16.

[523] “Text of Federal Shariat Court Judgment in Zafran Bibi Case,” Dawn, August 21, 2002. This is the text of the court’s detailed judgment. It had released her on the basis of an earlier decision in June 2002. On this case, see also Waseem Ahmad Shah, “Zafran Case Sent to Shariat Court,” Dawn, May 8, 2002; Abdul Sami Paracha, “Mother Narrates Zafran’s Ordeal,” ibid., May 13, 2002; Seth Mydans, “In Pakistan, Rape Victims Are the ‘Criminals,’” New York Times, May 17, 2002; idem, “Sentenced to Death, Rape Victim Is Freed by Pakistani Court,” New York Times, June 8, 2002; Hina Azam, Sexual Violation in Islamic Law: Substance, Evidence, and Procedure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3–4.

[524] National Commission on the Status of Women, Government of Pakistan, Report on Hudood Ordinances 1979 (Islamabad: National Commission on the Status of Women, 2003). On Justice Majida Rizvi, the first woman to be appointed as a judge of a higher court, see “Interview: Truth and Justice,” Dawn, February 2, 2013.

[525] Report on Hudood Ordinances (2003), 39.

[526] For a discussion of the Hudood ordinances, the debate on it, the work of Justice Rizvi’s committee, and the Protection of Women Act of 2006, see Khan, “Institutions not Intentions,” chapter 5. For an earlier account of some of these matters, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Pakistan: Shari‘a and the State,” in Robert W. Hefner, ed., Shari‘a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 220–26.

[527] Ahmed Hassan, “NA Committee to Review Amended Draft,” Dawn, September 16, 2006; cf. idem, “Govt Yields to MMA on Hudood Laws,” ibid., September 12, 2006.

[528] Others included Sarfaraz Na‘imi and Munib al-Rahman, both of whom belonged to the Barelawi orientation. See Ahmad Hassan, “Govt Yields to MMA on Hudood Laws,” Dawn, September 12, 2006. Na‘imi was then the president of the Jami‘a Na‘imiyya of Lahore; Munib al-Rahman was the president of the board of Barelawi madrasas as well as chairman of the Ru’yat al-Hilal Committee, the official body that certifies the sighting of the moon in determining the beginning and the end of the month of Ramadan.

[529] Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, The Text of the Historic Judgment on Riba (Interest), Given by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, 23rd December 1999 … Section Written by Maulana Justice Muhammad Taqi Usmani (Petaling Jaya: Other Press, 2001).

[530] “Usmani Monetary Interest Led to His Removal,” Dawn, June 12, 2002.

[531] Ibid.

[532] For example, “Govt’s Ulema Team,” Dawn, September 10, 2006.

[533] Amir Wasim, “MMA Rejects ‘Agreed’ Draft: Impasse on Hudood Bill Persists,” Dawn, September 15, 2006.

[534] Cf. Jahangir “What the Protection of Women Act Does,” 5–6. For the full text of the act, see www.pakistani.org/legislation/2006/wpb.html (accessed April 21, 2010).

[535] Raja Asghar, “Some Respite for Women, at Last: Protection of Rights Bill Gets through NA,” Dawn, November 16, 2006.

[536] Iftikhar A. Khan, “Musharraf Finds Kind Words for PPP,” Dawn, November 16, 2006.

[537] Ahmed Hassan, “MMA to ‘Resign’ in December,” Dawn, November 17, 2006.

[538] Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, Amendments in Hudood Laws: The Protection of Women’s Rights Bill—An Appraisal (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2006); idem, Hudud qawanin: Mawjuda bahth awr a’inda la’iha-i ‘amal (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2006); idem, Hudud qawanin main tarmim: Tahaffuz-i huquq-i niswan bill kiya hai? Aik mutala‘a (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2006); idem, “The Real Contents,” Dawn, December 24, 2006; idem, “The Reality of ‘Women Protection Bills,’” at www.hudoodordinance.com (accessed October 29, 2007; the site is no longer available); idem, “Making Pakistan Safe for Rapists,” at www.albalagh.net/women/0096.shtml (accessed October 29, 2007).

[539] Taqi ‘Usmani, “Reality.”

[540] ‘Usmani, “Reality,” citing Charles Kennedy, “The Status of Women in Pakistan,” in Kennedy, Islamization, 74.

[541] Taqi ‘Usmani, “Making Pakistan Safe for Rapists.” This article draws on an essay by Taqi ‘Usmani in the Urdu language as well as on the text of an interview with him. It is not clear if he chose its title himself. But given that it appears on a website associated with his madrasa and in view of his knowledge of the English language, it seems reasonable to assume, at the very least, his approval of how the article was titled.

[542] Taqi ‘Usmani, “Making Pakistan Safe for Rapists”; cf. Cheema and Mustafa, “From the Hudood Ordinances,” 41–44.

[543] “Interview: Truth and Justice.”

[544] Council of Islamic Ideology, Hudood Ordinance 1979: A Critical Report (Islamabad: Council of Islamic Ideology, 2007). Also see Muhammad Tufayl Hashimi, Hudud Ordinance: Kitab o sunnat ki rawshani main (N.p.: ‘Awrat Foundation, 2004).

[545] On the membership of the committee, see Report on the Hudood Ordinances (2003), 2. On Taqi ‘Usmani’s declining to be part of the committee’s work, ibid., 2, 39, 108.

[546] Nasir Iqbal, “CII Objects to Having Been Sidelined on Hudood Laws,” Dawn, September 22, 2006.

[547] Cf. Zaman, The Ulama, 78–83.

[548] Report of the Committee Set Up by the Governor of West Pakistan for Recommending Improved Syllabus for the Various Darul Ulooms and Arabic Madrasas in West Pakistan (Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1962 [hereafter, Report, 1962]), appendix I, esp. p. xxiii.

[549] Ibid., 14–23; quotation at 14.

[550] Ibid., 14.

[551] Ibid., 19.

[552] Ibid., 25 and 1.

[553] Report qawmi committee barai dini madaris Pakistan (Islamabad: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1979), 65–77, esp. 66–67.

[554] “Provinces Views on Madaris Ordinance Ignored,” News, June 22, 2002.

[555] “Wafaqul Madaris May Get Varsity Status,” Dawn, February 23, 2005.

[556] See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Pluralism, Democracy, and the ‘Ulama,” in Robert W. Hefner, ed., Remaking Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 80–81.

[557] For the text of the National Action Plan, see https://nacta.gov.pk/20-points-of-national-action-plan/ (accessed June 11, 2017). On the Taliban’s killing of the schoolchildren, see Ismail Khan, “Taliban Massacre 131 Schoolchildren,” Dawn, December 17, 2014.

[558] For Ludhianawi’s critique, see Bayyinat (Karachi) 38/2 (January 1981): 2–28; also see Bayyinat 47/1 (1985): 35–63. For a summary of its contents, see Zaman, The Ulama, 78–81.

[559] Bayyinat 38/2 (January 1981): 12–13; quoted in Zaman, The Ulama, 79.

[560] Bayyinat 38/2 (January 1981), 16; Zaman, The Ulama, 79.

[561] Bayyinat 38/2 (January 1981), 27; Zaman, The Ulama, 79.

[562] Kashif Abbasi, “Five Seminary Boards to Adopt FBISE Syllabus,” Dawn, July 14, 2016.

[563] See the statement by the head of the madrasa board alliance in ibid.

[564] Mukhtar Allah Haqqani, Fatawa Haqqaniyya, 6 vols. (Akora Khattak: Jami‘a Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya, 2002), 1: 124–25.

[565] “Mufti Shamzai Shot Dead near Jamia Binoria,” News, May 31, 2004; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A Swati Boy Who Became Mufti,” ibid., May 31, 2004.

[566] “Cleric, Trader and Activist Shot Dead in ‘Sectarian Attacks’ across City,” Dawn, September 11, 2014.

[567] Muhammad ‘Imran Ashraf ‘Usmani, Shirkat wa muzarabat ‘asr-i hazir men (Karachi: Idarat al-ma‘arif, 2001); Muhammad Zubayr Ashraf ‘Usmani, Jadid ma‘ashi nizam men Islami qanun-i ijara (Karachi: Idarat al-ma‘arif, 2005). The former is Taqi ‘Usmani’s son, the latter, his nephew.

[568] Matthew J. Nelson, “Dealing with Difference: Religious Education and the Challenge of Democracy in Pakistan,” Modern Asian Studies 43 (2009): 591–618, at 595.

[569] See Khan, “Institutions not Intentions,” 30–31, n. 44.

[570] See chapter 1, note 151.

[571] Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, xxiv.

[572] This finding is based on a survey carried out by Nelson between 2003 and 2005, in which he interviewed nearly 800 people, mostly urban and educated, from across Pakistan regarding schooling preferences for their children. See Nelson, “Dealing with Difference,” 594, 600–613.

[573] In 2004–5, the Jama‘at-i Islami had 454 madrasas, with 2,749 teachers and a reported enrollment of 52,774. See Pervez A. Shami and Imtiaz Khan, Report on Deeni Madaris of Pakistan: Base-line Inoformation, 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 (Islamabad: Academy of Education Planning and Management, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, 2006), 20.

[574] Muhammad Khan Qadiri and Muhammad Siddiq Qamar, Tahrik-i minhaj al-Qur’an awr a’inda qiyadat (Lahore: Idara-i minhaj al-Qur’an, 1988), 26. For the other goals and achievements of the movement, see ibid., 24–33.

[575] On this movement, see Sadaf Ahmad, Transforming Faith: The Story of al-Huda and Islamic Revivalism among Urban Pakistani Women (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2009). On its presentation of Islam as modern and rational, ibid., 71–77. Also see the important study by Faiza Mushtaq, “New Claimants to Religious Authority: A Movement for Women’s Islamic Education, Moral Reform and Innovative Traditionalism,” PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 2010.

[576] See Mushtaq, “New Claimants,” chapter 6.

[577] For a discussion of the ‘ulama’s criticism of Hashmi and al-Huda, see ibid., chapter 4. Also see Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, Fatawa-i ‘Usmani, ed. Muhammad Zubayr Haqq Nawaz, 3 vols. (Karachi: Maktaba-i ma‘arif al-Qur’an, 2006–12), 1: 86–90.

[578] The characterization is Mushtaq’s: “New Claimants.”

[579] Report, 1962, 4.

[580] “Bring Students into Mainstream, Madaris Told,” News, January 1, 2005.

[581] Pakistan Education Statistics, 2013–2014 (Islamabad: Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training, 2015), 42, at www.aepam.edu.pk/Files/EducationStatistics/PakistanEducationStatistics2013-14.pdf (accessed June 23, 2015).

[582] Ibid., 75; Kashif Abbasi, “New Report Reveals One-tenth of All Children Enrolled in Madressahs,” Dawn, April 22, 2015.

[583] Pakistan Education Statistics, 2013–2014, 75. The primary school student numbers grew from 17,567,581 in 2011–12 to 17,869,859 in 2013–14. The number of high school students declined during those years from 2,691,595 to 2,318,840. The number of madrasa students increased during this period from 1,759,141 to 1,836,143. Ibid., 75. Also see Abbasi, “New Report.”

[584] International Crisis Group, Education Reform in Pakistan (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014), 14.

[585] The statement went on to claim that the number of students enrolled with madrasas had grown by 40 percent during 2008–9. See Khawar Ghumman, “Enrolment in Seminaries Rises by 40pc,” Dawn, October 28, 2009. This dramatic assertion remains unverified.

[586] On the collection and disbursement of zakat under Zia al-Haqq, see Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 85–119; on their proceeds going to madrasas, ibid., 143–53. Of the more than 2,500 madrasas that existed in the Punjab ca. 1995, about 800 were reportedly recipients of zakat funds from the government. See “Punjab ke dini madaris: Zakat fund se kis ko kitna milta hai?” Zindagi (Lahore), February 17–23, 1995, 38.

[587] Malik, Colonialization, 206–7.

[588] Rashid, Taliban, 90–92.

[589] 3 (3)-PMS/48: Correspondence with the Hon’ble Minister for Finance, 145–49, at 147–48 (NDC). The memo was prepared by one Abdul Matin Chaudhry. In forwarding it to the prime minister, the finance minister had signaled his concurrence with its contents.

[590] Ibid., 149.

[591] Khwaja Shahabuddin, minister of the interior, to the premiers of North-West Frontier, East Punjab, Sind et al., March 24, 1949. 108/CF/48–1888: Minutes, cabinet meetings (NDC).

[592] Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 64–65.

[593] Kalbe Ali, “Seminaries Boom in Absence of Govt Checks,” Dawn, April 29, 2016, quoting Mufti Munib al-Rahman, the head of the five-board madrasa consortium.

[594] Kepel, Jihad, 384, citing Ian Skeet, OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 240–44.

[595] See chapter 2, notes 133 and 146. Also see Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Edward Heath, the British prime minister, January 25, 1974, FCO 37/1504: Second Islamic Summit Conference, Lahore, 20–24 February 1974: 7–8 (TNA; Electronic Resource).

[596] Omar Noman, “The Impact of Migration on Pakistan’s Economy and Society,” in H. Donnan and P. Werbner, eds., Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society (London: Macmillan, 1991), 83.

[597] Ibid., 90.

[598] See, for instance, Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 3: 86, 108, 111, 191, 270, 282–83.

[599] Hints of changing religious attitudes as a possible effect of work in the Arab Middle East have continued to occasionally come to light. Tashfeen Malik, who, together with her US-born husband, was involved in a deadly shooting rampage in San Bernardino, California, in December 2015, had grown up in Saudi Arabia, where her father had moved with his family a quarter century earlier. The father had once been a mail carrier in southern Punjab. As his brother was reported to have observed, he was “a normal Barelvi Muslim, but might have taken interest in Salafi Islam in Saudi Arabia.” Shakeel Ahmed and Fareedullah Chaudhry, “Tashfeen Malik Was Like Normal Students at BZU,” Dawn, December 8, 2015. Also see Declan Walsh, “In Conservative Pakistani City, a ‘Saudi Girl’ Who Stood Out,” New York Times, December 7, 2015. Incidentally, Malik had also been briefly associated with al-Huda, the aforementioned women’s piety movement, though that does not appear to have had any direct bearing on her radical views.

[600] Zia al-Haqq had come to power in July 1977. The last results of the survey conducted by the reform committee were received in May 1979 (Report, 1979, 14). There was clearly not enough time for the madrasas to grow so dramatically in less than two years.

[601] See Abu ‘Ammar Zahid al-Rashidi, “Dini madaris ke nisab o nizam main islah ki zarurat,” al-Shari‘a 22/1 (January 2013): 6. On the attempted takeover of the madrasa, also see Mufti Mahmud’s speech in the National Assembly, NAPD 5/16 (June 17, 1976): 486.

[602] Jonathan Addleton, Undermining the Centre: The Gulf Migration and Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 88–98.

[603] See Fihrist-i madaris-i mulhiqa-i tanzim al-madaris (Ahl-i sunnat) Pakistan (Lahore: Markazi daftar tanzim al-madaris Pakistan, 1990), 3.

[604] Ali, “Seminaries Boom.”

[605] Finance minister Ghulam Muhammad to the prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, December 16, 1949, 3 (1)-PMS/49: Correspondence with Hon’ble Minister for Finance (NDC).

[606] Mahmud Hasan, trans., al-Qur’an al-karim wa tarjamat ma‘anihi wa tafsiruhu ilal-lugha al-Urdiyya (Medina: Majma‘ khadim al-haramayn al-sharifayn al-malik Fahd li-tiba‘at al-mushaf al-sharif, 1993). This new edition was published for free distribution in association with the Saudi-sponsored Muslim World League.

[607] Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, Tafsir-i ‘Usmani, 2 vols. (Lahore: Maktaba-i Rahmaniyya, n.d.). The commentary was completed in 1932.

[608] Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, Hindustan ka taza safar (Deoband: Dar al-kitab, 2010). For the text of his speeches, see Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, Khutbat-i dawra-i Hind, ed. Sa‘adat Allah Khan Qasimi (Karachi: Maktaba-i ma‘arif al-Qur’an, 2012).

[609] Taqi ‘Usmani, Hindustan, 63.

[610] Ibid., 11, 41, 56.

[611] Ibid., 17–38.

[612] Cf. ibid., 37, 60–61.

[613] Ibid., 34, quoting the words of one Riyasat ‘Ali Bijnori.

[614] Middle Eastern businesses have continued to advertise in the monthly journal of Taqi ‘Usmani’s madrasa. See, for instance, the advertisement of Pak-Qatar General Takaful, an Islamic insurance company, in al-Balagh, January 2016 (back matter).

[615] See, for example, Taqi ‘Usmani, Khutbat, 46, 48, 50, 54, 56, 90–93, 103–6, 112, 196, 204, 227, 233–34, 297, 309, 318–19.

[616] See Graham, “Traditionalism,” especially 522.

[617] Khutbat, 312. The lecture, delivered at a madrasa in Bangalore, is titled “Two Means of Guidance: The Book of God and the Men of God.” Ibid., 305–20.

[618] Ibid., 312–13, referring to Q 1.7.

[619] The term “authority” is broad and evocative enough to serve as a convenient rendering of both Arabic terms here.

[620] Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran: An Explanatory Translation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), 598 (rendering the title of Q 67 as “The Sovereignty”). The translation was dedicated to the Nizam.

[621] Needless to say, Bodin and Hobbes had quite different conceptions of sovereignty, and both differed from other early modern theorists writing on this matter. For a brief survey, see Quentin Skinner, “The Sovereign State: A Genealogy,” in Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner, eds., Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26–46.

[622] On the idea of the “Artificiall person,” see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 16, 111–15; Skinner, “The Sovereign State,” 35–37.

[623] The premodern exegetical tradition is of course vast, as is the corpus of the modern commentaries. The examples I adduce here are illustrative of some broad trends in this literature on the questions under consideration, though no such sample can claim to represent the full range of the relevant opinions.

[624] Abu Ja‘far Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari, Jami‘ al-bayan ‘an ta’wil ay al-Qur’an, 30 vols. (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1954–68), 3: 222; Abu ‘Abdallah Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‘ li-ahkam al-Qur’an, 20 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-katib al-‘Arabi, 1967), 4: 52, 54; Fakhr al-din al-Razi, al-Tafsir al-kabir, 32 vols. (Tehran, n.p., n.d.), 8: 4.

[625] Tabari, Jami‘, 3: 222; Razi, al-Tafsir, 8: 5–6; Qurtubi, al-Jami‘, 4: 55; Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur’an al-‘azim, ed. Mustafa al-Sayyid Muhammad, Muhammad al-Sayyid Rashad, Muhammad Fadl al-‘Ajamawi, ‘Ali Ahmad ‘Abd al-Baqi, and Hasan ‘Abbas Qutb, 15 vols. (Giza: Mu’assasat Qurtuba, 2000), 3: 42.

[626] Qurtubi, al-Jami‘, 18: 206 (commentary on Q 67.1).

[627] Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, 3: 42 (commentary on Q 3.26).

[628] al-Husayn b. Mas‘ud al-Baghawi, Tafsir al-Baghawi, Ma‘alim al-tanzil, ed. Muhammad ‘Abdallah al-Nimr et al., 8 vols. (Riyadh: Dar tayba, 1993), 2: 23.

[629] Razi, al-Tafsir, 8: 7 (commentary on Q 3.26).

[630] Ruzbihan al-Baqli, Ara’is al-bayan, ed. Ahmad Farid al-Mizyadi, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2008), 1: 75.

[631] Tabari, Jami‘, 12: 220. Also see Sana Allah Panipati (d. 1810), Tafsir-i mazhari, trans. from Persian into Urdu by Sayyid ‘Abd al-Da’im al-Jalali, 6 vols. (Delhi: Nadwat al-musannifin, 1962), 6: 154.

[632] Qurtubi, al-Jami‘, 9: 192. Cf. ibid., 6: 439 (commenting on Q 6.57—where the phrase occurs again—he explained that God alone decides whether to delay or hasten punishment for the wrongdoers).

[633] Tabari, Jami‘, 13: 14; Qurtubi, al-Jami‘, 9: 228.

[634] Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, 8: 43 (commentary on Q 12.40).

[635] Razi, al-Tafsir, 18: 175 (commentary on Q 12.67).

[636] Razi, al-Tafsir, 8: 7–8 (commentary on Q 3.26). This was also the view of the proponents of the divine right of kings in English constitutional history. See Skinner, “The Sovereign State,” 30 (citing Sir John Hayward, An Answer to the First Part of a Certaine Conference, Concerning Succession [1603]).

[637] For the dictum and the gloss on it, see Sayf al-din al-Amidi, al-Ihkam fi usul al-ahkam, 2 vols. (Cairo: Matba‘at Muhammad ‘Ali Subayh, 1929), 1: 41; quoted in Urdu translation in Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, “Hakim-i haqiqi sirf Allah ta‘ala hai,” in idem, Maqalat-i Sulayman, ed. Shah Mu‘in al-din Nadwi (A‘zamgarh: Matba‘-i ma‘arif, 1971), 3: 366–88, at 381. Mawdudi also quoted Amidi, whom he took to say that “Allah is the Sovereign and no command is worthy of obedience except

that which is given by Him.” Sayyid Abul A‘la Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, trans. Khurshid Ahmad, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), 275.

[638] Muhibb Allah al-Bihari, Musallam al-thubut, 2 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Husayniyya, n.d.), 1: 16–17. My translation is based on Sulayman Nadwi’s in his “Hakim-i haqiqi,” 383–84. The Ash‘aris, Maturidis, and Mu‘tazila are schools of theology.

[639] Amir ‘Ali Malihabadi, Tafsir mawahib al-Rahman, 30 vols. (Lucknow: Nawal Kishore, 1926–31), 3: 146–51. (This Amir ‘Ali, an Ahl-i Hadith scholar, is not to be confused—as he is sometimes—with the modernist Syed Ameer Ali.) For some other examples, see Panipati, Tafsir, 2: 208–12; Shihab al-din al-Alusi, Ruh al-ma‘ani, 30 vols. (Beirut: Dar ihya al-turath al-‘Arabi, 1970), 3: 112–14; Siddiq Hasan Khan (d. 1890), Fath al-bayan fi maqasid al-Qur’an, ed. ‘Abdallah ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari, 15 vols. (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-‘asriyya, 1992), 2: 211.

[640] Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tafsir al-Qur’an al-hakim, al-shahir bi-Tafsir al-manar, 12 vols., 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar al-manar, 1947–54), 3: 270 (commenting on Q 3.26).

[641] Ibid., 270–71.

[642] Ibid., 270; cf. ibid., 271. Rida here follows his mentor, the modernist scholar Muhammad ‘Abduh, whose influence pervades this commentary.

[643] Ibid., 271, again following ‘Abduh.

[644] Olivier Carré, Mysticism and Politics: A Critical Reading of Fi Zilal al-Qur’an by Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), trans. Carol Artigues (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 202.

[645] A noteworthy earlier discussion of the idea of the sovereignty of God in the context of Pakistani constitutional debates is Manzooruddin Ahmed, Pakistan: The Emerging Islamic State (Karachi: Allies Book Corporation, 1966). This book is based on the author's PhD dissertation, "The Concept of Divine Sovereignty in Pakistan," Columbia University, Department of Political Science, 1960. The study, written from a Muslim liberal perspective, is useful in showing how the idea of divine sovereignty figured in the early constitutional history of Pakistan, but it does not do much toward putting the development of this idea in an historical context. Instead, it examines it as a way of showing how Pakistan's first constitution, of 1956, "was successful in bringing about the synthesis between Islamic principles and the Western institutions" (Ahmed, Pakistan, 244). For other discussions of divine sovereignty, see Mahmud Ahmad Ghazi, "Islam ke siyasi nizam main iqtidar-i a'la ka tasawwur," al-Balagh (Karachi), 5/10 (December 1971): 21–28; Carré, Mysticism, esp. 192–94; Sayed Khatab, The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb (London: Routledge, 2006), esp. 7–46; Andrew F. March, "Genealogies of Sovereignty in Islamic Political Theology," Social Research 80 (2013): 293–321; and Jan-Peter Hartung, A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 100–110, 205–9.

[646] Sayyid Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 6 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-shuruq, 1974), 4: 1990 (commentary on Q 12.40). On his sense of the significance of this passage, see ibid., 1989, 1991.

[647] Though of relatively recent coinage, the term hakimiyet was in use in the sense of sovereignty in the late Ottoman and early Republican Turkish circles in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. See Banu Turnaoğlu, The Formation of Turkish Republicanism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 73–74, 229–30.

[648] See al-Manar (Cairo), 7 (1904): 577–80; reprinted in Rida, Tafsir al-manar, 6: 405–9 (commenting on Q 5.44–47). The

request for the fatwa had come from Mawlawi Nur al-din of the Punjab, whom I take to be the person leading the Ahmadi community after the death of its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908). On Nur al-din (d. 1914), see Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, 13–14.

[649] Cf. Qutb, Zilal, 2: 898 (commenting on Q 5.44).

[650] For instance, Binder, Islamic Liberalism, 174–77; Carré, Mysticism, 25; Hartung, A System of Life, 100–105, 205–9. Also see Hasan al-Hudaybi, Du‘at la qudat (Cairo: Dar al-tiba‘a wal-nashr al-Islamiyya, n.d. [1977]), 16–19, 63–65, 72–73. Putatively written by the leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (1951–73), this work is highly critical of Qutb (who is not mentioned by name), though rather less so of Mawdudi, who is mentioned and some of whose ideas Hudaybi takes to have been misinterpreted by others (ibid., 72–73). On Hudaybi and this work, see Barbara Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (London: Routledge, 2009).

[651] Mawdudi, Islam ka nazariyya-i siyasi, 22–23. In his translation of the Qur’an and the commentary on it, Mawdudi renders the relevant part of Q 12.40 as follows: “The authority of rulership (farmanrawa’i ka iqtidar) belongs to none other than God.” He does not however use the term hakimiyyat in discussing this verse. See Sayyid Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, Tafhim al-Qur’an, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Maktaba-i ta‘mir-i insaniyyat, 1958), 402–4.

[652] Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, Qur’an ki char bunyadi istilahen (Delhi: Markazi maktaba-i Jama‘at-i Islami, 1981; first published in 1941), 20.

[653] Ibid., 27.

[654] Ibid., 28.

[655] Ibid., 28.

[656] Ibid., 28–29. Mawdudi evoked the Qur’anic phrase malik al-mulk (Q 3.26) often in his discourses. It also occurs in the constitution of the Jama‘at-i Islami. For the original version, see “Dustur-i Jama‘at-i Islami,” in Mawdudi, Musalman awr mawjuda siyasi kashmakash (Pathankot: Maktaba-i Jama‘at-i Islami, n.d.), 3: 208–20, at 209. For a later iteration of the constitution, see Dustur-i Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan (Lahore: Markazi maktaba-i Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan, 1952), 11 (article 3).

[657] Ali Suavi, “al-Hakim huwa Allah,” Ulum Gazetesi, Rebiülahir 1286/August 1, 1869, 18–31. I am grateful to M. Şükrü Hanioğlu for drawing my attention to this article and for translating portions of it for me. On Suavi, see Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 360–84; on the question of sovereignty, ibid., 366–67, 373–74. See also Turnaoğlu, Formation of Turkish Republicanism, 73–79.

[658] Suavi refers, inter alia, to Muhammad A‘la ibn ‘Ali al-Tahanawi’s (fl. 1745) encyclopedic work on the meaning of theological, juridical, and other technical terms. For the relevant passage, see al-Tahanawi, Mawsu‘at istilahat al-‘ulum al-Islamiyya, 6 vols. (Beirut: Khayyat, 1966), 2: 380, s.v. “al-hakim.”

[659] “Inil-hukm illa lillah,” al-Hilal (July 1, 1913), 5–8, at 7.

[660] Ibid., 7.

[661] See Qur’an-i majid mutarjam bil-tarajim al-thalath (Delhi: al-Matba‘ al-Mujtaba’i, 1872), 263.

[662] Nazir Ahmad, Chiragh-i hidayat, ed. Muhammad Isma‘il Afzal (Lahore: Shaykh Ghulam ‘Ali, n.d.), 288; idem, Matalib al-Qur’an (Lucknow: Nazir Press, n.d.), 130.

[663] John Richardson, A Dictionary of Persian, Arabic and English (London: William Bulmer, 1806), 379–80. The work was first published in 1777.

[664] In his Persian translation of the Qur’an, Wali Allah had rendered al-hukm in Q 12.40 as farmanrawa’i. Qur’an-i majid mutarjam bil-tarajim al-thalath, 263. The 1829 edition of Richardson’s Dictionary translates a cognate term, farmanguzari, as sovereignty (and empire). A Dictionary of Persian, Arabic and English (London: Parbury, Allen & Co., 1829), 1084. That Persian term does not occur in the 1806 edition.

[665] Powell, Scottish Orientalists and India, 277, n. 101. Also see ibid., 230–31.

[666] Mohamed Ali, My Life: A Fragment, ed. Afzal Iqbal (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1946), 108.

[667] Ibid., 205.

[668] Maulana Muhammad Ali, The Holy Qur’an: Arabic Text, English Translation and Commentary (Lahore: Ahmadiyyah Anjuman Isha‘at Islam, 1973), 136 and n. 406.

[669] Ibid., 1079–80. Also see his preface to this chapter (ibid., 1079) and n. 2526.

[670] Mohamed Ali, My Life, 165–69.

[671] Ibid., 168–69; quotation at 168.

[672] H. G. Wells, Mr. Britling Sees It Through (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 439, 442. The words in quotation marks are from a letter Mr. Britling was trying to write to the father of the slain German youth. Part of this text is also quoted in Mohamed Ali, My Life, 149.

[673] H. G. Wells, God the Invisible King (New York: Macmillan, 1917), xiii. This, too, was a book Muhammad ‘Ali had read during his confinement, along with Wells’s The Soul of a Bishop (1917). See Mohamed Ali, My Life, 148–53.

[674] Mohamed Ali, My Life, 153.

[675] Minault, The Khilafat Movement, 139–40, 169–72.

[676] For the full proceedings of the two trials, see R. V. Thadani, ed., The Historic State Trial of the Ali Brothers and Five Others (Karachi: R. V. Thadani, 1921). For a contemporary Urdu version of Muhammad ‘Ali’s statement at the city magistrate’s court, see Bayan-i Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali sahib … jo ra’is al-ahrar Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali sahib … ne Karachi ke magistrate ki ‘adalat main diya, compiled by Munshi Mushtaq Ahmad (Delhi: Swaraj Printing Works, 1921). For brief comments on this trial, see Minault, Khilafat Movement, 172–74.

[677] Thadani, ed., Historic State Trial, 69–70. In the Urdu version of the statement, it is the term shahanshahi (“monarchy”) that is used for what the original English version characterizes as “sovereignty.” See Muhammad ‘Ali, Bayan, 11. The

translator of the Urdu version is not specified. It may have been the compiler, Munshi Mushtaq Ahmad.

[678] For his part, Maulana Muhammad Ali had translated the key sentence as “Judgment is only Allah’s.” The Qur’anic quotations in the Urdu version of the statement given at the city magistrate’s court seem to be based on Nazir Ahmad’s translation, though they depart from it in some ways. Cf. Muhammad ‘Ali, Bayan, 11.

[679] Thadani, ed., Historic State Trial, 283.

[680] Ibid., 314–15.

[681] Ibid., 324, citing Matthew 6.10. The “k” in king George is in lowercase in the original. The reference is to King George V (r. 1910–36).

[682] On the proposed title of the book, see the introduction by Afzal Iqbal to Mohamed Ali, My Life, vii–viii. A section of that incomplete book was published by the editor under the title My Life: A Fragment. See ibid., viii–ix.

[683] See Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, “Khud niwisht,” in Muhammad Yusuf Bhutta, ed., Mawlana Mawdudi apni and dusron ki nazar main, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Idara-i ma‘arif-i Islami, 1984), 23–39, at 32–35. This is a brief autobiographical essay that Mawdudi had written in 1932.

[684] Ibid., 32–33.

[685] Ibid., 33.

[686] Cf. Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, 233: “the acceptance and admission of the de jure sovereignty of God is Islam and its denial is Kufr” (unbelief; italics in the original).

[687] See John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion in John Calvin: Works and Correspondence (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation, 1995), electronic edition, note 1 to book 1, chapter 13, at http://libwebprod.princeton.edu/resolve/lookup?url=http://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=calvin/calvin.01.xml (accessed March 23, 2014).

[688] Mawdudi, Tahrik-i azadi-i Hind awr Musalman, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1973): 190–99, at 191–92. Cf. idem, Tafhim al-Qur’an, 6 vols. (Lahore: Idara-i tarjuman al-Qur’an, 2008), 1: 254–55, n. 48 (commenting on Q 3.51). Qutb, too, spoke of the Kingdom of God (mamlakat Allah), though without invoking the Bible. See Zilal, 3: 1433–34 (introduction to Q 8).

[689] Thadani, ed., Historic State Trial, 283. For Mawdudi’s insistence that God alone is the source of law, see Islam ka nazariyya-i siyasi, 21–24.

[690] This language appears, for instance, in a letter the Prophet Muhammad is said to have written to the Christians of Najran. See Ahmad b. Abi Ya‘qub al-Ya‘qubi, Ta’rikh, ed. M. T. Houtsma, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1883), 2: 89. Quoted in Michael Cook, “Is Political Freedom an Islamic Value?” in Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen, eds., Freedom and the Construction of Europe, 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2: 289–90, n. 26. The letter also has Muhammad call the Christians “to the authority (wilaya) of God and away from that of [His] slaves.” Ya‘qubi, Ta’rikh, 2: 89.

[691] Mawdudi, “Pakistan main Islami qanun kyun nahin nafidh ho-sakta?” in idem, Tahrik-i azadi-i Hind, 2: 335–64, at 360. This was a speech Mawdudi had delivered at the Lahore Law College in January 1948.

For an English translation, see Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, 39–72, at 67.

[692] For a cautious discussion of the relationship of Iqbal and Mawdudi, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 34–39.

[693] Mawdudi, Islam ka nazariyya-i siyasi, 38–39; Cook, “Political Freedom,” 302.

[694] Mawdudi, Islam ka nazariyya-i siyasi, 38.

[695] Iqbal, Asrar-i khudi, in Kulliyyat-i Iqbal (Persian), 44–46; R. A. Nicholson, trans., The Secrets of the Self (Asrar-i-Khudi): A Philosophical Poem (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944), 78–84.

[696] Mohammad Iqbal, “Muslim Democracy,” The New Age (1916), 251, quoted in Nicholson, “Introduction,” Secrets of the Self, xxix n. 1.

[697] Iqbal did, however, speak of “the Kingdom of God on earth,” which, as he explained in a letter to R. A. Nicholson, “means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth.” Nicholson, “Introduction,” Secrets of the Self, xxviii–xxix. Compare Mawdudi, Islam ka nazariyya-i siyasi, 43–44: “The position of the imam, amir, or head of the government in an Islamic state consists in this alone: that ordinary Muslims, to whom the caliphate belongs, choose the best amongst them and entrust the powers [of their caliphate] to him. That the term caliph is used for him does not mean that he alone is the caliph; it means rather that the caliphate of ordinary Muslims has become concentrated in his person.” (The term “concentrate[d]” is Mawdudi’s own.)

[698] Sayyid Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, Dawlat-i Asafiyya awr hukumat-i Britaniyya ke siyasi ta‘alluqat ki ta’rikh par aik nazar (Haydarabad: N.p., 1928).

[699] For a study of Hyderabad’s “minor sovereignty” in a comparative framework, see Eric Lewis Beverley, Hyderabad, British India, and the World: Muslim Networks and Minor Sovereignty, c. 1850–1950 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Beverley does not, however, discuss Mawdudi or his work. On the protest to the United Nations, see ibid., 54–56, 286–87.

[700] Mawdudi, Dawlat-i Asafiyya, 3, paraphrasing, without disapproval, Sir John Malcolm’s characterization of Hyderabad. Ibid., 188, quoting the Viceroy, Lord Reading, who had made clear to the Nizam that his “internal sovereignty” came from the British, to whom the likes of him were accountable in the final analysis. For the text of Reading’s letter in Urdu translation, see ibid., 186–90.

[701] Abul-Mahasin Sajjad, Hukumat-i Ilahiyya, ed. Mujahid al-Islam Qasimi (Phulwari Sharif: Imarat-i shar‘iyya Bihar wa Orissa, 1999), 42–53.

[702] Ibid., 134.

[703] Wells, too, was anything but friendly to clerical authority, which makes it ironic that Mr. Britling was read at a school for chaplains during World War I. See David C. Smith, H. G. Wells: Desperately Mortal (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 224.

[704] Hifz al-Rahman Seoharwi, “Muqaddima,” in Sajjad, Hukumat-i Ilahiyya, 17–32, esp. 22–24, 26–30.

[705] Seoharwi, “Muqaddima,” 19–20.

[706] Hifz al-Rahman Seoharwi, Islam ka iqtisadi nizam (Delhi: Nadwat al-musannifin, 1942), 110–11 and n. 1. For a discussion of Seoharwi and of this book, see Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 234–39.

[707] Hifz al-Rahman Seoharwi, Islam ka iqtisadi nizam (Lahore: Mushtaq Book Corner, n.d.), 126 n. 1. This fourth and final edition of the book was published in 1951. As Seoharwi noted in his preface to this edition, it represented no change over the previous edition, which was published in 1946 (ibid., 17–18). The Kharijis refer to a religio-political orientation in early Islam whose most famous slogan, “There is no judgment other than God’s,” has become synonymous with anarchic challenges to constituted authority.

[708] See Sayyid Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, Tahrik-i azadi-i Hind awr musalman (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1964), 1: 304–25.

[709] Dustur-i Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan (Lahore: Markazi maktaba-i Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan, 1952), 11–12.

[710] Ibid., 15.

[711] S. M. Zauqi to M. A. Jinnah, January 12, 1940, JP, 3rd ser., 15: 41–45; quotations at 42–43.

[712] On the life and career of Zauqi Shah, see Robert Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound: Politics and Piety in Twenty-first Century Pakistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 46–59.

[713] See Muhammad Zauqi Shah, “Tahrik-i Abul-A‘la,” in Wahid Bakhsh, ed., Mazamin-i Zauqi (Karachi: Mahfil-i zawqiyya, n.d.), 279–302; for a criticism of Mawdudi’s goal of establishing a “divine government”

(hukumat-i Ilahi), see ibid., 292–94. For other direct and indirect criticism of Mawdudi, see ibid., 303–5. An English collection of Zauqi Shah’s articles (see the following note) also bears the same title as the Urdu collection.

[714] This correspondence is reproduced in Wahid Bakhsh, ed., Mazamin-e-Zauqi (English) (Karachi: J. G. Lennard and Co., 1948), 47–64. The letters are undated, but one of Zauqi Shah’s letters gives December 26, 1932, as the date of his previous letter to Pickthall (ibid., 59).

[715] Ibid., 61. Emphasis in the original.

[716] Ibid., 63.

[717] Ibid., 51.

[718] Ibid., 61.

[719] CAPD, 5/1 (March 7, 1949): 7.

[720] See Rafi‘ ‘Usmani, Hayat-i mufti-i a‘zam, 153–54, for a facsimile of what purports to be an early draft of the Objectives Resolution in the handwriting of Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani and with further annotations on it by Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘.

[721] Jama‘at-i Islami, Rudad-i Jama‘at-i Islami, 7 vols., 7th ed. (Lahore: Shu‘ba-i nashr o isha‘at, Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan, 1989), 6: 102–7.

[722] Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, 210.

[723] Cf. ibid., 154.

[724] Sulayman Nadwi, “Hakim-i haqiqi.” The article was first published in Ma‘arif (A‘zamgarh), a monthly journal of which Sulayman Nadwi was the long-time editor.

[725] Ibid., 386–87.

[726] Ibid., 368.

[727] Ibid., 387–88.

[728] Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, Sovereignty of Allah, trans. Syed Abu Asim (Karachi: Maktabat al-sharq, 1953).

[729] Fundamental Principles of an Islamic State, 3.

[730] Muhammad Shafi‘, Dustur-i Qur’ani (Karachi: Dar al-Ulum, 1953), 6, 12. Twelve thousand copies of this tract, in both Urdu and English, were distributed free of charge (see ibid., front matter).

[731] Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, Qur’an ka siyasi nizam (Lahore: Idara-i tulu‘-i Islam, n.d.), 37–38. This booklet is based on an article first published in Parwez’s monthly, Tulu‘-i Islam, in March 1960. My references here are to the booklet.

[732] Ibid., 29.

[733] Ibid., 34.

[734] Ibid., 29; cf. 27.

[735] Ibid., 31–34.

[736] Ibid., 28.

[737] For this metaphorical image, see ibid., 28.

[738] Mawdudi, “Islam main qanun-sazi ka da’ira-i ‘amal,” in idem, Tafhimat, 3 vols. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1965), 3: 7–14, at 7. This is the text of a paper Mawdudi had read at the International Islamic Colloquium, held in Lahore in December–January, 1957–58. Also see Mawdudi, Tafhim al-Qur’an, 2 (1958 ed.), 37 n. 41 (commenting on Q 7.54).

[739] Rahman, “Implementation,” 208–9. Emphasis in the original.

[740] Ibid., 209.

[741] Ibid., 209.

[742] See, for instance, Mawdudi, “Majalis-i qanun-saz ki rukniyyat shar‘i haythiyyat se,” in idem, Tahrik-i azadi-i Hind, 2: 233–35 (this piece is dated December 1945).

[743] Sayyid Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, Aik nihayat ahamm istifta (Lahore: Maktaba-i Jama‘at-i Islami, n.d.).

[744] Ibid., 6, n. 1. For the quotation from the opening address of the advocate-general, see Moti Ram, ed., Two Historic Trials in the Red Fort (Delhi: n.p., n.d. [1946]), p. 19. On the Indian National Army and the movement associated with it, see Sugata Bose, His Majesty's Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India's Struggle against Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). For an echo of Mawdudi's view in the work of an erstwhile associate, see Amin Ahsan Islahi, Islami riyasat (Lahore: Maktaba-i markazi anjuman-i khuddam al-Qur'an, 1977), 228.

[745] Mawdudi, "Pakistan main Islami qanun," in idem, Tahrik-i azadi-i Hind awr Musalman, 2: 354–57.

[746] Irfan Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of the Jamaat-e-Islami (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

[747] Nasr, Vanguard, 127–31.

[748] M. Ikramullah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, to Habib I. Rahimtoola, Pakistan's high commissioner in the UK, October 2, 1948. 26 (4)-PMS/48: Misc. Correspondence during HPM's Visit to the UK, vol. 3: 32 (NDC).

[749] Resolutions passed at the March 17 and April 6–8, 1949, sessions of the consultative assembly in Jama'at-i Islami, Rudad, 6: 106–7. Also see Mawdudi, Tahrik-i azadi-i Hind, 2: 228 n. 1; Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 2, 915–16 (statement by Amin Ahsan Islahi). Cf. Nasr, Vanguard, 124–25.

[750] See Muhammad Sarwar, Jama'at-i Islami awr Islami dustur (Lahore: Sindh Sagar, 1956), 120–21, 128 (quoting Mawdudi's statement in support of the constitution).

[751] For a hard-hitting criticism of Mawdudi and his Jama‘at for their acceptance of the Objectives Resolution and the 1956 constitution, see ibid., esp. 38–138. Sarwar’s concern in this book is not to show the inadequacy of these foundational documents, of course, but rather to argue that Mawdudi’s acceptance of them was hypocritical. They represented not a victory for him but rather a humiliating defeat, Sarwar said, since many of his demands regarding the place of Islam in Pakistan’s public life were rejected by the modernist framers of those documents.

[752] Nasr, Vanguard, 162.

[753] Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission, 289.

[754] The question has received rather different assessments from observers of the Jama‘at. See, for instance, Nasr, Vanguard, 40–41; Hartung, System of Life, 232.

[755] Sayyid Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, Tahrik-i Islami ka a’inda la’iha-i ‘amal, 3rd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1966), 178–79. For a useful account of the crisis the Jama‘at faced in 1957, see Nasr, Vanguard, 31–43.

[756] Mawdudi, Tahrik-i Islami, 195. For the reference to the career of the Prophet Muhammad, see ibid., 194–95.

[757] Ibid., 194.

[758] What he did say in his famous 1957 speech was that the whole party could not be judged by the ethical lapses of some of its members, that the party’s moral fiber was stronger than that of its competitors in the political arena, and that the right response to a corrupt political field was not to flee it

but rather to enter it with the resolve to change things for the better. See Mawdudi, Tahrik-i Islami, 222–24; also 219–21 for Mawdudi's response to worries that the party would go "morally bankrupt" in the existing political arena. The point about the working of the shari'a is more unambiguously his. See Mawdudi, "Pakistan main Islami qanun," in idem, Tahrik-i azadi-i Hind, 2: 348–51; Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, 53–57.

[759] See Sarwar, Jama'at-i Islami.

[760] In an important study, Markus Daechsel has argued that the "discourse of development," as it found expression in the Pakistan of the 1950s and the 1960s, was a means for a "sovereignty-obsessed" governing elite to put that sovereignty on display. Paradoxically, however, the imperatives of development, as understood by Western experts advising the government, were also in significant conflict with postcolonial aspirations to sovereignty, and this conflict remained unresolved. Daechsel, Islamabad. Mawdudi's sovereignty of God served, for its part, to simultaneously delegitimize the development discourse and postcolonial claims to sovereignty. Such challenges could not but be anathematic to the Ayub Khan regime.

[761] Ishaq Nadwi, Islam ka siyasi nizam, 12–14 (God as muqtadir-i a'la, which is glossed in English as "sovereign"). Mawdudi's influence is palpable on what Ishaq Nadwi said about God's sovereignty and on the "political polytheism" (siyasi shirk) involved in failing to recognize it (14–15). This work does not really count therefore as a case of the 'ulama's independent articulation of such matters.

[762] Muhammad Taqi 'Usmani, Islam awr siyasi nazariyyat (Karachi: Maktaba-i ma'arif, 2010), 173–77. By this point, it was possible for Taqi 'Usmani to straightforwardly translate al-hukm in Q 6.57 and 12.40 as sovereignty (hakimiyyat). Thus, his Urdu rendering of the relevant portion of these verses translates as "sovereignty belongs to God alone."

[763] For the Urdu text (asl hakim, tashri‘i awr takwini haysiyyat se), see Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, Nifaz-i shari‘at awr us-ke masa’il (Karachi: Maktaba-i Dar al-‘Ulum, 1992), 19. For the Arabic version (“al-hakim al-haqiqi …”), produced and published by the Jama‘at-i Islami, see al-Mabadi al-asasiyya lil-dawla al-Islamiyya (Karachi: al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, n. d.), 3.

[764] For the Urdu version, see Pakistan ka manshur-i azadi (Karachi: Manager, Governor General Press, n.d. [1950]), unpaginated front matter. The difference between the connotations of the English and the Urdu versions was noted long ago by Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State, 78–79.

[765] In his System of Life, Hartung has provided the most detailed investigation so far of how some modern Western intellectual trends shaped Mawdudi’s thought. He does not, however, explore the provenance of the sovereignty of God in that study.

[766] Besides examples already noted (see note 33, earlier), see Mawdudi, Tafhim al-Qur’an, 2 (1958 ed.): 37 n. 41 (commenting on Q 7.54).

[767] I draw here on the account of the early activities of this office—the Dar al-‘uruba lil-da‘wa al-Islamiyya—in Jama‘at-i Islami, Rudad, 7: 163–78.

[768] See William E. Shepard, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), xx, 8, 43, 105–6. On the various editions of this book, see ibid., 357.

[769] For instance, see Khalil Ahmad Hamidi, Tahrik-i Islami ke asarat (Lahore: Mansura Book Center, 1976), 13.

[770] Ghulam Ahmad Parwez to Ayub Khan, January 12, 1968 (GAPP).

[771] Mawdudi, “Islam main qanun-sazi ka da’ira-i ‘amal,” in idem, Tafhimat, 3: 7–14, at 7–8. Also published in International Islamic Colloquium Papers, December 29, 1957–January 8, 1958 (Lahore: Punjab University Press, 1960), 21–28 (of the Urdu section of this volume). What may have irritated Parwez even more about Mawdudi’s prominence at this event (he was on its organizing committee) is that a number of leading Western scholars of Islam were also in attendance at it. These included Alessandro Bausani, G. E. von Grunebaum, A.K.S. Lambton, Bernard Lewis, Louis Massignon, Steven Runciman, and W. C. Smith. Some among them may well have been sympathetic to Mawdudi’s view of what the sovereignty of God meant in an Islamic context.

[772] Mawdudi, “Islam main qanun-sazi,” in idem, Tafhimat, 3: 9–14. Mawdudi had taken a similar position in his statement to the Court of Inquiry investigating the anti-Ahmadi riots of 1953. See Report of the Court of Inquiry, 211–12.

[773] “Even if an ijtihad undertaken without the various precautions [that Mawdudi had elucidated] and according to one’s capricious interpretations is given the force of law on the basis of political power, it would not be accepted by the collective conscience of Muslims. Nor can it properly become part of an Islamic legal system. The moment the political power that has enforced it leaves the scene, its law would be tossed into the trash bin.” Mawdudi, Tafhimat, 3: 13–14.

[774] Rahman, “Implementation,” 208.

[775] CAPD, 5/5 (March 12, 1949 [Zafrulla Khan]): 71.

[776] Ibid., 65–72, especially 66.

[777] Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, al-Shahab, ya‘ni Mirza’iyyon ke irtidad ka thubut awr qatl-i murtadd ke shar‘i dala’il (Karachi: Dar al-isha‘at, 1974); Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, 29.

[778] See chapter 2, note 5.

[779] Jawaharlal Nehru to B. C. Roy, April 4, 1950, in Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2nd ser. (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984–), 14/1: 170–73, at 171.

[780] The figures from the 1998 census are available at http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/population-religion (accessed January 2, 2014). For the figures from the 2017 census, which were provisional and incomplete at the time of this writing, see Khaleeq Kiani, “Country’s Population Surges to Nearly 208m,” Dawn, August 26, 2017.

[781] Report of the Court of Inquiry, 10. Cf. Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 5: 2351 (Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, the head of the Ahmadi community). Two decades later, in hearings at a closed session of the National Assembly, Mirza Nasir Ahmad, the then head of the Ahmadis, gave a significantly higher figure, 3.5 to 4 million, as the size of his community in Pakistan at that time. National Assembly of Pakistan, Proceedings of the Special Committee of the Whole House Held in Camera to Consider the Qadiani Issue, 21 parts, August 5–September 7, 1974 (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, n.d. [2011]), no. 1 August 5, 1974, 29, at https://archive.org/details/NAPakistan1974QadianiIssue_201608 (accessed October 8, 2013; hereafter, Proceedings of the Special Committee). Also see Nawa-i waqt, August 1, 1974.

[782] On the size of the Shi‘i population in Pakistan, see Andreas Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan: An Assertive and Beleaguered Minority (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), xi. The best study to date on Shi‘i religious thought in Pakistan is Fuchs, “Relocating the Centers.” The question of the anxieties generated by the Shi‘a among the Sunnis is not, however, among those Fuchs examines in his work. In an important study of religion and the state in Pakistan with reference to the Ahmadis, sociologist Sadia Saeed does address the question of “why the Ahmadiyya community provokes unique anxieties for political and religious actors in Pakistan,” but the focus of her study is on the state rather than on the ‘ulama and the Islamists, as is the case in this chapter. See Sadia Saeed, Politics of Desecularization: Law and the Minority Question in Pakistan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), quotation at 3.

[783] Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, 183; cf. Smith, Modern Islam in India, 65.

[784] Unless otherwise indicated, my discussion here is primarily concerned with those who consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. On Ahmadi doctrines, see Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous.

[785] “Shamloo,” ed., Speeches and Statements, 120–21 (responding to Jawaharlal Nehru’s criticism of his anti-Ahmadi stance); ibid., 239 (castigating the nationalist views of Husayn Ahmad Madani and likening them to those of the Ahmadis).

[786] Ibid., 94.

[787] Ibid., 100.

[788] Also see chapter 4, note 159 (with reference to Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani).

[789] For the ‘ulama’s testimony in this case, which was presided over by the district magistrate of the princely state of Bahawalpur (now in the Pakistani Punjab), see Bayanat-i ‘ulama-i rabbani bar irtidad-i firqa-i qadiyyani (Deoband: Maktaba-i rashad, 1989). The case was decided in favor of the plaintiff.

[790] “Shamloo,” ed., Speeches and Statements, 103.

[791] Mohammad Iqbal, “The Doctrine of Absolute Unity as Expounded by Abdul Karim al-Jilani,” Indian Antiquary (Bombay), 29 (1900), reprinted in Syed Abdul Vahid, ed., Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), 3–27, at 9. That this essay by Iqbal could still be reprinted in Pakistan in the 1960s is a telling indication that attitudes toward the Ahmadis were not uniformly hostile even by that late date.

[792] “Kiya Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Sahib Qadiyyani ke pairaw kafir hain? Imam al-Hind Mawlana Abul-Kalam Azad ka fatwa,” Zamindar, November 18, 1923. I am grateful to Rajarshi Ghose for drawing my attention to this fatwa.

[793] Cf. Daryabadi, Hakim al-ummat, 260.

[794] S. Zainulabadin to Liaquat Ali Khan, May 19, 1940, JP, 3rd ser., 15: 340. Zainulabadin was an office holder in an Ahmadi organization.

[795] See Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850 (London: Routledge, 2000), 375, 442, 447. On Iqbal, ibid., 294–97, 364–69.

[796] Jinnah to S. Zainulabadin, May 5, 1944, JP, 2nd ser., 10: 338–39. For the query to which this was a

response, see Zainulabadin to Jinnah, April 30, 1944, ibid., 329. In an earlier meeting with Pir Akbar Ali, an Ahmadi member of the Punjab legislative assembly, Jinnah had told him that “according to the latest constitution of the All India Muslim League there was no bar to members of the Ahmadiyya community joining the Muslim League, and that as members of the League they would be entitled to such privileges as are enjoyed by members of other various sects of Muslims.” See enclosure with Zainalabadin to Jinnah, April 30, 1944, JP, 2nd ser., 10: 329.

[797] For overviews of this history, see Afzal, Pakistan, 64–70, 102–9; Binder, Religion and Politics, 183–296.

[798] That there could be significant differences among the modernists in their attitude toward the ‘ulama is well illustrated by the case of Nazimuddin, who had wanted to go as far as he could in negotiating with them. His own brother, Khawaja Shahabuddin, the governor of the North-West Frontier Province at the time, was among those who had advocated crushing “Mullaism.” To such suggestions, Nazimuddin had responded at one point by equating Islam and the ‘ulama’s Islam in a manner quite uncharacteristic of other modernists. As summarized later by an observer, the prime minister had remarked at a cabinet meeting in late February 1953: “There were persons in this meeting who were for crushing mullaism and Peerism and, as a matter of fact, Islam itself [but] … that he in all conscience could not be a party to this and that he would resign.” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, Appendices, 132 (Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain). It is telling, however, that he did not resign, choosing instead to stand with his colleagues in government.

[799] See the inspector-general of police’s “Note on the Situation as it Developed from the 5th March 1953,” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 223–24.

[800] Ibid., 2: 110–11.

[801] Ibid., 2: 285, 293.

[802] See the statement by the deputy inspector-general of police, Punjab, in ibid., 1: 249 (7–8 of the statement).

[803] Ibid., 216, 231; 2: 464.

[804] Ibid., part 4: 1596; Report of the Court of Inquiry, 347.

[805] The preacher in question was Muhammad Ishaq Mansehrawi (d. 1962). For his role in helping bring the agitation to an end in Rawalpindi, see Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 2: 488; cf. Report of the Court of Inquiry, 179. For a brief biographical sketch (which does not mention this role), see Fuyuz al-Rahman, Mashahir ‘Ulama, 3 vols. (Lahore: Frontier Publishing Company, n.d.), 2: 467–53. It was Zafar ‘Ali Khan, the proprietor and editor of the Zamindar and an influential poet and bête noire of the Ahmadis in colonial India, who in 1936 had characterized Mansehrawi’s mosque as “the laborer’s.” See Zafar ‘Ali Khan, “Masjid-i angur, Rawalpindi,” in idem, Kulliyyat-i Mawlana Zafar ‘Ali Khan, ed. Zahid ‘Ali Khan (Lahore: al-Faysal, 2011), 197 (in the collection titled Nigaristan). Also quoted in Fuyuz al-Rahman, Mashahir, 2: 653.

[806] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 187.

[807] Ibid., 1: 106. This may just have been by way of punishing anyone not cooperating with the effort to shut down the city, but it probably also had a class dimension to it.

[808] The British high commissioner and the American ambassador in Karachi were unwilling to see Zafrulla Khan resign in the face of the pressure on him. Gilbert Laithwaite, the UK high commissioner, to Percivale Liesching, CRO, London, July 23, 1952. DO 35/3185. Also see the UK high commissioner’s telegram to CRO, April 11, 1953, DO 35/5370: 65 (TNA). For

his part, the prime minister had told a group of leading figures representing the anti-Ahmadi movement in January 1953 that “if he removed Ch. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan from the Cabinet, Pakistan would not get a grain of wheat from the United States of America.” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 1: 132 (testimony by Abul Hasnat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri). In his own testimony, the former prime minister denied that he had “said anything of the kind. What I said to them was that the removal of … Zafarullah Khan would create difficulties for us in obtaining wheat quickly because even India had to face great difficulties in that behalf.… I was confident that ultimately we would get wheat from America whether or not … Zafrullah Khan remained as our Foreign Minister. We, however, wanted it urgently and a quick decision was necessary.” Ibid., part 3: 1353.

[809] Mandal resigned in September 1950. He had already left Pakistan for India, and his resignation was a cause of severe embarrassment to the government of Pakistan. On this episode and Mandal’s vilification by some members of the government, see 3 (18)-PMS/50: Resignation of Mr. J. N. Mandal, Minister for Law and Labor, Government of Pakistan (NDC). Mandal’s grievances had to do with the government’s inattention to the plight of the scheduled castes in East Bengal. See Mandal to the Prime Minister, January 19, 1950, detailing instances of police brutality against the minority community. 3 (3)-PMS/50: Correspondence with Hon’ble Minister for Law and Labour (NDC).

[810] Sayyid Abul A‘la Mawdudi, Qadiyyani mas’ala, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1963). The tract was first published on March 5, 1953, at the height of the anti-Ahmadi agitation. It was soon translated into English, Sindhi, and Bengali. Some months after the agitation had been extinguished, the superintendent of police, Lahore, told the Court of Inquiry that the Urdu version had been disseminated in 35,000 copies. Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 364.

[811] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 5: 2412.

[812] Report of the Court of Inquiry, 75.

[813] Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Islam: Its Meaning for Modern Man (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 14. Also see his statement in response to a government directive, obliquely referring to him, that no federal or provincial minister “use his official position in propagation [of] any sectarian creed.” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 77–78. For the official communique, see ibid., 1: 76. Zafrulla Khan’s response was published in Dawn, August 17, 1952.

[814] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 3: 1405. Also see ibid., part 3: 1455–56.

[815] In the early years of Pakistan, some Ahmadi bureaucrats were also suspected of using their office to proselytize. See Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 3: 1283, 1294 (testimony of Sardar Abdur Rabb Nishtar, a former governor of the Punjab).

[816] CAPD, 5/5 (March 12, 1949): 69.

[817] A. K. Brohi, “Thoughts on the Future Constitution of Pakistan,” Dawn, August 24, 1952 (italics mine). Brohi was not an Ahmadi. Cf. the response of Mian Mumtaz Daultana, the chief minister of the Punjab during the 1953 agitation, when asked by the Court of Inquiry about how he would have responded to the anti-Ahmadi demands if he were, as the court had put it, “the dictator of Pakistan.” “If it depended entirely on my will, I would have done my best to see that these demands were not raised. The demands in themselves were not fundamental or immediately necessary in any way for Pakistan.” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 6: 2691–92.

[818] See, for instance, CAPD, 5/5 (March 12, 1949): 65–66, 68–69.

[819] Ahmadi modernism, it is worth noting, has had its limits. Unlike other modernists, the Ahmadis have tended to defend polygyny rather than reinterpret the Qur’an in such a way as, in effect, to do away with this institution. See Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, 184. Zafrulla Khan, too, had some very conservative views regarding veiling and women working outside the home. See Qurrat al-‘Ayn Haydar, Kar-i jahan daraz hai, 3 vols. (Delhi: Educational Publishing House, 2003), 2: 468, 537.

[820] Cf. Mawdudi, Qadiyyani mas’ala, 38–40. There were hints of this in government circles, too. In a wide-ranging “Scheme for Supervision and Control of Religious Institutions and Religious Activity,” prepared by the Ministry of the Interior in 1960, it was noted that the Ahmadi community had established “an organization which copies institutions which are typical of a Government.” 54/CF/60–2293: Administration of Mosques; Training of Imams; Scheme for Supervision and Control of Religious Institutions and Religious Activity; Employment of Itinerant Preachers; Streamlining of Auqaf Properties in East Pakistan: 33 (NDC).

[821] Report of the Court of Inquiry, 47–48.

[822] See Nawa-i waqt, May 14, 1974, and news reports for the days that followed.

[823] See Jang, June 2, 1974.

[824] Nawa-i waqt, May 31, 1974.

[825] Ibid., May 19, 1974.

[826] Ibid., May 23, 1974.

[827] Dawn, May 19, 1974, and press coverage of this event on the following days.

[828] See, for instance, Nawa-i waqt, May 30, 1974; Dawn, May 30, 1974.

[829] Alan Mitchell, Commissioner, Lahore Division, to C. C. Garrett, Chief Secretary to Government of the Punjab, January 27, 1935, L/PJ/7/751: Ahrar-Ahmadiya Dispute at Qadian, Punjab: 206 (BL).

[830] Ibid., 203.

[831] Copy of D.O. Letter no. C16(1), S.B., from the Government of the Punjab to the Government of India, Home Department, January 21–23, 1935, L/PJ/7/751: 241 (BL).

[832] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 3: 1367. On Ahmadi provocations, see also the statement of Fida Hassan, the commissioner of Rawalpindi division, ibid., 2: 376–77.

[833] Nawa-i waqt, May 31, 1974; June 1, 1974; June 15, 1974; August 17, 1974.

[834] Justice Samdani later complained about this: “The government should know that it is wrong not to publish the report of an enquiry ordered for the benefit of the public. At the same time it is also interesting to note that there was no demand from the public, either, that the report be published.” K.M.A. Samdani, Reminiscence (N.p., n.d. [ca. 2005]), 90.

[835] See the statement by the head of the Ahmadi community before the Samdani commission: Nawa-i waqt, August 1, 1974. Cf. ibid., July 16, 1974.

[836] For the text of this resolution, see Proceedings of the Special Committee, no. 15 (August 30, 1974), 1971–74. Earlier, in spring 1973, the legislative assembly of Pakistani (“Azad”) Kashmir had called for the Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslims, thereby helping bring the issue back into the limelight and putting some pressure on the Bhutto government. See Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani, “Qadiyani—ghayr Muslim kiyon?” al-Balagh 7/5 (July 1973): 3–11.

[837] Laurence Pumphrey, “The Ahmadiya Issue,” dated September 24, 1974 (p. 3 of the note). FCO 37/1501: Issue of Atrocities Committed against Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan (TNA; Electronic Resource). Ahmadi contributions to Bhutto’s election campaign are mentioned in the confidential note by A. A. Halliday, British Embassy Islamabad, February 15, 1973. Ibid., 28.

[838] Demands to have the Ahmadis removed from key positions followed the Rabwah incident almost immediately. See, for instance, Nawa-i waqt, May 31, 1974; ibid., June 15, 1974; ibid., June 18, 1974; Jang, June 22, 1974.

[839] On the Ahmadis’ alleged military ambitions, see also Nawa-i waqt, June 22, 1974. For other statements to this effect, see ibid., June 25, 1974.

[840] Ibid., June 28, 1974.

[841] Ibid., June 18, 1974. The leader of the Ahmadi community was also questioned about the Ahmadi mission in Israel during the in-camera session of the National Assembly. See Proceedings of the Special Committee, no. 8 (August 21, 1974), 1007–15. Also see ibid., no. 15 (August 30, 1974), 2048–56.

[842] Jang, June 28, 1974.

[843] Nawa-i waqt, July 11, 1974.

[844] See Vazira Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

[845] For these advertisements, see Jang, July 5, 7, 8, 1974; ibid., July 8, 1974, for a defense on Bannuri's behalf. Also see Dawn, July 4, 6, 8, 1974. The idea that religious conflicts in Pakistan are stoked by outsiders has had its purchase in the highest circles of government, too. For instance, in 1963, following Shi'i-Sunni riots in Muharram, Ayub Khan had ordered an investigation into whether 'ulama and Shi'i preachers visiting Pakistan from India had been involved. No evidence of their involvement was found. "Note for the President," by Habibullah Khan, Minister of Home and Kashmir Affairs, March 15, 1965, in 390/CF/63: Shia-Sunni Incidents; Influence of Religious Leaders from India (NDC).

[846] Nawa-i waqt, July 11, 1974.

[847] Jang, June 1, 1974 (speech by Kausar Niazi, the minister of information and of religious endowments).

[848] Nawa-i waqt, June 27, 1974.

[849] Jang, August 27, 1974. Mir also took the opportunity in this statement to deny that he was an Ahmadi.

[850] That the Bhutto era would prove to be a time of considerable growth for religious institutions is ironic in hindsight, but fostering such growth was no part of government policy and it was, in any case, not perceptible to most people living through those years.

[851] Jang, June 20, 1974; Nawa-i waqt, July 18, 1974.

[852] Nawa-i waqt, July 11, 1974.

[853] Ibid., June 26, 1974.

[854] Ibid., June 29, 1974. Also see ibid., July 4, 1974; Jang, June 30, 1974.

[855] Muhammad Manzur Nu‘mani to Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, November 26, 1945, in Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 149–51.

[856] It was only in late 2011 that the proceedings of this in-camera session were quietly released to the public. The proceedings comprise a little over 3,000 pages in print.

[857] For the text of this ordinance, see Promulgation of New Ordinance: Qadianis’ Anti-Islamic Activities (Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, n.d. [1984]); quotation at 3 (introduction).

[858] For the full range of blasphemy laws, many of which had originated in the colonial era, see M. Mahmood, The Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, as Amended Up to Date (Lahore: al-Qanoon Publishers, 2009), 867–92. Sections 295-B, 295-C, 298-A, 298-B, and 298-C were added in the Zia al-Haqq years. For an ethnographic account of these laws and their colonial origins, see Asad Ali Ahmed, “Specters of Macaulay: Blasphemy, the Indian Penal Code, and Pakistan’s Postcolonial Predicament,” in Raminder Kaur and William Mazzarella, eds., Censorship in South Asia: Cultural Regulation

from Sedition to Seduction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 172–205.

[859] Din Mohammad, governor of Sindh, to Khwaja Nazimuddin, the prime minister, August 10, 1952, enclosing an untitled note marked “top secret.” File 3(20)-PMS/52 (Correspondence with the Hon’ble Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation): 87–91; the quotation is at 89. (NDC). Cf. Qasmi, The Ahmadis, 133; the tension between the state’s Islamic and liberal aspirations is a key theme of Qasmi’s study.

[860] NAPD, 5/39, 565–70.

[861] See Jang, January 6, 1984 (speech by Justice Tanzil al-Rahman, the chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology, at a convention of the ‘ulama). For a discussion of the jurisprudence on the Ahmadi issue in subsequent years, see Naveeda Khan, Muslim Becoming: Aspiration and Skepticism in Pakistan (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 111–16; Saeed, Politics of Desecularization, 178–208.

[862] This time around, the movement that the ‘ulama and allied groups launched to press for their demands had, as Saadia Saeed has observed, “a very narrow base.” Saeed, Politics of Descularization, 159–61; quotation at 161. In contrast with Saeed, ibid., 164, I see the 1984 ordinance less as a matter of the government “caving in to the demands of the religious establishment” than its helping to generate them. The strongest indication of this is provided by the fact that it was the recommendation of the Council of Islamic Ideology that the religious groups wanted to see implemented. See, for instance, Jang, April 18, 1984; ibid., April 20, 1984.

[863] Jang, January 6, 1984.

[864] Nasr, Vanguard, 195–96.

[865] Karam Haydari, ed., Taqarir o tajawiz-i ‘ulama convention (Islamabad: Wizarat-i madhhabi umur wa aqalliyyati umur, n.d. [1980]), 31. The scholar quoted here is Sayyid Mahmud Ahmad Rizwi, a Sunni belonging to the Barelawi orientation. The reference to “the pure members of the Prophet’s household” (ahl-i bayt) is worth clarifying here. To the Twelver Shi‘a, the phrase refers to Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, her husband ‘Ali, and their children and descendants. This pointedly excludes other members of Muhammad’s family, such as his wife, ‘A’isha, or Muhammad’s uncle, al-‘Abbas, whose descendants would later go on to found the ‘Abbasid dynasty (r. 750–1258), under which several of the Shi‘i imams lived difficult lives. To the Sunnis, the Prophet’s household carries an expansive meaning. And Mahmud Ahmad Rizwi’s invocation of it was intended as an appeal to defend the honor of those the Shi‘a typically leave out of their reckoning. Allegations that the honor of an official was more important to the government than the Prophet’s had been heard during the 1953 anti-Ahmadi agitation as well. See, for instance, “Extracts from Weekly Confidential Diaries, Sialkot District, January 24, 1953,” in Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 2: 207.

[866] Cf. A. P. Fabian to R. D. Lavers, British Embassy, Islamabad, September 15, 1980, FCO 37/2358: Internal Political Situation in Pakistan, 1980: 89 (TNA; Electronic Resource).

[867] Born an Isma‘ili, Jinnah had later converted to Twelver Shi‘ism. See Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 215–19.

[868] AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i bist o nuhum ba-maqam Patna … mun‘aqida 29, 30, 31 December, 1938 (Lucknow: Sarfaraz Qawmi Press, n.d. [1939]), 8–9 (the published proceedings do not have continuous page numbers; the reference here is to the independently paginated report on the conference proceedings by Sayyid Muntakhab Husayn). Also see ibid., 19–20, for a denial, against newspaper reports, that Jinnah had intended to speak at the conference.

[869] The Leader (Allahabad), May 10, 1939, quoted in Jones, Shi‘a Islam, 201.

[870] Sir Harry Haig to Lord Linlithgow, May 9, 1939, L/PJ/5/267: 86 (United Provinces Governor’s Reports [BL]).

[871] On Madani’s leadership role in the Madh-i sahaba controversy, see Haig to Linlithgow, April 18, 1939, with Haig’s note on “The Lucknow Madhe Sahaba Controversy,” L/PJ/7/2587: 38 (BL). Also Haig to Linlithgow, October 24, 1938, Eur. Mss. F125/101: 95 (Correspondence with the Governor of the United Provinces and His Secretary, vol. 2, 1938 [BL]).

[872] Madani to Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman, September 8, 1947, in Islahi, ed., Maktubat-i Shaykh al-Islam, 2: 288.

[873] Ibid., 2: 288, quoting Madina (Bijnor), December 1, 1945.

[874] Musa belonged to the predominantly Shi‘i Hazara ethnicity. In recent years, members of this community have borne the brunt of Sunni militancy in the Balochistan province.

[875] I. I. Chundrigar, prime minister of Pakistan for a mere two months in late 1957, was also a Shi‘i. Rieck, Shias of Pakistan, 73.

[876] A. P. Fabian to Graham Archer, September 7, 1980, British Embassy, Islamabad, FCO 37/2358: 85 (TNA; Electronic Resource). As this report makes clear, British diplomats in Islamabad were skeptical that the figure was quite so high, and so were the Indian consular officials.

[877] These motifs are examined in Oskar Verkaaik, Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 100–101, 145–49, 159–60. The MQM is not, however,

a Shi‘i organization but one based on linguistic ties among the Urdu-speaking emigrants to Pakistan. Initially called the Muhajir Qawmi Movement (the “national movement of the migrants”), it changed its name to Muttahida Qawmi Movement (the “united national movement”) in 1997. This did not do much, though, to expand its support base beyond its core constituency. Ibid., 57.

[878] On the size of her father’s initial landholdings, see Hussain, Power Failure, 81.

[879] Andreas Rieck, “The Struggle for Equal Rights as a Minority: Shia Communal Organizations in Pakistan, 1948–1968,” in Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende, eds., The Twelver Shia in Modern Times (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 274, 276, and n. 38.

[880] Zaman, The Ulama, 117 and 233–34 n. 37. Also see Sayyid Muhammad Saqalayn Kazimi, Imamiyya dini madaris-i Pakistan: Ta’rikh o ta‘aruf (Lahore: Wifaq al-madaris al-Shi‘a Pakistan, 2004), 5, 53, 99, 128, 198, 205, 226, 246, 395, 439, 441, 451, 458, 466, 555, 581, 583, 613, 625, and 629.

[881] There has been considerable contestation within the ranks of the Shi‘a, too, on the reform of particular beliefs and practices. For some aspects of this contestation, which falls outside the purview of the discussion here, see Syed Hussain Arif Naqvi, “The Controversy about the Shaikhiyya Tendency among Shia ‘Ulama in Pakistan,” in Brunner and Ende, eds., The Twelver Shia, 135–49; Fuchs, “Relocating the Centers,” chapter 2.

[882] Jones, Shi‘a Islam, 100–105.

[883] Written statement by superintendent of police, Gujranwala, July 12, 1953, in Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 2: 372. Emphasis added.

[884] Shibli Nu‘mani, Muwazana-i Anis o Dabir (Lahore: Maktaba-i din o dunya, n.d.) At its 1912 session in Patna, the All India Shi‘a Conference had adopted a resolution calling on the governments of Bengal and Madras to remove two of Shibli’s books, on the Rashidun caliph ‘Umar and the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun, from the curriculum of the educational institutions under their jurisdiction. Both books were deemed to be unfavorable to Shi‘i views. The Bengal government accepted the request, but the Madras government turned it down. See AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i shashum, 5, 158–61; AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i hashtum, All India Shi‘a Conference, mun‘aqida … 18-19-20 October, 1914 ba-maqam Lucknow (Lucknow: Muhammadi Press, n.d. [1915]), 87.

[885] Syed Akbar Hyder, Reliving Karbala: Martyrdom in South Asian Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 137–59. On Mawlana Muhammad Ali, see ibid., 149–50.

[886] Faiz Ahmad Faiz, “Marsiya-i imam,” in idem, Sham-i shahr-i yaran. This poetic collection is part of Faiz’s collected works, Nuskha-ha’i wafa (Lahore: Maktaba-i karawan, n.d.), 551–56. The poem was composed in 1964.

[887] Shakir, “Idrikni,” in Sad barg, one of the four books (with independent pagination) in her Mah-i tamam, 131–32. For a brief discussion, and for the translation, which I have used with modifications, see Hyder, Reliving Karbala, 194–95.

[888] Advertisement in Jang, January 1, 1977.

[889] Rieck, Shias of Pakistan, 75–78, 138–42, 162–71. Also see Mohammad Musa, Jawan to General: Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier (Karachi: East & West Publishing Company, 1984), 198–204.

[890] Rieck, Shias of Pakistan, 199.

[891] Sawad-i a‘zam ke mulki o milli huquq ke tahaffuz ke-liye ahamm Sunni mutalabat (Lahore: Khuddam-i ahl-i sunnat wal-jama‘at, n.d. [1973]. Microfiche. New Delhi: Library of Congress Office, 1995), 7, 9.

[892] See, for instance, Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, 68–70.

[893] Haydari, ed., Taqarir, 163–64; quotation at 163.

[894] On the TNFJ, see Zaman, The Ulama, 114–18. For its leaders’ opposition to the “shari‘at bills” of the late 1980s, consider the following sampling of banner headlines in the party newspaper, Rizakar: “Passage of the Shari‘at Bill Would Strengthen Sectarianism” (July 16, 1986: 1); “Shari‘at Bill a Conspiracy to Deprive Muslims of Their Fundamental Rights” (July 24, 1986: 1); “We Are Opposed Not to the Implementation of the Shari‘at but Rather to a Particular Way of Thinking [about It]” (November 8–16, 1986: 1); “Shari‘at Bill Opposed to Popular Aspirations” (December 16, 1986: 1); “We Will Not Accept the Shari‘at Bill at Any Cost” (May 8, 1987: 1); “Proposed Shari‘at Bill Not Acceptable to All Schools of Thought” (March 24, 1987: 1); “We Will Not Permit a Controversial Shari‘at Bill to Be Implemented” (August 1–8, 1989: 1); “Realities Not Taken into Consideration in Preparing the Shari‘at Bill” (September 24–30, 1989: 1); “Shari‘at Bill Undermines the Stability of Pakistan (January 24, 1990: 1).

[895] Rieck, Shias of Pakistan, 133–45.

[896] A. P. Fabian to R. D. Lavers, March 5, 1979: 3, British Embassy, Islamabad, FCO 37/2188: Internal Political Situation in Pakistan, 1979: 11 (TNA; Electronic Resource). The Shi‘i leader quoted in this document is not named.

[897] Sayyid Safdar Husayn Najafi, “Har sadi ke mujaddid ‘ulama,” in idem, Mabadiyyat-i hukumat-i Islami (Lahore: Imamiyya publications, 1981), 35–42, at 41.

[898] Jang, February 2, 1984.

[899] Haydari, ed., Taqarir, 50–51; quotation at 51. Ansari was referring to article 12 of the Iranian constitution. See Qanun-i asasi-i jumhuri-i Islami-i Iran (Tehran: Wizarat-i farhang wa irshad-i Islami, 1989), 31.

[900] Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 162–63.

[901] Ibid., 163.

[902] Nawa-i waqt, February 11, 1979.

[903] Haydari, ed., Taqarir, 113–14. For Zahir’s full speech on this occasion, see ibid., 108–21.

[904] On Zahir, see Jawid Jamal Daskawi, Ihsan Ilahi Zahir (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1990).

[905] Najafi, “Islami tarz-i hukumat Shi‘a [sic] nuqta-i nazar se,” in idem, Mabadiyyat-i hukumat-i Islami, 43–65, esp. 62–65, quotation at 65. The article is undated, but internal evidence suggests that it was written in late 1979. On Najafi, see Sayyid Husayn ‘Arif Naqwi, Tazkira-i ‘ulama-i Imamiyya-i Pakistan (Islamabad: Markaz-i tahqiqat-i Farsi-i Iran wa Pakistan, 1984), 140–44. Among Najafi’s translations is his Urdu

rendering of Khomeini’s Tawzih al-masa’il (Tehran: Sazman-i tablighat-i Islami, 1983). The print run for this edition was 50,000 (ibid., front matter), a substantial number by Pakistani standards.

[906] Hussain, Power Failure, 550–51.

[907] On these organizations and their leaders, see Zaman, The Ulama, 111–43. For a candid acknowledgment of the fear that anti-Shi‘i rioting following Jhangawi’s assassination had inspired in Abida Hussain, see Hussain, Power Failure, 357–65.

[908] See Abu Rayhan Zia al-Rahman Faruqi, Sipah-i Sahaba kiya hai, kiya chahati hai? (n.p., n.d.); idem, Sipah-i sahaba ka nasb al-‘ayn awr taqaze (Faisalabad: Idara-i isha‘at al-ma‘arif, 1994). The author is a former head of the organization.

[909] See Abu Rayhan Zia al-Rahman Faruqi, Khilafat World Order (Faisalabad: Idara-i isha‘at al-ma‘arif, 2003).

[910] Ihtasham ul Haque, “Lashkar, Jaish, TJP, TNSM & SSP Banned,” Dawn, January 13, 2002.

[911] Jawaharlal Nehru, “His Highness the Aga Khan,” in S. Gopal, general ed., Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972–82), 7: 470–74 (first published in Modern Review, November 1935).

[912] Ibid., 7: 472.

[913] Abdul Hakim, Iqbal awr mulla, 19. The first sect mentioned in this passage is the Twelvers, while the one with “many millionaires” refers to the affluent Isma‘ilis. Those mentioned last are of

course the Ahmadis. For the view that “most of the Pakistani Shi‘a are unbelievers,” straightforwardly expressed by Muhammad Farid (d. 2005), the leading mufti of the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya, Akora Khattak, see Mufti Muhammad Farid, Fatawa-i Faridiyya, ed. Muhammad Wahhab Manglori, 7 vols. (Zarobi: Dar al-‘Ulum Siddiqiyya, 2013), 1: 133. He had the same view of the Iranian Shi‘a (ibid., 3: 561–62) and of the Isma‘ilis (ibid., 1: 138–40).

[914] How the response of Shi‘i religious scholars and activists toward the Ahmadis has differed from that of the Sunnis is a question also worth exploring. I leave it aside here, except to note that, in taking a position against the Ahmadis, the Shi‘is have not lost sight of the possibility that some such fate could be visited upon them as well. In 1953, the deputy commissioner of Gujranwala had noted that though the Majlis-i ‘amal leading the charge against the Ahmadis had two Shi‘i members, they had kept aloof, “presumably afraid of becoming the next target, after the Ahmadis, to be declared a minority.” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 2: 263. In the summer of 1974, a group of fifty Shi‘i ‘ulama had affirmed their commitment to the doctrine of the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood even as they had distanced themselves from the social boycott of the Ahmadis then being practiced in some circles. See Jang, August 2, 1974. Shi‘i concerns were not misplaced. Some of those active in the anti-Ahmadi agitation in 1974 would emerge as the leaders of anti-Shi‘i sectarianism in the 1980s (Zaman, Ulama, 114), and a social boycott of the Shi‘is has also been attempted on occasion. See Rizakar, October 8, 1986: 2; ibid., February 24, 1989: 4.

[915] In his testimony before the Court of Inquiry in January 1954, Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud, the head of the Ahmadi community, had stated that “what the Qur’an calls a purely Islamic Government is now an impossibility,” though he thought that such a government had, indeed, existed under the first successors of the Prophet, the Rashidun caliphs. Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 5: 2334–35.

[916] The year 1984 might seem to be an exception, but, as noted, there was no countrywide agitation on this issue then, only a regime’s effort to shore up its credentials.

[917] “A Report of My Visit to Pakistan,” 7, enclosure with Rahman to Frodin, October 7, 1974, FF 74–141 (RAC).

[918] My interpretation here differs from Qasmi’s, who sees putative similarities between the Pakistani Sunnis and the Ahmadis, beyond the question of the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood, as fueling Sunni anxieties toward them. The Shi‘a, for their part, are seen, as some Shi‘is do themselves, as more clearly distinguishable from both communities. See Qasmi, The Ahmadis, 224–26.

[919] “Mob Kills 3 Members of Ahmadi Community,” Dawn, July 29, 2014; Nabeel Anwar Dhakku, “Ahmedis in a Chakwal Village Fear for Their Lives,” ibid., June 9, 2015; Wasim Ashraf Butt, “Factory Torched in Jhelum over Blasphemy Allegation,” ibid., November 22, 2015. Also see ibid., August 6, 2009: “Is There an End?”

[920] Zaheeruddin v. the State, The Supreme Court Monthly Review, 26/8 (1993): 1718–80, at 1777. The Blasphemy Act dates from 1697, not 1679.

[921] On the Christian community of Pakistan and how the blasphemy laws have affected it, see Linda S. Walbridge, The Christians of Pakistan: The Passion of Bishop John Joseph (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

[922] See, for instance, ‘Aziz al-Rahman, “Qanun-i tahaffuz-i namus-i risalat awr masihiyyon ka na-rawa tarz-i ‘amal,” al-Balagh 33/2 (June 1998): 3–9.

[923] The fourteen-year-old was one of three Christians brought to court for blasphemy. One of them was assassinated before the case went to trial in the lower court, another after the Lahore High Court overturned that verdict. The minor was whisked out of the country soon thereafter. On this case, see “PM

Offers Meaningful Dialogue to Opposition," News, February 4, 1995; "Blasphemy Case: Rehmat, Salamat to the Gallows," ibid., February 10, 1995; "Countrywide Rallies Reject Change in Blasphemy Law," ibid., May 28, 1995.

[924] Asim Hussain, "Apostasy Decree Issued against Taseer," News, November 25, 2010.

[925] "Taseer Falls to Security Guard's Bullets," Dawn, January 5, 2011; Carlotta Gall, "Governor's Assassination Deepens the Divide in Pakistan," New York Times, January 6, 2011; idem, "Pakistan Faces a Divide of Age on Muslim Law," New York Times, January 11, 2011.

[926] For a somewhat similar argument, made with reference to the Ahmadis rather than the Shi'a, see Saeed, Politics of Desecularization. Saeed posits that the failure of the governing elite to "settle" the relationship between religion and the state has given repeated opportunities to religious groups to assert themselves on sites such as that provided to them by the question of the Ahmadis' status. See, for instance, ibid., 106, 218–19.

[927] Zia al-Rahman Faruqi, Sipah-i sahaba ka nasb al-'ayn, 41, quoting the revered saint 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani. Also see 'Ali Sher Haydari, Jawahirat-i Haydari, ed. Muhammad Nadim Qasimi (Lahore: Maktabat al-sahaba, 2010), 157, for the characterization of the Prophet's companions as the medium (wasita) through which his effulgence (fayz) reaches ordinary believers. This is strongly evocative of the Sufi masters serving as such intermediaries. Haydari, who was assassinated in August 2009, had once been the Sipah-i Sahaba's patron-in-chief.

[928] Muhammad Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia (Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbal, 1959; first published London, 1908), 82–83. Emphasis in the original.

[929] Iqbal, Reconstruction, 177–78.

[930] Ibid., 143.

[931] Iqbal, “Baghi murid,” in Kulliyyat-i Iqbal (Urdu), 496. This poem is part of Iqbal’s collection Bal-i Jibril. On Iqbal’s critique of Sufism, see also Carl W. Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism (Boston: Shambhala, 1997), 200–203. In discussing the modernists, the Islamists, and the state, among others, in their relationship with Sufism (ibid., 199–228), Ernst covers some of the same ground as I do in this chapter.

[932] Rahman, Islam, 140. Also ibid., 143, 144.

[933] Rahman, Islamic Methodology, 109–12.

[934] Rahman, Islam, 144.

[935] Ibid., 153. Cf. Rahman, Islamic Methodology, 117, where he dates this development to the twelfth century.

[936] Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, Ae kushta-i sultani o mulla’i o piri (Lahore: Idara-i tulu‘-i Islam, n.d.), 14. Parwez gives no reference for the quoted statement of Iqbal.

[937] Thanawi, al-Ifadat, 4: 179.

[938] Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, ‘Irfan-i Hafiz: Hafiz-i Shirazi ke mashhur wa maqbul Farsi diwan ki sufiyana wa ‘arifana Urdu sharh (Karachi: Nafis Academy, 1976).

[939] Muhammad Iqbal, Masnawi-i asrar-i khudi (Lahore: Union Steam Press, n.d. [1915]), 66–72. Translation based, in part and with modifications, on Abu Sayeed Nur-ud-Din, “Attitude towards Sufism,” in Hafeez Malik, ed., Iqbal: Poet Philosopher of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 287–300, at 294. When the work was first published in 1915, these lines caused enough consternation in influential circles for the modernist poet to omit them from later editions of that book. The original 1915 edition I use here is at the British Library, with Iqbal’s autograph.

[940] See Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, 85–88.

[941] Islahi, ed., Maktubat, 2: 403–28, at 427–28. The letter is addressed to Abul-Lays Nadwi, the first leader of the Jama‘at-i Islami of India following the end of colonial rule. It does not carry a date, but internal evidence suggests that it was written ca. 1951. For Abu’l-Lays’s letter, in which he had complained of Deobandi propaganda, as well as a fatwa, against Mawdudi and had invited Madani to the annual session of the Jama‘at-i Islami, see ibid., 2: 403–5. The two people Madani refers to in this quotation, besides Wali Allah, are the famed sixteenth- to seventeenth-century Naqshbandi Sufi, Ahmad Sirhindi, and the early nineteenth-century reformer, Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareli, who had led an abortive effort to establish a polity on the northwest frontier of India.

[942] Mawdudi, “Sa‘y-i la hasil,” in ‘Asim Nu‘mani, Tasawwuf awr ta‘mir-i sirat: Mawlana Mawdudi ki tahriron ki rawshani main (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1972), 102–7; quotation at 106. Though the advent of Islam was supposed to have brought the age of jahiliyya to an end, Mawdudi argued that Muslims had come to be afflicted by a new malaise of quasi-pagan ignorance and materialism. In the letter quoted earlier, Madani alluded to this view of Mawdudi and what it meant for how the history of Islam itself was to be judged. Like the idea of the sovereignty of God,

Mawdudi’s formulation of the notion of jahiliyya also came to acquire a prominent place in the writings of Sayyid Qutb.

[943] L/PJ/7/5297: The Music in Muslim Shrines Act 1942: 6 (BL).

[944] Ibid., 5.

[945] AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i bist o shashum … mun‘aqida 26, 27, 28 October, 1935 bamaqam Rae Bareli (Lucknow: Sarfaraz Qawmi Press, n.d. [1936]), 12–13. Despite the opposition of some members, who could not see why the women in question should be excluded from the processions, the AISC passed a resolution in support of the Shi‘a Young Men’s action. Ibid., 62–63.

[946] See chapter 5, note 19.

[947] L/PJ/7/5297: The Music in Muslim Shrines Act: 16–17.

[948] Ibid., 12.

[949] Ibid., 17.

[950] Ibid., 18. This was stated by Raja Fateh Khan, a legislator from Rawalpindi.

[951] According to an estimate from 2007, donations at the shrine of Shaykh ‘Ali Hujwiri in Lahore amounted to nearly 160 million rupees per year (approximately $2.6 million). Altogether, the 320 or so shrines under the control of the Awqaf Department in the Punjab generated revenue of 590 million rupees in 2006–7 (around $9.7 million). The department’s expenses on these shrines amounted to 400 million rupees (roughly $6.6 million) that

year. See Abdul Manan, “Auqaf Meets Its Expenses with Income from Shrines,” Daily Times, August 27, 2007. On the number of shrines in the Punjab, see “Blast at Baba Farid’s Shrine Kills Six,” Express Tribune, October 26, 2010. This article gives the figure of 800 million rupees (around $9.3 million, according to the exchange rate then) as the revenue of the awqaf shrines in the Punjab, of which about 80 percent took the form of pious donations. The Awqaf Department of Sindh has approximately 250 shrines and mosques under its control. See “250 Shrines and Mosques under Auqaf Dept, Tells Sharmila,” Daily Times, February 12, 2013.

[952] See L/PJ/7/2413: “NWFP Muslim Waqfs Act 1938” (BL). On the opposition to it of Madani and Kifayat Allah, see ibid., 72.

[953] The abortive initiative had taken the form of the Muslim Auqaf Bill, moved in the Punjab legislative assembly in 1937. See Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, 160–64.

[954] Syed H. M. Naqvi and Syed Mahmudunnasir, The Law of Waqfs (Lahore: All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1968), 115, 117.

[955] The 1962 constitution gave the provisions of the 1961 waqf ordinance legal protection to preempt the possibility of its being deemed by the courts to be in contravention of fundamental rights. See M. Farani, Law of Auqaf and Evacuee Trusts (Lahore: Lahore Law Times Publications, n.d. [1967]), 4.

[956] Naqvi and Mahmudunnasir, Law of Waqfs, appendix: “The East Pakistan Waqfs Ordinance, 1962,” with independent pagination.

[957] Ibid., appendix, 21–22.

[958] Ibid., appendix, 24.

[959] See Katherine Ewing, “The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan,” Journal of Asian Studies 42/2 (1983): 251–68.

[960] “G-G Pleads for Revival of Islamic Learning,” Dawn, November 28, 1952.

[961] See chapter 1, note 149.

[962] Proceedings of the Special Committee, no. 2: 338–39. Cf. ibid., no. 12: 1542–43, 1655, 1663–64, 1675, 1681 (the views of the Lahore-based Ahmadis on this matter).

[963] Ibid., no. 4: 537–45. Cf. ibid., no. 12: 1543 (the views of the Lahore-based Ahmadis).

[964] Ibid., no. 3: 361.

[965] Ibid., no. 3: 471.

[966] Ibid., no. 12: 1685–87. For an early refutation of such arguments, see Murtaza Ahmad Khan (Maikash), Alburz shikan gurz ‘urf mirza’i nama (Lahore: Taj Company, 1938 [hereafter, Mirza’i nama]), 201–116.

[967] Proceedings of the Special Committee, no. 12: 1680–81, 1726. For one of the verses he cited from Rumi, see Masnawi-i ma‘nawi, ed. Tawfiq Subhani (Tehran: Wizarat-i farhang wa irshad-i Islami, 1995), part 5: 702 (verse 742): “O disciple, he [the pir] is the prophet (nabi) of his time / For the light of the prophet is manifest in him.” Also see Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 6: 65 (statement of the

Ahmadiya Anjuman Ishaat-i-Islam, Lahore). The beliefs of the Lahore-based group, though notably less extravagant than those of the Rabwa-based Ahmadis, may have been more threatening in that they tended to accentuate the similarity between the claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and those of some medieval Sufi saints. For a passing recognition of this point, see Murtaza Ahmad Khan (Maikash), Mirza'i nama, 201.

[968] Proceedings of the Special Committee, no. 13: 1735.

[969] Ibid., no. 4: 547.

[970] For other efforts by the 'ulama to refute the Ahmadi invocation of the Sufi tradition, see ibid., no. 15: 2006–14; no. 16: 2577–81.

[971] Muhammad Hanif Nadwi, 'Aqliyyat-i Ibn Taymiyya (Lahore: Idara-i saqafat-i Islamiyya, n.d.), 331–38 The book has no date of publication, but the Library of Congress catalogue gives it as 1965.

[972] Ibid., 351–52 and, more generally, 349–56.

[973] Ibid., preface, v–vi. The words "reactionary" and "literalist" are given in English.

[974] See Muhammad Hanif Nadwi, Lisan al-Qur'an, 2 vols. (Lahore: Idara-i saqafat-i Islamiyya, 1983), 1: 33. This is a posthumous and incomplete work on the lexicon of the Qur'an.

[975] Muhammad Hanif Nadwi, Mirza'iyyat nae zawiyon se, ed. Muhammad Sarwar Tariq (Faisalabad: Tariq Academy, 2003; first published in 1952). On this book, see Bhatti, Qafila-i hadith, 333.

[976] Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, Imdad al-mushtaq (Delhi: Maktaba-i Burhan, 1981; first published in 1925), 32–33. For Thanawi’s own discourses on the Masnawi, see idem, Kelid-i masnawi, 24 vols. (Multan: Idara-i ta’lifat-i ashrafiyya, 2005; first published 1924–33).

[977] See chapter 1, note 28.

[978] Iqbal to Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, November 13, 1917, in ‘Ata Allah, Iqbal nama, 1: 79.

[979] Shahab, Shahab nama, 455. For a detailed hagiography of Waris ‘Ali Shah by a contemporary who had received an English education and subsequently became a disciple, see Fazl Husayn Siddiqi Warisi, Mishkat-i haqqaniyya (Karachi: H. M. Sa‘id, 1982). This book was first published in 1919. Also see Claudia Liebeskind, Piety on Its Knees: Three Sufi Traditions in South Asia in Modern Times (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), esp. 177–223.

[980] Fazl Husayn Warisi, Mishkat, 128.

[981] Ibid., 69.

[982] Ibid., 66.

[983] The president, however, had a rather mixed view of the pir. “This type of people are more relaxed and broad-minded,” he wrote in his diary after a meeting with him in April 1967, “unlike the mullahs whose minds are grooved and narrowed. One can talk philosophy with them at the same time.” Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 84 (entry for April 19, 1967). For a more sour view after he had left office, see ibid., 366: “I am told that Pir of Dewal, having exploited my name for so long and amassing so much wealth by skillfully duping people, now talks against me in an attempt to rehabilitate himself. For some time past he had been

losing ground as people discovered that he was a skillful fraud” (entry for February 24, 1970). Speaking with a British consular official, Mawdudi, for his part, characterized the pir of Dewal Sharif as “the Rasputin of Pakistan.” DO 134/34: Correspondence between Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca on Pakistan General Politics, 1967–68 (N. J. Barrington’s interview with Mawdudi, September 13, 1967, item #83) (TNA; Electronic Resource).

[984] Anjum Niaz, “The Pir in the Palace,” Dawn, July 14, 2013; Imran Ali Teepu, “PM into Spiritual Healers,” ibid., September 19, 2012.

[985] For an illustration, see Daechsel, Islamabad, 239–42.

[986] “Asif Ali Zardari Offers Prayers at Ajmer Sharif, Announces $1 Million,” Times of India, April 8, 2012; Sagnik Dutta, “Ajmer Hasn’t Helped Pak VIPs,” Sunday Guardian, April 8, 2012, at www.sunday-guardian.com/news/ajmer-hasnt-helped-pak-vips (accessed July 24, 2016).

[987] A “secretary” is the head, in the federal government structure, of the secretariat that administers a ministry. See Charles H. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 6–8. The principal secretary to the governor-general and, after 1956, to the president and the prime minister is the highest bureaucratic official in the secretariat attached to that office.

[988] Shahab, Shahab nama, 161–69.

[989] Ibid., 169–71.

[990] On this Sufi path, see The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1960–2002), s.v. “Uwaysiyya” (by J. Baldick).

[991] Shahab, Shahab nama, 797.

[992] Cf. Daechsel, Islamabad, 241.

[993] Bano Qudsiyya, Raja gidh (Lahore: Sang-i mil publications, 1981). The words “abnormal” and “paranormal” are from the last line of the novel: ibid., 564.

[994] Iqbal, Reconstruction, 115. As he stated elsewhere in these lectures, “Humanity needs three things today—a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe has, no doubt, built idealistic systems on these lines, but experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation alone can bring…. The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich. Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man’s ethical advancement.” Ibid., 170. Though Sufism was hardly the only source or instance of the “spirituality” that Iqbal spoke of, his repeated invocation of Sufi thinkers and poets shows that he took it to be a major instance of it, just as it represented to him a “religious psychology” (ibid., 125) far superior to the psychology then developing in his contemporary West. The ethical dimensions of this Sufi-inflected spirituality are also clear in Iqbal’s thought, not least in the preceding passage. It is difficult therefore to agree with the sweeping view of Hamilton Gibb that “what lies behind his thought is a Sufi theology, not the Sufi ethic. It was the Sufi ethic that Iqbal hated, because to him it was the symbol and source of passivity and resignation. And it is just here that his chief weakness as a religious thinker lies, for Sufism, without its ethical and ascetic disciplines, runs to seed and becomes—as Iqbal himself expressed it—‘the pursuit of a nameless thing.’” H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 82. The equation between passivity and “the Sufi ethic” was Gibb’s, not Iqbal’s.

[995] Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, 133. Here and elsewhere, Abdul Hakim’s understanding of religion and morality is also influenced by the Danish theologian Höffding’s idea of the “conservation of values,” as he acknowledges. Ibid., 50.

[996] Ibid., 158–59.

[997] Ibid., 157. On the exclusion of the polytheists, which would have included Pakistani Hindus, see ibid., 157.

[998] ‘Attar and Ibn al-‘Arabi are not mentioned in this book, but Rumi and Sarmad are. See ibid., 138.

[999] Khalifa Abdul Hakim, “Mullaiyyat,” in Shahid Husayn Razzaqi, ed., Maqalat-i Hakim, 3 vols. (Lahore: Idara-i saqafat-i Islamiyya, 1969), 3: 183–91.

[1000] Ibid., 187.

[1001] The sharp contrast between Sufi-inspired ethical values and the lifeless formalism of the mulla’s Islam is repeatedly evoked as well in Abdul Hakim’s extended meditation on the Urdu and Persian verse of the great nineteenth-century poet Ghalib: Khalifa Abdul Hakim, Afkar-i Ghalib (Lahore: Maktaba-i mu‘in al-adab, 1973; first published in 1954). See, for instance, ibid., 454–56.

[1002] “Soul of Pakistan,” editorial, Civil and Military Gazette, August 20, 1952. Cutting in DO 35/3185 (Pakistan Internal Affairs) (TNA). It is worth noting that an Ahmadi, Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, was a “controlling shareholder” of the newspaper at the time. Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 2: 923.

[1003] Yohanan Friedmann, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 113. For the point that the putative conflict in the work of many Sufis and poets between unbelief and belief “is rather, in most cases, that between outward form and inner meaning,” see Abdul Hakim, Afkar-i Ghalib, 29.

[1004] See, in particular, G. M. Sayyid [Syed], Jaysa main ne dekha (Karachi: Idara-i furugh-i insaniyyat, 1972). This book was first published in Sindhi in 1968. The English translation is titled Religion and Reality (Lahore: Fiction House, 2012; first published in 1986).

[1005] For a useful study, see Oskar Verkaaik, “Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan,” in Magnus Marsden, ed., Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 111–31.

[1006] Ibid., 119–20.

[1007] With some difference of interpretation, I am indebted here to Verkaaik, ibid., especially 128–30.

[1008] Sherkoti, Anwar, 165 (‘Usmani to Habib al-Rahman Ludhianawi, December 29, 1945).

[1009] Ibid., 68–70. For another speech by ‘Usmani in which he returned to the question of the veneration of tombs and urged Ibn Sa‘ud not to destroy such tombs, see ibid., 71–75. Summaries of these speeches come from a diary ‘Usmani kept during his visit to the Hijaz. The contents of this diary are reproduced in Sherkoti, Anwar, 68–80.

[1010] Khwaja Hasan Nizami, Murshid ko sajda-i ta‘zim, 11th ed. (Delhi: Khwaja Awlad Kitab Ghar, 1970; first published in 1920).

[1011] Q 12.100 (following Arberry, The Koran Interpreted).

[1012] Nizami, Murshid ko sajda-i ta‘zim, 53–61.

[1013] Nizami himself had made the point that the Deobandis had no grounds to disagree with his position on prostration. See ibid., 5–6. This is an exaggerated claim. For another Deobandi view on the question of prostration to anyone other than God, see Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, Mazarat-i awliya Allah par ‘urs ki shar‘i haysiyyat, collected in idem, Sunnat o bid‘at (Karachi: Idarat al-ma‘arif, n.d.), 81–83. Shafi‘ roundly condemned the practice but did not characterize it as unbelief (kufr)—that is, as long as the intention was not to worship the being in question. This legal opinion was first issued ca. 1931. About two centuries earlier, Wali Allah as well had noted that excessive veneration of shrines was a grave sin but that it did not amount to unbelief. Shah Wali Allah, al-Tafhimat al-Ilahiyya, ed. Ghulam Mustafa al-Qasimi, 2 vols. (Hyderabad: Shah Wali Allah Academy, 1967–70), 2: 49–50 (#34).

[1014] Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, 98, 100.

[1015] Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘, Mere walid-i majid awr unke mujarrab ‘amaliyyat (Karachi: Dar al-isha‘at, 1975), 72–73, 76, 78, 82, 84, 86.

[1016] On the making of amulets by Deobandi ‘ulama in Chitral, in the Frontier province, see Marsden, Living Islam, 157–92. Even as it shows that reform-minded Deobandi ‘ulama, too, can deal in amulets, this otherwise admirable ethnographic account is premised on the counterintuitiveness of this being the case.

[1017] For brief accounts of Azhar’s career on which I draw here and later, see Sultan Mahmud Ziya, “A’ina-i kirdar,” in Muhammad Mas‘ud Azhar, Khutbat-i jihad, ed. Sultan Mahmud Ziya, 2 vols. (Karachi: Maktaba-i Hasan, 2001), 1: 7–15. (Vol. 1 was first published in August 1994 and vol. 2 in May 1996. The edition of the two volumes used here was published in April 2001.) On Azhar’s career and his Jaish-i Muhammad, see also Muhammad ‘Amir Rana, Jihad-i Kashmir o Afghanistan: Jihadi tanzimon awr mazhabi jama‘aton ka aik ja’iza (Lahore: Mash‘al Books, 2002), 140–65; Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 61–70.

[1018] Muhammad Mas‘ud Azhar, Tuhfa-i sa‘adat (Karachi: Idarat al-khayr, 2001). On the publication date, see front matter and 5–6.

[1019] Azhar himself makes no effort, however, to connect it to any larger framework of Sufi thought and practice.

[1020] Ibid., 17, 25, 158–62.

[1021] Ibid., 21, 61.

[1022] Ibid., 48, 58, 71, 153–57.

[1023] Ibid., 92.

[1024] Ibid., 83, 149.

[1025] Ibid., 85, 95, 105.

[1026] Ibid., 19, 20, 27, 30, 32, 51, 61, 138, 174–75.

[1027] Ibid., 22, 32, 62, 69, 114, 122, 133, 176–77.

[1028] Ibid., 31, 34, 47, 50, 107, 134.

[1029] Ibid., 75.

[1030] Ibid., 25.

[1031] Ibid., 52.

[1032] Ibid., 163–66.

[1033] Ibid., 17, 29, 45–46, 56, 112, 185.

[1034] Mawdudi, “Khud-niwisht,” in Bhutta, ed., Mawlana Mawdudi apni and dusron ki nazar main, 25.

[1035] Ibid., 26–29.

[1036] Mawdudi in his monthly journal, Tarjuman al-Qur’an (August 1951), quoted in Nu‘mani, Tasawwuf, 39–40.

[1037] See, for instance, Nu‘mani, Tasawwuf, 33.

[1038] Ibid., 30–32.

[1039] ‘Ali Hujwiri, Kashf al-mahjub, translated and abridged by Mian Tufail Muhammad, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1968; the first edition, not available to me, was published in 1966). The work was completed while Tufail Muhammad was in jail in 1961–62. See ibid., 21, 30.

[1040] According to an estimate from 2004, 28,000 to 32,000 people visited the shrine every day, and 55,000 to 60,000 did so on Thursdays and Fridays. Ghafir Shahzad, Data Darbar Complex: Ta‘mir se takmil tak (Lahore: Idrak Publications, 2004), 12. The source of this estimate is an employee of the Awqaf Department of the Punjab province.

[1041] Tufail Muhammad, trans., Kashf al-mahjub, 23.

[1042] Ibid., 24.

[1043] Ibid., 26–29. This is the translation by Muhammad Husayn Gondlawala (Lahore: Malik Muhammad Din, n.d.). See ibid., 29. This work was not available to me.

[1044] See interview with ‘Abd al-Ghafur Ahmad in Jang, April 25, 1984.

[1045] Nasr, Mawdudi, 124.

[1046] For the official biography of Tahir al-Qadiri, see “A Profile of Shaykh-ul-Islam Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri,” at www.minhaj.org/english/tid/8718/A-Profile-of-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-Muhammad-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html (accessed June 22, 2016). The profile does not mention any madrasa from which he had graduated—a significant liability from the perspective of many Pakistani ‘ulama. Other hagiographic works do claim, however, that he had completed the full madrasa curriculum—again without naming a madrasa where he did so. See Qadiri and Qamar, Tahrik-i minhaj al-Qur’an, 110–11.

[1047] See Sher Ali Khan, “Tahirul Qadri: The Odd Man Out,” Herald, September 2014, at http://www.dawn.com/news/1135526 (accessed June 27, 2016).

[1048] Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, “Punishments in Islam: Their Classification and Philosophy,” PhD dissertation, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 1984, 495, at http://eprints.hec.gov.pk/1475/1/1359.htm (accessed June 22, 2016).

[1049] On these events and his career more generally, see Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox, 282–94; Ayesha Siddiqa, “Tahir-ul-Qadri: Revolutionary or Stooge?” Newsline, July 2014, at http://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/tahir-ul-qadri-revolutionary-or-stooge (accessed June 22, 2016); Khan, “Tahirul Qadri: The Odd Man Out.”

[1050] The Nawaz Sharif government wanted to bring General Musharraf to trial for treason on account of a state of emergency he had decreed in late 2007 to stave off a showdown with the Supreme Court. The military establishment was averse to seeing its former head humiliated in this manner. See Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox, 282–94, 352–56.

[1051] “Sit-ins Show Deep-rooted Discontent,” Dawn, September 14, 2015, quoting data provided by the Institute for Policy Reforms, a Lahore-based think tank.

[1052] Muhammad Tahir al-Qadiri, Dala’il al-barakat fil-tahiyyat wal-salawat, trans. Zuhur Allah al-Azhari (Lahore: Minhaj al-Qur’an Publications, 2009), 49. The quotation is from the introduction by the translator.

[1053] Muhammad Tahir al-Qadiri, al-Minhaj al-sawiyy min al-hadith al-nabawiyy, 13th printing (Lahore: Minhaj al-Qur’an Publications, 2008; first published in 2005), 1–25.

[1054] On the women in his sit-in and the contrast between his protest and that of Imran Khan’s rallies, at which, “with the blare of song and music … the atmosphere was more festive than charged with revolutionary zeal,” see Zahid Hussain, “The Last Episode,” Dawn, August 20, 2014.

[1055] For instance, the local government in Sindh expected no fewer than 1.5 million people to attend the ‘urs of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan in June 2013. “Lal Shahbaz Qalandar’s 761st Urs,” Express Tribune, June 29, 2013. In his study of mulids—the saints’ birth anniversaries—in Egypt, Samuli Schielke argues that their appeal to people belonging (or aspiring to belong) to the middle class, the “festivity” with which they have long been associated, and probably also the number of people attending them have all diminished over the course of the twentieth century. See Samuli Schielke, The Perils of Joy: Contesting Mulid Festivals in Contemporary Egypt (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2012), esp. 197. Whether this is also the case so far as popular attendance at major Sufi shrines in Pakistan is concerned awaits systematic study.

[1056] See Marsden, Living Islam, especially 33, 241–42 (with reference to Chitral in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

[1057] See Ernst, Shambhala Guide, 24–45, 199–215.

[1058] A useful criticism of such approaches is offered by Carl W. Ernst and Bruce B. Lawrence, Sufi Martyrs of Love: The Chishti Order in South Asia and Beyond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

[1059] For two different views on Egypt, see Valerie J. Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), arguing against decline; Schielke, Perils of Joy, arguing for it. On West Africa, strongly arguing against any decline, see Rüdiger Seesemann, The Divine Flood:

Ibrahim Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth-century Sufi Revival (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). For Sufism in Bangladesh, see Hans Harder, Sufism and Saint Veneration in Contemporary Bangladesh: The Maijbhandaris of Chittagong (London: Routledge, 2011), arguing for the continuing vitality of shrine-based devotionalism; and Katy Gardner, Global Migrants, Local Lives: Travel and Transformation in Rural Bangladesh (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), for the argument that, while shrines have continued to thrive, the “purists” have coopted some shrines into a framework of reformed Islam, leaving many others to the poor and the uneducated and often causing some decline in attendance at them (see, for instance, Gardner, Global Migrants, 263). On institutional Sufism’s declining fortunes in contemporary Afghanistan, see David B. Edwards, Caravan of Martyrs: Sacrifice and Suicide Bombing in Afghanistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017), 65–66, 96, 99–100, 127–28, 134, 139. On Pakistan itself, the indicators I note in what follows may be compared with the upbeat assessment in Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound.

[1060] My point here is hardly to dispute that “[a] movement like Sufism … should not necessarily be judged by the literature it produces.” Fritz Meier, “The Mystic Path,” in Bernard Lewis, ed., The World of Islam (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 127; quoted in Seesemann, Divine Flood, 6. It is only that Sufi intellectual output has fallen markedly in Pakistan in comparison with the intellectual productivity of colonial-era Sufi masters. One partial exception is the discourses of Zulfiqar Ahmad Naqshbandi, a contemporary Deobandi pir belonging to the Naqshbandi Sufi order. But his publications do not match Thanawi’s in quantity and certainly not in their range. On him, see note 148, later.

[1061] For a similar point for a wider cultural zone, “the Balkans-to-Bengal complex,” see Ahmed, What Is Islam?, 524–26. There are exceptions, of course. Jawwad S. Khawaja, a former judge of the Lahore High Court and of the Supreme Court, and briefly, in 2015, the latter’s chief justice, was well-known for his Sufi proclivities and for drawing inspiration from the likes of Hafiz. See Asad Rahim Khan, “Jawwad S. Khawaja: Poetic Justice,” Herald, April 2016, at http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153394 (accessed November 6, 2016). Such exceptions serve only to prove the rule, however.

[1062] See Marsden, Living Islam, 240–44.

[1063] Thanawi, Imdad al-fatawa, 2: 516–20 (#617–18).

[1064] Ibid., 2: 516, 518.

[1065] Cf. ibid., 2: 519.

[1066] In a fatwa on a related question, Mufti Muhammad Farid of the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya had noted in 1974 that a child born within two years of the husband’s absence from home was legitimate, since that was the extreme outer limit of gestation. He made no reference, however, to the role of any supernatural forces in transporting the husband to her wife during those two years. Farid, Fatawa-i Faridiyya, 6: 132. In another case, a husband working abroad had invoked modern science to dispute his paternity of a child born six months after he had left for work in Qatar. He had told his wife: “No medical history anywhere in the world accepts that a child can be born within this time period.” The mufti responded, however, that a child born in this time frame was in fact legitimate. Ibid., 6: 125–26 (the question or the answer is not dated).

[1067] Pir Muhammad Karam Shah, Ziya al-Qur’an. 5 vols. (Lahore: Ziya al-Qur’an Publications, 1978), 1: 24–25 (commenting on Q 1.4). Also see ibid., 2: 667 (commenting on Q 17.57). For other instances of his defense of Barelawi beliefs and practices, see ibid., 1: 172 (commenting on Q 2.248 to justify the veneration of relics); 2: 609–14 (commenting on Q 16.115 to argue that sacrificing animals in honor of holy men is not a polytheistic practice). The first edition of this work was published in two volumes in 1965–70; my references are to the 1978 edition.

[1068] For a fuller discussion of this point, see Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, 84–90.

[1069] Shahab, Shahab nama, 795.

[1070] On the saga of Dabba Pir, who was the subject of much ridicule by investigative journalists and was eventually arrested, see Imroz, August 27, 1968. Also see the coverage in the newspaper on the following days and the editorial on “fake pirs and holy men” (“Ja‘li pir faqir”) (ibid., August 30, 1968). Most of the boxes the police recovered from his residence belonged to women (ibid., August 27, 1968). In self-defense, the pir had claimed that he was helping people develop habits of thrift, presumably by way of putting away money in the said boxes (ibid., August 31, 1968). That he should have tried to appeal to such developmentalist sensibilities in justifying his practices as a pir, at a time when development was the leitmotif of the regime, is noteworthy here. On the discourse of development in this era, see Daechsel, Islamabad.

[1071] Shahab, Shahab nama, 799–800.

[1072] See Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound, especially 46–87. On Siraj ‘Ali Muhammad, ibid., 132–34. On the sense of continuity with the past, see ibid., especially 9.

[1073] According to Rozehnal, members of the Chishti Sabiri order in Pakistan “number in the thousands.” Ibid., 132. While allowing for Rozehnal’s caution against gauging a Sufi order’s significance simply on the basis of the numbers it can muster (ibid.), “thousands” in what is the world’s sixth most populous country obviously suggest a miniscule figure.

[1074] On his educational and professional background, see Muhammad Aslam Naqshbandi, Halat-i faqir: Sawanih hayat-i mahbub al-‘ulama wal-sulaha hazrat mawlana hafiz pir Zulfiqar Ahmad Naqshbandi Mujaddidi (Faisalabad: Maktabat al-faqir, 2013), 30–41; on the madrasas he has established or patronizes, ibid., 245–60. For a useful

illustration of his style of discourse, see Zulfiqar Ahmad Naqshbandi, Khutbat-i Hind, compiled by Khalil al-Rahman Sajjad Nu‘mani Naqshbandi, 2 vols. (Mamdapur, Maharashtra, n.p., 2011).

[1075] Black economy, too, “calculated at three times the size of the official economy” in 2000, is a contributor to religious causes. (On this estimate, see Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy [London: Pluto Press, 2007], 153.) Asked in December 1980 if black marketing was permissible, Mufti Muhammad Farid of the Dar al‘Ulum Haqqaniyya responded: “In the present age, black [marketing] is only a legal crime [as distinguished from one according to the shari‘a], since it harms the administrative system (intizam). In countries where the doors to apostasy are wide open and where opposing and combating the Islamic system is not outlawed, on what basis are their rulers to be considered worthy of obedience?” Farid, Fatawa-i Faridiyya, 7: 48–49. Also see ibid., 86–87.

[1076] Sarah F. D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 34.

[1077] Malik, Colonialization, 62.

[1078] For a similar point, though not with reference to charitable endowments, see Muhammad Amir Rana, “Dilemma of Barelvi Politics,” Dawn, August 24, 2014.

[1079] Malik, Colonialization, 64–65.

[1080] “Death Toll Rises to 45,” Dawn, July 2, 2010.

[1081] “DG Khan Shrine Bombing: Death Toll Reaches 50,” Express Tribune, April 4, 2001. One of the attackers was a teenage schoolboy from the Frontier province.

[1082] Somini Sengupta and Salman Masood, “Blast Kills 19 at Pakistani Shrine during Muslim Festival,” New York Times, May 28, 2005; “Sixth Shrine Hit,” Dawn, April 4, 2011.

[1083] Ali Hazrat Bacha, “Terrorists Turn on Sufi Saint’s Shrine,” Dawn, March 6, 2009 (the shrine of Rahman Baba, in Hazarkhwani, near Peshawar). For other instances, see “Mazarat par hamlon ki tafsil, Express, July 3, 2010 (the shrine of ‘Abd al-Ra’uf Malang Baba, in December 2007; Abu Sayd Baba’s shrine in the Khyber Agency of the tribal areas, in March 2008; the tomb of Bahadur Baba in Nowshera, near Peshawar, in March 2009; the tomb of the poet Amir Hamza Shinwari, in Landi Kotal, in May 2009); Ibrahim Shinwari, “Shrine Blown Up in Khyber,” Dawn, July 16, 2010 (the shrine of Baba ji and three others, located in the tribal area of Landi Kotal); “Ten Killed in Terror Attack on Mosque-shrine,” Dawn, March 5, 2011 (the shrine of Akhun Panju Baba, near Peshawar; on him, see Muhammad Amir Shah Qadiri, Tazkira-i ‘ulama wa mashayikh-i Sarhad [Peshawar: ‘Azim Publishing House, n.d.], 16–24); “Shrines Destroyed, Two Killed in Khyber,” Dawn, December 11, 2011 (the shrines of Shaykh Nissa Baba and Shaykh Bahadur Bara, both in Landi Kotal); Ali Hazrat Bacha, “Peshawar Panj Pir Shrine Blast Kills Three,” Dawn, June 22, 2012 (the Panjpir shrine in Hazarkhwani, near Peshawar); “Shrine Damaged in Peshawar Blast,” Dawn, June 29, 2012 (the Mian Neka shrine, in Surizai, near Peshawar); “Blast Damages Shrine in Peshawar,” Dawn, November 4, 2012 (the Phandu Baba shrine near Peshawar).

[1084] Qurban Ali Khushik, “Bloodbath at Sehwan Shrine; Over 75 Perish, 250 Injured,” Dawn, February 17, 2017. It is worth noting that ISIS characterized the people targeted as a “Shia gathering.” Ibid. In late 2016, ISIS had also carried out a bombing at a shrine in Khuzdar, Balochistan. Saleem Shahid and Abdul Wahid Shahwani, “52 Killed in Suicide Attack on Balochistan Shrine,” Dawn, November 13, 2016.

[1085] The case of Ahmadi mosques is different, however. They have been attacked, as they were on several occasions in 1953, for what they represent rather than only to terrorize and kill those present there. For such attacks, see Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 140; ibid., 2: 383.

[1086] Khan, “Taliban Massacre 131 Schoolchildren.”

[1087] “Government to Set Up Sufi Advisory Council,” Dawn, June 7, 2009. On the National Sufi Council, see Alix Philippon, “A Sublime, yet Disputed, Object of Political Ideology? Sufism in Pakistan at the Crossroads,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 52 (2014): 271–92, at 283–86.

[1088] Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Miliband’s Visit Seen as Bid to Back Moderates,” Dawn, July 10, 2009.

[1089] “US Ambassador Announces Grants to Conserve Shrines,” News, April 22, 2010.

[1090] Nabeel Anwar Dhakku, “Kabaddi, Bullfights Mark Annual Urs of Sufi Saint,” Dawn, September 23, 2013.

[1091] Mansoor Mirani, “Thousands Attend Sachal Urs at Daraza Sharif,” Dawn, July 14, 2014.

[1092] “DG Khan Shrine Bombing: Death Toll Reaches 50,” Express Tribune, April 4, 2011.

[1093] Tariq Saeed Birmani, “Devotees Miss Drum Beat and Dance at Sakhi’s Urs,” Dawn, April 6, 2015. Portions of the shrine and the adjoining areas are subject to two jurisdictions, urban and rural (or “tribal”). The use of musical instruments was prohibited only on the urban side. Ibid.

At the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, too, the suicide bombing took place in February 2017 as a Sufi dance was being performed. Khushik, “Bloodbath at Sehwan Shrine.” Defiant devotees returned the day after the blast for their ritual dance. “Devotees Resume Dhamal at Lal Shahbaz Qalandar Shrine,” Dawn, February 18, 2017.

[1094] Ali Hazrat Bacha, “Terrorists Turn on Sufi Saint’s Shrine,” Dawn, March 6, 2009. Till recent times, women in the Frontier province have had considerable freedom to go into the inner sanctum of many shrines—more so than is the case at some major shrines in the Punjab. See Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound, 211.

[1095] A. Azfar Moin, “Sovereign Violence: Temple Destruction in India and Shrine Desecration in Iran and Central Asia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 57 (2015): 467–96.

[1096] Wheeler M. Thackston, trans., The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor (New York: Modern Library, 2002), 269; cited in Moin, “Sovereign Violence,” 493.

[1097] Between 1926 and early 1932, the All India Shi‘a Conference alone issued 93,100 appeals in protest against the Wahhabi desecration of tombs in Medina and elsewhere: AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i bist o chaharum … ba-maqam Lahore, mun‘aqida 24, 25, 26 March 1932 (publication data not available [ca. 1933]), 2 (report on the safeguarding of the holy sites; independently paginated).

[1098] AISC, Rudad-i ijlas-i bist o haftum … ba-maqam Lucknow, mun‘aqida 25, 26, 27 December 1936 (Lucknow: Sarfaraz Qawmi Press, n.d. [1937]), 135.

[1099] “Militants Seek to Destroy Mali Shrines,” New York Times, June 30, 2012; Tim Arango, “Tears, and Anger, as Militants Destroy Iraq City’s Relics,” New York Times, July 30, 2014.

[1100] Mufti Muhammad Farid, the leading Deobandi jurisconsult of the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya, Akora Khattak, was asked in February 1989 whether it was permissible to kill the custodian of a shrine where “un-Islamic” practices took place and whether the custodian’s residence, too, could be set on fire. In response, the mufti had cautioned against any such action even as he suggested rectifying the custodian’s sinful practices by nonviolent means. Farid, Fatawa-i Faridiyya, 1: 307. For another instance, see ibid., 3: 325 (a fatwa from July 1975, characterizing the destruction of tombs associated with un-Islamic ways as a Salafi [“Najdi”] practice).

[1101] Ibrahim Shinwari, “Shrine Blown Up in Khyber,” Dawn, July 16, 2010.

[1102] Imtiaz Ali, “Qawwali Star Sabri Gunned Down in Karachi,” Dawn, June 24, 2016. The funeral prayer for the singer was performed by the custodian of the revered shrine of Baba Farid al-din Ganj Shakar, which is located in Pakpattan, Punjab. See “Amjad Sabiri ke janaze main shahr umadd aya,” Jang, June 24, 2016.

[1103] For such instances, see Muhammad Hussain Khan, “No Barriers to Bhittai,” Dawn, July 20, 2014.

[1104] “Devotees Throng Rahman Baba Shrine,” Dawn, April 6, 2014. The shrine was destroyed by the Taliban in March 2009 but subsequently rebuilt. Also see Dawn, April 4, 2015: “Rahman Baba’s Urs Begins in Peshawar.”

[1105] Shiza Malik, “For Some a Shrine, for Others a Refuge,” Dawn, November 30, 2014. This is the tomb of a woman named Nur al-Nisa or Mai Sahiba near Dina in the Punjab. It is overseen by women.

[1106] The fact that Sufi motifs are sometimes encountered in the discourses of contemporary militant leaders has not done much toward improving the fortunes of institutional Sufism. Conversely, a superior court judge's drawing on Sufi ethics in support of social justice—as evidenced by the recently retired Jawwad Khawaja—has done more to highlight his idiosyncrasy than it has to rejuvenate the relevant areas of Sufi or modernist thought. Also see his speech as the outgoing chief justice of the Supreme Court, an office he occupied for a mere twenty-three days: "Farewell Address by Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Pakistan Mr. Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja," at www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=2028 (accessed November 6, 2016). On his tenure, curtailed from the beginning by an impending retirement, see Nasir Iqbal, "Justice Khawaja's 23-day Tenure as CJP Begins Tomorrow," Dawn, August 16, 2015.

[1107] See note 3, earlier.

[1108] H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), 188–89.

[1109] Rahman, Islam, 254.

[1110] Ibid., 248. Rahman acknowledges his debt to Gibb's observations here: ibid., 247. Ernst, Shambhala Guide, 202–3, has remarked on the indebtedness of modernist assessments of Sufism to the work of European orientalists. That influence was not unidirectional, however.

[1111] Rahman, Islam, 254.

[1112] In a much publicized 2010 fatwa against militancy, Tahir al-Qadiri also highlights the historical role of Sufism in dealing with the crises facing Muslims, and he, too, quotes Gibb (without indicating his source) to make that point. He laments that militant attacks on the Sufi hospices (khanaqahs) had imperiled their very existence, but his criticism is also directed against those associated with these institutions. The

khanaqah was once “an all-encompassing welfare institution,” he says, catering as much to people’s spiritual as to their material needs. Such practices are now in abeyance; the guardians of the khanaqahs have relocated to luxurious urban abodes, with the result that poor people have been forced to turn to madrasas, which indoctrinate their children at will. Muhammad Tahir al-Qadiri, Dahshat gardi awr fitna-i Khawarij (Lahore: Minhaj al-Qur’an Publications, 2010), 584–86. Tahir al-Qadiri’s fatwa has also been published in Arabic and English versions. The final chapter in which this discussion occurs is not part of the English version: Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombing (Lahore and London: Minhaj-ul-Quran International, 2010); the Arabic version was not available to me. There is some irony in Tahir al-Qadiri’s complaint that the custodians of the Sufi hospices had moved away from them since he does not live in close proximity to his Pakistani disciples either.

[1113] For a sophisticated treatment of this question in a broad historical and comparative framework, see Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern Politics, especially 215–48.

[1114] Thanawi, al-Ifadat, 1: 73–96.

[1115] These views are summarized in Mawdudi’s letter to Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, July 13, 1948, in Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 211–14.

[1116] ‘Usmani to Mawdudi, July 7, 1948, in Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 206. For the full correspondence, see ibid., 206–20.

[1117] Ibid., 207–10 (July 7, 1948).

[1118] Ibid., 209. Also ‘Usmani to Mawdudi, August 8, 1948, in ibid., 215.

[1119] Ibid., 222–24, at 223. The fatwa was published in Zamindar, on June 17, 1949.

[1120] Mawdudi to ‘Usmani, July 13, 1948, in Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 211–14. A key passage Mawdudi invokes in support of his position is Qur’an 8.58.

[1121] Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 213–14. Ibid., 217–18 (September 6, 1948).

[1122] Ibid., 214, 218.

[1123] That question was at the center of Indian Muslim concerns. See the “Indian Muslim Leaders’ Memorandum to Dr. Graham,” in DO 35/3005: Position of Muslims in the Indian Union: 17–20 (August 17, 1951) (TNA). Frank Graham was the United Nations’ representative on Kashmir. The memorandum was signed by fourteen prominent Indian Muslim public figures, including Zakir Hussain, the vice chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University and a future president of India, and Hifz al-Rahman Seoharwi, a member of the Indian parliament and a leader of the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind.

[1124] On this movement, see Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 58–113; Lal Baha, “The Activities of the Mujahidin 1900–1936,” Islamic Studies 18 (1979): 97–168.

[1125] Fazl-i Ilahi Wazirabadi, Mas’ala-i jihad-i Kashmir awr uski mukhtasar ta’rikh (Rawalpindi: Tanzim al-da‘wa ilal-Qur’an wal-sunna, 1997; first published in 1948). For a brief account of Wazirabadi’s life, see the introduction by ‘Abd al-Rashid Azhar, ibid., 37–40. All references are to this edition unless otherwise noted.

[1126] For an overview of the rules of war, see Hallaq, Shari‘a, 324–34.

[1127] Wazirabadi, Mas’ala-i jihad, 50–90. For another discussion of Wazirabadi’s book, see Jalal, Partisans, 292–94.

[1128] Wazirabadi, Mas’ala-i jihad, 57. Also see ibid., 59–60, adducing Qur’an 8.55–57.

[1129] Wazirabadi, Mas’ala-i jihad, 67, referring to Qur’an 2.246. Wazirabadi made extensive use in this context of what he took to be the relevant lessons from the Qur’an’s retelling of the story of Saul, David, and Goliath (Q 2.246–51). For the very different use to which this story was put by Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, see Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, 52–54. On another note, though Wazirabadi did not say so, life, property, and progeny are well-recognized elements of what the medieval jurists called the purposes of the shari‘a.

[1130] Wazirabadi, Mas’ala-i jihad, 67–68.

[1131] Ibid., 235–40.

[1132] Ibid., 175–80.

[1133] Ibid., 177–78, citing ‘Ala al-din ‘Ali b. Muhammad al-Khazin (d. 1341), Tafsir al-Khazin, al-musamma Lubab al-ta’wil fi ma‘ani al-tanzil, 7 vols. (Cairo: al-Maktaba altijariyya al-kubra, 1961), 1: 221, regarding Saul’s killing of many “‘ulama and the pious (al-‘ubbad)” on account of their upbraiding him for trying to murder David. Wazirabadi, however, was misleading here. He gave the impression that David and others had been willing to fight under Saul’s banner despite the latter’s reprehensible ways. Yet, Saul had shown his true colors after the battle that the Qur’an speaks of, not before it. See al-Khazin, Tafsir, 1: 220–22.

[1134] The 2004 edition of this book carries a preface by Hafiz Muhammad Sa‘id, the leader of the Lashkar-i tayba. Fazl-i Ilahi Wazirabadi, Jihad-i Kashmir: Farziyyat, fazilat awr ta’rikh (Lahore: Dar al-Andalus, 2004), 19–22.

[1135] Mawdudi to ‘Usmani, September 16, 1948, in Sherkoti, ed., Anwar, 219–20.

[1136] Nasr, Vanguard, 121–22.

[1137] “Intelligence Reports Concerning the Tribal Repercussions to the Events in the Punjab, Kashmir, and India” (for week ending September 20, 1947), Mss. Eur. F164/48: 10. Mudie Papers (BL). On the strong reaction among Afghans at the reported desecration of shrines, notably that of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, see ibid., 9–10.

[1138] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 9: 85.

[1139] Memo from the home secretary, Government of the Punjab, to the chief minister, July 4, 1952, annexure H-1, ibid., 1: 74. In February 1953, around the time the anti-Ahmadi agitation was coming to a boiling point, the provincial government had given the Zamindar, the most strident of the anti-Ahmadi newspapers, a large share of otherwise scarce newsprint. Ibid., 9: 40.

[1140] This, at least, is what Daultana thought. Ibid., part 6: 2483.

[1141] Ibid., part 4: 1751, 1781–82 (Mian Anwar Ali, inspector-general of Police, Punjab); ibid., part 5: 2089 (Ghias-ud-Din Ahmad, home secretary, Government of the Punjab); ibid., 1: 6 (Hafiz Abdul Majid, chief secretary, Punjab).

[1142] M. Anwar Ali, “Report on the Disturbances,” July 18, 1953, ibid., 1: 209 (p. 53 of the report). Cf. the assessment of the district magistrate of Gunranwala, characterizing it as “a large-scale anti-Government agitation” (ibid., 2: 295, memo dated April 19, 1953).

[1143] On calls for jihad against the Ahmadis, see the police report from Pakpattan, March 12, 1953, in ibid., 3: 155. For the motif of the “satanic government,” see M. Anwar Ali, Inspector-general Punjab Police, to G. Ahmad, Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of the Interior, March 10, 1953, in ibid., 1: 244.

[1144] Daily situation report relating to Montgomery district, March 21, 1953, ibid., 3: 313.

[1145] Ibid., part 5: 2157 (quoting ‘Abd al-Sattar Niazi).

[1146] Nawa-i waqt, August 23, 1965 (Barelawis); ibid., August 30, 1965 (Deobandis).

[1147] Ibid., October 11, 1965. The distinction between qital and jihad is premised on the idea that while the former refers specifically to warfare, the latter—jihad—signifies struggling in God’s cause in a variety of possible ways, of which taking up arms is only one. Mawdudi’s point was that all such ways of reaching the desired goal could count as jihad.

[1148] Public figures who had failed to support it were mercilessly criticized. See, for instance, Shorish Kashmiri, “Faiz Ahmad Faiz ke nam,” Nawa-i waqt, November 14, 1965. This is a poem in which Kashmiri, a journalist associated with the Majlis-i Ahrar, asks Faiz Ahmad Faiz, the great Urdu poet with markedly leftist leanings, why he had not written anything in support of the war.

[1149] “Constitution Bill Passed,” Dawn, March 1, 1956, quoting the Bengali leader of the opposition, H. S. Suhrawardy.

[1150] Shorish Kashmiri, “Mashriqi Pakistan ko salam,” Nawa-i waqt, October 6, 1965. Reprinted in Shorish Kashmiri, al-Jihad o al-jihad (Lahore: Matbu‘at-i chatan, n.d.), 65–66. This is a collection of Kashmiri’s poems on the 1965 war.

[1151] Q 3.124–27.

[1152] Nawa-i waqt, October 11, 1965: “Muta‘addid buzurgon ko Pakistan ki fath o nusrat ki basharatain.”

[1153] Shahab, Shahab nama, 500.

[1154] Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, Pakistan ki na’i ‘ziyarat gahen’ (Lahore: Idara-i tulu‘-i Islam, n.d.), 12. This short piece was first published in Parwez’s monthly journal, Tulu‘-i Islam, in January 1966. For the date of publication, see Khadim ‘Ali Javed, Ishariyya-i majalla-i Tulu‘-i Islam (Lahore: al-Nur Publishers, 1991), 315. My references here are to the self-standing reprint (quotation marks around ziyarat gahen in the original; I will omit them in the following references).

[1155] Ibid., 13–14, adducing Q 33.21.

[1156] Parwez, Ziyarat gahen, 8, with reference to Q 2.34.

[1157] Parwez, Ziyarat gahen, 14–15, using the English word “credit.” Also see Parwez to Lt. Col. A. R. Siddiqi, Director, Public Relations, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, January 31, 1968 (GAPP).

[1158] Parwez, Ziyarat gahen, 16–17.

[1159] Ibid., 17–18, with reference to Q 22.40.

[1160] Parwez, Ziyarat gahen, 19.

[1161] Ibid., 23.

[1162] Nawa-i waqt, October 5, 1965. Also see ibid., October 8, 1965. Cf. Q 8.65: “Prophet, urge the believers to fight: if there are twenty of you who are steadfast, they will overcome two hundred, and a hundred of you, if steadfast, will overcome a thousand of the disbelievers.”

[1163] “Press Note on Jamaat,” Dawn, January 7, 1964.

[1164] A petition against the banning of the party had been turned down by the West Pakistan High Court but accepted by the High Court in East Pakistan. It then went to the Supreme Court, whose chief justice at the time was the noted Christian jurist A. R. Cornelius. See O. R. Blair, UK High Commission, Karachi, to G. L. Simmons, CRO, July 29, 1964. DO 196/418: Banning of Fundamentalist Muslim Movement Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan (TNA).

[1165] See Jinnah’s speech in Dacca, March 21, 1948, in JP, 1st ser., 7: 227–35; quotation at 234.

[1166] As Khwaja Nazimuddin told the Court of Inquiry, while the chief ministers and governors of the other provinces were part of the deliberations on the anti-Ahmadi agitation, those of East Bengal were not, “because it is practically not a problem in East Pakistan.” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 3: 1325. Also ibid., part 3: 1345, 1371–72.

[1167] File 3 (3)-PMS/48: Correspondence with the Hon’ble Minister for Finance, 145–49 (NDC). See chapter 3, note 177.

[1168] UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to the CRO, November 21, 1956, in DO 35/6340: Pakistan Attitude to Arab-Israeli Crisis, October 1956: 131. Also UK High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, December 6, 1956, ibid., 3 (TNA).

[1169] See “Mulk ke liye sab se bara khatra,” Nawa-i waqt, February 25, 1970.

[1170] Quoted in Verkaaik, Migrants and Militants, 155 (from the Frontier Post [Peshawar], July 25, 1990). Though a small minority, there are more Hindus in Sindh than in any other province of post-1971 Pakistan (about 7.5 percent of the province’s population according to the 1998 census, at www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//tables/POPULATION%20BY%20RELIGION.pdf [accessed October 20, 2016]). Some among them had allied themselves with the Sindhis in opposition to the muhajirs. As Verkaaik notes, this view of the Sindhi as non-Muslim was opposed by other members of the MQM. Verkaaik, Migrants and Militants, 155, 158–59.

[1171] This is what he is reported to have said the day he assumed the Eastern Command: “What have I been hearing about shortage of rations? … This is enemy territory. Get what you want. This is what we used to do in Burma.” Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission, 503.

[1172] Ibid., 510.

[1173] Ibid., 510. Racism played a part, too. As one army general from West Pakistan is reported to have said in Dhaka in December 1970 with reference to the Awami League, “Don’t worry … we will not allow these black bastards

to rule over us.” Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977), 29; quoted in Siddiqa, Military Inc., 77. Also see Bass, The Blood Telegram, 81–83.

[1174] A. R. Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality (Lahore: Vanguard, 1996), 204–6, quoted in Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 76–77. Badr, Uhud, and Khaybar refer to some of the Prophet Muhammad’s battles; Damascus was captured by Muslim troops in 636, during the reign of the caliph ‘Umar.

[1175] Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan, 205. My translation of these verses differs somewhat from Siddiqi’s. The “self-sufficient one” (be-niyaz) is a common Urdu translation of the Qur’anic al-samad (Q 112.2).

[1176] Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission, 520.

[1177] Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission, 504. Upon assuming his charge in East Pakistan in April 1971, General Niazi is reported to have asked the officer transferring the command to him, “When are you going to hand over your concubines to me?” See Salik, Witness, 92; quoted in Mookherjee, The Spectral Wound, 132.

[1178] Text of the statement issued by Mawdudi on April 30, 1971 in Hafiz al-Rahman Ahsan, Jama‘at-i Islami awr Mashriqi Pakistan (Lahore: Tasnim Academy, 1971), 118–19.

[1179] Sayyid Abul-A‘la Mawdudi, “Afwaj-i Pakistan ki karawai ke khilaf propaganda ka jawab: Mawlana Mawdudi ka memorandum dunya-i Islam ke nam,” Tarjuman al-Qur’an, 75/4 (June 1971): 9–23.

[1180] Haqqani, Pakistan, 77–78. Decades later, some of those allegedly involved in these war crimes were prosecuted in Bangladesh by the government of prime minister Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of the country's founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. See Ellen Barry, "Bangladesh Hangs 2 Leaders Convicted of War Crimes," New York Times, November 22, 2015: A14; "Pakistan Condemns BD JI Chief's Execution," Dawn, May 12, 2016.

[1181] See, for instance, R.W.D. Fowler, UK High Commission, Karachi, to J.M.C. James, CRO, May 3, 1957, DO 35/6349: Threats to Defense of West Pakistan (TNA). British officials dismissed Pakistani warnings of this threat, voiced by Ayub Khan, as self-interested and exaggerated.

[1182] K. M. Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, 1977–1988 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 306.

[1183] Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 385.

[1184] For a balanced assessment on this score, see Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 86–104. Also see Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 162–65.

[1185] Malik, Colonialization, 207.

[1186] Quoted in ibid., 207.

[1187] 'Abd al-Qayyum Haqqani, Khutbat-i Haqqani, ed., Muhammad Ramazan, 3rd ed. (Akora Khattak: Mu'tamar al-

musannifin, 1991; first published in 1988), 93 (first quotation) and 95 (second quotation).

[1188] Arif, Working with Zia, 321–23.

[1189] On the connection between Afghanistan and Kashmir, see Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 (London: Hurst, 2013), 69–70.

[1190] For an overview, see Rana, Jihad-i Kashmir o Afghanistan, 235–58; idem, Jihad awr jihadi: Pakistan awr Kashmir ke ahamm jihadi rahnumaon ka ta‘aruf (Lahore: Mash‘al Books, 2003), 19–30. The Lashkar-i Tayba long continued to maintain a visible presence in remote regions of Afghanistan. See Mujib Mashal, “Rugged Afghan Region Lies beyond Reach of Aid and Time,” New York Times, December 26, 2015.

[1191] On the Harkat al-mujahidin, see Rana, Jihad-i Kashmir, 166–82.

[1192] Azhar, Khutbat, 1: 39.

[1193] Ibid., 1: 188.

[1194] Ibid., 1: 188; cf. 1: 91. As might be expected, such narratives appear in other works relating to Afghanistan, too—notably in the writings of ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam (d. 1989), a Palestinian who exercised a significant influence on Bin Laden. See Edwards, Caravan of Martyrs, 95–105.

[1195] On the lack of resort to jihad as imperiling women’s honor, a familiar motif in the context of Kashmir, see Azhar, Khutbat, 1: 41–42,

44, 62, 160. On the otherwise unexplained sacrilege toward the Qur’an, ibid., 1: 62, 135, 206. On Muslim humiliation resulting from an abandonment of jihad, ibid., 1: 206–8.

[1196] Ibid., 1: 56–57.

[1197] Ibid., 1: 36–38.

[1198] Ibid., 2: 101.

[1199] Ibid., 1: 109.

[1200] I draw here primarily on two exegetical works by Hafiz Muhammad Sa‘id: Tafsir surat al-tawba, compiled by ‘Ubayd al-Rahman Muhammadi (Lahore: Dar al-Andalus, n.d. [2006]) and Tafsir surat Yusuf, compiled by Hafiz Muhammad Siraj (Lahore: Dar al-Andalus, n.d. [2009]). The former is a commentary on chapter 9 of the Qur’an and the latter on chapter 12.

[1201] Rana, Jihad awr jihadi, 20.

[1202] Sa‘id, Tafsir surat al-tawba, 85.

[1203] This is a key theme in a series of Friday sermons he delivered in Lahore between December 2014 and March 2015: Muhammad Sa‘id, Khutbat-i Qadisiyya: Fitna-i takfir—asbab, nuqsanat, awr us se bachao ke tariqe (Lahore: Dar al-Andalus, n.d. [2015]).

[1204] For this point, see Cabeiri deBergh Robinson, Body of Victim, Body of Warrior: Refugee Families and the Making of Kashmiri Jihadists (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 181.

[1205] Sa‘id, Tafsir surat al-tawba, 415.

[1206] Ibid., 415–22, commenting on Q 9.122.

[1207] Rana, Jihad-i Kashmir o Afghanistan, 251–53.

[1208] The organization soon denied, allegedly on instructions from unnamed intelligence agencies in Pakistan, that it had been responsible for the attack on the Indian parliament. See Rana, Jihad-i Kashmir, 157.

[1209] Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 245–48. Also see Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 67–70. A second attempt on Musharraf’s life was made by a different group later that month.

[1210] Muhammad Mas‘ud Azhar, Ae Musalman behen (Karachi: Maktaba-i Hasan, 2004; first published in 2003), 104–5. For the date of this editorial (November 10, 2001), see ibid., 101. “Mother ‘A’isha” is, of course, one of the wives of the Prophet Muhammad. Militant Sunni organizations have often referred to her in this familiar way.

[1211] Sa‘id, Tafsir surat al-tawba, 79, 281 (Muslim rulers afraid of the United States and acting as its instruments); ibid., 281 (moral waywardness). Also see Sa‘id, Tafsir surat Yusuf, 196 (one cannot buy even a packet of soap or a matchbox without a woman’s picture on it: “Evil is dancing naked today and it is as though goodness is hiding its face in shame …”).

[1212] Hafiz Muhammad Sa‘id, Khutbat-i Qadisiyya (Lahore: Dar al-Andalus, n.d. [2014]), 101–2. The title of this collection of Sa‘id’s sermons is the same as the main title of another work of his. I distinguish

between the two by also giving the subtitle of the latter (Khutbat-i Qadisiyya: Fitna-i takfir).

[1213] Sa‘id, Tafsir surat al-tawba, 42.

[1214] Ibid., 181–82, 193; idem, Tafsir surat Yusuf, 211, 275–78.

[1215] Sa‘id, Tafsir surat tawba, 42–44.

[1216] Ibid., 48, 280–83. Also see idem, Khutbat-i Qadisiyya: Fitna-i takfir, 70, 72–73, 90–91, 140, 99–100, 105–10.

[1217] Sa‘id, Tafsir surat tawba, 283.

[1218] Rana, Jihad-i Kashmir o Afghanistan, 236; idem, Jihad awr jihadi, 23.

[1219] Sa‘id has also been critical of movements like ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), arguing that “rather than armed jihad against Muslim rulers, it is necessary to urge them to act according to the teachings of Islam and to reform their ways.” He considers ISIS to be a Western conspiracy against Muslims. “Da‘ish jaisi tanzimen Musalmanon keliye bara khatra hain,” Nawa-i waqt, January 1, 2016.

[1220] Rana, Jihad awr jihadi, 21.

[1221] See Zaman, The Ulama, 139–41.

[1222] Ibid., 140.

[1223] See, for instance, Abdullah Jan, “Thousands to Enter Afghanistan Today,” News, October 28, 2001; Anwarullah and Haleem Asad, “TNSM Supporters Head for Kabul,” Dawn, October 28, 2001.

[1224] Anwarullah Khan, “82 Die as Missiles Rain on Bajaur,” Dawn, October 31, 2006; ibid., “The Dargai Carnage” (editorial), November 10, 2006.

[1225] The TTP was banned in August 2008, prompting a spokesman to scoff: “Tehrik-i-Taliban is not a political organization that can be barred from parliament by imposing a ban.” “Tehrik-i-Taliban Banned,” Dawn, August 26, 2008.

[1226] “Woman, Two Men Stoned, Publicly Executed,” Dawn, March 15, 2007; Ibrahim Shinwari, “Woman and Three Men Publicly Executed,” ibid., June 5, 2007; “Couple Stoned to Death in Fata,” ibid., April 2, 2008; Ali Hazrat Bacha, “Two Women of ‘Loose Character’ Executed,” Dawn, August 21, 2008; “Video Shows Killing of Man and Woman,” April 18, 2009, at www.dawn.com/news/846839/video-shows-killing-of-man-and-woman (accessed April 18, 2009); Syed Hassan Mahmood, “Militants Cut Off Hands of Alleged Thieves,” May 16, 2010, at www.dawn.com/news/851951/militants-cut-off-hands-of-alleged-thieves (accessed May 16, 2010).

[1227] The film, A Girl in the River: The Price of Forgiveness, is a production of HBO Documentary Films and was released in 2015. See also “No Honour in Honour Killing: PM,” Dawn, February 23, 2016.

[1228] Osama Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 135–42; quotation at 138. As part of the survey, 440 people were interviewed (ibid., 107). On the inefficiency of the judicial system, as perceived by the respondents, see ibid., 116–35. Part of the reason for the rise and growth of a Taliban-affiliated movement in the Swat region of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province was widespread resentment at the working of the judicial system. In

an effort to mollify local sentiment, the government instituted a legal regime in 2009 with a shari‘a-laden nomenclature (the Nizam-i Adl Regulation) and with an emphasis on a quick disposal of cases. In other respects, however, there was little to differentiate it from the legal system elsewhere in the country. See ibid., 385–98.

[1229] Urban dacoits in Karachi have sometimes projected a similar image. See Gayer, Karachi, 123–62, especially 159.

[1230] Pazir Gul, “Miramshah Taliban Open Office,” Dawn, September 28, 2006.

[1231] Jane Perlez, “Militants Draw New Front Line inside Pakistan,” New York Times, November 2, 2007: A1, 6.

[1232] See Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 221–23.

[1233] “Pesh-Imam’s Son Became Pakistan’s Most Wanted Militant,” Dawn, August 8, 2009.

[1234] Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Pakistan Uses Tribal Militias in Tribal War,” New York Times, October 24, 2008. As one might expect, not all maliks have been on the Taliban’s wrong side. When Baitullah Mehsud married a second time not long before his death, it was to the daughter of a notable from South Waziristan. See “Pesh-Imam’s Son.”

[1235] Ismail Khan, “Suicide Attack on Army Base: 40 Troops Dead,” Dawn, November 9, 2006.

[1236] Sailab Mehsud, “Kidnapped Security Personnel Butchered,” June 22, 2012, at www.dawn.com/news/728684/kidnapped-security-personnel-butchered (accessed June 23, 2012); Salman Masood, “Video from Taliban

Shows the Killing of 16 Pakistanis," New York Times, July 16, 2011.

[1237] "Baitullah Denies Role in Attack," Dawn, December 30, 2007.

[1238] Khalilur Rehman Bacha, "14-Year Old Activist Shot and Critically Wounded," Dawn, October 10, 2012; Declan Walsh, "Taliban Gun Down a Girl Who Spoke Up for Rights," New York Times, October 10, 2012; Declan Walsh, "Two Champions of Children Are Given Nobel Peace Prize," New York Times, October 11, 2014.

[1239] Zulfiqar Ali, "Distinction between Good, Bad Taliban No More: PM," Dawn, December 18, 2014. For his part, Hafiz Muhammad Sa'id has criticized efforts to erase the distinction between the good and the bad Taliban: see Khutbat-i Qadisiyya: Fitna-i takfir, 134.

[1240] Saleem Shahid, "Frequent Flyer 'Mansour' Used Pakistan Airports," Dawn, May 24, 2016.

[1241] Khalid Kheshgi, "RS 300 m Allocated for Madrassa in KP Budget, Assembly Told," News, June 17, 2016. Explaining the allocation, Imran Khan observed that it would "help seminary students assimilate in our society, bring them into the mainstream and keep them away from radicalization." Amir Wasim, "Zardari Questions Allocation for Haqqania Seminary," Dawn, June 27, 2016.

[1242] My observations here are based on Gayer, Karachi, especially 101–9. "Operation Clean-up" was the name of a major military crackdown on the MQM in 1992–94. See ibid., 75.

[1243] Barelawi polemics apart, there remains a sharp doctrinal divergence between the Hanafi Deobandis and the Salafis. For some illustrations, see Farid, Fatawa-i Faridiyya, 1: 117, 153–60.

[1244] Muhammad Mas‘ud Azhar, Fath al-Jawwad fi ma‘arif ayat al-jihad, 4 vols. (Lahore: Maktaba-i ‘irfan, 2007–9), 2: 279.

[1245] Ibid., 2: 279–80. For another explicit commendation of suicide bombing, see Muhammad Mas‘ud Azhar, Faza’il-i jihad (Karachi: Maktaba-i Hasan, 2001), 354 and, more generally, 329–54. This book is an Urdu abridgement of and commentary on a work by a medieval scholar, Ibn al-Nahhas (d. 1411), Mashari‘ al-ashwaq ila masari‘ al-‘ushshaq.

[1246] “Mawjuda buhran—asbab awr ‘ilaj: Mulki surat-i hal par mulk ke mumtaz ‘ulama-i kiram ka mushtaraka mawqif,” al-Faruq 24/4 (May 2008): 5–10, quotation at 6. al-Faruq is the monthly journal of Jami‘a Faruqiyya, a prominent Deobandi madrasa of Karachi known for its militant ties. Qari Husayn, “the Pakistani Taliban’s chief suicide bomb instructor,” was reportedly a graduate of this madrasa. See Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “In Violent Karachi, Pakistani Insurgency Finds a Haven and a Forge,” New York Times, May 22, 2010: A4.

[1247] Masood, “Video from Pakistan.” They have also referred to Pakistan as an “infidel” state, justifying attacks against government offices. Ismail Khan, “Suicide Blast Hits Pakistan, Killing 22,” New York Times, December 30, 2015. In this latter instance, the bombing was carried out by a breakaway Taliban group called the Jama‘at al-Ahrar. For what it is worth, it should be noted that leading Pakistani newspapers did not mention that the group in question had referred to the state as infidel. For instance, see the reporting in Nawa-i waqt, December 30, 2015 (“Mardan: Nadra office ke gate par khudkush dhamaka”); Mohammad Riaz Mayar, “26 Killed in Blast outside Nadra Office in Mardan,” News, December 30, 2015. In 1953, too, the anti-Ahmadi agitators had occasionally characterized the police and the military taking action against them as apostates (murtadd). See Superintendent Police, Sialkot to Deputy

Inspector-General, CID, Lahore, March 10, 1953, in Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 2: 37.

[1248] In May 2017, a number of prominent ‘ulama, among them Mufti Rafi‘ ‘Usmani of the Dar al-‘Ulum of Karachi, issued a much clearer denunciation of terrorism and suicide bombing in the form of a fatwa. The fatwa was unveiled at a conference in Islamabad at which the president of Pakistan, Mamnoon Hussain, also spoke. This public association of the signatories with the government could not have gone down well with other ‘ulama and Islamists, however. Indeed, Sami al-Haqq of the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya, the madrasa most closely associated with the Taliban before and after 9/11, was reported to have distanced himself from it. It is also worth noting that the original draft on which the fatwa was based had had some biting criticism of government policies, all of which was excised from the publicized fatwa. For the text of the fatwa, see “Jihad Jurisdiction of State, Suicide Attackers Are Traitors, Declares Fatwa,” May 29, 2017, at www.dawn.com/news/1335797 (accessed June 1, 2017); for the original draft, see Munib al-Rahman, “Qawmi bayaniyya awr ahl-i madaris,” al-Shari‘a 28/4 (April 2017): 33–38. For Sami al-Haqq’s opposition, see the editorial in Dawn, June 1, 2017: “Fatwa against Terrorism.”

[1249] Zahid al-Rashidi, “Mawjuda surat-i hal awr Afghan Taliban ka mawqif,” al-Shari‘a 25/2 (February 2014): 2–5, at 3. A “book of rules” issued in 2010 by the Taliban leadership to guide and regulate the conduct of their followers allows for suicide bombing, but with certain conditions, viz that the person undertaking it is properly trained for the act, the target is worthwhile, efforts are made to avoid the killing of common people, and the act has been authorized by the leadership. See “Taliban’s Code of Conduct,” in Yoshinobu Nagamine, The Legitimization Strategy of the Taliban’s Code of Conduct: Through the One Way Mirror (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 157–58 (article #57).

[1250] Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst, 2012), 84.

[1251] Ibid., 181.

[1252] Ibid., 181.

[1253] For the imagery of moderate versus inflamed voices among notables and ‘ulama in the tribal areas, see “Mawjuda buhran,” al-Faruq 24/4 (May 2008): 8.

[1254] On the business interests of the Pakistani military, see Siddiqa, Military Inc.

[1255] See Intikhab Hanif, “Ulema Must Undo Extremist Narrative of Religion: PM,” Dawn, March 12, 2017; “Jihad Jurisdiction of State,” quoting remarks by the president, Mamnoon Hussain.

[1256] A good deal of the journalistic and policy-oriented literature on the Pakistani Taliban and allied groups takes this view. For one example, see Brown and Rassler, Fountainhead.

[1257] See the illuminating exchange between Yahya Bakhtiar, the attorney-general, and Mirza Nasir Ahmad, the head of the Ahmadi community, in Proceedings of the Special Committee, part 9: 1205–6. Bhutto’s Third Worldism had been heightened by the Western powers’ failure to come to the aid of Pakistan in its moment of need in 1971 and by Britain’s decision soon afterward to recognize Bangladesh as a sovereign state. It was in that context that Pakistan noisily quit the British Commonwealth in January 1972.

[1258] For some of the key works Azhar uses, see his introduction to the book in Fath al-Jawwad, 1: 529–31.

[1259] Ibid., 1: 530.

[1260] Mufti Muhammad Zahid, “Mawjuda pur-tashaddud tahriken awr Deobandi fikr o mizaj,” al-Shari‘a 20/11–12 (November–December 2009), 79.

[1261] A number of scholars and preachers have, in fact, been killed by the Taliban and allied groups for expressing opposition to them. See, for instance: Ashfaq Yusufzai, “Wafaqul Madaris VP Shot Dead,” Dawn, September 16, 2007; Muhammad Faisal Ali, “Suicide Bomber Kills Anti-Taliban Cleric Allama Naeemi,” Dawn, June 13, 2009; “Ex-MNA among 32 Killed: Terrorists Attack Wana Seminary, Kurram Jirga,” Dawn, August 24, 2010; “Pro-Govt Cleric Shot Dead in Lakki Marwat,” Dawn, May 14, 2012.

[1262] As noted earlier, the Barelawis have been more forthcoming than many others in condemning religious militancy. The most illustrative example is Muhammad Tahir al-Qadiri, Dahshat gardi awr fitna-i Khawarij. The fatwa’s impact within Pakistan is unclear, however. And doctrinal rivals are likely to see it as better suited to currying favor with Western governments and policy circles than to addressing the views of the contemporary militants, with whom it does not engage directly. Tahir al-Qadiri is a Canadian citizen, and the English version of the fatwa has a foreword by John L. Esposito of Georgetown University and a blurb by Fareed Zakaria of CNN.

[1263] Qurrat al-‘Ayn Haydar, Ag ka darya (Lahore: Maktaba-i jadid, 1959), 165–66.

[1264] Ibid., 201. The domains of war/unbelief and of peace/Islam are familiar legal categories in Islamic juristic thought. The domain referred to here as dar al-salam is commonly called the dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam or submission).

[1265] Ibid., 692–93.

[1266] The best account of Qurrat al-‘Ayn Haydar’s life is her three-volume autobiography: Kar-i jahan daraz hai. The second volume is devoted to her years in Pakistan. On her anxiety about what the imposition of martial law meant for freedom of literary expression, see Shahab, Shahab nama, 513.

[1267] Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, 178.

[1268] Ibid., 183.

[1269] Ibid., 181, 183.

[1270] Ibid., 181.

[1271] Ibid., 190.

[1272] See chapter 2, note 30.

[1273] “Fortnightly Report from the Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Lahore for the Fortnight ending 16th June 1953”: 2, in DO 35/5296: Fortnightly Deputy High Commissioner’s Reports from Lahore (TNA); Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, 87; Afzal, Pakistan, 58.

[1274] Rahman, Major Themes, 64. Emphasis in the original.

[1275] Ghamidi, Mizan, 581 and n. 4 on the same page.

[1276] Ibid., 579–80, 601.

[1277] Muhammad Faruq Khan, Jihad, qital, awr ‘alam-i Islam (Lahore: Dar al-tazkir, 2005), 72–74.

[1278] Ibid., 187–88.

[1279] Ibid., 191–96.

[1280] Ibid., 183–84.

[1281] Report on Hudood Ordinances (2003), 2.

[1282] See Jane Perlez, “Killing of Pakistan Doctor Part of Taliban War on Educated,” New York Times, October 9, 2010; Jamal Hoti, “Moderate Scholar Dr Farooq Killed in Mardan, Dawn, October 3, 2010; “VC of Swat Varsity Shot Dead in Mardan,” News, October 3, 2010.

[1283] Abu ‘Ammar Zahid al-Rashidi, Mu‘izz Amjad, Khurshid Nadim, and Faruq Khan, Janab Javed Ahmad Ghamidi ke halqa-i fikr ke sath aik ‘ilmi awr fikri mukalama (Gujranwala: al-Shari‘a Academy, 2007). This is the record of a debate between Zahid al-Rashidi and some of Ghamidi’s students on a variety of questions, including jihad. Faruq Khan was among Zahid al-Rashidi’s interlocutors.

[1284] Ibid., 80.

[1285] The district magistrate, Rawalpindi, to the home secretary, Punjab, March 31, 1953 in Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 2: 411.

[1286] Ibid., 2: 411.

[1287] Dawn, October 29, 2001. On the delegation to the Taliban of which Shamzai was a member, see ibid., September 28–29, 2001. Taqi ‘Usmani, too, was a member of the delegation.

[1288] Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 43.

[1289] The mosque’s name had to do with the color in which it had originally been painted rather than with any leftist predilections. I draw here on an earlier discussion: Zaman, “Pakistan: Shari‘a and the State,” 227–28.

[1290] Syed Irfan Raza, “Lal Masjid Threatens Suicide Attacks,” Dawn, April 7, 2007.

[1291] Muhammad Rafi‘ ‘Usmani, “Lal masjid intizamiyya awr hukumat ke darmiyan muzakarat kiyun nakam huwe?” al-Balagh, 42/7 (August 2007): 3–14, at 9. For his criticism of the Lal Masjid brothers, see ibid., 5.

[1292] Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Taliban Enlist an Army of Pakistan’s Havenots,” New York Times, April 17, 2009. Cf. Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 81.

[1293] The question of what counts as “Islamic” is, of course, a vexed matter. The point here is not, however, that particular invocations of Islam are recognized as credible or persuasive by all others—which would hardly ever be the case—but only that some sustained effort to invoke Islam is made at all.

[1294] As should be clear from the foregoing, Sa‘id has continued to maintain a thin line between, on the one hand, condemning Muslim regimes

for seeking to “deceive God and His servants” with their lip service to Islam (Sa‘id, Khutbat-i Qadisiyya, 119) and, on the other, arguing against branding such regimes as infidel (a central theme of his Khutbat-i Qadisiyya: Fitna-i takfir). That line might be less distinct to his listeners and readers, but he defends it on doctrinal grounds.

[1295] For a similar argument with reference to the criminal gangs of Karachi, see Gayer, Karachi, 134–38; and with reference to religio-political groups pressing for their anti-Ahmadi demands in a political context in which the relationship between religion and the state remains unsettled, see Saeed, Politics of Desecularization, especially 143, 146, 218.

[1296] See also Zaman, “Pluralism, Democracy, and the ‘Ulama”; Khan, “Institutions not Intentions.”

[1297] Mawdudi, Qadiyyani mas’ala, 52–53. Quotation marks around “mulla” in the original. The tract was published on March 5, 1953, the day, as the Punjab chief minister later observed, “[m]ore firing had taken place … than probably ever before in the history of Lahore in the course of a popular agitation.” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 9: 81. The incitement this tract was believed to have provided to the agitators was a key reason why a military court sentenced Mawdudi to death, though that sentence was soon commuted to imprisonment.

[1298] Martin Lau, “Pakistan,” Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 9 (2002): 372–78, at 375–76.

[1299] Ismail Khan, “Pakistan Most Terror-hit Nation,” Dawn, February 23, 2014.

[1300] Ministry of the Interior, “Scheme for Supervision and Control of Religious Institutions and Religious Activity,” July 13, 1960, 54/CF/60–2293: Administration of Mosques, etc., 29–42 (NDC).

[1301] Ibid., 31. There is little historical merit in the claim that the ‘Abbasids and the Mughals had had any notable success in regulating religious life in their realm. As for Hyderabad, the rulers of this state did make efforts in the early twentieth century to foster an inclusive, cosmopolitan culture that would allow different religious and intellectual traditions to coexist, but that is not quite the same thing as the public regulation of religion. On Hyderabad, see Kavita Saraswathi Datla, The Language of Secular Islam: Urdu Nationalism and Colonial India (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013).

[1302] “Scheme for Supervision,” 36–37.

[1303] Ibid., 33.

[1304] Ibid., 33.

[1305] Ibid, 37.

[1306] Ibid., 40.

[1307] Ibid., 31–32.

[1308] On this idea of a contract, see Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, 48–50.

[1309] See Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 203–4, for a useful

warning against “hypostatizing” traditions, which in our case would apply well to the doctrinal orientations in question.

[1310] On his madrasas, see chapter 6, note 148. Though polemics against rival doctrinal orientations are not a prominent part of his discourses, they are scarcely absent from them. For some examples, see Aslam Naqshbandi, Halat-i faqir, 308, 314–15 (contra Barelawis); Zulfiqar Ahmad Naqshbandi, Khutbat-i Hind, 2: 169–70 (against the Shi‘a); idem, Ma‘arif al-suluk, ed. Mustafa Kamal Naqshbandi (Faisalabad: Maktabat al-faqir, 2012), 54–56 (against the Ahl-i Hadith; ibid., 56–57, on the Barelawis). It is worth noting, too, that the first female madrasa Zulfiqar Ahmad had established, in his native Jhang in 1986, was the Jami‘a ‘A’isha Siddiqa (named after the Prophet’s wife) and located in the very neighborhood (Mahalla Pipliyanwala) in which Haqq Nawaz Jhangawi had founded the Sipah-i Sahaba in 1984. On this madrasa and its location, see Aslam Naqshbandi, Halat-i faqir, 41, 247–48; cf. Muhammad Ilyas Balakoti, Amir-i ‘azimat: Hazrat Mawlana Nawaz Jhangawi (Jhang: Jami‘a ‘Usmaniyya, n.d.), 137. No source I have come across mentions any connection between Zulfiqar Naqshbandi and Haqq Nawaz.

[1311] See Shahjahanpuri, Mawlana Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi, 13–16.

[1312] Nasr, Vanguard, 55.

[1313] Abul-Hasanat Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, Awraq-i ghamm (Lahore: Rizwi kutubkhana, 1972). On 1929 as the date of the book’s completion, see ibid., 538. Qadiri, it is worth noting, was a long-serving imam of the historic Wazir Khan mosque, which would serve as the nerve center of the anti-Ahmadi agitation in Lahore in 1953. See Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 173.

[1314] Nawa-i waqt, December 17, 1965.

[1315] See M. R. Kayani, Afkar-i parishan (Lahore: Pakistan Writers Cooperative Society, 1965), 183–94, at 194. The text of the speech he had delivered on the occasion is undated. Also see Qasmi, The Ahmadis, 26.

[1316] Nawa-i waqt, March 16, 1970. Cf. Kayani, Afkar, 194.

[1317] See chapter 5, note 136.

[1318] See chapter 6, note 49.

[1319] “Scheme for Supervision,” 33, again speaking with reference to the Ahl-i Hadith.

[1320] Murtaza Ahmad Khan Maikash, Tarikh-i aqwam-i ‘alam, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Majlis-i taraqqi-i adab, 1958), 7; quotation at 7. For the dedication, ibid., 5.

[1321] Ibid., 8.

[1322] Ibid., 370–71.

[1323] Ibid., 661–62. Emphasis added.

[1324] Ibid., 766–67.

[1325] Ibid., 769–70.

[1326] Ibid., 781.

[1327] Murtaza Ahmad Khan Maikash, Tarikh-i Islam, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Lahore: Maktaba-i A‘la Hazrat, 2006), 2: 432.

[1328] Ibid., 2: 365–77.

[1329] Ibid., 2: 374.

[1330] Cf. ibid., 2: 432.

[1331] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 352–53.

[1332] Ibid., part 4: 1701–2 (Mian Anwar Ali).

[1333] Ibid., part 2: 503.

[1334] Ibid., part 4: 2003.

[1335] Ibid., part 2: 501–2.

[1336] The two judges of the Court of Inquiry were sensitive, however, to the public impact of such lines of questioning. Though the proceedings of the court were regularly reported in the national press, this was among the portions specifically marked as “not to be published.” Ibid., part 2: 501–3.

[1337] For a concise statement to this effect, see Report of the Court of Inquiry, 231–32.

[1338] The publisher’s name, Maktaba-i A‘la Hazrat, evokes a common honorific for Ahmad Riza Khan, the founding figure of the Barelawi orientation. During his lifetime, however, Maikash may have been less clearly affiliated with the Barelawis than he would later appear to be. In his Mirza’i nama, 199–200, he thanked both Barelawi and Deobandi ‘ulama for assistance with the book, though without identifying their doctrinal orientations.

[1339] See note 28, earlier.

[1340] See chapter 7, note 26.

[1341] For instance, in line with many other contemporary and later observers, he repeated stereotypes about the materialism of the modern West. Some of his contemporaries, however, had taken a significantly more nuanced view of this matter. See Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 159–60.

[1342] Looking for people with a “clean” record could mean that the government might find no one to rely on. In the aftermath of the 1953 agitation in the Punjab, the government wanted to know the names of the religious scholars and imams who had taken no part in the agitation. The district magistrate of Rawalpindi responded: “If the Government desired only the names of the mullahs who have taken absolutely no part, I fear that the answer will be nil.” Secret memo to the home secretary, Punjab, March 31, 1953, Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 2: 412–13 (words underlined in the original; also see chapter 7, notes 173–74). This was disheartening. Yet, it did not mean that the ‘ulama and the Sufi pirs were necessarily unwilling to work with the government, even on an issue as sensitive as this one. Thus, several prominent religious figures were mentioned among those “secretly cooperating” with the government during the 1953 agitation. Among these were Mawlana Ghulam Allah Khan, who presided over a mosque that had played a central role in the agitation in Rawalpindi (ibid., 2: 431); Mawlana ‘Abd al-Hannan, a respected scholar who

officiated at another Rawalpindi mosque and whom the city’s superintendent of police credited not just with “whole-hearted” cooperation but also with “keeping the female volunteers out of this agitation” (ibid., 2: 440); and the influential pir of Golra Sharif (ibid., 2: 455).

[1343] As the anti-Ahmadi movement gained momentum, Suhrawardy had come out in support of its demands. See Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 1: 216, 230–31.

[1344] For a somewhat similar point in the context of French secularism and its relationship with the Muslim inhabitants of the Republic, see John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), especially 247–49.

[1345] On modernist institutions and associations in Indonesia, see Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Abbas, “Knowing Islam.”

[1346] The head of the Directorate of Public Relations was also the secretary of the Department of Islamiat. On the work of the department, see Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 3: 1265–67.

[1347] See chapter 7, note 27.

[1348] Court of Inquiry Proceedings, part 4: 1496. This person, one Amir Bakhsh, was also active in converting rural folk to Islam: ibid., 1496–97. Ironically, the wrestler himself was an Ahmadi, though he noted that those overseeing the final act of conversion were non-Ahmadi ‘ulama. Two figures he named in this connection (ibid., 1497—Ahmad ‘Ali and Ghulam Murshid—were reputable Deobandis. Ahmad ‘Ali was the adopted son of the noted Deobandi scholar ‘Ubayd Allah Sindhi; Ghulam Murshid was a long-serving

imam at Lahore’s largest mosque, the Badshahi Masjid. The fact that an Ahmadi was converting people to Islam with the formal assistance of Deobandi ‘ulama suggests that it was then possible to work across these boundaries. Yet, the wrestler-proselyte was conscious that there were boundaries to be minded. Asked by the court why he had not employed an Ahmadi ‘alim to oversee the conversion, he responded: “I went to Maulvi Muhammad Hussain Qureshi, who is an Ahmadi, but he said that if he went to perform the ceremony, not only he but I myself and the person who had to be converted would be brick-batted.” Ibid., 1497.

My point in adducing the wrestler’s case is not that someone like him was necessarily unsuited for the job he was assigned. It is only that the department’s choice of particular people had less to do with their credentials and much more with considerations of patronage. This much emerged clearly from the relevant proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

[1349] This is not limited to Islamic institutions. As a recent study of the judicial system in Pakistan has shown, the federal and provincial academies that exist to train judges are also characterized by excessive control “by the top judicial leadership—a fact which is palpably resented within the academies and believed to hinder operational autonomy, flexibility, and initiative.” Such overregulation is often accompanied by chronic inattention to the academies by those responsible for them, with their administration left in practice to “skeletal staffs … [that] have little capacity, training, time, and most importantly, autonomy, to focus on the training program structure, pedagogy, curricula, syllabi, and quality evaluation.” Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law, 398–409, quotations at 403–4.

[1350] See, for instance, Karamat Bhatty, “Institute of Islamic Culture Desperate for Funding,” Express Tribune, October 25, 2011.

[1351] On Rahman’s influence on Indonesian intellectuals, see Abbas, “Knowing Islam.” For his reception in Turkish divinity schools, see Felix Körner, Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology: Rethinking Islam (Würzburg: Ergon, 2005).

[1352] CAPD, 5/1, 5.

[1353] Bhutto, Reconciliation, 273, 284; quotation at 284.

[1354] Ibid., 295–96.

[1355] J. McCormick, “The Mullahs and Their Influence in Pakistan,” memo enclosed with L. B. Grafftey Smith, UK High Commissioner, Karachi, to C. R. Attlee, CRO, February 14, 1951 in DO 35/3185: Pakistan Internal Affairs (p. 4 of the memo [TNA]). Cf. Daultana’s statement to the 1953–54 Court of Inquiry: “Unquestioned leadership of the nation died with the Qai[d]-i-Azam. It became increasingly difficult for those who followed to resist the temptation of stabilising their popularity by calling to their assistance an appeal which had overwhelming emotional support of the people—namely the appeal of Islam and of the march toward an Islamic State. Unfortunately, the conception was never given precise content.” Court of Inquiry Proceedings, 9: 7.

[1356] See Altaf Gauhar, Translations from the Qur’an (London: Islamic Information Services, 1977; first published in 1975). The translations in this book are based on “the exquisite Urdu Translation and valuable explanatory notes” of Mawdudi’s Tafhim al-Qur’an. Ibid., 1. In the late 1960s, Gauhar (d. 2000) was the information secretary of President Ayub Khan. Mawdudi was arrested in January 1967 after “the Government,” as Gauhar described it to some journalists, “were just fed up with the Mullahs.” R. G. Beer to N. J. Barrington, British High Commission, February 2, 1967, with enclosed note titled “The Arrest of the Mullahs.” DO 134/32: Correspondence between Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca, item #264 (TNA; Electronic Resource).

[1357] For a useful overview, on which I draw here, see Kepel, Jihad, 61–80.

[1358] For his blueprint of an Islamic university, see Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi, “Aik Islami university ka naqsha,” in idem, Ta‘limat (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1963), 155–65. On the prize, see the official website of the King Faisal International Prize, http://kfip.org/service-to-Islam (accessed February 26, 2016).

[1359] See Zaman, “Religious Discourse,” 60–71. The decision in 1999 against financial interest by the Shari‘at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court did, however, discuss Fazlur Rahman in an attempt to refute his arguments. The court was presided over by Justice Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan. For the full text of that decision, see Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan, The Supreme Court’s Judgement on Riba (Islamabad: Shari‘ah Academy, 2008); on Fazlur Rahman, ibid., 111–14.

[1360] See Saeed, Politics of Desecularization, especially 178–208 and 221–22, for the argument that the Pakistani higher judiciary had come to be increasingly subject from the mid-1980s to religio-political forces in the country—pressures it had often been able to resist until then.

[1361] See chapter 3, note 86.

[1362] See also Zaman, “Pluralism, Democracy, and the ‘Ulama”; Khan, “Institutions not Intentions.”

** Glossary

| ‘alim | —Traditionally educated religious scholar. |

| amir | —Leader or head. |

| dar al-‘ulum | —Institution of Islamic learning; see also madrasa. |

| din | —Faith; religion. |

| fatwa | —Legal opinion issued by a jurisconsult; see also mufti. |

| fiqh | —Islamic law and jurisprudence. |

| fitna | —Disorder; chaos. The term is also used for the first civil war in the history of Islam (656–61 CE), with which began the division of the Muslim community into hostile factions and later into distinct sects. |

| fuqaha (singular: faqih) | —Scholars of Islamic law. |

| hadith | —Traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, regarded by Muslims as second to the Qur’an as a source of religious guidance and law. |

| hakimiyya | —Sovereignty. |

| hudud (sometimes spelled as hudood; singular, hadd) | —Punishments expressly sanctioned in the Qur’an and the sunna and, unlike many other punishments, not subject to being mitigated by the ruler or the aggrieved party. |

| hukm | —Authority; a legal ruling; judgment. |

| ijma‘ | —Consensus; considered to be a source of legal norms in Sunni jurisprudence. |

| ijtihad | —Systematic reflection on the foundational sources of the law to arrive at legal rulings on matters not already or explicitly determined by the sacred law. |

| imam | —Leader or head of the community; the person leading the ritual prayers; those descendants of ‘Ali (d. 661) who are regarded by the Shi‘a as their infallible guides. |

| imambargah | —Sites dedicated to Shi‘i devotional practices. |

| jahiliyya | –The “age of ignorance” prior to the advent of Islam; pagan materialism. |

| jihad | —“Struggle” in God’s cause, which may or may not involve taking up arms. |

| madh | —Praise. |

| madhhab | —School of law. |

| madrasa | —Institution of traditional Islamic learning. |

| mawlana | —Honorific used to designate a religious scholar. |

| mawlawi | —A religious scholar or religious functionary. |

| millat (Arabic: milla) | —A community as defined by ties of faith. |

| mufti | —A jurisconsult; one who issues legal opinions; see also fatwa. |

| mujahidin | —Those waging jihad. The term has often also been used to refer to those participating in the armed struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. |

| mujtahid | —A practitioner of ijtihad. |

| mulk | —Authority. |

| mulla | —A religious scholar. The term has pejorative connotations in modern South Asian usage. |

| pir | —A Sufi master. |

| qawm | —Nation as defined by ties of ethnicity, shared territory, and language. |

| qital | —Warfare. |

| Rashidun | —The first four caliphs—Abu Bakr (r. 632–34); ‘Umar (r. 634–44); ‘Usman (r. 644–56); ‘Ali (r. 656–61)—to succeed the Prophet Muhammad. They are viewed by the Sunnis as “rightly guided” (rashidun), with a religious stature second only to that of the Prophet. |

| riba | —Financial interest; usury. |

| sahaba | —The companions of the Prophet Muhammad. |

| sajjada nishin | —“The occupier of the [Sufi master’s] prayer rug”; the guardian of a Sufi shrine. |

| shari‘a | —The totality of Islamic legal and ethical norms; the sacred law of Islam. |

| shaykh | —A Sufi master; a religious scholar. |

| Sufi | —Muslim mystic. |

| sunna (or Sunnah) | —The normative example of the Prophet Muhammad, typically expressed in the form of reports relating his teachings and conduct; see also hadith. |

| taqlid | —“Investing with authority”; following the legal rulings of earlier scholars, or of the school of law to which one professes adherence. |

| tasawwuf | —Sufism. |

| ‘ulama (singular: ‘alim) | —“People of knowledge”; traditionally educated religious scholars. |

| umma | —The worldwide community of Muslims. |

| ‘urs | —The death anniversary of a saint, commemorated at his or her shrine. |

| wali | —“Friend [of God]”; a saint. |

| waqf (plural: awqaf) | —Charitable endowments. |

| zakat | —Islamic alms tax paid annually on one’s accumulated wealth; one of the five “pillars” of the faith. |

| zina | —Unlawful sexual intercourse. |

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There has been an on-going debate regarding the propriety of social scientists working as consultants for the U.S. intelligence services, notably the CIA. I connect interested readers with sources pertaining to this debate.

For information on a related debate concerning pro-U.S. bias in international relations research, [[https://dgibbs.arizona.edu/debate_political_bias_international_relations_research][click here]].

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1. Peter Monaghan, "Does International Relations Scholarship Reflect a Bias toward the U.S.?" Chronicle of Higher Education, September 24, 1999. Cover story.

This article does a nice job of showing how political science promotes and celebrates official US policy. It is useful antidote to those who believe that universities are packed with radical professors who relentlessly criticize. The Chronicle article does not actually address the question of CIA links to academia, but it opened the door to later articles that do address these links (see below). The article contains comments from Robert Keohane, Bruce Russett, Richard Mansbach, Irene Gendzier, David Lake, Christopher Simpson, and William Thompson.

For full text, [[https://dgibbs.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Chronicle%20of%20Higher%20Education_0.pdf][click here]].

2. Chris Mooney, "For Your Eyes Only: The CIA Will Let You See Classified Documents - But at What Price?" Lingua Franca, November 2000.

An interesting article that revealed a previously unknown fact: Even before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a significant number of prominent

political scientists worked with the Central Intelligence Agency. To my knowledge, this fact had not previously been acknowledged in public. Includes comments from Robert Keohane, Bruce Cumings, Bradford Westerfield, Richard Mansbach, Craig Murphy, Joseph Nye, Thomas Volgy, and Robert Jervis.

For full text, [[http://cryptome.org/cia-price.htm][click here]].

3. David N. Gibbs, "Academics and Spies: The Silence that Roars," Los Angeles Times, Sunday Opinion Section, January 28, 2001.

Reprinted in ten other periodicals, including the Cleveland Plain Dealer, St Peterburg Times (Russia), Daily Yomiuri (Japan), Evrensel Gençlik (in Turkish translation), and O Estado de São Paulo (in Portuguese translation).

For English full text, [[http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/01/lat012801.html][click here]]. For German web translation, [[http://www.netzwerk-regenbogen.de/cia_akadem120201.html][click here]].

4. Chris Bunting, "I Spy with My Science Eye," Times Higher Education Supplement (London), April 12, 2002.

The CIA-on-campus issue, seen from a British perspective. This article focuses on the field of anthropology, although a number of political scientists, including Robert Jervis, also are quoted.

For full text, [[http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=168425&sectioncode=26][click here]].

5. Daniel Golden, "After Sept. 11, the CIA Becomes a Force on Campus," Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2002. Front page.

A useful article on how CIA-academic ties have grown considerably since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The focus is primarily on the "hard" scientific disciplines, with substantial new information about the CIA at Rochester Institute of Technology, Arizona State University, and Texas A & M. The article notes in passing that "about 30 academic political scientists and economists are now moonlighting with the intelligence community." Presumably, this figure of 30 only refers to academics who are currently on the payroll, and does not include those who had previously worked for the Agency. And of course, it also does not include the range of researchers who engage in informal, unpaid consulting and collaboration activities with the Agency.

For full text, [[http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2002/CIA-Growing-On-Campus4oct02.htm][click here]].

6. Chris Mooney, "Good Company: It's Time for the CIA and Scholars to Work Together Again," The American Prospect, November 2002.

An advocacy piece, published in a magazine considered the voice of liberal opinion in the U.S. A sign of the times, no doubt.

For full text, [[http://www.prospect.org/print-friendly/print/V13/21/mooney-c.html][click here]].

7. "CIA on Campus: The Intelligence Community Reemerges after 9/11 as a Force in Academia," Democracy Now radio program, November 13, 2002.

This nationally syndicated radio program featured a debate between Robert Jervis (former president of the American Political Science Association) and David Gibbs, as well as commentary by Daniel Golden of the Wall Street

Journal. The program, which lasted about 20 minutes, was moderated by Amy Goodman.

To hear a recording of the debate, [[http://stream.realimpact.net/rihurl.ram?file=webactive/demnow/dn20021113.ra&start=40:26.2][click here]]. For a written description of the debate, [[http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=03/04/07/0312250][click here]].

8. "Spooky Scholarships," London Guardian, December 17, 2002.

Short article on a recent scholarship program for graduate students, set up by the CIA. The program requires student recipients to obtain security clearances. Overall, it seeks "to promote disciplines that would be of use to intelligence agencies."

No online text currently available.

9. David N. Gibbs, "Spying, Secrecy, and the University: The CIA is Back on Campus," Counterpunch, April 7, 2003. Reprinted in Outlook India.

This article provides a lengthy, critical analysis of CIA influence at universities.

For full text, [[http://www.counterpunch.com/gibbs04072003.html][click here]].

10. Mark Clayton, "Higher Espionage," Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 2003.

A detailed and reasonably balanced discussion of the CIA-on-campus issue. The article quotes both advocates of intelligence consulting, such as Stansfield Turner, as well as critics, such as Bruce Cumings.

For full text, [[http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0429/p13s01-lehl.htm][click here]].

11. "CIA Seeks Anthropologists," Anthropology Today 20, no. 4, 2004.

Discussion of recent agency efforts to recruit among academic anthropologists, via the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program.

For full text, [[http://saturn.bids.ac.uk/cgi-bin/ds_deliver/1/u/d/ISIS/17489203.1/bpl/anth/2004/00000020/00000004/art00012/A6CC6C4A0964AA6F11139542639BA868703F48F862.pdf?link=http://www.ingentaconnect.com/error/delivery&format=pdf][click here]].

12. David Glenn, "Cloak and Classroom: Many Social Scientists Say a New Government Program will Turn Fieldwork Abroad into Spying. Can Secrecy Coexist with Academic Openness?" Chronicle of Higher Education, March 25, 2005. Cover story.

Further examination of the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars program, with extended quotes from anthropologist Felix Moos, who favors academic collaboration, as well as David Price, who opposes collaboration. The article contains some excellent information on the historical background regarding the CIA's past infiltration of academe, including academic involvement in counter-insurgency programs in Thailand during the 1960s.

For full text, [[http://chronicle.com/free/v51/i29/29a01401.htm][click here]].

13. Phil Baty, "CIA Outrages UK Academics by Planting Spies in Classroom," Times Higher Education Supplement, June 9, 2005.

Critical comments on the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program.

For full text, [[http://www.thes.co.uk/current_edition/story.aspx?story_id=2022341][click here]].

14. David N. Gibbs, "The Question of Whitewashing in American History and Social Science," in Four Arrows [Donald Trent Jacobs], ed., Unlearning the Language of Conquest: Scholars Expose Anti-Indianism in America (University of Texas Press, 2006).

Analysis of the CIA's influence in the social sciences, and its effects on scholarship.

For full text, [[https://dgibbs.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Unlearning_the_Language_of_Conquest_Scholars_Expos..._----_%28CHAPTER_13._The_Question_of_Whitewashing_in_American_History_and_Socia...%29.pdf][click here]].

*** Arizona State University and the CIA

1. Nicole Girard, "CIA Recruitment Sparks Campus Protest," ASU State Press, September 6, 2002.

Student responses to CIA recruitment efforts at Arizona State University, as covered by ASU's student newspaper.

Full text available through [[http://www.asuwebdevil.com/main.cfm?include=search][Web Devil]] archives (registration required).

2. "ASU Partners with CIA on Research Projects," Associated Press, March 30, 2003.

Details on the CIA and research activity at Arizona State. Discusses ASUs new president, Michael Crow, who recently worked for a private sector spin-off of the CIA, called In-Q-Tel Inc. It notes that Crow "has top-secret clearance."

Full text available through [[http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/form/academic/s_guidednews.html][Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe]] (search under "News Wires").

3. Kirsten Searer, "ASU’s Crow Partners with CIA on Research Projects," East Valley Tribune [Mesa, Arizona], March 31, 2003.

The article is celebratory in tone and dismissive of critics, but it does provide some interesting information. Crow openly acknowledges intelligence ties and defends his background this way: "We have definite aggressive, mobile active enemies that are interested in the destruction of our country." Presumably, the CIA protects us from these enemies and makes us safer. Judge for yourself.

For full text, [[http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/?sty=2536][click here]].

4. John Dougherty, "Mission Impossible: The Arizona Legislature May Prove to be too Much for ASU's Unsinkable Michael Crow," Phoenix New Times, May 29, 2003. Cover story.

More on ASU's Michael Crow, with substantial discussion on Crow's ties to the Agency and the (generally uncritical) reaction from the university administration.

For article full text, [[http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/issues/2003-05-29/feature.html/1/index.html][click here]] (CIA material begins in the middle of [[http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/issues/2003-05-29/feature.html/3/index.html][Section 3]]).

*** Historical Background on the CIA and Covert Operations

1. Bruce Cumings, "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies during and after the Cold War," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 29, no. 1, 1997.

Excellent introduction to the history of social scientific collaboration with the CIA.

For full text, [[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/cumings2.htm][click here]].

2. David Price, "Anthropologists as Spies," The Nation, November 2, 2000.

Analyzes the CIA's longstanding relationship with the anthropology profession.

For full text, [[http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20001120&s=price&c=1][click here]].

3. Public Information Research Inc., "CIA on Campus" (web-based archive).

This is a very useful site for persons interested in researching the historical background to the CIA's relationship with academia. The site reproduces the full text of numerous articles and documents pertaining to this issue, some of which are almost 40 years old.

To connect to this web site, [[http://www.namebase.org/campus.html][click here]].

4. U.S. Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975).

Fascinating report, which details U.S. efforts to overthrow Chile's democratically-elected president, Salvador Allende. The report was part of the larger investigation of the CIA undertaken by the Senate select committee on intelligence, chaired by Senator Frank Church (the "Church Committee"). Sadly, covert operations -- and the reports by the Church Committee -- have nearly vanished from political science journals during the past decade.

For full text of the Senate report, [[http://www.foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp][click here]]. For a Spanish translation of the Senate report, [[http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/doc/encubierta.html][click here]]. For the most recent documentary information on covert operations against Allende, from the National Security Archive, [[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20001113/][click here]]. For the State Department's 2000 assessment of the Chile operation ("The Hinchey Report"), [[http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp][click here]].

5. U.S. Senate, Complete Set of Reports from the Church Committee Investigation of the CIA

Finally, someone has entered this hard to find, multi-volume set into digitized format. A valuable historical resource, from an unimpeachable source. See especially the first report, which includes the documentation on CIA efforts to assassinate Castro, Lumumba, and others.

For table of contents, with links to full text, [[http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm][click here]].

6. Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities with the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975).

Report on CIA spying activities inside the US. The investigation was directed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. Considered to be far less interesting and less revealing than the reports of the Church Committee (above).

For table of contents, with links to full text, [[http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/rockcomm/contents.htm][click here]].

7. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba," March 13, 1962 (recently declassified).

This document presents a proposed operation against Cuba, termed "Operation Northwoods." It was proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and forwarded with a cover memo by General L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS. Northwoods provides an excellent illustration of what a "dirty" covert operation looks like, and it advocated the following:

We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba... We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington... We could sink a boat load of

Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on the lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding... Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents also would be helpful.

The overall objective was to create "pretexts... [which] would provide justification for U.S. military intervention in Cuba." It is remarkable that such a plan was actually described in writing, and that it was declassified in full. Fortunately, Northwoods was rejected and never implemented.

For the full text of the document, [[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf][click here]]. For a written description of the document, prepared by the National Security Archive, [[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/][click here]].

8. White House, Memorandum of Conversation [transcript of meeting among Henry Kissinger, Gerald Ford, and Shah Mohammad Pahlavi], May 15, 1975 (recently declassified).

Kissinger et al openly discuss possibilities for trying to "buy off" academics who criticize U.S. foreign policy.

For full text of document excerpt, [[http://dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/sites/dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/files/ShahKissingerTranscript.pdf][click here]].

9. "Should the US Fight Secret Wars?" Harpers, September 1984.

This is the transcript of a public panel on covert operations, chaired Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, where supporters and opponents of covert operations

engaged in a rare -- and revealing -- debate. Includes comments by John Stockwell, George Ball, Ray Cline, William Colby, Leslie Gelb, Ralph McGehee, and Morton Halperin, among others. Some historically significant points were made in this forum, including Colby's suggestion that US sponsorship of Mobutu Sese Seko was one of the greatest successes in the history of covert operations.

For full text, [[http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/should_the_cia_fight_secret_wars][click here]].

10. US Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987).

This report contains Senate hearings regarding the important subject of narcotics trafficking and their role in covert operations undertaken during the late Cold War. The published report is now hard to obtain, but it has been scanned and been made available in digital format through the Memory Hole website. This collection contains 1,800 pages of material. It is interesting to note that the investigation was directed by Senator John Kerry.

For a description of the document collection, with links to full text of both the hearings and the final report, [[http://www.thememoryhole.com/kerry/][click here]].

11. Declassified CIA and FBI Documents on Anti-Castro Terrorism in Cuba

These documents describe the career of Luis Posada Carriles, "a former CIA agent" and "one of the 'engineer[s]' of the 1976 terrorist bombing of Cubana Airlines flight 455 that killed 73 passengers," according to the National Security Archive description. This site also contains links to press articles, pertaining to Carriles.

For access to the documents, with full text links to the originals, [[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB153/index.htm][click here]].

12. William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, third edition, forthcoming, October 2003).

The best single, comprehensive volume on covert action, presenting the history of many CIA operations. Well documented, with extensive references to primary sources.

For Amazon listing, [[http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1567512526/qid=1052943361/sr=1-6/ref=sr_1_6/103-9783269-3006259?v=glance&s=books][click here]].

#title I Spy with My Science Eye

#author Chris Bunting

#date April 12, 2002

#source Times Higher Education Supplement. <[[https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/i-spy-with-my-science-eye/168425.article?storyCode=168425&sectioncode=26][timeshighereducation.com/features/i-spy-with-my-science-eye/168425.article?storyCode=168425&sectioncode=26]]>

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Social scientists with specialist knowledge of ‘dangerous’ peoples are increasingly valuable in the fight against terrorism, but is it ethical to spy on your subjects? Chris Bunting reports

In December 1919, Franz Boas, the grand old man of American anthropology, accused fellow anthropologists of spying for the American government in Central America, saying they had “prostituted” their science. “In consequence of their acts, every nation will look with distrust upon the visiting foreign investigator who wants to do honest work, suspecting sinister designs,” he thundered.

Boas did not name the targets of his attack, but one of them was probably the senior Harvard academic Samuel K. Lothrop. Files recently obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation by David Price, an anthropologist at St Martin’s College in Washington, confirm that Lothrop spied for American naval intelligence in the Caribbean during the first world war. In 1940, Lothrop went to Peru to “conduct an archaeological investigation”. He provided intelligence to the US military before returning to a quiet academic life at Harvard in 1944.

Boas had prodded his finger into a running sore at the heart of the problematic ethics not only of anthropology but of the whole of international social and political science. Is it acceptable for a patriotic social scientist to serve the interests of his own country with information gathered about another? Or should the academic’s responsibility always be to the interests of the people he studies? For Price, this is of pressing relevance in a world in which the president of the United States declares a global “war on terrorism”, a campaign that President Bush says “will be waged by day and by night, in the light and in the shadow, in battles you will see and battles you won’t see”.

“Clearly, if this war is to be prosecuted successfully it is going to need unprecedented quality of covert intelligence,” Price says. “They are talking about going after small groups of people in cultures that were previously

almost completely unknown to the agencies involved. So what are they going to do? They are going to be knocking on the doors of the experts that do exist. That means academics. Academics are already working with the Americans in Afghanistan in areas such as directing the bombing so that it does not hit civilians."

For those who decide to work with intelligence agencies, there is no shortage of role models, from T. E. Lawrence in the first world war to the British ethnologist and explorer Tom Harrisson, who parachuted into Borneo to raise a guerrilla army to fight the Japanese in the second world war. One early pioneer of anthropology, Holland's Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, developed an unrivalled understanding of Muslim culture in colonial Indonesia but then betrayed the confidence of his research subjects by engaging in counterinsurgency activities by the Dutch colonial authorities during the bloody Atjeh war at the turn of the 19th century. It was a war ostensibly aimed at reducing piracy, the 19th-century equivalent of a war against terrorism. More than 100,000 people died, almost all Indonesian.

The eminent American anthropologist Gregory Bateman famously worked for the US Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, applying his ideas of schismogenesis to foster disorder among enemy minority populations. Bateman would later harbour grave doubts about this work — even before joining the OSS he had wondered about the ethics of using scientific understanding of societies to manipulate them. "Now that we have techniques, are we in cold blood going to treat people as things?" he asked.

Others, apparently, had no such qualms. Many of the techniques of controlling populations used by the CIA in Vietnam were based on concepts developed by social scientists, and much of the post-war boom in "area studies" was fuelled by covert and overt government funding. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies, for instance, is reported to have been clandestinely funded by the CIA at its inception. In 1976, a US Senate committee reported: "The CIA is now using several hundred American academics located in more than 100 American colleges, universities and related institutes. In addition, there are several

American academics abroad who serve operational purposes, primarily the collection of intelligence."

Activist raids on university offices in the 1960s and 1970s established that senior social scientists were participating in covert operations in the Korean war, the Vietnam war and in counterinsurgency across the globe. Eric Ross, an American anthropologist at the Institute of Social Studies in the Netherlands, says there is no reason to think that such links have ended or were restricted to the US. "The only difference in places such as Britain is you don't get any information at all about what is going on. We only find out about these things 30 years after the event if we are lucky. But this kind of involvement is continuing, you can rest assured of that. It is only going to increase in the current climate. There will be a lot of grant money and a lot of positions that will come directly out of the intelligence agencies' pockets. Many will take this money because they believe they are here to do a job for people in power."

Of course, "doing a job for people in power" in the context of a military campaign could have deadly consequences for the people about whom information is traded. But Ali Ansari, a lecturer in the political history of the Middle East at Durham University, cautions against a simplistic assertion that advising governments automatically transforms the social or political scientist into a freelance spy. "If we are to mean anything, we have to try to communicate what we know to people in power. It doesn't mean we are betraying the people we are studying, in fact possibly quite the opposite. The extent and nature of that involvement is a genuine moral issue, but my problem at the moment is that the British government doesn't seem to give a monkey's about what we say, not the opposite."

For Robert Jervis, professor of international politics at Columbia University, who admits to consulting for the CIA, judging how and in what way to communicate with the authorities is a delicate balancing act that can be resolved only by individual conscience. "I think most of us would say that it is unacceptable to go out to do fieldwork on a group of people, say in Somalia, knowing that you are going to covertly report back. But what if you are going to prevent another World Trade Center attack? What if you have, or retrospectively, might have information about a group of dangerous people

that could save lives? One thing I would resist is any blanket assertion that we must serve the interests only of the people we are studying. I would say our duty is not to our government and not to the people we are studying but to the truth as we see it."

A growing band of academics, including Price and David Gibbs, associate professor of political science at Arizona University, are lobbying for professional codes of conduct on the issues that lie outside such vagaries of individual morality. After all, says Jervis, "the betrayal of one academic could lead to the next guy out there having his legs pulled off". Gibbs and Price argue for rules forcing academics to disclose all sponsorship, including that from the intelligence agencies, and to make all of their advice to those agencies publicly available.

Price points out that there are rules against the use of fieldwork as a cover for espionage in the United Kingdom's Association of Social Anthropologist's code of conduct, but he says they are much less explicit about the use of information after fieldwork has been completed. The American Anthropological Association intentionally removed rules forbidding secret research and briefings from its ethical codes in the 1980s, replacing them with rules saying anthropologists had "no professional obligation" to provide such briefings. "The current code effectively says only that you don't have to be a spy if you don't want to," Price says.

Many academics, it seems, do not want any discussion of the issue at all. During his research, Price was told by other anthropologists that to raise such questions could endanger the lives of fieldworkers around the globe. It is an ironic echo of the reaction to Boas's letter in 1919. The American Anthropological Association decided to censure Boas, in effect removing him from the ruling council of an organisation he had helped create. The association said he was unpatriotic and his accusations might endanger others' ability to undertake fieldwork. As for the spies themselves, they were allowed to take part in the vote and were never properly investigated.

#title The Near and Middle East Research and Training Act: Background and Current Status

#author Steven Heydemann
Staff Associate Social Science
Research Council

#date Fall, 1991

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In July 1991, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee authorized the creation of a new program to fund a broad range of research and training activities on the Near and Middle East. The program, titled “The Near and Middle East Research and Training Act” (NMERTA), is part of the State Department Authorization Bill. The NMERTA has been authorized by the Senate at a level of $4.0 million/ year. While many hurdles remain to be overcome before this program becomes a reality (notably, it still remains to be appropriated), the Senate’s action constitutes a major step forward in efforts to secure the passage of the NMERTA, and holds out hope for a long overdue increase in the level of federal resources available to scholars and specialists on the Middle East. This report offers a brief review of NMERTA, its background, and legislative prospects. It also describes how the act is organized and the range of activities it is intended to support.

The immediate origins of the NMERTA can be traced to the Social Science Research Council in New York. Its success thus far, however, is largely a reflection of current circumstances. Such a program has long been needed and has been discussed informally for several years. Yet it is unlikely that it would (almost) exist today were it not for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war. The attention these events focused on the region helped crystalize concerns about the importance of understanding the region, and reaffirmed the need to expand the academic training and basic research programs currently available• Just as importantly, they created an opportunity to mobilize Congressional support for expanded federal funding for scholarly research on the Middle East.

At its March 1991 meeting, the SSRC's Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East agreed to pursue this opportunity, and to initiate efforts to create a federal program of research and training on the region. The Committee adopted as a model the existing and highly successful Soviet and East European Research and Training Act of 1982, also known as the Title-VIII program. In fact, the language adopted by the Middle East Committee for the NMERTA is essentially identical to the language of the Title-VII program. Having Title-VIII available as a model, and as an example of an effective area studies program, greatly facilitated the work of the Middle East Committee in persuading those in Washington of the viability of the NMERTA.

The Committee's efforts to secure passage of the NMERTA got underway last spring, relatively late in terms of the Congress' legislative calendar. The House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs had already completed initial work on its version of the bill authorizing the activities of the Department of State. Nonetheless, the Committee's initiative was in time to persuade the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to add the act as an amendment to its version of the State Department Authorization Bill. The language submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee by the SSRC's Middle East Committee was accepted with no significant changes and was eventually accepted as part of the final Senate version of the bill. At this time, it is anticipated that the amendment will not be challenged when the House and Senate committees meet to reconcile their versions of the State Department Authorization bill.

A number of people deserve important credit for their work on behalf of the NMERTA. Without them, it would remain simply an interesting and worthy idea. Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana has been a crucial supporter of the act. He has been an effective and consistent advocate of the NMERTA within the Congress. His efforts have been ably coordinated by Dr. Andrew K. Semmel, the Senator's Legislative Aide for Foreign Policy. The committee's efforts in Washington have been supported in a remarkable way by Dr. Graeme Bannerman and Ms. Roxanne Perugino of Bannerman and

Associates. Dr. Bannerman, former Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his staff have contributed their time and effort on a pro bono basis to help this initiative. Within the Council, efforts to push ahead with the NMERTA have enjoyed the strong support of the President, Dr. David Featherman, and the Vice President, Dr. Stanley Heginbotham.

The NMERTA identifies a number of activities as crucial to the "development and maintenance of knowledge about the countries of the Near and Middle East." These include, graduate training; advanced training; public dissemination of research data; contact and collaboration among government and private specialists; language training; and firsthand experience in Middle Eastern countries by American specialists, including on-site conduct of advanced training and research to the extent practicable.[1] The act requires that funds be allocated to support a national research program at the post-doctoral level; for graduate, post-doctoral, and teaching fellowships for advanced training in Near and Middle Eastern studies and related studies; for fellowship and research support for American specialists in the fields of Near and Middle Eastern studies and related studies to conduct advanced research with emphasis upon the use of data on the countries of the Near and Middle East; to conduct seminars, conferences, and other workshops designed to facilitate research collaboration between government and private specialists in the field of Near and Middle Eastern studies and related fields; to conduct specialized programs in advanced training and research on a reciprocal basis in the countries of the Near and Middle East designed to facilitate access for American specialists to research institutes, personnel, archives, documentation, and other research and training resources located in the countries of the Near and Middle East; to support training in the languages and dialects of the Near and Middle East;

and to support “other research and training in Near and Middle Eastern Studies not otherwise described” in the act.

This is an enormously broad and flexible mandate, opening up a huge realm of activities for support from NMERTA funds. The act is notable for the absence of restrictions it imposes on scholars and students of the region: it is entirely unrestricted with regard to academic discipline, the topics which can be funded, the countries in the region which can serve as focus of research, and the languages for which training funds may be sought. The inclusion of language in act referring to “related studies” means that NMERTA funds may be used for research on topics which include the Middle East as a central focus but extend beyond it, such as research on the Hajj; on transnational religious movements; on the effects of transformation in Soviet Central Asia on the Middle East; on labor migration within the region, as well as the migration of labor to and from the Middle East; on the foreign policies of external actors in the region; as well as comparative studies in which Middle Eastern countries serve as foci; and so on.

In addition, the act is structured to ensure that proposals for research and training are evaluated independently, on the basis of scholarly criteria. In place of a direct process through which scholars would apply to and be evaluated by a federal agency, NMERTA funds will be awarded on a competitive basis to “national organizations with an interest and expertise in conducting research and training concerning the countries of the Near and Middle East and in disseminating the results of such research.” Institutions which “emphasize the development of a stable, long-term research program,” which demonstrate the capacity to carry out a national research competition on a peer-review basis, will receive priority in funding decisions. These organizations will be responsible for developing research and training programs to which both individual scholars and other institutions may apply, and for developing peer-review evaluation procedures to award funds. Decisions about which “national organizations” will receive NMERTA support will be made by a committee set up in the Department of State comprising the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Education (or their representatives); the Librarian of Congress; the President of the Middle East Studies Association, representing the nation’s leading research universities.

Programs developed by the SSRC's Committee on Soviet Studies using Title-VIII funds give a general illustration of activities which might be supported by the NMERTA. The Soviet Studies Committee currently offers general fellowships for research and training in Russian, Soviet, and East European studies at both the predoc tor al and the postdoctoral levels; support for research and development initiatives in Soviet studies; grants for summer language institutes for languages other than Russian; grants for summer Russian language institutes; fellowships for first-year Ph.D. student in underrepresented fields in Soviet studies; a program to alleviate backlogs in Soviet and East European collections in U.S. libraries; and a summer workshop in underrepresented fields in Soviet Studies, targeting sociology and anthropology. Obviously, the specific Middle East programs which might be created with NMERTA funds will not duplicate these, but will reflect the priorities and needs of the Middle East studies community.

The NMERTA has the potential to strengthen the study of the Middle East in the United States. However, as noted above, many obstacles remain before the NMERTA becomes a reality. Not surprisingly, the most important has to do with money. The act will, in all probability, be signed into law by the President. None of these steps, however, guarantee that funds will be appropriated or otherwise allocated for the act. The Middle East Committee and other supporters of the act are now directing their efforts towards ensuring that the NMERTA is not only authorized, but also appropriated. There are no guarantees that these efforts will succeed. If they do, it is possible that the first cycle of programs supported by NMERTA will be in place around the middle of 1992. If they are not, the Middle East Committee and others will continue to work to persuade Congress of the merits of funding the act, and look to 1993 as the year when the Middle East studies community will be able to benefit from the support provided by the NMERTA.

[1] This paragraph is a patchwork of quotations from the act.

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established in memory of the wife of Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard. Its purpose is to support continuing research in the social anthropology of Africa.

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*** Foreword

In 1926, E. E. Evans-Pritchard arrived for the first time in the Sudan, after studying under Professors Seligman and Malinowski at the London School of Economics. He was to carry on the ethnographic survey work initiated by Charles and Brenda Seligman for the Sudan Government. Between 1909 and 1912, the Seligmans had visited the Nuba mountains, the Kababish Arabs and the Beja, and in 1921–2 they had carried out investigations in the south. But they were unable to complete their fieldwork because of illness. Their research had already been accepted as valuable, not only in academic terms but also in a practical way to the administrators of the Sudan. The Sudan Government, and in particular Sir Harold MacMichael, Civil Secretary (1926–34), were sympathetic to this type of field enquiry, and therefore gave Evans-Pritchard every support in his work. Although his subsequent research covered at various times parts of Libya, Egypt, Syria, Ethiopia, the Congo and Kenya, the major body of his field work was carried out between 1926 and 1936 in the Sudan. The Sudan material is a rich source of ethnographic information, published in seven books and over 150 articles. These writings, together with the later study of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, form the basis of Evans-Pritchard’s world-wide standing in social anthropology, and have attracted the attention of philosophers, psychologists, historians, political scientists and economists.[1]

To indicate adequately the importance of Professor Evans-Pritchard’s work would be impossible here, and we are not attempting to do so. But we feel it might be of interest to give a brief chronological outline of his various Sudan expeditions, based on published material. This fieldwork record is in itself an outstanding achievement.

Evans-Pritchard’s first field expedition was to Dar Funj; he started from Khartoum about the end of October 1926, and established himself at Soda, in Ingessana country. The record he has given us of Ingessana society has not since been bettered. On 12 December, he left on a tour of the “Burun” country to the south, and arrived back in the Ingessana Hills on 7 January, 1927. During this period of scarcely a month, he made many detailed and accurate observations on the languages, history and custom of the southern Funj hills, providing a framework for future investigations. After passing south through Sillok and Ulu, he was prevented by illness from travelling more than a few miles beyond Wadega, into the Uduk speaking area; but he completed the circuit via Kurmuk and Keili.

Later in 1927, Evans-Pritchard arrived in Zandeland for the first time, and in connection with this trip spent five weeks on investigations among the peoples of Amadi District. On the basis of this first expedition to the Azande, he prepared a doctoral thesis for London University; and by late 1928 was on his way back to the Azande. In March 1929, he spent nine days in Bongo country, in Torn District, on his way home from the Zande trip. In his report on the Bongo (Sudan Notes & Records, 1929), he makes an appeal for others to follow up his research: “Owing to the shortness of my visit, my own notes are lamentably incomplete…” This appeal was to be echoed in many of his writings on lesser-known peoples, which, however, remain important and sometimes unique records.

For most of 1930, Evans-Pritchard was engaged on field research. He made his way, at the special request of the Government, to Nuerland, arriving there (unfortunately without most of his baggage) early in the year. In spite of misgivings, he spent some time in Leek and then in Lou country. He experienced so many difficulties, however, in particular political suspicion

because of recent punitive patrols against the Nuer, that after three-and-a-half months he decided to return to the Azande.

This third and final visit to Zandc country brought the total period he had spent there to about twenty months. On his travels to and from Zandeland he continued to make brief investigations on a variety of non-Zande peoples: for example, he spent four days making enquiries among the Mberidi and

Mbegumba, on the old Yambio-Tonj road, in 1930, in connection with his Zande historical studies. He also prepared some notes on the Moru of Amadi District.

In the dry season of 1931, Evans-Pritchard returned to Nuerland. He went to the eastern Nuer area, spending the first fortnight at Nasser and then moving to the cattle camps on the Nyanding River. Physical conditions were harsh and movement almost impossible, so he went on to the Yakwac cattle camp on the Sobat and stayed there until the early rains. He had intended to go back to Leek country, but had a severe attack of malaria and was obliged to retire to Malakal hospital and England. This trip had lasted for five-and-a-half months; it was his longest in Nuerland. Just before taking up the Chair of Sociology at Cairo University in 1932 he read a paper to the British Association in which he remarked: “I do not regard my work among the Nuer as finished, and I hope to complete it when circumstances are more favourable.”

In 1935, after being appointed to a research lectureship in Oxford, he was awarded a Leverhulme Fellowship for two years, to study the Galla of Ethiopia. There was, however, a delay in making arrangements, and so he spent two-and-a-half months on the Sudan-Ethiopian border, making a survey of the Anuak. When at last he entered Ethiopia, the Italian invasion was imminent, and so he had to return to the Sudan, and he then spent seven weeks among the Nuer at Pibor. It was in the rains, and this trip again ended in sickness. But in 1936, after a period of fieldwork among the Nilotic Luo of Kenya, Evans-Pritchard returned for the fourth time to the Nuer, entering Adok in western Nuerland on October 1st. He had to retire once more after seven weeks, because of fever.

The bulk of Evans-Pritchard's Sudan fieldwork was concluded by 1936; but in 1940 "I found myself back in Anuakland... and was able to make some further observations about their political system during a strenuous, if very minor campaign."

The research tradition combining scholarship with an explorer's determination which is peculiarly that of Professor Evans-Pritchard was established in a former era of the Sudan's history. Since then, the country has welcomed many political changes; and it has continued to foster academic studies in social anthropology, in recent years through the University of Khartoum, the Anthropology Board of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Education.

The essays in the present volume are offered as examples of contemporary work in the ethnography of the Sudan. They are the work of members, past members and informal associates of the Department of Anthropology and Sociology in the University of Khartoum. In their geographical spread (Nuri village to the Didinga, Darfur to the Ethiopian border), the varied character of the communities in which they are set (nomadic pastoralists, sedentary cultivating villages, Omdur-man and El Obeid) and the range of problems with which they deal (economic development, oral tradition, political and legal organisation, rite and symbol, the logic of kinship and the place of anthropology in the Third World) they indicate an important place for this subject, both in the intellectual life of the Sudan and those connected with it and in the practical social administration of the country.

We dedicate the essays in this collection to Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, after his retirement from the Chair of Social Anthropology at the University of Oxford, as a token of our debt to his pioneering example, our affection, and our gratitude for the unceasing interest he has shown in the development of social studies in the Sudan. We remember with pleasure his recent visits in the capacity of external examiner to the Department of Anthropology and Sociology in the University of Khartoum.

February 1972

Ian Cunnison

Wendy James

*** Editors’ Notes

**** Acknowledgements

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Hull University is at present in Egypt on a British Academy travel grant. Gunnar Haaland (1972-) paid two visits to the Sudan from the University of Bergen in connection with the F. A.O. Jebel Marra Project. Abdel Ghaffar Mohammed Ahmed (1970-) is engaged on research at the University of Bergen. Taj al-Anbia Ali al-Dawi (1966-) returned to Khartoum in 1971, after writing up his research at the University of Manchester. Farnham Rehfisch (1958–69) is now at the University of Hull. Peter Harries-Jones (1969–71) is at York University. Ontario.

**** Note, on Transliteration

Transliterations from languages other than Arabic arc in the standard forms. For various reasons it is not always appropriate to transliterate Arabic in the way most generally accepted. While most Arabic words have been spelt according to the system in use in Sudan Notes and Records, in some cases preference has been given to the dialectal rather than the classical forms. Some common words and some geographical, tribal and personal names have been written in their anglicised forms, where this is accepted or preferred current usage.

**** Use of Sudanese terms

Most of the terms from Sudanese languages used in the text are explained by the various authors as they occur. However the reader might like to note the following terms and abbreviations in common Sudanese usage, not italicised in the text: dura (sorghum vulgare), a common food grain \ feddan, a measure of 1.038 acres; jebel or jab al, a hill; khor, a stream or stream bed; wadi, an open shallow water-course in desert or semi-desert country; goz, stabilised sand-dune country with a cover of vegetation. Piastre or pt., a hundredth part of a Sudanese pound (LS). Omda, an official in charge of an adminisrative unit, the omodiya. In the system of local government prevailing until recently, several Omdas might be grouped under a Nazir.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-1.jpg][The Sudan]]

** I. Southeastern Nuba Age Organisation

James C. Faris

This paper is a description of the age organisation and its variations amongst the Southeastern Nuba. It will be argued that circumstances involving the history of the wider colonial society are sufficient and necessary to explain the variations documented in the Southeastern Nuba age system.

We are all now aware, I assume, that descriptions are (or in fact imply) theories, and that social anthropology’s theory and method are as much a part of its imperialistic heritage as the definition of its subject matter. This may sound pedantic and even rhetorical. But given the contemporary social anthropological proclivity for the speculative interpretation of symbol systems,[2] and the previous poverty of limited functional explanations (particularly of variation and change[3]), it is time to restate the case for historical materialism in explanation. It is perhaps appropriate here to do so as Professor Evans-Pritchard is one of the few British social anthropologists who have attempted to stress diachronic perspectives.

*** The Southeastern Nuba[4]

The peoples here designated Southeastern Nuba reside in three villages in the southeast corner of Kordofan Province, Democratic Republic of the Sudan. The villages—Kao, Nyaro, and Fungor—have a total population of under 2,500. This small group of sedentary farmers (who keep some animals) live on and around the base of the last small group of low rocky mountains before the country slopes off to the sudd.

They are physically and socially rather isolated from other Nuba of central Kordofan, although they share certain cultural features with the Southern Nuba group (Mesakin, Talodi, Werni) and the North Central Nuba group (Heiban, Otoro, Tira)—the latter with whom they also share a language family (speaking a mutually unintelligible dialect).[5] Today closest neighbours are Baggara Arabs (Awlad Himeyd) to the north and west, and Shilluk to the south and east.

Their social organisation, characterised by duolineal descent and clanship, is quite likely an amalgam of the matrilineally-organised Southern Nuba and the patrilineally-organised North Central Nuba. This is borne out by traditions of migration, and by the sharing of certain matriclan section names with the Southern Nuba Werni peoples and certain patrician section names with the Tira and Otoro Central Nuba. The local duolineal system is a unique and peculiar adaptation, however, not found elsewhere in the Nuba Mountains.[6]

Oral tradition documents Nuba habitation prior to the movement of Baggara nomads into the area.[7] Surface habitation and stone tool evidence indicate the Southeastern Nuba have been in their present location for at least the past 200 years, and genealogies and linguistic separation from others of the same language family would indicate an even greater time depth. There are also traditions in linkage to the Funj kingdom (Tagali branch)—apparently a rather common claim of non-Arab groups on either side of the White Nile at this latitude.[8]

However reliable these oral data, it is certain the Southeastern Nuba have suffered locally at the hands of a series of raiders and slavers for a long time. Most relevant to this paper are the raids during the Mahdiya period.

While the Mahdi mobilised at Gedir in 1881,[9] he was met by the peace priest and assistants from the Southeastern Nuba. On the presentation of several pots of honey, local tobacco[10] and other gifts, a promise was extracted from the Mahdi not to attack the Southeastern Nuba.[11] Tradition holds that this promise was respected during the Mahdi’s lifetime, but ignored after his death by his Baggara successor, the Khalifa ‘Abdallahi.

It is said that three of the Khalifa’s lieutenants, known locally as Rashid, Majbur, and Al-Nur ‘Anja, raided[12] the Southeastern Nuba, and at least once were successful in overcoming Fungor, the least defensible and smallest of the three villages of the total society. Although some people escaped, the majority were captured, branded (and the men circumcised), and eventually taken to Omdurman to fight against Kitchener in 1898.[13]

The Southeastern Nuba were of sufficient numbers or renown that today one section of the modern city of Om-durman still bears their name.[14] After the fall of Omdurman in 1898 the remaining Southeastern Nuba returned to Kordofan. The circumstances and period of enslavement, however, resulted in several unique features of the Fungor social organisation and local community—not shared by Kao and Nyaro.[15] The major feature relevant to this paper is the variation manifested in the age organisation.

*** The formal age-group structure[16]

There is no term which can be translated ‘age organisation’, nor a term which may be translated ‘age grade’. There are three named units (here designated grades), the names of which may be translated, each composed of subdivisions (here designated sets) which are named and for which there is a term. The formal structure is illustrated in Table 1.

The grade names, Ider, kadundor, and kadonga, may be translated as ‘responsible boys’, ‘males of kadundor hair style’, and ‘elders’, respectively. The term for age set, lame kangeren, may be rendered ‘people of the same age’, as the term ngeren means simply ‘age mates’. The translations of the set names are given in Table 1, and will be explained further below.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-2.jpg][Table 1: Southeastern Nuba Age Structure]]

| Grade (no term) | Set (lame kangeren) | Hair Style | Diacritical Marks | | Approx. Beginning Age |

| I loer | 1 chur (fallen testicles)
2 bakabak (broad shouldered)
3 patera (large) | small skull cap + rim
larger skull cap + rim
larger skull cap + rim | use of red permitted | | 8—11
11 —14
14—17 |

| II kadunddr | i eya (new)
2 kro ka tacho (children of the fighting stick) | kadunddr strips + rum
kadunddr strips + riim | use of yellow permitted | use of black permitted | 17—20
20—23

23—26
26—29
29—31 |

| | 3 kro torga (children in-between)
4 kro koren (old children)
5 dagenya (fathers) | kadunddr strips + rum
kadunddr strips + rum kadunddr strips + rum | |

| III kadonga | 1 ketldng (little)<b>2 koren (old) | kadunddr strips only head shaved | | | 31—45
45— |

The term kadundor may crudely denote ‘warrior’ in some circumstances, but it would be a mistake so to translate it. In its most narrow translation sense it labels the two-shaved strip hair style—a hair style which may be worn by men who have not yet become members of the actual soldier police (‘warrior’) force, the talmara, or by men who have recently retired from it.

The Southeastern Nuba age organisation is linear rather than cyclical. That is, individuals (or sets) do not ‘revolve’ in the system: the kadonga koren, ‘old elders’, do not become Ider kachur, ‘responsible boys of fallen testicles’. Neither do initiation sets acquire a name peculiar to them which they

maintain for life. All Southeastern Nuba males pass through a fixed linear structure, moving in groups of initiates which form sets, into new set statuses every three years. The age sets are grouped into broad categories (grades) which crudely denote certain functions and divide males into boys, young men, and elders. The kadundor grade, which might be glossed ‘young men’s grade’, only approximates the range of age sets which may constitute the soldier/police force (the talmara} and the degree of approximation is much greater in Kao and Nyaro than in Fungor.

Male infants and very young boys are not differentiated into formal age groups, and their hair fashion, later to become the group indicator, varies with the whim of their fathers.[17] At about the age of 8 to 11 years, a boy ceases to wear a random or clan-specific hair style, and begins to wear a tuft of hair on the crown of his head, the rum, which will remain until senior elderhood. In addition to this, he begins to have his hair groomed in one of two ways, either two narrow straight stripes originating at the rum and spreading forward at an ever-increasing angle to the front of the head (drothb), or a small skull-cap type of hair patch, with the rum tuft at roughly the centre (ludu). The size of this skull cap increases until initiation into the kadundor grade, some nine years later.

At the first indications of a boy’s approaching maturation, his hair style is changed and he is considered a member of the first set of the first grade. Entry is usually the decision of the village section elders, and involves no ceremony save the new hair style. At this time a boy may begin to decorate his body with red or shell-white base colours, and designs in black.[18] He is also now eligible to compete formally in wrestling tournaments.

The first Ider set usually wrestle only within the village section. They wrestle in other sections of the same village only after advancing to the second set of the first grade, Ider kabaka-bak, ‘broad-shouldered boys’. Boys advancing to the final set of the grade, Ider patera, ‘big boys’, wrestle in other villages—they meet opponents of their age set and others of loer grade whom they will be likely to meet in one or another of the sports of the

society for the next ten years. The junior sets of loer grade may wrestle with foreigners who come into their village sections, but they cannot cross village section boundaries to do so.

In these inter-village wrestling matches (as in the more dangerous sports characteristic of the next grade), boys fight hereditary opponents—those with whom they have no traceable links—and the determination of potential opponents acts to inculcate a large measure of genealogical knowledge and awareness of intricate social networks.

Except for the increase in size of the ludu skull cap and the increasing formalisation of the wrestling activities, there are but few overt distinguishing activities of the various sets of the loer grade. For one example, only loer kabakabak of the village compete in the long distance race at the new year’s activities (alete).

But even if the distinctions have heretofore not always been clear between the various sets of the lder grade, the patera set (final set) is carefully chosen, and all boys who have been age-set mates up to the time for advancement to the patera set may not necessarily be advanced to it together. Some boys, of course, mature more quickly than others, and elders of each village section decide which boys are of sufficient maturity to be advanced. This normally includes boys who arc from fourteen to seventeen years old; a physically precocious fourteen year old may be advanced to loer patera at the same time as a slower maturing seventcen-year old.

Advancement into the first set of the kadundor grade also depends on physical maturation, plus a host of other necessary factors, such as the maturity state of a young man’s betrothed and his health at the time. The young men chosen for advancement to kadundor eya begin first by adopting the kadundor hair style, and next by the use of yellow background in body design. Their formal initiation (which is really initiation into the sport of bracelet and stick fighting) comes two or more years later. After the initiation and the bracelet

fighting debut, the kadundor eya are entitled to use rich black background in body painting, and are entitled to use a stick in the tribal sports, and become kro ka tacho, ‘children of the stick’ (see Chart 1).

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-3.jpg][Chart I. Kadundor Eya Age Set Graph]]

Advancement through the last four sets of the kadundor grade involves no shift in diacritical markers—only attendance at a yearly age organisation ritual, ngorana, where every third year persons in the grade are advanced one set. It is at this ritual (see below, p. 20) that decisions are publicly announced regarding membership in the village soldier/police force, the talmara. Advancement by set each three years through the entire grade is automatic after entry into the eya set; no mitigating circumstances delay formal progression. When a man has been in the kadundor dagenya set for three years, a stick is broken which symbolises his set’s retirement from the sport and entry into the next and last grade, kadonga. A man at this time will be approximately thirty-one years old (see Table 1).

The kadonga grade is divided into two rough parts—the kadonga ketleng, ‘little elders’, and kadonga koren, ‘old elders’. No formal ceremony marks the shift from ‘little’ to ‘old’, but normally a man ceases to decorate his body and stops wearing the rum tuft of hair and kadundor strips, and begins to keep his head entirely shaved. Entry into the kadonga grade need not correspond to retirement from the talmara (soldier/police). As will be seen below, the age of recruitment to and retirement from the talmara varies markedly between the village of Fungoi’ and the villages of Kao and Nyaro, and even slightly within Kao and Nyaro over periods of time.

Elders no longer engage in sports, though their own fighting praises may still be sung by the drummers in the praise song cycles, and they may still prance and scream challenges at this time. It must not be assumed that a man’s life is labour after retirement from kadundor grade, however, for only after becoming kadbnga is one eligible for the very many ritual leadership posts.

*** Age and the organisation of production

The entry into Ider grade (marked only by a hair style and potential use of red body decoration) is normally coincident with goat-herding activities. Boys, singly or in small groups, are responsible for goats of the village section for at least the duration of their membership in the chur set. By the time boys enter the bakabak set they may have begun herding calves— which during the dry season requires that they accompany the older calves for distances up to two to three days from the villages in search of water and grass. If there are few boys in the set, they may have responsibility for the entire herd of a village section. Although it is herded together, each boy is normally responsible for the calves or herd of a father, a father’s brother, or a mother’s brother. Though every adult man does not have cattle, it is a rare youth who does not find himself caring for a few cattle for some senior patrikinsman—or more commonly, senior matrikinsman.

While a bakabak, a boy normally will become betrothed to a girl some six to eight years his junior. During his tenure as loer patera he will begin the required bride-service—which continues until the girl becomes pregnant, normally about six to eight years from initial betrothal.

The amount of work involved in bride-service to a girl’s father (or appointed surrogate) is substantial. A boy is required to provide yearly contributions of grain (in the amount of about two bushels, threshed); to build at least one normalsized living hut and one large cattle hut; erect fences around the fields adjacent to the village sections to keep cattle and other animals from the crop; and to contribute substantial weeding chores each season—

amounting to at least two days’ labour by all members of his age set in the village section. Moreover, he is required to provide oil (an amount of approximately eight gallons each year) and coloured ochre for his betrothed (girls cover themselves completely with red or yellow ochre and oil from about five years of age until pregnancy), and various gifts, such as on occasions of scarring—which accompany all physiological changes in females. Demands are also made on a young man by his future mother-in-law for gifts of cloth, oil and money.

Depending on the maturity of a young man’s betrothed, he may begin a farm on his own while in the last year of Ider grade. If not, he will undoubtedly begin a crop of his own after advancement into the kadundor grade. The marriage is finalised normally on pregnancy, or, if this is not forthcoming, at an appropriate time after initial menstruation, usually about two years. Even the very rare girl who is without a betrothed will take on a skirt, cease to wear oil and ochre, and assume the appearance of other young married women

of the community about two to three years after initial menses.

It occasionally happens that a young man’s betrothed becomes pregnant while he is still loer patera. In this case, he is immediately advanced to kadundbr and enters the next bracelet fight—to wait for formal initiation when the next Ider patera set is advanced to kadundbr eya.

After advancement to kadundbr, young men always assume their own fields. On finalisation of the marriage, a young couple normally moves into one of the husband’s father’s huts or, if none is available, into a vacant hut of another resident senior patrikinsman. Only in rare circumstances will a man and his new wife move into one of his matrikinsmen’s huts, and almost never into a hut of the girl’s kinsmen. With the common occurrence of cross-cousin marriage, of course a young man and his wife share many kinsmen. The physical consummation of the

marriage, part of the pregnancy, and the delivery of the first child (only), takes place, however, in the wife’s natal home.

Wives to a new kadundbr (the society is characterised by common polygyny) are a vital production asset. Apart from domestic support, wives carry grain from the fields to the threshing arenas, and make the beer necessary for weeding, harvesting, and threshing parties.

With the agricultural techniques available and rigorous environmental conditions, there are limits on the size of fields a man can handle. Weeding, harvesting and threshing are collective activities, but beyond a certain amount it is impossible to capitalise on existing agricultural produce. Grain can seldom be stored more than one year without ruin from vermin and elements, and there are no reasonably accessible markets for surplus grain sale. Occasionally grain is sold to nomadic Arabs or Fellata (Sokoto Fulani) going through the area, but this is not a substantial exchange.

Some young men without wives (usually whose wives have been stolen) have begun to cultivate cotton in the past few years. This is sold to Arab merchants in the nearest market town, but it is important to note that most of their proceeds must go for grain purchase. With a new wife and young children this becomes a dangerous and uneconomic investment. Older men with mature sons of Iber grade may attempt both cotton and grain production, but the exigencies of production in current technological and ecological circumstances make this diversification possible only with a more sizeable labour force. A man’s productive life after retirement from the kadundor grade is precisely related to the labour force in sons and attached kinsmen he may command. The very aged usually attach themselves to a son and contribute what labour they can. Aged men without offspring are the responsibility of more distant kinsmen, usually matrikinsmen.

Very little of a grown man’s time is spent on herding or cattle care activities. But generally elders spend an increasing amount of time in hunting pursuits. Game is still reasonably plentiful, and at least every other hunt yields some meat. Hunts are seldom more than one or two hours from the village, except

where a specific group of men (based on friendship and residential networks) go after giraffe or other large species found at greater distances from the villages. Fishing is sometimes pursued in lakes during the spring—a productive activity which is most commonly carried out by young kadonga and older kadundor. This is never for more than about two weeks in any year, however.

Even though ‘elderhood’ begins at approximately thirty-one years, it would be wrong to assume tensions and strain from a premature retirement and antagonisms based on early transition to elderhood, as does Nadel.[19] On becoming kadonga the demanding and onerous talmara duties are nearing an end (particularly in Kao and Nyaro, see below, p. 26), and a rich and full ritual life begins. Moreover, prestige accrues from agricultural and hunting success and the fathering of many children.

The time invested in ritual activities should not be underestimated—and to a large extent this is specific to elder males. On the assumption of adult personality (after the bracelet fight initiation), young men participate in the affairs of the ritual societies to which they may belong by ascription; the kin-group rituals (patrigroup and matrigroup); kin groups linked to one’s own (sec below, page 21, note 24, for reciprocal clan relations), and matrikin groups of one’s father. Investment at this point is limited to group participation, but on reaching elderhood, a man assumes various leadership posidons in the ritual activities, which involve considerably more time.

For four or five sets of kadunddr f kaddnga (six sets in Fungor) men, the talmara soldier/police force requires time, in weeding assignments for important priests as well as other society functions (see below, p. 21). In former times the talmara constituted the raiding organisation and first defence force. The time and work is so demanding that men always press for early retirement and release from talmara activities.

*** Age-group recruitment and group function

The formal recruitment mechanisms for age-group structure have been outlined above. For the tribal sport of bracelet and stick fighting (timbraf and for the village-specific talmara force, the age-organisation recruitment mechanisms are specifically mechanisms for personnel selection to the activity. In other age-based activities, age-group memberships are prerequisites or correlates of activities, but the recruitment mechanisms themselves are not necessary to these functions and activities.

(1) The timbra

By far the most important sporting activity of the Southeastern Nuba is the bracelet and stick fighting which generally characterises the kadunddr age grade. Boys train for this activity during their wrestling years and the results of the sport form the basis for dance praise (or ridicule) songs composed by the drummers' society—a vitally important public acknowledgement of one's performance. These praises are remembered, recounted many times publicly, and transmitted through members of the drummers' society (chabajaf)[20] to be sung on occasion during a man's waning years and finally to form the central dance praise song at his funeral. The importance of this sporting activity and its consequences for adult males can hardly be overemphasised.

(a) Initiation

Decisions about changes in status of young men in the age system are made at the ngbrana ceremonies in October or November (see below, p. 20), and become effective or are implemented at the following New Year's rituals (alete) normally held in January. In the case of kadundor eya, a decision is reached about their initiation at the fall ngorana, and is normally effected at the following alete (see Chart 1).

The ‘initiation’ or period of isolation prior to the first fight is normally from ten days to two weeks. Young men are initiated in village-section groups[21] and spend most of the period of seclusion in caves on the mountainside immediately adjacent to their village sections—only coming down in the evening to sleep in a special cattle hut prepared for the occasion. They are covered each day with sacred mud (ku) and ash, both to give them strength for the coming initial fight, and to protect them from the potentially dangerous stares of others. This is washed off each night when the young men descend from the mountain to sleep, and is the same mud that will be smeared on them prior to all other timbra. fights in which they will participate for the next ten years. On coming down each evening, the initiates also put on sandals as protection from dangerous substances or signs on tlie ground which might have been set by witches or enemies. For the same reasons—fear of pollution and loss of strength—the initiates do not cross village-section boundaries during the isolation period.

The isolated fighters are served by a chosen Ider patera boy who will belong to the next set to be initiated. He keeps their sleeping hut clean, brings them water and food, and keeps the initiates company—particularly important if only a few arc involved. Food is particularly rich and heavy, involving much oil and honey. Milk and meat are made available in large quantities, and the normal grain-porridge staple is mixed with water and strained, and the liquor drunk. Food is provided for each initiate by female matrikin and wives of patrikinsmen. In real ways, the isolation is a fattening period.

The isolated initiates are visited by village-section elders who advise them of appropriate behaviour during the initial fight and when later visiting other villages. Much of this is, of course, common knowledge. The elders also offer considerable moral instruction, and constant admonition to fight well, to not dissipate strength on lovers, and to be as brave as the elders were in their day. The end of the isolation is marked by an extended and elaborated version of the common prefight ritual used by all combatants of the kadundor grade.

Each village section has a special priest for rituals involving the timbrd fight. This post is hereditary in specific resident patrician sections, and the incumbents are responsible for all pre-fight ritual of new initiates as well as older fighters. This specialist mixes the village section’s ku mud and prepares the herbal mixtures applied to the bracelets prior to fights. He arranges the invocations preceding each contest, supervises the tying-on of the bracelets (which are kept in a special storage place near his compound). He also makes decisions about allowing a young man who may be weak or ritually polluted, such as from the death of a close kinsman or from recent sexual intercourse, to prepare ritually, put on a bracelet, and attend the contest. These initiates approach their fight much less conspicuously than older fighters, for they do not yet wear rich shiny black which protects against the stares of others, and which can be worn only after the first daytime performance of their first fight’s praise song and dance (usually taking place within the month following the initial fight). The initial fight is a combat with the heavy brass bracelets only, the stick fight portion of the contest not coming until entry into the second set of the kadundor grade, krb ka tacho (‘children of the stick’). All the village section rejoices if a youth does well in his initial fight, and then begins to collect the necessary material and money required by the drummers’ society to pay for the composition of the praisesong cycle of his initial fight. This is extremely expensive (amounting to LS 7) but critical, for without it, the prancing and shouting which take place at the dance are impossible, and the payment is further supported as the drummers’ society will not perform at a man’s funeral until this initial payment is completed.[22]

After this praise song is composed and performed the first time, the young fighters may weai’ the rich black background colour in body designing, and may shortly begin the stickfighting portion of the timbrd combat. The initiatory aspects of the kadundor grade are then finished. At this point a young man is considered to have a wholly adult personality.

The entire initiation is one of classic form: ritual removal; a period outside society characterised by extraordinary behaviour and diet; a ritual re-introduction with new knowledge and superior strength; and a changed

status realised by entry to the tribal bracelet fight and the diacritical shifts after the first fight’s praise songs.

(b) Combatants

Opponents in the timbrd fight are determined by an examination of the kinship and affinal bonds between potential combatants, or between an elder spectator and two potential combatants. Should any male older than the fighters object, and should such objection be supported genealogically, the fight cannot take place. Combat is between those with no traceable links to one another or to a third party objector. The degree to which kin and affinal relationships are considered is sometimes striking. Fights between matrikinsmen and between patrikinsmen are prohibited—sanctioned respectively by witchcraft fears and the threat of expulsion.[23] Another categorical prohibition includes the same-generation members of the father’s matriclan (i.e., classificatory FaSiSo), the same-generation offspring of males of own matriclan (i.e., classificatory MoBrSo), and the same-generation offspring of males of father’s matriclan (i.e., same-generation offspring of males of the same matriclan). This category is coded by a term, da^da^a, and fighting between da^da^a automatically brings about leprosy. But quite apart from these mechanical prohibitions, a not atypical example is illustrated in Figure 1.

A refused to allow B (his wife’s brother) to fight C (A’s mother’s uterine half-brother’s daughter’s son).

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-4.jpg][Fig. I]]

The complicated kinship and affinal networks narrow the range of potential opponents. This has become so serious in the society that most combatants are now from different villages—the intra-village possibilities now being negligible. In some cases a fighter may have only one or two potential combatants for the entire range of his fighting years. Others, however,

especially of small matriclans and small patricians, may have many possibilities and frequent opportunities for , combat.

Should there be no traceable (or objectionable) kinship or affinal links between the potential combatants or between them and an objecting third party, the fight may take place. Referees watch carefully to attempt to ensure that no undue advantage accrues to either of the fighters, as, for example, in the case that one stumbles, breaks his fighting stick, or loosens the bindings holding his brass fighting bracelet.

But age, relative size, and skills learned from several years in the grade are normally irrelevant to determining combatants, and a small, young and inexperienced fighter in his last eya set year may find himself matched against a large, experienced fighter in his last dagenya set year. The only consolation to the young fighter in such a case, as the outcome of the individual fight is obvious, is that he must only meet this opponent for one year, since the older fighter is soon to retire from the grade.

If two young combatants enter the fight at the same time, they may be expected to fight each other up to three or four times a year for a period of nine to twelve years. Given the kinship basis of defining opponents, a fighter may find many of his opponents are siblings to each other.

An important point with regard to the age organisation is the fact that its recruitment mechanisms initially dictate the participants for the fight, and although any given fighter is active in the timbrd for only about ten years, his opponents’ ages will vary ten years on either side of him, and the range of opponent ages that a young man will meet during his ten years in grade is thus twenty years. In other words, opponents come from the entire grade, not simply a temporally-identical set, and he may fight old kadunddr when he is young and young kadunddr when he is old.

(ii) Ngdrana ceremony

After the ripening of the first grain (about October), the ngdrana[24] ritual is held. Most males of kadunddr and kaddnga grade attend, the specific date being set by the hereditary priest-in-charge. This leader is the rain priest (or a surrogate from the rain priest's clan section) in each village. The relationship between rain and the age organisation is manifest only in the talmara (soldicr/police force) relationship to the rain priest. They weed his fields, may build his huts, and should his ritual control bring insufficient or too much rain, the talmara arc responsible to the entire society for forcing a correction. The annual 'tax' due the rain priest (paid in grain contributions) may be collected by the talmara should it not be forthcoming voluntarily, and should action be necessary because of inadequate rain control, the talmara beat him or tie him to an ant-hill (or both), which may result in death. This 'punishment' is regarded as putting into motion a purely mechanical kind of causality.

After a host of invocations for good health, long life and production success, the remainder of the ngorana ceremony is age-related. The rain priest announces (although the decisions have been predetermined) the retirement and/or recruitment of age sets to the talmara, if it is to be done, and may also (every third year) announce the retirement of a senior kadundor set from the timbra (symbolised by the breaking of a stick) and advancement to kadonga. Individual cases for advancement to kadundor are also discussed at this time, and should it appear that a young man's wife may become pregnant before the next age-set advancement, he may be instructed to enter the next bracelet fight.

Should any change in talmara leadership be necessary (for reasons of retirement, incapacity or incompetence), it takes place at the ngorana, the rain priest announcing the new incumbent after consultation with elders. And talmara strength and performance (see below, p. 23) is discussed, including such issues as undue harassment of a priest or ritual specialist; or conversely, insufficient warning or punishment of recalcitrant specialists. The rain priest may bring

complaints against the talmara for insufficient aid in weeding, house building, collection of grain due, or non-cooperation in general. Talmara members younger than the elders bringing the complaints must not dispute the charges (see below, p. 28 for relative age behaviour).

The talmara then leave the ngorana site, go to the village near farms, and each take four heads[25] of ripe unharvested grain. They are accompanied by the rain priest's assistants who collect grain as 'tax' for rain services rendered. Some of the talmara grain is boiled, roasted and eaten, and the remainder is made into beer by the wives of talmara leaders to be consumed by the talmara later. After feasting on the boiled and roasted grain, the talmara return to the Helds near the village sections to confiscate loose animals (pigs, goats or cattle) which might get into fields to eat the newly-ripened grain.

Should loose animals be confiscated, those responsible for keeping the animals penned may be beaten (i.e., younger Ider boys and young girls). The animals are divided equally between all talmara members, except that the head, spleen, liver, chest and kidneys go to the peace priest, who may also command a fine from the animal's owner for having let it become loose.

No one attempts to block talmara action during these activities, for fear of being beaten or tied to an ant-hill. At no other time of year, however, do talmara have authority to confiscate animals, unless so ordered by the peace priest for payment of fines, or for provision for special external guests (such as the rare occasion when a district Local Government Inspector visits the community).

(iii) The talmara

The age organisation also provides the basis for recruitment to the talmara (soldier/police force), but the way in which this is

effected is quite different in the village of Fungor from that of Kao and Nyaro. The latter two villages share the same recruitment/replacement system.

(fl) Kao/Nyaro recruitment

At every third ngorana the formal advancement of persons to higher sets takes place. Except for the initial kadundor sets and the final kadundor dagenya there is no ritual, and advance is without ceremony or diacritical marker. More important,

is food', an unrelated non-reciprocal clan sections are llga-—those 'between whom there is fire'. See Faris, "Some aspects of clanship..." for details.

however, is consideration of talmara strength, and this may take place at each year's ngorana. If the strength of the talmara is down from natural causes, or if a potential incoming set is small, decisions will be made to delay retirement of the eldest set of the group, even if this set is retired from Umbra combat and the kadundor grade. If strength is sufficient, one set may be retired without admission of a new set; if strength is insufficient, a new set may be admitted without retirement of the eldest set. This may be diagrammed, as in Chart 2.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-5.jpg][Chart 2 Talmara strength (Kao-Nyaro)]]

If sets are large, then talmara strength is kept up with fewer of them, but if they are small, it may be that four or more sets are required. This variability is clear evidence that the kadundor age grade and the talmara soldier force are not exactly the same and should not be confused. Indeed, a concrete example of the necessity of this

flexibility in talmara recruitment may be seen in the case of Fungor.

(b) Fungor recruitment

The age-grade and age-set system of Fungor is identical to that of Kao and Nyaro. But the use of the set system for recruitment to talmara is strikingly different. The Fungor talmara may at one time be roughly the kadunddr age grade, such as it is in Kao and in Nyaro. But at another time it will contain only members of the oldest set of kadundor, while the great majority of members will be kadonga. Recruitment in Fungor, instead of every third year, is but once every eighteen years.

The Fungor talmara is normally composed of up to six sets, in contrast to the four-plus sets of Kao and Nyaro. At the time of recruitment, the youngest members will be kadundor eya, and the oldest members the youngest kadonga set—a range from about eighteen to thirty-six years of age. Just before the time of the next recruitment to the talmara, eighteen years later, the youngest member will be a young kadonga ketleng’, the oldest members will be kadonga koren, about fifty-two to fifty-five years old. In terms of able bodies, then, the Fungor talmara are strongest just after an initiation, and become progressively weaker as the next initiation approaches. Some men will be members of the talmara during their strong young manhood, while others only become talmara as their youth is waning and serve the talmara as increasingly aged ciders. Only every other generation is efficiently utilised—this circumstance is a contemporary mirror of an historically necessitated fact.

Those Fungor men captured and taken to Omdurman during the Mahdiya (see above, p. 4) came back as elders. In reconstituting a talmara force they had only themselves and the offspring they might create in future. Thus they continued to serve as the Fungor

talmara until the new offspring matured to kadundor and were initiated.

A ‘generation’ of potential talmara was wiped out in the raids on Fungor, and the recruitment system today maintains this generation gap. Rather than the slow trickle in and out of the talmara every third year which characterises the Kao and the Nyaro talmara, the Fungor talmara jumps with a complete change of personnel every eighteen years each incumbent then serving the entire eighteen years of the duration between initiations. Without a change in recruitment, there is no way of adding to the numerical strength of the force, whereas in Kao and Nyaro, sets may be added or dropped as size and strength demand.

A proto-Fungor talmara may have looked like that found in Kao and Nyaro today. Certainly the flexibility of the Kao and Nyaro system is suggestive—for should strength be low, retirement may be delayed. This is exactly what happened in Fungor, but the delay had to be until an entirely new generation of males could be bred and matured to kadundor—an 18-year delay. This delayed retirement then became an instituted feature of the Fungor talmara selection, and the Fungor talmara today contains the requisite six sets (eighteen years), the time necessary for maturity to kadundor of a newborn. The flexibility provision characterising the entire Southeastern Nuba talmara selection, was then evoked in the extreme to permit reconstruction of the Fungor talmara.

(c) Talmara leadership

The elder leadership positions for the ngorana age ritual have been described above. Formal leadership positions in any given age set are not necessary, as mobilisation is villagesection based, and this will seldom involve more than six to eight persons. Age grades and village-wide age sets never emerge as corporate groups. After acceptance into the talmara the entire village-wide group of men

constituting the talmara must be activated for specific tasks and formal leadership is necessary.

The talmara leadership is fixed in specific patrician sections—that is, the post is hereditary in the clan section, the specific incumbent being chosen by the ngorana leaders. But this is slightly different for each village of the society. In the village of Kao there is one leader with two assistants, both of whom come from patrician sections of a different village section than the leader. These men are hereditary assistants and never leaders. This means, in Kao, with three village sections, one village section provides neither leader nor assistants. During the tenure of my research this was a sore point, and there was discussion by the "disadvantaged" village section talmara of forming a separate talmara society.

In the village of Nyaro, the same imbalance is not found, as there are two talmara co-leaders, each post hereditary in patrician sections of each of the two village sections of the village.

In Fungor, the number of talmara leaders exceeds the number of village sections, and each section is represented by at least one leader (succession again in the patriline). There are six co-leaders in total. In Fungor, however, one 'leader' (of appropriate patrician section) must be an infant. This baby attends all talmara functions—being carried or placed on a donkey until old enough to walk. This youth serves as a marker, whose maturity and advance to kadundor is an indicator of the appropriate time for another talmara force to succeed. Shortly after this youth is initiated to the timbra, the existing talmara force is retired and another talmara comes into being, with this young man as one of its adult leaders. Another infant male of his patrician section also becomes a leader at this time, and the eighteen-year talmara tenure period begins.

In all villages, the talmara leader (s) and assistants make decisions about talmara actions, mobilise the membership for

these actions and direct sanctions against members who have not participated in the talmara chores. This is not an easy or popular task. No glory or praise songs accrue to talmara activities, and they are generally regarded as onerous. The talmara must weed the fields of the rain priests and the peace priest, and must frequently run errands for the latter. Today this involves various courier assignments, including messages to the nearest police post, about forty miles away, the summoning of persons to the public moot of the peace priest, and the enforcement of decisions of the moot. Thev must also meet nomadic Arabs to turn them and their herds away from Nuba water sources in very dry years—not a popular assignment and a constant source of friction between the sedentary Southeastern Nuba and the nomadic Baggara Arabs. And they must decide upon and execute various punishments to recalcitrant priests and ritual specialists should failure occur in the sphere of activity over which these specialists and priests bear responsibility.

None of this activity is rewarded, and it takes determined and strong leaders to decide upon action and mobilise the force for these assignments. Talmara who do not participate may have their granaries invaded by the membership, the grain so acquired being distributed to members after it has been made into beer by the wives of the talmara leaders. This ‘fine’ levied on recalcitrant members who do not have acceptable excuses for their lack of participation is heavy, being many times the worth of the labour required in the talmara activities.

The talmara must never take prepared food, however, in any of their requisitioning actions, and there are important sanctions (accompanied by a series of symbolic equations) which specify persons who may command cooked or prepared food.[26]

*** Relations between sets, internal set solidarity, relative age behaviour

Specific relationships exist between adjacent and alternate sets. It has been pointed out above that those running errands and keeping the isolated

timbrd initiates company are members of the adjacent younger set, i.e., Ider patera. This aid is symbolic of the close relationships which exist between adjacent sets who will remain sources of support to each other throughout life. To a lesser extent, close relationships exist between alternate sets—a member of an older alternate set is, for example, considered best to help bind on one's timbrd bracelet, for then it is less likely to come loose. And older sets, adjacent and alternate, have authority, can scold, give unwanted advice, and criticise. Younger sets must accept this, however onerous it may become.[27]

Internal set solidarity is based first on the common experience of age, reinforced by many factors. By the time boys are herding cattle, their constant companions will be age-set mates from the same village section. Patrician sections are localised and boys are cautioned not to cross village section boundaries until they are kadunddr—save on the sanctioned occasions such as a bakabak or patera wrestling match. Thus age and sex are visible in most group activity of young people until after their timbrd initiation when they begin to participate in matriclan rituals (matriclans are dispersed) and in other non-kin organisations and societies[28] in which both adult men and women are involved.

There is age-set cooperation in herding, as mentioned. But when a young man begins bride-service—which involves considerable work time in weeding and hut building— villagesection age-set help is essential. Cooperative age-set work teams take care of each other's bride-service obligations in turn. A man's reputation vis-a-vis his affines rests to a large extent on his abilities to mobilise his village-section age-set mates when required. Indications of unsuccessful bride-service can result in rejection of a young man as a suitable mate. As relative age demands respect, there is little redress a young man has should a future father-in-law reject him.

Age-set solidarity for adults is, of course, basically manifest in the fact that the men of a group are recruited and retired together—they enter and leave the talmara together, for example. And finally, on a death, the drummers sing the praise songs of the deceased and his age-set mates, and

such age-set mates are obliged to prance, utter challenges, and otherwise express their mourning loudly and publicly.

The very great degree of respect tended elders by younger men can be seen first in the fact that any older person can object to a fight (timbra} and the younger combatants must accede to his objection, however poor his reason may appear—i. e., however remote the links may be that he traces between himself and the two combatants or simply those that he perceives between the two fighters.

The respect involved in relative age distinctions can also be seen in any formal interaction setting, such as a ritual or a public moot. Here, any younger speaker should not directly address an elder—he should address indirectly the person the statement is intended for, by making his comments to another attending elder, preferably a kinsman. In fact, this caused me initial grief, as my familiarity with the language did not allow me to see at first that most statements in moots and rituals were actually directed to persons other than those to whom they were in fact addressed. In all decision-making situations, relative age distinctions always dictate authority where it is not otherwise specified.

Youths must not eat from the same container as their elders (members of other grades), nor sit on the same sleeping racks.[29] In greetings, a younger person always initiates the action and extends his arm so the elder may touch the top of the wrist or the extended hand. Only age mates shake hands, and a younger’s hand must be placed beneath an cider’s in the hand-touching greeting. This is perhaps one of the most concrete manifestations of the superordinate-subordinate character of relative age behaviour.

*** Conclusions

The age organisation of the Southeastern Nuba has been described in brief. It differs from the better-documented age organisations of East Africa[30] basically in that Southeastern Nuba personnel move through a fixed linear structure, as opposed to a peer group (set) ‘revolving’ in a cyclical structure

(cf. Karimojong, Jie, Turkana, Kikuyu). Although the Fungor talmara structural variation initially looks similar to the ‘generation set’ described for the Karimojong[31] and others of East Africa, it should be clear the similarity is spurious. Without knowledge of the history of the wider social structure of the Sudan, however, it might seem less so.

Enough detail has been presented to demonstrate that there are insufficient differences between the Kao-Nyaro and Fungor systems to derive a functional explanation of the differences in the talmara organisation. The absolute equivalence in formal age organisation and functional equivalence in talmara activities demands that explanation for the talmara recruitment and retirement differences be sought elsewhere. This illustrates in these circumstances the poverty of explanation of a synchronic comparative approach.

Even in this limited aspect of the age organisation of an isolated tribal society it can be seen that colonial history is a necessary and sufficient factor in explanation. How much more critical should be historical materialism, then, for causal questions in wider African settings. We must, as Thompson says,

... look at history as history—men placed in actual contexts which they have not chosen, and confronted by indivertible forces, with an overwhelming immediacy of relations and duties and with only a scanty opportunity for inserting their own agency...[32]

POSTSCRIPT

Since this paper was written I have received information from Prof. P. M. Holt on a recent summary translation of the unpublished Kitab sa‘ adat al-mustahdi bi sirat al-Imam al-Mahdi (Isma‘il b. ‘Abd al-Qadir) prepared by Dr. Haim Shaked as a thesis in the University of London, 1969. This hagiographical account contains references to Rashid Ayman’s advance on Gedir in 1881:

On reaching Jabal Funqur, Rashid warned the inhabitants not to inform the Mahdi of his march, hoping, thereby, to take the Mahdi by surprise (Shaked, p. 128).

It continues:

When the Mahdi heard that the people of Jabal Funqur, which is two days from Qadir, had aided Rashid with transport animals, provisions, and some fighting men, he set out with all his companions, to raid them. After the Mahdi’s arrival at Jabal Funqur, its people wanted to fight him, but God cast fear in their hearts and they requested the Mahdi’s aman, which he granted them. In accordance with his noble practice he pardoned them and returned without a battle (Shaked, p. 131).

I have noted the oral tradition that the people of Kao and Nyaro did in fact on occasion notify the Mahdi of advancing Government troops with signal fires, and the new information above corroborates the general tradition that Fungor was, for its treachery, on at least two occasions the focus of the wrath of the Mahdi.

** II. The Politics of Rain Control Among the Uduk

Wendy James

Professor Evans-Pritchard’s earliest fieldwork was in the southern Funj region in 1926–7; and in his reports many questions are raised which have not yet been given the attention they deserve. For example, he records in several parts of the region the importance attached to rounded stones, symbolic objects which have been noted in various parts of the Sudan,[33] especially in connection with rain. Unluckily, Professor Evans-Pritchard became ill and

was unable to complete his investigations. However, even after the short time he had available for enquiries among the Uduk, he writes:

My single note on their customs consists of a reference to rain-making. I was told that the rain-maker keeps rainstones in a bag and that when he wants rain he makes a hole in the ground and places the stones in it and pours water over them. The stones are then washed and the blood of a sacrificed ox is added to the water. When rain is no longer desired the stones arc covered over in the hole with earth...[34]

It has been my privilege to carry out fieldwork recently in the southern Funj region, particularly among the Uduk-speaking people,[35] and to take up some of the ethnographic problems first posed by Professor Evans-Pritchard. My debt to him is even greater in that he has been my teacher for many years, and it was partly through him that I was drawn in contact with the peoples of the Sudan, at first through the literature and later personally. This essay will deal with some aspects of the significance of attempts to control the weather in Uduk society, of the sort indicated in the quotation above.

In the Kurmuk District live some 10,000 people who speak the Uduk language,[36] mainly in scattered hamlets on the three Khors Ahmar, Tombak and Yabus. They rely largely on the hoe cultivation of dura (sorghum), maize and sesame for subsistence, although some livestock is kept (cattle, goats, chickens and pigs). They conceive of their own social organisation in terms of incorporation by blood into matrilineal clans (wak”), but this tic is complemented by important reciprocal obligations between a person and his father, and father’s clan. The named matrilineal clans arc widely scattered, but within them are exogamous units (also teak’ we may call subclans, which usually form the core of local residential groups. The subclan is a joint cultivating, herding and consuming unit, and is jointly responsible for debts incurred by its members. It is in theory the unit for blood-vengeance.

There is no formal political ascendancy of clans in Uduk society; nor are there formalised positions of leadership, apart from the Omda, sheikhs, officials of the Chali Church (started by the Sudan Interior Mission) and local

council representatives, whose authority is derived from outside “traditional” Uduk society. The Uduk area, in regional terms, is a political vacuum: in the context of several local religious cults the Uduk are politically tributary to the Jum Jum and Meban, their northern and western neighbours; in relation to wider questions such as administration and national politics, the villagers on the whole accept the leadership of local merchants and the officials mentioned above. Struggles for influence and ascendancy within Uduk village society take place on a small scale, and are rarely of more than local significance.

However, it is within the context of local political struggles that the main significance of rain-control ritual can be seen. Control over the weather, not only to bring rain necessary to produce the crops, but also to use storms and the threat of damage to lives and property as a means of commanding tribute, co-operation, and the payment of bad debts, is a component of most forms of power as conceived in Uduk thought. It would be misleading to take Uduk rain rites and beliefs and analyse them as a formal system, apart from the way they are actually used in the context of social action. To perform a rain ritual is not simply to carry out a naive “symbolic” act which is supposed to have instrumental efficacy; it is to make a calculated move in a very real game of social and political manoeuvre. That moves in the local power game are often of a “symbolic” character should require no special explanation, as symbolic action is bound up with politics everywhere. Politics is played not only with such obvious symbols as flags, banquets and cricket matches, which may be opposed in the mind to the reality that they symbolise; but also with symbols which are themselves a reality, a means of social articulation and political control. Currency is such a symbol, the circulation of money and financial policy being in themselves the stuff of politics. The hard cash in one’s pocket is of value, but only in relation to the economic and political creditworthiness of one’s country, the nature of which may affect what can be done with one’s money. On a larger scale, financial manipulation may build up or destroy political power. Control over the rain is one of the main idioms through which power relations are worked out in Uduk society; and although rainstones, the main medium of such control, may not be compared with currency directly, their manipulation might be seen as analogous to the higher levels of financial politics. This is certainly not a field of “mere” symbolism, but of real political competition and the building up and destruction of credit.

It would be valuable to know why political symbolism draws so heavily on rain control among the Uduk; but I do not have sufficient historical information to answer this question. This essay attempts to explain how the symbolism of weather control is used today in the southern Funj, particularly within Uduk society, and falls into three parts. Firstly, I consider ecological conditions in relation to the Uduk conception of the nature of rainfall; secondly, I show in general terms how the symbolism of rain-control enters into social and political relations; and thirdly, some case-situations are examined.

*** I

Geographical and climatic conditions in the southern Funj may certainly be described as marginal for peasant cultivators. The Kurmuk District receives, on average, about 1000 mm. rain each year in the south-east, decreasing to about 800 mm. in the north-west.[37] With the decrease goes increasing irregularity of the showers. Most of the rain falls between mid-May and mid-November, and is brought by south-easterly winds, which having deposited most of their rainfall on the Ethiopian Highlands, have little left by the time they reach this “rain shadow” area. In the villages of the western Kurmuk District, one often waits in bright sunshine for the first few showers to cool the scorched earth, while day after day there are dark clouds and heavy precipitation over the hills to the east.

The Uduk annual cycle is of five seasons, based on the pattern of agricultural work related to the three main crops, dura, maize and sesame. Dura and maize are of approximately equal importance as food grains, and each has different essential rain requirements: maize needs regular showers in the early part of the rainy season (May-July); and dura can survive with less regular showers during the middle, and later, rainy season. Although it often happens that one crop or the other does badly, it is only rarely that both fail. Sesame, which is a subsidiary crop, is used for transactions rather than direct consumption and may be used to purchase food grains if necessary. Although there are various risks to the crops (such as insects, birds, flocks of the nomads who pass through the area, and even village livestock), the

shortage or excess of rainfall, its maldistribution, or associated floods are the greatest single worry of the Uduk farmer. Famine conditions are never very far away.

Rain showers are not only irregular in terms of frequency, they are often highly localised and geographically erratic. The region is a fairly uniform plain, drained by wide valleys opening to the west into the White Nile swamps; but there are scattered hills, outliers of the Ethiopian Highlands, rising to five hundred and sometimes a thousand feet above the general level of the plain. This pattern of relief obviously makes for localised showers in the vicinity of the hills. Indeed, the hills are often capped with cloud in the rainy season, and showers seem to spread from them. It is therefore not surprising that rain showers are usually associated with particular hills; and this association becomes significant when it is realised that hamlets, too, are often grouped around hills. One can, under these conditions, sympathise with a farmer whose fields remain dry, in spite of the fact that rain has been visibly falling over several neighbouring hills.

A final characteristic of rain in this region, as indeed in much of the Sudan, is that it very rarely falls in a mild and continuous form. Most of it comes in short, intense downpours, and is often accompanied by wind, thunder and lightning. Such storms are not only dramatic and rather unpleasant; they may cause a good deal of damage. Crops may be battered, trees or huts may be struck by lightning or blown over, and people may be hurt and even killed. Thus, although rain is beneficial and life-giving, it cannot be dissociated from potential danger and destruction. By the very nature of local meteorological conditions, farmers are bound to have a highly ambivalent attitude to the rain.

The Uduk word asho’k, which in some contexts appears to be the equivalent of the English word “rain”, can be fully appreciated only in relation to the local climatic conditions. It has a broader range of reference than “rain”, for which there is no exact translation. Its focus is upon the atmospheric disturbance behind the weather which produces rain, rather than upon the falling water itself. The word can be used equally of heavy clouds, winds, whirlwinds, thunder and lightning, and falling rain. Asho’k manifests itself in all these forms, and is therefore

perhaps best rendered by an insubstantial word such as “turbulence” or “storminess”.[38] The concepts of thundering, rain, and so forth are commonly expressed in the Uduk tongue by using the “abstract” noun asho’k with a variety of verbs. Thus, one says asho’k doro’d (the “storm” is beating, or thundering), asho’k mi’da war (the “storm” is making lightning), asho’k hethe’d (the “storm” is raining) or asho’k eke’dayide^ the “storm” is pouring out water; the same verb, ek, can be used with noise, to suggest loudness). At the heart of the turbulence named asho’k, there is sometimes said to be a ball of fire, an idea which makes sense of the action of lightning, and of the way in which dry winds can apparently set huts on fire. In the dry season, and during occasional dry periods in the rainy season, asho’k is said to go into a hole underground. However, it can be active in the drv months, when it causes strong winds and dust devils, o

Iii Uduk thought, disturbed weather is not part of a blind and uncontrollable nature. Turbulence in the atmosphere, so often the home of spiritual powers, is thought to be influenced by the activity of spiritually potent men. I think the Uduk see the interplay of human passions, especially the anger of powerful men, being worked out in the winds and violent clashes of the upper air. This human element in the atmospheric struggle, of which rain is a by-product, is understood in the Uduk word asho[,]k. Whenever a shower or storm is mentioned, it is never inappropriate to ask, “Whose rain? Whose storm?” (oy^o’Z; maja?) The answer may be, “I don’t know”, or “Probably God’s rain” (asho’k ma rum); but as often as not an individual, or a group of people, will be named as a possible source. I have seen men furiously shouting directly up at the heavens in a downpour, urging their own rainstones to ward off the danger from those of their adversaries.

*** II

Control over the weather is one of the commonest forms which power in Uduk society is thought to take. Most influential people, even though they

are not primarily responsible for the rain, have nevertheless a certain effect on it, which may be beneficial or harmful. Diviners fari) for example, possess small stones which they wash and anoint in various curative rituals, and this incidentally encourages the rain. The anger or ill-will of any ritual specialists can inhibit the rain. The tribute and respect paid to Meban religious leaders is rationalised in terms of the need to please them to avoid the danger of drought. When missionaries began work at Chali, they were suspected of trying to prevent the rain from falling.[39] He who controls the rain, possesses a double-edged power to bless or to curse; and this quality, derived from the nature of rainfall itself, makes it a particularly suitable idiom for the symbolic expression of political power, also ambivalent in character.

Although there are various sources of power over the weather, the commonest is through the possession of rainstones. This means of control is indeed said throughout the region to be typically Uduk; rainstones are one of the few ideas which the Uduk have exported to other peoples, for example, on a small scale to the Meban. The stones are known as wosha sho’k (stones of the “storm”), or simply as asho’k. The stones are kept in collections, which may number anything from two upwards. I have not heard of any stone being kept singly. They must be rounded, river-worn pebbles. Bright colours and translucent clarity are admired, and many of the stones I have seen appear to be quartz. Stones like this do not occur naturally in the Uduk area, but are acquired by various means from people living in the Ethiopian foothills, or near the Blue Nile. Stones do not, of course, “work” automatically as soon as acquired; new stones have to be consecrated by sacrifice before they are thought to have any potency. Ideal stones should be at least an inch and a half long, I would guess; but the bigger the better. They should feel cool to the touch, as “there is water inside”. Individual stones are classified according to colour, the commonest being white and red. Black stones may be included in a collection, but may fall into another category, that of the koykoro] agricultural ritual, aimed at bird and insect control. Their use in this capacity has the incidental effect of encouraging gentle rain. Otherwise, there does not seem to be a clear division of labour according to the colour of the stones. They are also, however, classified according to sex: the elongated, egg-shaped stones are male, and the spherical ones female (I have even heard of stones described as pregnant, or as little children). The female stones, in particular, are said to

bring steady, gentle rain, and the males to cause dangerous storms. Each collection should include both.

Rainstones are effective only in relation to the symbolic treatment they arc given. If a man neglects rainstones he is entrusted with, he may become sick. An important part of the treatment accorded rainstones takes the form of animals contributed for sacrifice, and the wider the area from which the contributions arc made, the more effective the stones arc expected to be. It is said that the stones must be “fed” on the blood of such sacrifices. In the past, according to general opinion, there were only a few sets of stones in the country, and because each set was fed by people bringing animals from miles around, there was plenty of rain. Whereas

today, the former large collections of stones have been broken up through quarrelling and rivalry, and each small group of stones is fed only from a small area, and that is why the rains are so poor these days. Today, certainly, stones are kept in many small hamlets, and few collections are thought to be widely effective.

Rights over rainstones are normally vested within a matrilineal subclan, and one or two people within the subclan are responsible for administering them. The stones may sometimes be referred to by the clan name of their owners. Some collections have a relatively long history, and special names. The ideal rule is for a man to pass on the stones to one of his sister’s sons, so that they continue to be administered from within the clan of their owners. Very often, however, a man will pass them on to his own son, which can lead to complex situations. The stones remain the property of their original owners, however, and should eventually be returned to them.

The normal sequence of treatment for the rainstones throughout the year is as follows. At the beginning of the dry season, each collection of stones is “tied” by its owner. This is usually done by burying the stones in a hole with special substances, but sometimes stones are tied by putting one of them in an antelope horn filled with water, which is stopped up with mud and wood ash. The horn is then kept under the eaves of the hut for the dry season, and

the stone stays there in the water. The stones should be quiescent during the dry season.

The first rains that fall after the dry season, before any stones have been brought out, are known as asho’k arum (the rain of God). It is only later, when the planting of maize has begun and occasional showers become vital to the growing crop, that the rainstone man will “untie” his stones, usually by digging them up, washing them, perhaps sacrificing a chicken and touching them with its blood, and finally anointing them with a little oil. The stones will then be exposed overnight. Rain will be expected within two or three days. During the rainy season, the stones are normally kept in a shallow hole in the ground, covered with a shard. The minimal treatment, if rain is to be encouraged, is to wash and expose them. The maximum treatment, when rain is desperately needed, is to make beer and sacrifice animals; black animals are required for this purpose.[40] Any special event, such as the moving of the stones from one place to another, may be marked by a special beer party.

As the rainy season progresses, a little of each new crop that ripens is dedicated to the rainstones (for example, maize, beans, squash, sesame). Wild leafy plants used as food (mainly in sauces) are also “fed” to the stones when they first appear in the early rains. This action of dedicating new foods to the stones is thought in itself to encourage rainfall. It is explained in terms of acknowledging the part played by the rain in producing crops which feed people; because the stones bring the rain and the rain brings the crops which we eat, we should therefore give some of the crops back to the stones. At harvest time, beer is sometimes made for the stones, to express the same notion of thanksgiving.

In the heart of the rainy season, when the maize has already ripened and the dura is coming on nicely, and when there is no great anxiety about the rain, the stones do not receive much attention. The rain falls as the rain of people in general, the cumulative effect of everybody’s efforts. The early rains, when the crops are sprouting, is the time when the greatest anxiety is shown and the stones receive the most careful attention. At this time of year each darkening cloud on the horizon may be discussed and watched, and the source of each shower may be a subject of speculation.

If the rainy season proceeds smoothly, and everyone is satisfied with the progress of his crops, there is little cause or excuse for social tension. But this rarely happens. Two main problems arise from the weather which may cause great suffering: that of drought, in spite of normal measures taken to ensure rainfall; and that of the damage done by violent storms. In both cases, a full explanation has a social component. Drought is a major political matter, while storms affect local subclan relations. I will deal with each in turn.

When rain fails to appear, after rites have been carried out in one's own hamlet to release the power of the local stones, the commonest interpretation is that the more powerful stones of a nearby village have not yet been brought out of the ground. As time goes on and there is still no rain, complaints against the owner of these powerful stones will increase; when perhaps he lets it be known that his stones require sacrifices, people will bring animals from neighbouring hamlets. The owner, who may be thought to be angry for some reason, and to need placating, will go on extracting tribute in this way, until rain falls; or until his political credit collapses. At this point, the blame for the drought is likely to be placed farther afield, at the door of some powerful religious leader, and the same pattern will be repeated, whereby he will be placated with tributes until the rain comes, a sign that he is at last satisfied; or until his credit also collapses. The blame may then be transferred right outside Uduk society, perhaps to Meban religious leaders. Such leaders may drop timely hints that they are indeed responsible for the drought, and on the strength of this claim, will extract what material homage they can from as wide an area as possible. For example, 1966 was a rather dry year, and the reason was generally thought to be the anger of the Meban spiritual leaders, over the murder in 1965 of a senior Uduk member of a religious cult controlled by them (people of the spirit of Leina). He had been killed by an Uduk, and on the strength of this situation, special tribute was demanded by the Meban leaders from the whole Uduk area, for the following two years. The leaders of this cult take advantage of whatever opportunity presents itself for extracting material support from the Uduk, and even if the murder had not taken place, some other reason would probably have been found for turning the dry year of 1966 to their political advantage. The failure of the rains, therefore, creates a situation in which the political credit of accepted leaders is put to the test. At

the beginning of a drought, the struggle is between local leaders, at hamlet and neighbourhood level; and as the drought continues, the struggle grows in scale and is eventually removed from the hands of local people altogether.

Sometimes, in the course of this process, the political credit of a particular leader collapses so completely that people turn against him. They may blame him personally for causing the drought through his own ill-will; he may be labelled a witch, and killed. This rarely happens because of drought alone, but in conjunction with other accusations of witchcraft, and of causing illness and death. It may however happen primaiily because of drought; I have an example of an Uduk rainstone man being murdered by Meban, in the last generation (at Beni Mayu), for causing drought. This perhaps suggests that at that time the Uduk were more powerful in relation to the Meban than they are today.

William Danga describes the way in which witches (dhathu can prevent the rain from falling, in the following passage. It should be remembered that anyone may be described as a witch, if opinion turns against him sufficiently.

Some people can... ride on the rain, to stop the rain from falling. The clouds gather, and the rain is about to fall, and some witches ride inside to divide the clouds and clear the sky. The rain refuses to fall. They can do that. They beat it, to stop it from falling... with a whip, yes, ciw, ciw, ciw..., to clear away all the rainclouds.

Witches may also be held responsible for excessive rain when it is not needed, indeed harmful, for example at the time of dura-harvest, when all the rainstones have been “tied” and placed in the ground.

Whereas prolonged drought tends to affect a wide area, and therefore to pose large-scale political problems, damage caused by violent storms tends to be local and specific. This type of misfortune, which usually affects individuals or at the most individual hamlets, is thought to arise from bad relations between subclans. In particular, it is thought that grumbling about

an overdue debt will cause the subclan’s rainstones to become aggressive and strike the property of the debtor’s subclan with storm damage, or perhaps hurt or kill one of its members. There is a double advantage in having rainstones, for if there is a storm overhead, by exposing the male stones you can ward off the potential danger; or your male stones can be aggressive on your behalf against your debtors. The debt then has to be settled. It is in this sphere of the claiming and payment of debts that the subclan emerges clearly as a corporate economic unit; all members may be required equally to contribute towards a debt payment, which becomes the joint property of members of the receiving subclan. Requests for help towards the payment of such a debt may not be made to outsiders (for example, patrilateral kinsmen). The debts in question are usually straightforward ones of wealth or property. The principles involved are clear in the following-brief example. The house of a merchant in Uduk country burnt down for no apparent reason, and he moved to Meban country. His house there also burnt down. People asked him, why don’t you go to nfeki? An Uduk diviner commented to me, “If he came to us, we would be able to tell him the reason: he has swindled and cheated people for so long that he owes them a lot of money, and now people are angry, and their rainstones have sent the wind to burn his house.”

To possess rainstones, then, is an insurance against being cheated, and against bad debts. It means that wealth may be collected in from debtors, if the debts are grumbled about sufficiently to arouse the rainstones to threaten the debtors. They are not thought to be active in this way unless their owners are grumbling. I asked a minor rainstone owner if he had collected in many goats through his stones; and he laughed in reply, saying that he had collected nothing, as he never grumbled about other people. Storm damage is therefore a sign of discontent and hostility.

In practice, the sequence of events is on the following lines. Some damage is caused, and those who suffered it consult a diviner (usually one of the numerous rjari, but there are other oracular specialists). After making the necessary oracular enquiries (usually by examining the pattern made in a gourd of water by burning ebony sticks over it: the method is commonly used for diagnosing illness), the diviner suggests or hints at the particular debt which lies behind the damage. His verdict obviously depends partly on his knowledge of local gossip, and current

complaints against the subclan in question. It may not, of course, be a disinterested opinion.

However, his clients are obliged to open negotiations with the creditors who are the supposed source of trouble. Ceremonies are held, at the first hamlet to remove the danger of further damage, and at the creditors' hamlet, when the required wealth is handed over and relations are healed by a sacrifice.

These transactions rarely take place in isolation. They often form only part of a continuing series of similar payments between one subclan and another over a period of years, signifying a continuing relation of tension. There is no permanent domination of some subclans by others in this sphere; the pattern between subclans is one of overlapping dyadic relations, one subclan being a debtor to a second but a creditor to a third. Nevertheless this is a field in which people may, and do, strive to further the interests of their own subclan, and in which particular subclans may achieve temporary political success. Before this can be fully appreciated, I must explain something of the significance of inter-subclan debts.

There are two main ways in which debts can arise. The first is through the loss or death of animals, for which the owner holds someone else responsible. This situation may occur through the common custom of lending goats or cows to be herded together with those of another subclan, in order to re-inforce a relation of friendship and alliance. The second subclan may neglect or lose the animals, or may kill them for private use. Or, a man may become angry at the incursions of his neighbours' animals into his fields, and kill them. There arc numerous incidents of this sort, which may be generously forgotten, or may later be used to press a claim.

The second source of debt claims is the professional activity of diviners and men of God in healing illness. If a patient dies, no fees are payable to the specialist; but if he recovers, a substantial payment is often required, and is usually made at a special beer-party some months later, when the specialist shaves the head of the patient to show that he is free of his obligations. Until the day of that ceremony, which is itself known as the beer of shaving the head (asum 'thi 'kufA, the patient should leave his hair to grow.

The long hair is a sign of the unpaid debt. The Uduk word for debt, amure, is closely linked with this concept of hair (amur}; and both grow with time. Sometimes these debts are not paid for years, for it may be necessary to plant extra crops in order to be able to afford

to pay up; and if there is a series of poor years, very few debts will be paid immediately. In a small hamlet at any given time, there are likely to be several unpaid debts of this kind, usually arising from the treatment of children’s illnesses, and thought to lie upon the mother and children equally. If the situation drags on for years, the specialist may die; or the patients may move out of the area. But the debts are unlikely to be forgotten by the relatives of the specialist; and eventually storm damage may be attributed to their dissatisfaction. Even if fees are handed over after recovery from an illness, storm damage may later suggest that the specialist did not feel he had received adequate payment.

Thus, there is a complex network of debt relationships between subclans, some of which may fade away with time, especially if they are between people who are friendly; but others, especially where there is already resentment and hostility, will be the subject of complaint until, after a storm threat, they are paid up. When repayment is made, it should be as generous as possible, in order that the creditors should be satisfied. In any case, it is not a question simply of replacing the original wealth due; the debt has grown with time, and one could say that it is the original sum plus interest which has to be paid. Uduk informants explain this in terms of the fact that if I give you one goat, it will give birth many times, and its children will also multiply, and you will eventually buy cows with its progeny. Moreover, the formal repayment of a debt includes the transfer of other categories of goods, such as spears, bangles, hoes, oil, and tobacco (though money has not, as yet, entered into these transactions). The symbolic, rather than purely commercial, character of the transfer is further reflected in the fact that a small counter-payment is made at the same time, the recipients providing at least a goat for sacrifice, and perhaps a chicken and other small presents for the former debtors to take home.

These transactions are quite frequent, most subclans being involved in one or two each year. They are moreover some of the most substantial transfers of wealth which take place between subclans, and are of importance in articulating economic and political relations. The reason for their relative importance lies partly in the restriction of alternative avenues for the pursuance of rivalries and hostilities between subclans under conditions of modern administration. Thus, there are inhibitions today on direct violence, feuding, witchcraft accusation and the killing of witches. I think it likely that there has been a related increase in the expression of hostility through complaints over debts. A further reason for the importance of debt claims in Uduk society, as compared with neighbouring communities, is the highly self-contained character of the subclan group, in economic and social terms. The most valuable asset of the subclan is its womenfolk, and rights over them are not transferable. Bridewealth is not paid.[41] The next most valuable wealth of a subclan is its cattle; and the herd of cattle may be increased only through the investment of surplus crops grown by the members of the subclan. There is no pattern of exchange transactions between Uduk partners whereby the “capital” of the group may be increased. When animals are transferred from one subclan to another, for example in direct payment for ritual services, or as presents from father to son, they should be consumed and not invested. They are essentially gifts, and it would be immoral to keep them to multiply, that is to treat them as capital for investment. The only major channel through which the subclan capital of animal stock may be added to, is the pursuance and collection of old debts. Animals transferred in payment of a debt, consequent upon a threat from the rainstones, may be treated as capital and kept to multiply.

It is only in relation to these restrictive rules of economic morality, which limit the means whereby livestock resources can be built up, that we can appreciate the importance attached by Uduk farmers to the possession of rainstones. They are not only an insurance against bad debts, but, used with political skill, one of the few means of increasing the subclan’s wealth while maintaining the fiction that a state of balance and equality is merely being restored. Of course, no subclan is able to become very wealthy through this means, as each debt claim tends to set off a reaction; the debtors look around for ways of regaining the animals they have had to pay out. and start complaining about debts owed to them.

The importance of the role of diviners in this situation can hardly be exaggerated. Even though a subclan possesses rainstones of some reputation, it is necessary to have sympathetic diagnoses from diviners before any claims can be made. Diviners have to make the crucial decision, in each case of storm damage, as to which debt is in question. Even though they may do their best to point out as creditors their fellow ritual specialists, oi' subclans friendly with their own, their position is politically very delicate: for it is the aggrieved party, and not the potential beneficiaries, who approach the diviner and pay for a diagnosis. The party who has suffered the damage will of course try to find a sympathetic diviner, who may indeed listen to their own suggestions as to the source of the damage; and they will certainly not approach a man who is likely to give a judgment greatly to their disadvantage. Efforts are often made to find an outside diviner, usually from some distant village, who will give an accurate and neutral opinion; Uduk villagers are always willing to try new forms cf divination introduced from outside, and non-Uduk diviners. This sometimes gives to outsiders considerable influence over internal Uduk politics.

These principles do not mean that a subclan without rainstones cannot become influential. But the paradigm which emerges, of an Uduk subclan attaining relative economic and political strength partly through the practice of ritual specialisms and the possession and manipulation of rainstones, is of some value in interpreting local political life.

*** III

In this section I present, partly in informants' own words, material relating to a situation in which the symbolism of rain control is significant, and which illustrates the general principles described above. The situation is one of continuing tension and rivalry between the Lake subclan based in Waka'cesh, in the Pam'Be area, and other subclans in the Chali area some five miles away. Ra'da administers rainstones on behalf of the Lake subclan in Waka'cesh. His people used to live in the Chali area, until about 1937.

William Danga, a brother of Ra'da (in the classificatory sense of belonging to the same subclan) gave the following account,[42] which after indicating the

work of rainstones in general, in the dry season and the rains, describes a personal experience of being struck by a rainstorm. He then goes on to explain the situation which lay behind the event.

In the dry season (moyurante) the rainstones remain in the hole. They are all tied up by people. There is no thunder, or lightning, in the dry season. But they stir up whirlwinds and come to strike those houses which have a debt upon them. Sometimes a wind comes whirling with fire inside, and sets a house alight. Or again, a house will just explode, and burn.
•

And in the eleventh month, November, people tie up their stones. They keep them all in their house (i. e. in holes in the ground). Inside holes. Some stones are tied by people and kept in the open, then tied with ‘kos wood, and some of the nest of the sisi bird is brought to tie them, together with the ’kos wood. This is to secure all the stones. Then they stay inside the hole, and nothing further happens. There is no lightning and no opportunity for them to thunder. And if they want to intervene because of outstanding debts, they just stir up a whirlwind and go to strike the house on which thev have a claim. It is from their z

owners. From the words of their owners, because they are continually grumbling, saying: ‘Why don’t those people arrange something for a head-shaving ceremony? Why don’t those people have a head-shaving?’ And people complain all the time like that, until the stones hear their words and go to do their work. Because of those complaining words of their owners. And off they go, just striking huts, puthul! puthul! puthul!— with mighty whirling wind, breaking the roof frame; if it wants, it will break the centre poles of all the huts, or it will lift off the whole roof with great might and throw it on the ground.

Then people must go to seek advice, saying, what is the explanation of this wind which lifted the roof and threw it on the ground ? And they will find someone who is a diviner (iiari) to divine by fire, and to explain

that a debt exists from such and such a place, and that is why the hut was lifted by the wind. That is why the wind struck the roof.

And they must brew beer, to invite those people (to their village) to treat them (put matters straight, ritually). Because of the hut which is struck by the wind, people will arrange ritual treatment. Because of that hut which is struck by wind.

And sometimes a wind will come to set a hut on fire all at once. It ignites the hut and the hut burns. And others come with tongues of fire, with great strength, and you will see, if the wind roars in great anger, sounding very loud and shaking the trees, waving them and bending them to the ground, that that is a wind which comes in search of something. It comes to claim a debt; that is why it seizes the trees and shakes them so much, and sounds so loud and strong and is about to make thunder like the rain. You will hear something roaring very loud from a whirlwind. It goes on, and on, to find the exact place it is looking for. It does its work, and burns the hut. Or if it doesn’t want it to burn, it will use its force, shake the hut, shake, shake, and knock down the corner-posts, the corner-posts inside the hut. Knocks them down. And again, the place may suddenly become quiet, and it goes; and a hut may burn for no reason at all. The hut burns from an explosion inside, although there is no fire in the hearth. It just explodes by itself; and the fire will never burn from the ground upwards, the fire will burn the top of the centre-pole. From inside the hut, the fire burns the centre-pole, and then cracks through to the outside, he! and people see it, and run to save the things inside the hut and take them away.

And those of the rainy season: yes, their owners sit complaining too. Grumble, grumble, grumble, and it begins to thunder (dor: the same word means to beat). It will beat a person; if it wants to kill him, it will beat him inside his hut. The person will be sitting there, and it beats him and throws him outside. It throws him outside with great force and then the hut burns. If a person is killed by it, the hut will not remain; it will cause the hut to burn because it has killed the person.

It was like that here too in the rains, a great storm came and it poured with rain. We were sitting at home. Ra’da was in his house, and Dukke (his wife) was absent. Ra’da ran to shelter with me in the hut there. There were three of us sitting there, with Bwaybonya (speaker’s wife). It was a furious storm, thundering, thundering, thundering, until the whole place was reddened. Water was flowing all over the ground, red as red (‘per mo ki piw). I was sitting on the bed like this, and it came and pushed me over; I fell on the ground, ‘de’k\ I got up again, and Ra’da shouted out, while my face was red all over, it really was fiery, red as red. Then I came outside, with Ra’da, to fight the storm. We beat it with long sticks, beat it with long sticks, and we shouted, went on shouting, shouting, shouting. We shouted until the rain had stopped. I was shivering like anything with cold (a sign that you have been struck by the storm)...

It happened because of a certain debt: it was something of Kabala’s (a brother now living on the Yabus). This man called Pak (another name of Kabala) lives over there, he is a child of Umpa who was treated (when young) in Chali. He was treated by a diviner in Chali there, treated for ako (sickness from the mother’s milk). Things were given; one goat at first that year, and a few other things were given perhaps. And later, because these things were insufficient, people complained. And still they are complaining, saying this is not enough, not enough, not enough. This thing took action on Nyale (a sister) first, in a drcam. It pushed her over too. And so they took goats, three goats and another which couldn’t walk; it was beaten by Ra’da with a stick, dug! dug! and then was unable to walk. So they left this goat on the road, and went on as far as Chali. Those people cut one goat (of their own) for them, to wash them with the blood. Then they explained that ‘One of the goats couldn’t come with us, perhaps because I beat it, and perhaps this goat will die. I don’t know if it will go home.’ They explained this and then they came home.

And the goat lived; it became three years old, and gave birth to little ones. People took the little ones, and used them for various purposes. Then those people (to whom the goat should have been paid) sat wagging their tongues, wagging their tongues like anything. Those people of Milla wagged their tongues, wag wag, like that. They kept on repeating the story of the goat, and then this thing happened, as a result. Then we took some goats: we took

that very same mother goat (to Chali), with two young ones, making three with her, and then we took that little This E (‘lost one’, name of a particular kid). We took the little one you called This E, we took it and added it to the others to make four. It was to stand instead of the required gourd of oil, because there was no oil. The oil was about to be squeezed, (but) we took this young female goat to take the place of the oil. To take the place of the oil. Then we went; and we asked their opinion (as to whether the payment was now complete). They gave us a chicken to cut, and bathed us with the rainstones (i.e. water from a gourd containing the stones). Ra’da gave them a dog-toothed spear, to cut the chicken with his spear. They kept this spear. These are the things we gave: four goats and one dog-toothed spear, on that day, to finish off the debt. We asked them: ‘Is there anything else? If so you just tell us.’ They said: ‘No! It’s finished, we suppose. It’s finished. You go, and watch carefully in case anything else happens. Something may happen, but it seems to us to be finished at last, completely.’ They said it was finished. That’s how it happened.

Those people are Lake (i.e. same general clan as ourselves). The man spoke like this: he said, ‘The rain acted, but recoiled at the same time. For we are related (to bungwar—have, or are of, a body)’. He said it was because we are related (abas, blood) that the rain stopped short of killing us. The rain is aware of these things, that there is a slight relationship. Because they are Lake like us.

That’s all.

The debt in question arose when Ra’da’s subclan was living in the Chali area, and from relating it to other events, I would place it in the early 1920s. As William Danga explains, one of their brothers (an elder half-brother of Ra’da) was treated for sickness by a diviner from another Lake subclan in Chali, now usually referred to as Milla’s people. The diviner concerned died before the “head-shaving” ceremony and the payment of fees was arranged; according to Lente, another brother, the amount due was not very great as the patient was a boy and not a girl—perhaps 2 goats and 5 bangles.

In the late 1930s, Ra'da's subclan was dispersed from the Chali area. This was the result of mounting suspicion of witchcraft, in connection with a local spread of smallpox cases. Most of the subclan moved to Pam'Be (their present site is about six miles west of Chali), and some members moved elsewhere. Kabala, the brother whose treatment had not been paid for, went to the Yabus area (about 25 miles south of Chali). Then, in 1965, the dream of Nyale was interpreted (I am not sure by whom) as being a consequence of the grumbling of Milla's people over this debt. But as William explains, one of the goats which should have been paid returned home, and they kept it and consumed some of its offspring. The storm described by William happened about October, 1966. They consulted two diviners, one of whom was Lente, and were satisfied with the explanation of the storm as resulting from the annoyance of Milla's people over the unpaid goat. William describes how four goats and a spear were handed over to finish off the debt; this took place, I think, in the summer of 1967.

But this was not the end of the story. In the middle of April, 1968, the roof thatch of another brother of Ra'da's, Moho, was blown away. Ra'da placed one of his stones on the roof to ward off further damage. There was some desultory discussion as to what diviner should be consulted, but only through the pressure of the womenfolk did the men get round to making any consultations. Lente, himself a diviner, kept voicing his own opinion that the damage was caused by some of their own rainstones, which had been passed on to a son's son, and were signifying their desire to return home, from where they were being kept in Chali. (I shall return to this situation later.) However, Moho eventually went to a local diviner, of a subclan allied to their own, who suggested that the trouble was from the same source, the stones of Milla. His brothers were not very satisfied with this opinion, especially Lente; and they persuaded him to consult a famous specialist, Jida, from the Ahmar valley, through whom a Meban spirit gave oracular advice, in order to get the truth. Lente was hoping, I am sure, to get a verdict favourable to them, which would enable them to secure the return of their rainstones from Chali. When Jida arrived in the district, on other business, and when with some difficulty Moho had been granted a consultation, on May 2nd (at a cost of 50 piastres), the local diviner's diagnosis was confirmed. The spirit informed Moho that the people of Milla were still not satisfied with the settlement; and the main reason was that Kabala himself, who was originally responsible for the debt, had been absent from the reconciliation and had not contributed to the previous transactions. He must

therefore appear in person, and partake in the ritual to settle the affair. Details were given as to the payment that had to be made, and as to Kabala's own contribution. Beer was to be made by Moho for the people of Milla, and they were to have a sacrifice for his people, after the payments were received.

So a few days later, two of the younger brothers of Ra'da went off to the Yabus, to fetch Kabala. He arrived, and on May 9th beer was ready at Moho's. A number of men from Milla's subclan came, and also one of their sons, who was actually looking after their rainstones on their behalf. I cannot describe the proceedings in detail here; but briefly, the visitors made a show of patching up the damaged roof, discussed the whole situation with Moho after diviners from both parties had jointly consulted the ebony fire oracle, and then a small chicken sacrifice was held to "reconcile" the stones with the people of Moho. They were finally anointed with burnt sesame and oil, a rich black mixture thought to be a protection from the rain. Further, less formal discussion, took place when the ritual was completed, and quite soon the visitors left.

The next day all the local householders (married men, and those of their mothers or divorced sisters with huts of theii' own) of Ra'da's subclan, with Kabala, left for Milla's hamlet near Ghali. They took with them two goats, five ordinary spears, one toothed spear, one hoe blade, twenty arrows, and two loaves of tobacco. A further ritual, of the sacrifice of a goat, was held for them; and special attention was paid to Kabala himself. The hosts seemed satisfied with the amount of goods handed over.

However, Kabala himself did not actually bring any contribution from his home; all the goods were provided by his relatives in Waka'cesh. I asked if this meant that the stones of Milla could strike again, as the oracular instructions had not been carried out exactly; and Moho and his brothers agreed that it could happen, but was unlikely.

The reaction of Lente to this series of imposed payments to the Chali group had clearly been increasingly hostile, although he was obliged to accept the position. But, as I suggested above, he lost no opportunity for airing his own

views on the possibility of his own subclan's stones in Chali expressing through wind and turbulence their desire to return home. He even represented this to me as being the diagnosis of the first diviner who had been consulted, although Moho, who actually made the consultation, did not mention it. Later, I heard Lente telling the Chali people, in the informal discussion at Moho's place, that Jida's spirit had given this as a partial reason for the damage. I am sure that this was a fabrication on Lente's part. The previous day, among ourselves, he had expressed his grievances over the whole relationship with people in the Chali area. I must briefly summarise the issue of Ra'da's rainstones. They were acquired from a Berta man killed in fighting, probably about the end of the nineteenth century, by a man of the Lake subclan now based in Waka'cesh. He married a woman of the Woshakwaye subclan in Chali, and gave the stones to his son, Nyarjgal, who took them to his subclan village when his father and father's brothers died. Later, he passed on the stones to his own son, Tumko. Later, Tumko and his sister decided they woxdd return the stones to the Lakes, and handed them over to Ra'da and his brother Shayib (now living some distance away on the Ahmar). Later, Tumko's house was seriously threatened by a storm. According to Lente, he was afraid that this was a sign of a debt his father's people the Woshakwaye, with whom he was still living, owed to the Lakes. This was a debt of four goats which had been killed for trespassing, in the 1930s when Ra'da's people were living in Chali. So he apparently came to Waka'cesh and removed some of the stones, to prevent further damage. He may have done this with the connivance of Ra'da, to Lente's annoyance. Lente was complaining against the Woshakwayc, therefore, on two counts: because their son had taken charge of the Lake rainstones, and because of the original debt. I will quote his own words on that situation:

And there is something else in that village. A debt exists among them there... A debt remains, a debt of our goats remains with them. They killed four goats. Up to now they haven't given them back to us... He! They killed the goats when we were living in Chali there.

Lente extended his complaints over the Woshakwaye, and their son Turnko, to the whole complex of subclans in the Chali area, many of whom are linked closely in various ways, and in particular brought togethei' his resentment of the Lake subclan of Milla and the Woshakwaye. He said (and here I quote only roughly from notes):

If those people of Milla insist tomorrow on taking a lot from us, all right: we will give them a cow. Let them have a cow. And we will remind them that there are some people in Chali, the Woshakwaye, who are in debt to us... If we have to pay a lot to Milla we shall ask for our own debts too... A few years ago our stones disturbed the Woshakwaye people, because we were grumbling about them here. Tumko took some stones away; Ra'da gave them to him. I wouldn't have done that.

If the Woshakwaye don't give us our goats back, we shall demand a cow.

This kind of talk is the "grumbling" which is thought to activate the rainstones, and which in practice is well-known to the diviners who have to diagnose storm damage.

The pattern which emerges from the material quoted is one of mutual hostility between the subclan of Ra'da and various others in Chali; this hostility appears to be channelled through claims and counterclaims over rainstones and debt, and through the diagnoses of diviners. The tension almost certainly is to be explained in relation to the witchcraft suspicions which focussed on this particular subclan in Chali in the 1930s and caused them to flee elsewhere; and also in relation to the wider pattern of rivalry and opposition between the areas of Chali and Pam'Be.

In the same material may be seen other, small scale tensions characteristic of Uduk society. Firstly, the resentment arising between brothers of the same subclan in connection with this debt is marked: Lente voices his disapproval of Ra'da's weak action in letting Tumko remove some of the rainstones which are properly theirs; and a good deal of resentment was expressed over the fact that Kabala, generally regarded as irresponsible, was at the root of the trouble and didn't make any contribution to the payment. The Yabus area where he lived is rich land for tobacco-growing; and Lente asked him where was the tobacco he'd brought? Or did he still spend all his time drinking beer?

A second typical source of tension arises from the conflict between a man's relation to his sisters' sons i his "legal heirs", and to his own sons, with whom he has a strong personal bond. This tension is related to that between subclan brothers: for a man helps his own sons, let us say by lending them his subclan rainstones, at the expense not only of their crosscousins but at that of his own brothers. Each brother would like to use subclan property, such as animals or rainstones, to strengthen his relationship with his own sons; and if one does so, he deprives his brothers of the same advantage. Very often, rainstones may be lent temporarily by a man to his son, and as long as the father lives, little may be said. But if the father dies, and the son keeps the stones, his father's subclan will begin to resent the situation. In the case described above, the son of a member of Ra'da's subclan in this situation not only kept the stones of his father's people but passed them on to his own son. The latter was administering them on behalf o

of his father's people, the Woshakwaye of Chali, and it was this situation which underlay much of the tension between Ra'da's subclan, expressed mainly by Lente, and the Woshakwaye. This was probably the reason why he had deliberately brought up the old debt of foui' goats.

The position of a young man in relation to his father's subclan is another point of general political relevance which is highlighted by the material on rainstone disputes. A smart young man will utilise what opportunities he can from both his own people and his father's. Although ownership of rainstones cannot be wholly transferred to a son, he can make good use of them while he can retain their custody. One of the most powerful sets of rainstones in the Yabus area is that which belonged to Sheikh Marinyje, who died some years ago. He was not only a government official but a religious specialist and healer of wide reputation. Today, one of his sons holds not only the official position of his father, but is a religious leader in his own right and administers the rainstones of his father's subclan. Many people still owed fees for treatment to Marinyje when he died; and his son now collects these, partly on the strength of the rainstones. It is only fair to add that sometimes a proportion of the payments are handed on to his father's clansmen.

How can people regard rainstones as real and effective instruments? Let us return to the analogy with money, which however solid and effective in the

pocket, is often talked of in “unreal” ways: sterling is “getting on its feet”, confidence is rising here and falling there, prices on the stock exchanges reflect the rise and fall of statesmen and their policies. The symbols of rain-control are in a broadly similar way a system of giving shape and substance to social and political credit. One could not compare a rainstone with a piece of money, true; but one could suggest a parallel between rights over rainstones and, say, shares in an insurance company. To ask “Why do you believe in rainstones?” is in some ways parallel to asking “Why do you believe in the Sudanese pound?”—and not at all parallel to the question “Why do you believe the radio weather-forecast?” Belief in rainstones, as in currency, is rooted in local political structures of confidence and credit between people.

** III. Residence Among the Berti

L. Holy

The Berti, who number about 25,000, inhabit the Northern Darfur District in the region around Melit, their traditional centre, situated about thirty-five miles northeast of El Fashcr. Their original language belonged to the Middle Sahara language group and was closest to the Zaghawa language, but for several generations now they have been cpiite arabicised. They live in small permanent villages in the dry steppe of Northern Darfur and depend on agriculture with bulrush millet as the staple, animal husbandry and gathering gum which they sell at the local markets.[43]

The Berti, as all other societies, have “norms of residence”; that is to say, in their society there exist certain general rules about how the residence of a domestic family established in the process of marriage should be arranged. In other words, they consider a certain type of residence as normative in the sense of being expected or usual. Again as in all other societies, not all the residential arrangements of every domestic family correspond to these “norms”. Some domestic families arrange their residence differently. In this

article I discuss mainly two points. Ehc first one is that the existing norms of residence are structurally determined in the sense that they are the result of the operation of different systems of relations both inside and outside the domestic family. The second is that the residential arrangements which considered from the point of view of the norm appear as deviations, are basically determined by the same systems of relations that determine the “normal” residential arrangements: it is only that these systems of relations have been differently manipulated by the actors involved to serve their particular ends. Before discussing the structural factors determining the existing forms of residence of the newly established domestic family, I give some basic data on marriage and the ways in which an independent domestic group is established in Berti society.

It is always the father who in the final instance decides the choice of the future spouse, whether for his son or for his daughter. While the boy has sufficient opportunity to reveal his own opinion about the choice of spouse, and very often to push it through when discussing his marriage with his father, the girl is fully subservient to her father’s will. The father’s decisive position as far as his children’s marriage is concerned follows from his supreme authority over them and, in the case of the son, from the fact that it is he who pays the whole of the bridewealth.

The mother’s opinion about the marriage of her children is not decisive at all. Even when it differs from that of her husband, she is unable to reveal it publicly and is obliged to submit to her husband’s opinion. The boy’s father, or if he is dead the man who represents his authority, first of all comes to terms with the girl’s father; when he gets his consent he discusses it formally with the girl’s mother. Even when the girl’s mother personally opposes the marriage she is obliged to express agreement. Nevertheless, her personal attitude is usually well known and when it is negative she receives hagg aie (the payment for consent; lit. the payment foi’ “yes”) from the boy’s father; this can be anything up to ten Sudanese pounds. The girl’s mother can even demand hagg aie herself and make her consent dependent on its payment.

The proper process of marriage, during which a new family is established and finally becomes an independent domestic group, has three stages. The first

is the fatha, during which the groom’s father or the man who represents him pays the so-called sidag, that part of the bridewealth upon payment of which the marriage is legitimised. However, the groom and the bride do not start to live as a married couple immediately after the Jatha. They do not meet and they go on living in their original households with members of their families of orientation. They start living as a married couple only after the second stage of the marriage, the ‘irs, which takes place about six months after the Jatha. The ‘irs ends with a seven day period which the bride and groom spend together in a.shelter especially built for them in the homestead of the bride’s parents. After the ‘irs, the husband regularly visits his wife in this shelter. When both parties come from the same village the husband returns only at night; during the day he lives and works in his own parents’ household. When they come from different villages the husband visits his wife periodically, always spending a longer time in her parents’ household; the actual period depends primarily on the distance between their villages.

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The new family exists as such from the ‘irs, but it is not yet an independent domestic group. It becomes that after the third stage, the rahula, when the couple establish their own household and become economically independent of their parent households. The right of the young married couple to establish their own household is bound to the completion of bridewealth payment by the groom’s father to the bride’s parents. Payment is usually protracted, and the average interval between ‘irs and rahula is about four years. Most couples have one or more children by the time of rahula.

Thus the newly established family is not an independent domestic group until rahula. During the visits to his wife the husband works together with her in the way that any visitor works with his hosts; he performs this work in the framework not of his own but of his wife’s parents’ household. The wife has no fields of her own; during his visits in the

rainy season he cultivates, with her and the other members of her household, her parents' fields. Also the wife does not cook specially for her husband; but she helps her mother to cook for all members of the household. She carries the meals to her husband in the shelter where he always stays during his visits. His wife eats with the other women in the household, and the male members of the household (i.e. the wife's father and her brothers) eat together. The husband either eats alone in the shelter or shares his dish with some neighbours—friends of his in his wife's village; only during the absence of his wife's father can he eat with his wife's brothers.

After ^lirs it is the theoretical duty of the husband to buy clothes, shoes, glass beads and other ornaments, soap, oil, and perfumes for his wife. Most husbands bring these things to their wives in the form of occasional presents. Similarly, it is the theoretical duty of the husband to buy clothes for his children; these, however, are more often bought by his wife's brothers or her father from their own means. On the other hand the husband has no responsibility for feeding his wife or his children, who live with her in her shelter and later on in a small hut built in her parents' homestead. The wife is still a member of her parents' household, possessing full rights in the household in which she was born and bred. She takes part in all the work carried out by women in this household and during her husband's visits she is helped by him, especially in the cultivation of the farm. His children eat together with their mother, who herself eats with the other women living in the same household.

When the whole of the bridewealth is paid, the man can ask his wife's mother to prepare rahula—the departure of the wife to his household. Rahula is the third and final stage of marriage and its actual date depends on the bride's mother who is responsible for supplying the future household with the 'idda, the foodstuffs, dishes, furniture and other domestic implements. 'Idda is bought by the bride's mother from the money received in bridewealth.

In the year that the man intends to establish his own household, he founds a small farm near the village in which he and his wife will be living. His wife, it is true, gets a certain amount of grain from her mother as a part of

^lidda but this is usually insufficient, and the grain from the husband’s new field helps to support the household during the first year of its independent existence. The couple usually extend this field the following year and it becomes the core of the land they will cultivate in future.

Before the rahula. the husband also builds his own homestead. At first this usually consists of a single hut for himself and his wife; he extends it later by adding further huts and shelters. Some couples do not move during rahula directly to their own homestead but build their own hut in the homestead of one of the spouses’ parents; this hut is separated from the rest of the homestead by a fence and has its own entrance. Such families usually build their own homesteads only after the lapse of some time. Nevertheless, after rahula, every family forms an independent economic unit even when they live provisionally in the homestead of the parents of one of them: they cultivate their own farm, they own their cattle, and it is the wife, no longer her mother, who does the cooking for her husband and children.

Thus after rahida, every family forms a domestic group which is an independent unit of production, distribution and consumption. This does not mean that the family can exist without the help of other groups in all economic processes; on the contrary, it is dependent on the help of wider kinship groups over a whole range of economic activities. After rahula also, every newly established individual family becomes an independent residential unit, and it is during the process of rahula that the residence arrangements of the new domestic family are determined.

As the classification of residence arrangements has been extensively debated and there is no general agreement among anthropologists about the use of terms,[44] I have to start by defining the terms I shall be using. When a newly married couple establish their residence in the village where the husband’s parents live, I speak of virilocal residence; when their home is in the village of the wife’s parents, uxorilocal residence; when it is in the village

where both spouses live, bilocal residence; and when it is separate from the village of cither spouse’s parents, neolocal residence.

My analysis of residence arrangements among the Berti is based on a census of 87 households in 5 villages.[45] Deficiencies of classifications based on a synchronic census only, when genealogical data and life histories of subjects and their kin are neglected, are now generally known.[46] To avoid distortion I consider a couple’s residence as it existed immediately after rahula. A homestead might not have moved since rahula, but

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still may have to be classified differently from the way suggested by the census. For example, Yahya Addin and Hawa Adim live in their own household in the village of Duda. The household of the parents of Hawa Adim the wife, is situated in the same village, while Yahya’s father Addin Isma‘il has his homestead in the village of Nair. If we take no other facts into consideration, we classify the residence of Yahya Addin and Hawa Adim as uxorilocal. Similarly the homestead of Hawa Adim’s brother ‘Abd al-Rahman Adim who married ♦

Yahya Addin’s sister ‘Asha Addin is situated in Duda. The residence of the latter couple has to be classified as virilocal. The picture changes, however, if we take into consideration the life history of Addin Isma‘il. His parents lived in Nair and he resided after his marriage uxorilocally in Duda. Later, when his mother in Nair became ill, he moved his homestead from Duda to Nair to be able to look after his mother who had no close kin in Nair, and after her death he remained permanently in Nair. At the time when both his children built their homesteads in Duda his own household was also situated in Duda and therefore both the residence of Yahya Addin and Hawa Adim and the residence of ‘Abd al-Rahman Adim and ‘Asha Addin are properly classified as bilocal.

In the case of polygynous families the homesteads of individual wives are never in the same village if their husband is still sexually active. As far as the residence arrangements of these homesteads are concerned, I consider only the homestead of the first wife, because choice is possible only for this homestead. A husband never moves the homesteads of subsequent wives to the village of his first wife’s homestead: they are established in the villages of the wives’ parents, that is uxorilocally.

Although some families do move later during rahula the Berti couples see their choice of residence as lying only between the villages of husband’s and wife’s parents. With the exception of families resulting from gabuna marriages[47] they never reside neolocally immediately after marriage.

The Berti, and especially their menfolk, consider virilocal residence the ideal. This is connected with the type of economic relationship within kin and domestic groups. If a man inherits a considerable part of his father’s gum garden it is easiest for him to work it when the garden is in the immediate vicinity of his village of domicile, for then he and other members of his parents’ domestic group are in a position to carry out readily all activities necessary for gum gathering. Before rahula a man founds a farm which becomes the core of the plots which his future domestic group will possess. If this farm is near his own village he can easily cultivate it with the help of other members of his parents’ domestic group. The founding of a similar farm is much more difficult in his wife’s village, where he can rely neither upon the help of the members of his parents’ domestic group, nor upon the help of other inhabitants of the village—with whom he is not yet bound by ties of neighbourliness.

When residing virilocally a man is living among his nearest lineage kin, who form a group which provides him with an effective protection in all his disputes with members of other lineages.

Virilocal residence, however, is not universal. Nineteen married couples from the total of 87 (i.e. 21.8 per cent! live uxorilocally. Apart from the individual preferences of the married couple, determined by such factors as whether

the wife’s village is “good” (i.e. relations within it are suitably harmonious), or whether it is near a well or market, or whether it has fertile soil, there are other reasons which lead to uxori-local residence. Of these the most important is the fact that the rahula only exceptionally takes place with the full agreement of all who participate in the decision about it, the most important of whom arc the married couple themselves, and their parents. Rahula is a typical situation whose end, the

founding of an independent household of a newly established domestic family, can be differently defined by all participants. The general characteristic of a rahula is the opposition to it of the wife’s mother, who can keep postponing it by pointing out that she has not yet prepared all the items which her daughter is supposed to get as the ‘idda. It is in this situation that the conflict between a man and his wife’s mother, which can be taken as the prevailing pattern of their relationship, appears publicly for the first time. This conflict is largely a consequence of the mother’s inability to influence the choice of her daughter’s future spouse. While her explicit agreement to her daughter’s marriage is required during negotiations, she can demand the hagg aie for it; by this she shows for the first time that her private opinion is different. Such differences of opinion often lead to a conflict between mother and father but this conflict does not result in divorce; nor is it recognised as a ground for divorce: it would be a breach of proper conduct if the wife revealed openly, in her husband’s presence, dissatisfaction with the future spouse he has chosen for her daughter. Of course she can slander him to her neighbours, but she has to take care that her husband does not hear of it. An antagonistic relation between a man and his wife’s mother easily results in a hostile relation between the man and his wife. The mother shows a tendency to comment on the behaviour of her daughter’s husband in her presence, to point to his bad temper, and to compare him continuously with other men who, in her opinion, would make better husbands. If she succeeds in antagonising her daughter against her husband, which is especially easy when the daughter herself was an unwilling partner in the marriage, not only is it improbable that the daughter would establish an independent household without the formal rahula, but it is highly probable that the daughter would not compel her mother to prepare the rahula. If a man’s mother-in-law continues to postpone the rahula he can appeal to the authorities, but their measures are not always effective. Many men resolve

the rahula problem by marrying another wife, building a homestead and preparing the rahula for their second wife. It would be a disgrace for the first wife if the second should have rahula before her; when this danger threatens, the first wife and her mother usually insist on it themselves.

Uxorilocal residence, however, does not come about only as a solution to the conflicting interests of these actors. The establishment of the new household is a situation in which members of the domestic groups of the husband's parents and of the wife's parents typically compete for its economic loyalties.

Among the Berti, working groups recruited on the basis of kinship ties are organised for cultivation, water supply, animal husbandry, and gum gathering, in situations where the organiser cannot perform the tasks with the labour of his domestic group and where he has not the means to mobilise a neighbourhood group, or to pay for labour directly. Working groups composed of kin are thus mobilised by those household heads, both men and women, who are too old to work in the farms or gum gardens, or those whose households lack young labour to perform the necessary work. This is usually the case with old couples or with widows and widowers, and with old divorcees living alone in their own households. Even if they cannot afford to hire wage labour or mobilise a working group from among neighbours, their farms will not remain unweeded nor their gum-trees uncut. Their children or grandchildren living in the same village will do this work for them. Old couples and those living alone in their own households, unable to perform the necessary economic activities themselves, can rely on the help of their nearest kin, most frequently again their children or grandchildren. The activities concerned here arc sowing and harvesting, water supply and the care of cattle.

Temporary kin-based working groups take care of the cattle in the cattle-camp when a household has insufficient members able to leave the village for a considerable part of the year. These working groups facilitate the organisation of cattle husbandry, including the milking of cows, driving cattle to grazing, watering the cattle at wells, and occasionally looking for lost animals. Members of related households join together not only for watering cattle but also for drawing drinking water when one household has not

enough members to perform this work. Apart from these temporary working groups, the kinship tics between members of different households are the basis for forming permanent working groups to take care of the herd composed of cattle belonging to kindred living in different households. So in many cases related members of different households keep their cattle in one herd not only in the dry season camps but also during the rainy season when the cattle are kept in the villages.

Economic activities whose participants are recruited on the basis of kinship ties beyond the range of the immediate family are naturally performed in a certain spatial frame. With the exception of the joint care of cattle in the cattle-camp, the frame is the village. From this it follows that all forms of economic cooperation between kindred can be effective only among those who live in the same village and that the economic help of the members of the newly established household will be gained by the domestic group of the parents of that spouse in whose village the young couple build their own homestead. Even when the households of the parents of both spouses are in the same village, the newly established household tends to co-operate strikingly with the domestic group of the parents of the husband and not of the wife, and eventually with other domestic groups of the near kin of the husband. Even when the wife is bound by closer ties of kinship to the members of the domestic group of her parents than to the members of the domestic group of her husband’s parents, these ties alone do not justify her offering her services to her parents and siblings, while her husband co-operatively performs the same economic activities with his own kin. The economic loyalties of the household are indivisible because the wife is subject to the authority of her husband as far as the disposal of her own labour is concerned.

As virilocal residence is expected, in Berti society there exist certain jural norms whose meaning we can fully understand only when we consider them to be norms whose end is to compensate the loss which the household of the wife’s parents will suffer consequent on virilocal residence. Further, if we consider that the newly established household tends to unilateral economic co-operation with the households of the husband’s near kin, we can easily understand the son-in-law’s obligation to help weed the fields cultivated by his wife’s mother. A man helps to weed the field cultivated by the members of his wife’s parents’ household not only before he has his own household

and when his wife still lives in her parents', but also for up to three days a year when he later lives with his wife in their own household. Unlike other cases when the working groups of kin are formed this arrangement is not of great economic value because the husband weeds the field even when the members of his wife's mother's household are easily able to carry out the weeding themselves. On the other hand this activity clearly shows that we have to deal with the reciprocity typical of related domestic groups. That is, the mother-in-law after completing the weeding of her own field very often helps for up to three days in her son-in-law's field.

The behaviour of the wife's mother and efforts to gain the economic loyalty of the newly established domestic group are not, however, the only factors influencing the residence of the new family. There are other elements in the domestic economy and the family system which operate in the same direction.

Unlike many other African societies, it is rather rare among the Berti for kin beyond the range of the individual family (which represents a typical domestic unit in all stages of its development) to live with that family as members of the domestic group. This is because the forms of economic cooperation among cognates permit the existence of one-man households. Old widowers live as attached members of households because, unlike the widows, they could inhabit their own households only if they deviated from the norms of the division of labour—if they performed all the domestic work that is normally the task of women. A widower therefore usually attaches himself to his daughter's household. The reason the Berti give for the fact that he moves to his daughter's and not his son's household is in accord with the structure of economic relations in the domestic group and with the norms of the immediate family. An old widower attaches himself to an existing domestic group first of all because he needs someone to prepare food and millet beer for him every day. Cooking and brewing are tasks of the woman responsible for the domestic economy of the household. If a widower moved to his son's household he would depend on his daughter-in-law. Her duties and obligations toward him, however, are not so binding as those of his own daughter. The Berti characterise the different degrees by saying that it is a disgrace (Jadiha'} to refuse to help a father-in-law, while it is a sin (zanb) to do the same to a father. 1'hey say that a woman takes care of her father-in-law only because he is the father of her husband

whom she must obey and to whose authority she is bound; when her husband is away from the household, she will, however, immediately neglect his father living in her household. So a widower moves to his daughter, who takes care of him devotedly and affectionately regardless of whether her husband is present or not. A widower invariably prefers to move to the household of a daughter in his own village; if he moved to one elsewhere he would have to break off his everyday relations with his own kin. Thus establishment of uxo-rilocal residence accords with the interests of the wife’s father as well as those of her mother.

The degree of pressure from the wife’s parents to which the newly established family is exposed during rahula depends on the pattern of their domestic group. During the rahula of the wife whose father is a widower, it is possible to expect that he himself will strongly oppose a move to the husband’s village. Similarly, if there are only daughters in a family, the wife’s parents try to prevent a son-in-law from establishing his household in his own village. Every household needs male labour for drawing water from the well and for watering and grazing the cattle. In such a case the girl’s parents try to postpone rahula as long as possible because her husband during his visits does the household work that they find difficult to do themselves ; he goes to the well to draw water and water the cattle, and when he visits his wife in a cattle-camp he takes care of the grazing cattle and looks for stray animals. But since they cannot postpone rahula for ever they try to persuade their son-in-law to establish his household in their own village. In particular, rich families owning large herds and lacking the necessary man-power to take care of them usually insist on uxorilocal residence for their daughters. When the parents want the daughter’s husband to build his homestead in their village, they buy clothes not only for their daughter but for her husband too; they take care of his children, they tolerate his small deviations from the accepted norms of conduct, and so on. Sometimes they may agree with a proposed marriage only on condition that the couple will reside after rahula in their village. The son-in-law, however, is not bound by this condition later, because the moment his whole bridewealth is paid he has the right to rahula and he can bring his wife to his own homestead built according to his own desires either in her village or his own. His ultimate residence thus depends more on the actual behaviour of the wife’s parents and other members of the household towards him than on the preconditions of the marriage.

Residence patterns among the Berti result from the operation of a wide range of different systems of relations, the most important of which are the system of economic co-operation inside the household and between the related households, the system of the division of authority between the husband and wife over their children, the system of inheritance of certain productive resources, especially the gum gardens, and the system of relations between the patrilineal lineages and local communities. These constitute the most important structural variables determining the form of residence of each Berti couple. Put differently, the domestic family is necessarily a multifunctional group, a group which is a point of contact of different systems of relations. Residence is a result of the operation of the relevant systems of relations which, of course, operate with different force in each case.

The way that individuals negotiate in the rahula decisions is the result of the operation of relationships in these systems. The wife’s mother will act in one way if she agrees to her daughter’s marriage and in another way if she does not; the wife’s father will act in one way if he needs to acquire a man’s labour to take care of his cattle and in another if he does not; the husband’s parents will act in one way if they are desperately trying to gain the economic loyalties of the new household, and in another if they are not; the husband himself will act in one way if he is likely to inherit a big gum garden, and in another if he is not. Accordingly the residence of each couple is thus in one way or another a compromise between different and conflicting aims.

The Berti themselves consider rahula to be a conflict situation in which the competing interests of the families and domestic groups of the parents of both spouses meet. Preference for marriages of the children of siblings and for marriages within the same village are solutions to this conflict, since in this situation the economic loyalties of the new domestic unit can be bilateral and still remain undivided.

** IV. The Bovine Idiom and Formal Logic

Andreas and Waltraud Kronenberg

Usually we feel upset by paradoxical formulations, because they run against our established ways of thinking, and challenge them. One of the famous paradoxes of anthropological literature is Evans-Pritchard's statement on agnation and uterine descent among the Nuer.[48] "It would seem it may be partly just because the agnatic principle is unchallenged in Nuer society that the tracing of descent through women is so prominent and matrilocality so prevalent." Statements of this kind either provoke criticism or inspire rethinking. An example of the first reaction is David Schneider's criticism of that paradox:[49] "When Evans-Pritchard is faced with the odd fact that, although the lineages are territorial units, and although they seem to be patrilineal as patrilineal can be, descent is traced through women, and many people live matrilocally. In order to reconcile these apparent contradictions, we were treated to those special gems of paradoxical obfuscation for which Evans-Pritchard is justly famous." Far from pouring scorn on Evans-Pritchard's formulation, we believe it to be justifiable for the Nuer, and even more widely. In this paper we attempt to resolve a similar paradox for Didinga society.[50]

Didinga and Nuer social idioms can be reduced to similar logical constants.[51]

The title of this paper itself sounds rather paradoxical and we have to explain it.

Evans-Pritchard's description of Nuer interest in cattle is general knowledge among social anthropologists.[52] His analysis culminates in the statement that the Nuer tend to define all social processes and relationships in terms of cattle. Their social idiom is a bovine idiom. We have worked among two cattle peoples of the Southern Sudan, the Didinga and Longarim on the east bank of the Nile and we had to learn and then analyse their bovine idiom. The Didinga and Longarim belong to the vast group of East African peoples who are patterned by what Herskovits[53] has aptly called the cattle complex, and are organised in agnatic clans. The Didinga classify and relate a wide range of their social behaviour such as sexual relations, marriage,

kinship, age-organisation, and what we would call their political, economic and religious systems according to the bovine context of these aspects of life. All important matters among the Didinga are cattle matters. We want here to demonstrate the range of this bovine idiom which gives social behaviour a frame of reference such that it becomes difficult to distinguish a field of bovine relations from a field of relations of other sorts. The following example may serve as an illustration: if a Didinga (or Longarim) has a favourite beast,[54] the same cattle name is used for the “father” (owner) of the animal as for the beast itself, and if Didinga sing praise songs of their favourite beasts, it is impossible to distinguish either linguistically or on the level of sense between the man and the animal. If Didinga talk about actual animals, they are able to grasp intellectually, to evaluate, and to connect what would seem to be separate categories of social life. Among the Didinga the bovine idiom is a universal idiom which gives relevance and meaningful relations to what they perceive, express and do. In everyday life Didinga have to deal with actual cattle and practical problems.

The bovine idiom gives form and meaning to social facts and situations. Thus sexual relations are always cattle matters. The Didinga say it more drastically: “What girls have is for cattle only.” This manner of speaking typically conveys the interweaving of the bovine and social idioms. For example, marriage cannot be defined except in terms of cattle transfers.

Men and women are related to cattle in opposite ways. A man increases his status by his ability to inherit, acquire, and give away cattle. The circulation of cattle increases status. The more cattle a man can give away, the greater his potential for receiving them. A girl can increase her status by marrying early and so helping her family to obtain cattle, because her bride cattle are used to acquire a wife for her full brother. If her full brother can marry soon, the circulation of cattle speeds up. Her family of procreation hope for many daughters for whom they will obtain cattle as bridewealth. Thus men form, and women transform, cattle-relations. Women mean cattle for men, and cattle mean men for women. In exceptional circumstances these socially defined sex roles need not coincide with “natural” sex. It suffices to mention woman-to-woman marriage in this regard. To us it now seems very “natural” that a Didinga girl should fall in love with a bull,[55] or that the lover of a Longarim wife caresses the husband’s favourite beast. The cattle-relations of

a man are activated through his sex, marriage, kinship, and age-grade relations.

A sexual relation implies that a man exchanges a class or collection of his cattle-relations against the cattle-value of a sexual relation. This transaction gives continuity to his cattle-relations and intensifies them. It is expressed in such a way that it allows the immediate distinction of cattle relations among relatives, because kinship terminology' makes explicit certain categories within the family herds. Since usually only men own cattle, women are materially, and men are idiomatically, associated with cattle. This applies only to sexual relations which lead to cattle transfers. Incest for instance is a contradiction of sexual relations as expressed by cattle, because incestuous sex cannot create a new cattlerelation: if brother and sister committed incest, the brother would have to pay the adultery' fee to himself. Such illegitimate sex cannot be expressed by the bovine idiom and is an act of witchcraft. Sodomy is the most spectacular case, and such a witch is killed immediately by his brothers. The situation is similar if a man remains unmarried and hoards cattle for their own sake. Cattle have to circulate. Otherwise the herd stagnates, is good for nothing, the animals die of old age — edicay, "are finished", the Didinga say.[56] Breakdown of circulation is a deliberate waste of cattle (we would say, waste of life). If an elderly unmarried man dies, his body is witchcraft; no one should touch it, and he is pushed with sticks into his grave.

It could be argued that among the Didinga, there are other cattle matters which arc not related to sex. But this argument cannot be sustained. Blood-cattle for example can only be paid between unrelated persons; the blood-cattle compensate the cattle-value of the slain, whose brother marries a wife in his name. Payment of blood-cattle between brothers or other kinsmen would be just as nonsensical as bride-wealth cattle payment in incestuous unions.

If a man wants to have the recognised status of a pater towards children, he has to compensate in cattle the cattlevalue of his wife's fertility by paying bridewealth to her brother. What remains of his herd will be inherited by his sons. It does not matter whether the man from whom I will inherit is my genitor. Pater is a person who can transfer his herd to his sons by

inheritance. The sons have cattle-rights in the fertility of their full sisters but not of their paternal half-sisters, for these cattle-rights are defined in relation to the mother of full siblings only. Polygynous marriages are frequent, and because mothers live together with their children in one house, until they marry, the term “house” is used to indicate the uterine line.[57]

It can happen that a wife gives birth to daughters only. The eldest of the sisters now has to perform the role of a full brother. She inherits the share of the family herd that a full brother would inherit, and because she is female she receives bridewealth cattle on her own marriage as well as her sister’s. With all these cattle she now “marries” in a woman-to-woman marriage and plays the role of a pater. She is called “father” by her wife’s children, who belong to the patrilineage of their female “pater” and inherit the lineage cattle from her.

A man’s full herd derives from two sources: firstly by inheritance from his father, and secondly from the bridewealth received for his sisters. Thus half a man’s herd consists of the share which he obtains for his sister’s fertility on her marriage. The remaining half is composed of cattle which his father obtained in the same way for his sister, and his father’s father obtained for his, and so on. Thus, my sister’s fertility approximates the sum of all these shares. If now I marry, I give away half of my herd to my wife’s brother, and therefore only half of the cattle which I have received for my sister will be inherited by my sons.

Thus a man’s herd is completed on the marriage of his full sister and if he marries, he gives half of this herd away as bridewealth for his wife (or wives). In this way my herd is divided into two parts on my marriage: one half is given for the mother of my children, and half is inherited by my sons. My son will have a complete herd again, when his full sister marries.

We have now presented the barest of ethnographic data, and we want to discover the formal structure of this system. The analysis proceeds “to greater and greater abstractness and logical simplicity; instead of asking what can be defined and deduced from what is assumed to begin with, we ask instead what more general ideas and principles can be found, in terms of

which what was our starting-point can be defined or deduced.”[58] That is, if we try to understand things in their context, which is what the anthropologist surely does, we have to work on our state of mind as investigators. And that is the procedure of formal logic also.[59] We have to ask the fundamental ethnographic question: how can cultural material be analysed within its own context, free from projections of our own social matrix?

Evans-Pritchard was able to put forward his paradox, which is contradictory on the level of meaning but not as we hope to demonstrate on the level of sense, because he could think about Nuer kinship within the operation-rules of their system. He did not consider the formal relational svstem or the term-by-term substitution of logical constants on the level of sense when using such terms as agnatic, patrilineal, descent through women and so on. Such a consideration is vital to avoid misunderstanding by culturally biased persons —as we all are—otherwise the sense and the meaning of those terms might belong to different systems.[60]

To indicate the difference of meaning and sense we give two examples. Morning star and evening star have the same meaning; but they do not have the same sense. Sense here refers to the way the perception of this star is interpreted and associated with other phenomena by people who can communicate, discuss and evaluate the information they perceive. Again, as another example, if we write the number 10, you will say that we have written ten, but if we go on and write

| 10 | | 11 |

| — 1 | | + 1 |

| = 1 | or | =100 |

you will say we are mistaken, unless you realize that we are using binary numbers. The difficulty of binary numbers consists only in dissociating from them our standard arbitrary operation-rules and in using unfamiliar ones. For the sake of our later argument we have to dwell on this point for a few moments, and we shall try to explain how these binary numbers work,

because here we think lies the key to an ‘algebra’ of kinship and associated behaviour in traditional societies.

Binary numbers were already used in Ancient Egypt[61] and China, they were rediscovered by Leibnitz, and now they are used to write programmes for computers. Two symbols are used, 1 and 0. The principle is that the postposition of a zero multiplies by two instead of ten; in a sequence every 1 has double the value of its successor or conversely half the value of its predecessor.[62] Binary numbers might thus be useful in demonstrating the principles of different kinship systems, if we could develop an adequate algorithm in binary numbers for each system.

We should like to demonstrate, in the analysis of Didinga kinship and associated behaviour which follows, how we can avoid using the individual as the focus of social relations. In discussing kinship, Ego is usually the starting point, but we argue that the notion of Ego already implies a whole system of relevant relations.

The analysis of a kinship system by the method we now use for the Didinga, consists in finding an algorithm based on the proposition that we should dispense with Ego; and further that with respect to his kinship relations every individual consists of collections of characteristics which he or she shares with others. In our binary algorithm these collections of characteristics have different place-values and cardinalities for different categories of individuals, irrespective of the actual number of persons defined by each category. Some categories, in particular cases, may even have no members.

To discuss relevant relations among the Didinga, we have to explain what we mean by binary progression and regression. If we draw a line, we can recognise relations between its parts, by dividing it into classes or categories of halves and halves of halves. We thus obtain a compact binary progression[63] (see Fig. 1).

A binary regression or “thinning out” is the contrary movement in the other direction, in order to define subclasses of the first set. We indicate them by

writing zeros, because we deal with subclasses within the same class. Thus 10 indicates that we remain within the first class, i.e. the first half of our line, but that we deal with its second half only (see Fig. 2), and any section of our line can be defined in that way (see Fig. 3).

Didinga define the kinship of men in relation to the cattle which a man inherits from his pater, and in relation to the cattle which a man and certain categories of his relatives have to give to certain categories of a woman’s relatives, for this man to become the pater of the woman’s children. In discussing bridewealth, Didinga first have to consider what categories of relatives of the groom should give cattle and what categories of relatives of the bride should receive cattle. This part of the bridewealth discussion has nothing to do with the numbers of persons and cattle in these categories.

Didinga explained these categories of kinsmen to us again and again: (i) “peoples of the house”, et cik cyeso, (ii) midini, and (iii) oto. There is no fourth term, because kinship ceases to be recognised among the descendants of oto. These three categories of groom’s and bride’s kinsmen give and receive cattle, irrespective of the numbers of persons involved. Each of these three categories contains persons of lesser or greater uterine distance, and the set of full brothers nearest to the groom or the bride is the one that becomes necessarily, while the others remain potentially, involved in bridewealth exchange. Theoretically all persons in the uterine line would belong to a single “house”, but in practice, after three or four generations mother’s mother’s mother’s brother is dead and sister’s daughter’s daughter’s children are not yet born. The problem of the principles underlying the Didinga definition of these categories of kinsmen is the core of the following investigation.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-6.jpg][Fig. 1. The first and second classes or categories of a binary progression, written 1 and 11. The arrow indicates the direction of the progression.]]

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-7.jpg][Fig. 2. Two classes of a binary regression, written 10 and 100, within the first class of a

binary progression, written 1. The arrows indicate the directions of the progression and regression.]]

A man’s herd is composed of the following shares or categories: first, what he obtains on his sister’s marriage; second, inherited cattle which his father obtained for his sister; third, inherited cattle which his father’s father obtained for his sister, and so on. Didinga formulate this by referring to the cattle which a man has received from his house, from his father’s house, from his father’s father’s house and so on. We can demonstrate these categories of cattle by a compact binary progression 11111, etc. Every herd is built up in this way, and so reflects Ego with all its relevant categories (see Fig. 4).

If a man wants to marry, he has to exchange half of his herd as bridewealth for his wife. This bridewealth share does not simply consist in handing over the share of cattle which he obtained for his sister: the numbers of cattle handed over are similar, but theii⁻ derivation is various. He gives half of the share which he obtained for his sister, half of the share which his father obtained for his sister and whose half of it he has inherited, and so on. By doing so a man divides his herd again into two parts: one half of the herd is given for the mother of his children, and the remaining half is inherited by his sons. The sons will have a complete herd again, if their sisters marry. (The binary regression within one class refers to SiCh, SiDaCh, SiDaDaCh or to Mo, MoMo, MoMoMo, etc. But at any step of the regression, there may be another progression, e.g. SiSoCh MoFaSi.)

We shall try to show how this is done, by tracing the placevalue and cardinality of a common share in a herd among the descendants of siblings. The bridewealth which a brother obtains for his full sister is the maximum of an asymmetrical cattle relation. The descendants of a brother and sister will be connected with this maximum share in cattle, but unrelated people who marry them, adding foreign cattle-shares, thin out this maximum relation.

This process of binary progressions and regressions can be made operational by a simple method: for a set of full siblings, a male genealogical link is a progression, a female genealogical link is a regression. Thus if we draw a

paradigm of kinship of a set of siblings, Ego is shown in all its partial relations: male genealogical links are indicated by 1 and female links by 0, and we obtain the values shown in Fig. 5. To find out what category of kinship exists between two persons, a Di-dinga has to ask only whether the genealogical links are men or women, brothers or sisters.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-8.jpg][Fig. 3. Two classes of a binary progression, written 1 and 11. Within the first class there is a binary regression, written 10, and within this sub-class there is a further sub-sub-class of a binary progression indicated by 101. Within the second class of the binary progression, written 11, there is a sub-class of a regression, written 110. The arrows indicate the directions of the progressions and regressions.]]

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-9.jpg][Fig. 4. Sequence of cattle-shares in a complete herd. In binary numbers they would be indicated by 1, 11, 111, etc.]]

The numbers of this paradigm look like natural binary numbers, and although they order all natural numbers they are topological numbers. We do not discuss here the fascinating questions which lead us into the hoary problems of the theory of numbers and logical types, but we wish to show the practical use of binary topological numbers for an ethnographer, who can now deduce the categories of kinship which are recognised in this system. Every relation occurs just once. The relation So:Fa is thus represented by 11, the relation children: Mo by 10. The basic relation between brother and sister is represented by 1. The series of ratios can be divided again and again into two parts, of which one wholly precedes the other, and of which the first has no last term (binary progression), while the second has no first term (binary regression).

We can see already that the relation in the uterine line (regression) refers always to the same class or the same subclasses of a particular herd of cattle. Therefore all the individuals involved in this class fall under the term of one “house”. It has nothing to do with our notion of generations, for this term conveys the information that the share in cattle which a brother has

received for his sister belongs to the same class of cattle which sister’s son receives for sister’s daughter etc. An anthropologist will immediately realise that we have here a Crow-type skewing of generations among cognates, not with Lounsbury’s skewing rule as a postulate,[64] but as an inherent part of this algorithm, and there is no difficulty in finding with a minimum of binary digits any term referring to cognates with the same speed and accuracy as Didinga do.

In sister’s uterine line the cardinality remains constant, only its place value changes, while in the “agnatic” line cardinality and place value change analogously. The “skewing” of generations arises out of the switching from progression to regression. Within the last defined category of an “agnatic” progression a female link is a regression, and all its successors remain within the range of this “agnatic” category.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-10.jpg][Fig. 5. Paradigm of kinship of a set of siblings. Ego is shown in all its partial relations. The Crow-type skewing of cognates is indicated by three different lines.]]

The relationships result from the cardinalities and place values of the binary numbers as shown in Fig. 5. The place values indicate the number of generations in our bilateral use of this word, while a cardinality expresses the common shares in a herd, i.e. one class oi’ category. The kinship terminology of “house”, midini and oto refers to the same class of a binary progression, which has for two persons of reference a different place value and can be thinned out differently. These shares in common are the bridewealth cattle given for a woman, or in other words the cattle value of a woman’s fertility.

The range of the above mentioned three kinship terms are expressed in our binary numbers as follows:

(i) “people of the house”: The class of reference is full siblings, indicated by 1, and the field of relations lies between 1 < 11, or

cardinality + place value = 0 < 1 < 11

(ii) midini: Children of males of the above “people of the house” and the uterine line of each single set of full siblings. The class of reference is full siblings in relation to their FaSi, as indicated by 11, and the field of their relations lies between 10 < 11 < 111, or

cardinality + place value =10<ll<lll

(iii) oto: children of male midini and the “people of the house” of each single set of full siblings. The class of reference is full-siblings in relation to their father’s father’s sister, as indicated by 111, and the field of their relations lies between 110 < 111 < 1111 or

cardinality + place value = 110 < 111 < 1111

When discussing bridewealth, Didinga refer to these categories of people. If a man marries, the categories nearest in the uterine line of the “peoples of the house”, of midini and oto have to give cattle, and if a girl marries, these categories of her kinsmen receive cattle.

To sum up, the basic principle of this system is that a woman is the mother of her children. The ability to have children is inherited by the daughters. The sons inherit lineage cattle from their pater and cattle rights in the fertility of their sisters, which they use together with inherited cattle to exchange for kinship with the children of their wives. The operation-rule, in terms of our binary algorithm, consists in the preposition of the cattle-shares which are obtained for the sister, and the postposition of the inherited cattle-shares from father’s sister, father’s father’s sister, etc. Thus my uterinity has the first cardinality, father’s uterinity the second, father’s father’s uterinity the third and so on. Uterinity is a share in half a herd of cattle, and agnatic

descent means in this context the approximate sum total of different uterinities.

This principle illuminates the structure of the Didinga patrician, whose herd is built up in this way because it is exogamous.[65] Therefore we can now make a statement about the Didinga, similar to that of Evans-Pritchard about the Nuer, that although lineages seem to be patrilineal as patrilineal can be, descent is traced through women, and it is because the agnatic principle as a sum of uterinities in the male line is unchallenged in Didinga society, that the tracing of descent through women is so prominent.

We suggest that a variation of the algorithm we have used for the Didinga could be applied to the Nuer material. At least we hope now that those who have not lived among East African peoples can better understand Evans-Pritchard's paradox, and might even find it evident how culturally specific operation-rules generate regularities of social behaviour. From empirical data we can extract such operation-rules and translate them into logical constants which give general relevance to ethnographic data.

** V. Proverbs and Social Values In a Northern Sudanese Village

Ahmed S. al-Shahi

*** I

This paper attempts to show how proverbs and sayings are related to and reflect the value system of a particular community.[66] These proverbs and sayings have been collected from Nuri village but they may have wider application among Arabic speaking communities in the Sudan. Attention to the study of oral tradition as a subject in its own right has become popular in recent years. This new concern with the study of oral literature is reflected in an increasing number of publications. The lead in this has been taken by the Oxford Library of African Literature under the editorship of Professor E. E. Evans-Pritchard and others.

It is my intention here to illustrate certain ideas concerning “collective expressions”. My contribution owes its inspiration to an article by Professor Evans-Pritchard in which he discusses obscenities as group expressions with a social significance and a function in specific situations.[67] The proverbs and sayings with which I am concerned are used by individuals in such contexts as those of insult, abuse or joking, and they express certain collective ideas and values which distinguish the various social groups in Nuri community.

In a rigidly classed community, such as that of Nuri, expressions concerning the origin, intellect, and moral and physical characteristics of people tend to emphasise the existing group distinctions. These expressions suggest, as will be shown later, certain stereotyped categories into which people fall. They represent what people think of one another and they help to maintain the exclusiveness of each social category and its related social values. In the particular case with which I am dealing these proverbs and sayings reflect the onc-sidcdness of a community in which the socially superior group seeks to maintain its position of dominance by reminding the other lower-status social groups of the differences between them.

*** II

Nuri village is situated in the Northern Province of the Sudan on the left bank of the River Nile at a point where the river flows in a southwesterly direction and takes a gradual bend to the east on the upstream side towards the Fourth Cataract. About nine miles due west lies Merowe, the ancient site of Napata and the present administrative centre of Merowe Rural Council. On the opposite bank of the river lies Karima, the commercial centre of Merowe Rural Council and the terminus of the railway line from Khartoum. Nuri village lies in a basin which prior to 1917 was irrigated by the traditional method of water-wheels, saivagi (singular: sagiya). In that year mechanical irrigation was introduced resulting in a physical expansion of the village and in its present prosperity. Nowadays, the economy of the village depends on cash crops, citrus fruits, mangoes and dates, which are exported to the internal markets

of the Sudan. Another landmark in the history of Nuri was the flood of 1946 which destroyed most of the village and forced people to go and live on higher ground, the Jabal. Thus a new settlement was formed by the name of Ahl al-Jabal, the people of the hill. The Government tried to establish a new residential area on the Jabal away from the river in order to develop the land in the village proper which previously had been used for housing.

This was opposed: Nuri people did not wish to live among ‘abid, ‘arab and halab.[68] who are considered of a lower social standing. It is from this time that the village came to be divided into two physically and socially separate communities. The village proper is divided into a number of settlements, hilal (singular: hilla} which are scattered among the tree gardens and palm groves. The inhabitants of these hilal I call Nuri people, as a distinct social group whose membership in the village proper is determined by kinship and land ownership.

Nuri village and the Jabal settlement have a total population of 4,104 and there are 46 hilal with an average of 4.9 persons per house.[69] The population is divided in the following way:

Nuri people 3,461

‘Arab 346

‘Abid. 281

Halab..... 10

Not every inhabitant of Nuri village is in close touch with what goes on in the village; people living in one part of the village may rarely see others, except on social occasions, who reside at the opposite end of the village and who have their fields in that direction. This is one side of the residential pattern; the other side is that people living within a hilla have frequent informal everyday contacts. The hilal are connected by a number of small paths and there are three main roads linking Nuri with neighbouring villages. The area covered by the settlements and fields of Nuri village is quite extensive; at maximum point the width of the village is about two miles and the length is about three miles.

Nuri village has the following services: two markets, three clubs, one dispensary, a police station, two nursery schools, three primary schools, two intermediate schools, a post office and telephone exchange, a ferry boat, a rest house and a Government experimental farm. Several factors have been responsible for the development of these services: increase in population, greater prosperity due to the introduction of cash crops, and education. Nuri village has a shaikh, headman, who is elected by the villagers and whose function is to collect taxes on crops, trees and livestock for Merowe Rural Council. He represents the Native Administration, al-iddra al-ahliya, and he has administrative, but no judicial, powers.

Nuri is connected with two other villages, Jereif and Sagai, mainly through the pump-scheme established in 1917. The total land area irrigated by this pump-scheme is nearly 4,500 feddans[70] of which Nuri constitutes half. Land is the basis of the economic and social life of the people; it is a source of income, a symbol of status and a security. The transfer of land holds certain implications: to buy land gives a man prestige but to sell land, even out of necessity, is shameful. Because of its value in the economic sphere, individuals are insisting on their inherited rights to land which is resulting in land fragmentation; this, to some extent, has been a hindrance to agricultural development.

Now I shall discuss briefly the social composition of Nuri community as a whole. I will deal with each social group separately.

Nuri people: they inhabit the village proper and belong to seven tribal sections: (i) the Tsaiyab who arc Shaigiya and who regard themselves as the ‘owners’ of the village, ahi al-balad’, (ii) the Kawarir who are from the Jamu‘iya tribe; (iii) the ‘Oragab who arc ‘Abbasiya; (iv) the Hamadtiyab who arc from the Bakriya tribe; (v) the Musallamab who arc from the Ja‘aliyin tribe; (vi) the Kinana from the Kinana tribe; and (vii) the Nuba who claim to be the original settlers of the area before the coming of the Arabs. Thus the social group of Nuri people is composed of members from various tribes. 1’he Kawarir, ‘Oragab and Hamadtlvab came to the village successively as men of religion and established Koranic schools, khaldwi (singular: khalwd)’, they intermarried with the ‘Isaiyab and acquired land through these marriages and by gifts. Each section inhabits a particular part of the village but sections may own plots of land in other parts of the village. Marriages between members of different sections do take place but it is preferable that people should marry within their own sections, partly to keep land and property within the section. Differences in economic, religious and political status exist between the sections. For example, the ‘Isaiyab are the wealthiest and most influential section in the village, whereas the Kawarir, ‘Oragab and Hamad-tiyab are regarded as the religious leaders of the village. Recently, national politics came to play its role in dividing these sections and the members of particular sections. Alignment to different political parties cut across tribal sections but these divisions did not upset, to any great extent, the social and economic relationships between the members of a particular section.

‘Abid: they came to be incorporated into the Nuri community through three channels; they were acquired through the Shaigiya raids in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they were bought in open markets, or they came fleeing from their former masters in neighbouring areas. Some people in Nuri still remember how the ‘abid used to be brought chained to the village and then sold. The community of ‘abid is the only Jabal group which has been in long association with Nuri people. The majority of them live on the Jabal, but there are still some who live with their ex-masters in the village proper. There are a few individuals who own land or who have trees given to them by their ex-

masters and registered in then’ names. Although slavery was abolished after the re-occupation of the Sudan, the ‘abid still have obligations towards their ex-masters. On social occasions such as marriages, circumcisions, funerals, etc., the ‘abid render help and their presence is expected. Publicly and directly, Nuri people do not refer to the ‘abid as such, but in private they may refer to an individual as ‘our slave’, ‘abidnd. The social stigma attached to ‘abid has led the younger generation to leave the village and seek residence and employment in the big towns. Even the older generation of‘abid criticise Nuri people for not having hinniya, affection and help, such as their forebears showed towards the ‘abid. When the exodus of the ‘abid from the village to the

Jabal took place after the flood of 1946 a feeling of independence prevailed among them. This feeling led to the rise of Sa‘id al-Mahi as a leader of the ‘abid in the 1950s. He defended them, dealt with their problems and represented them in various situations. Further, to assert this independence, he established a khalwa and brought a. Jaki to teach the children of the ‘abid. His actions were aimed at establishing some form of equality with Nuri people. However, after his death in the early 1960s the khalwa was abandoned and the movement collapsed.

Halab: the present families of halab in the Nuri community have been there since the turn of this century. Before their departure to the Jabal they used to live with Nuri people. There is one family of halab who have a number of trees in Nuri village registered in their name. On account of this registration and other historical associations, this particular family live permanently in the village but most halab lead a nomadic life. Though this cannot be established with any certainty, the halab claim that they have come from Upper Egypt and relate themselves to the Ja‘afra tribe.[71]

‘Arab: in one context to claim descent from an ‘arab tribe is a matter of pride; in another context, to be an ‘arab indicates a nomadic way of life and an associated inferior

social status. (Conversely, nomads look down upon sedentary agriculturalists.) The present semi-nomadic group of ‘arab in Nuri live on the Jabal and are composed of members of various tribes: Kababish, Manasir, Suwarab (a Shaigiya section) and Ja’aliyin. Their number has increased recently because of the greater economic opportunities resulting from the economic changes in Nuri. The ‘arab help in various agricultural activities, they work as carriers of goods, and they supply livestock to the village. Some of them still return to the Bayuda Desert during the rainy season, kharif, taking their herds with them. Others among them work as middlemen selling livestock and they move from one market to another. The wealthiest have managed to acquire the right of cultivation, tazri‘a[72] over some plots of land in the village, although this intrusion is resented by Nuri people.

These four groups in Nuri community differ in status. In social terms Nuri people hold the highest status and the Jabal people are the lower-status social group. Within the Jabal community the three groups are graded accordingly: first the ‘arab, second the ‘abid, and lowest the halab. This gradation is based upon social rather than economic considerations. The ‘abid have a higher social status than the halab because of their long historical association with Nuri people. The ‘arab have a higher social status than the ‘abid and halab because they have an origin, mu’assalin, i.e. they belong to known tribes which the other two groups do not. In economic terms ‘arab, ‘abid and halab individuals have been able to acquire wealth but this material wealth has not enabled them to improve their social standing in relation to Nuri people. It is stated categorically that a poor Nuri person is ranked higher socially speaking than a wealthy ‘arabi, ‘abd or halabi. The significant feature of the system is that status is attached to groups rather than to individuals.

There are various principles underlying this system of social stratification which I shall now proceed to discuss in more detail.

Occupation: Nuri people are sedentary agriculturalists in the main, but some of them have other occupations as well— traders, merchants, shopkeepers, etc. With increasing prosperity it has become customary for Nuri people to employ manual labourers, tardbla (singular: turbal), to work the land for them. The ‘arab are the principal livestock suppliers of the village and some of them work as animal traders, sabdbi, and others as carriers of goods, jamali. Merchants, shopkeepers and farmers need transport for their goods and the ‘arab use their camels for this purpose. The ‘arab also help to pick the dates and fruit during the harvest season and receive wages in cash and in kind for their services. There are a few ‘arab who hold rights to cultivate land in Nuri village by the tazri‘a but Nuri people discourage this as they do not want their land to go to strangers. The ‘abid help in agricultural tasks and they are given small plots of land to cultivate by their ex-masters on the basis of crop-sharing. Recently, some ‘abid who have bettered themselves economically have come to hold rights to cultivate land by the tazri’a and some others have become traders and merchants. Most of the younger generation of ‘abid leave the village and seek work elsewhere. Some of their women engage in making the native spirit from dates, ‘aragi, in order to earn cash but this is prohibited by law. The halab men work as blacksmiths, an occupation despised by Nuri people; they repair tools, make knives, sickles, charcoal stoves, etc. They wander from one village to another following market days in the area. Cash is paid for their services and sometimes their payment is in kind. For example, a halabi may render services to a farmer and in return the farmer will alow him to cultivate a small plot of land in fodder crops. Halab women, to supplement their livelihood, tour houses in villages and wander in markets selling cookery utensils, clothes, shoes, perfumes and ointments. In the economic system, then, there is an interdependence between Nuri people and the three lower-status groups; the latter are indeed indispensable to Nuri people.

Marriage’. Marriages between Nuri people and members of the three lower-status social groups are strongly disapproved of and discouraged by Nuri people. Similarly, marriages between members of the lower-status groups are disapproved of by these groups. Thus marriage among each of the four groups is largely endogamous. There are, however, a few

exceptions: Nuri men have married some ‘abid women and ‘arab men have married some Nuri women. These marriages are frowned upon, though the children acquire status in the social group of their fathers. Though some of the ‘arab are Shaigiya by tribal affiliation, this makes no difference to their chances of marrying a Nuri woman.

Residence: Nuri people occupy the village proper and land is owned privately by them. The exceptions to this are some ‘abid who are still living among their ex-masters. The majority of ‘abid and all the ‘arab and halab live on the Jabal because they do not own land in the village upon which they could build houses. Recently, a few Nuri people have moved to live on the Jabal because of population pressure on land in Nuri village but this change of residence is not favoured by Nuri people. There is one lineage group of Nuri people who have stayed on the Jabal after the 1946 flood, but they live in isolation.

Social occasions’. Besides the economic interdependence between Nuri people and the three lower-status groups, many individuals have mu-dmala relationships: contributions, mostly in cash and sometimes in kind, are made at marriages, circumcisions, funerals, etc. These mu’dmala relationships bind members of the different groups in a system of reciprocity. The function of these exchanges is to assist people at times of heavy expenditure. Nuri people attend the social occasions of those with whom they have mu’dmala relationships among the lower-status groups and vice versa.

Colour’. There are various shades of skin colour among members of the Nuri community and social stigma is attached to two of these: azrag, black, and ahmar, light. The first is associated with the ‘abid and the second with the halab’, these two groups stand out from the rest of the population in respect of their skin colour. Among Nuri people themselves there is a variety of skin colour but it is rude to refer to a Nuri person as being azrag even though his skin is of this colour

because such a reference equates him with the ‘abid. Moreover, there are some ‘abid whose skin colour is ahmar, similar to that of the halab, but they are considered as ‘abid. In marriages within each group skin colour does not constitute a barrier; it is simply a further distinguishing feature of members of two of the social groups which make up the Nuri community.

Religion and politics’. Although ‘arab, halab and ‘abid observe the rituals of Islam, yet they do not participate in the religious life of Nuri people. They are lax about attending religious ceremonies held by Nuri villagers even if they are invited. The avenues for achieving power and authority in the village are also blocked to them; no member of any one of these groups would be elected to a position of authority in the village. However, they are called upon to lend support when a Nuri person stands for election to a position of power. Indeed, the votes of members of these groups were much sought after in the 1968 General Election because there was a delicate balance of power between the two candidates who stood for election in the Southern Merowe Constituency. Since the participation of members of these groups is called upon only in times of need, they show indifference to what happens in village affairs.

Furthei’more, their physical separation from the village proper makes communication and participation difficult.

*** III

The proverbs and sayings which will be listed in the next section of this paper convey certain themes which support some of the principles of social differentiation already mentioned. I will take each theme separately using proverbs and sayings as illustration.

Descent and origin: Slavery is viewed as a hereditary element which denotes a certain type of personality and an ascribed social status. The descent and origin of an ‘abd mean that he can never

better his social standing even though he may be able to improve his economic position. ‘Abid and halab have no sense of ‘belonging’ and they have no certain affiliation; they are not muassalin, people of known descent. This theme is illustrated in the proverbs, ‘He is a slave through and through’, and ‘His grandfather was a slave, a hundred years later he reverts to being a slave’. There is another proverb in general use which conveys related values: ‘Give your son an uncle’. The particular uncle in question is the mother’s brother who has various obligations towards his sister’s children. If the father is dead, if he is negligent, or if he is absent from the village, the mother’s brother assumes the responsibilities of educating his sister’s children, of providing financial support, food and clothing, of looking after them in times of trouble or difficulties, and sometimes of having them to live with him. Further, a mother’s brother should be hurr, free, and mu’ as sal, a man of known descent.

Inferior social position’. The lower social status of ‘abid and halab is closely linked to the previous theme. There is a proverb equating the low price of the ‘abd with his inferior social position: ‘ The slave’s price is a bag of rice’. The economic dependence and comparative poverty of the ‘abd is indicated in the proverb, ‘He is a slave and let him marry at the same time as his master’. On the one hand, it costs the ‘abd nothing if he marries at the same time as his master; and on the other hand, the marriage of an ‘abd costs his master very little because he is not worthy of lavish festivities in view of his inferior social status. Another proverb, ‘A slave has no slippers except the thorn and no cap but the sun’, suggests that any person of respectability should wear something on his feet and cover his head in public; but the ‘abd is not worthy of these signs of social acceptance on account of his inferiority. It is impossible for an ‘abd to hold a position of power and authority because the traditional system of allocation does not permit this. The proverb, ‘It is a blot on the settlement to have a slave for its headman’ implies that the mind and behaviour of an ‘abd are not equal to those of a ‘free’ man and his advice is not worth listening to; it does not refer to a real situation. This proverb may be said about anyone who is thought unworthy of the position which he holds in society.

Halab are looked upon as people with a different code of behaviour and as social outcasts in the same way as ‘abld and ‘arab. Physically and socially it is thought undesirable by Nuri people to incorporate ‘arab and halab into the community: ‘Tinkers, nomads, lepers and mice, may God keep their homes far from us’. Just as marriages are not made between Nuri people and halab, so is sexual intercourse between members of these groups met with disapproval. It is thought to cause pollution, najasa. Hence the proverb, ‘If you have intercourse with a (female) tinker you will not be clean for forty days until you have scrubbed yourself with a red brick’. Not only Nuri people, but also ‘arab and ‘abid, look down upon the halab. Among Nuri people, ‘arab and ‘abid, the following is said to someone who begs money, speaks loudly or shouts, is a coward, tells a lie, or walks with his wife publicly, ‘Are you a tinker?’

Small-mindedness, lack of understanding and stupidity: Irrespective of the generations which have passed between an ‘abd and his forefathers, and of the various changes in their lives, an ‘abd is regarded as no different from his forefathers in understanding and he is constantly reminded of them. ‘You have no more understanding than your grandfathers’. The ‘abid also use this proverb among themselves but in a rather different sense. They think that they are better than their forefathers and the proverb is used to imply that an ‘abd should know better. Nuri people consider that actions done by an ‘abd, which in normal circumstances would be disapproved of, cannot be taken seriously. If he is caught red-handed, he is not looked upon as being responsible; but it is thought that he came to act in this way because his forebears are known to have behaved in the same manner. Hence the proverb, ‘Do not put the blame on him whose grandmother is a slave’. Further, it is thought that the mind of an ‘abdis static: ‘A slave’s mind does not function till midnight’. This proverb probably refers to a time when water-wheels were in use and the “abid were responsible for their working. There were four main shifts, one of which ended at midnight. The proverb implies that an ‘abd does not think while he is engaged in the monotonous functioning of the water-wheel, but he is ready to talk and exercise his mental faculties after midnight when everyone else is asleep. So an

‘abd has no opportunity to improve his mind. Another proverb which expresses related values suggests that however much something is explained to an ‘abd and instructions given to him to carry out a task, he cannot perform it properly. ‘A slave understands a beating and he does not come to his senses without one’. It is thought that an ‘abd does not learn things in the normal way; but he is regarded as an unintelligent person who keeps repeating his mistakes and only pressure can make him return to his senses.

‘Arab are also thought of as stupid people; if an ‘arabi is told to do something he invariably makes a mistake. Hence the saying, ‘O nomad! Your brain is like that of your camel’.

Loyalty, submission and lack of perseverance: An ^lahd is thought to follow his emotions which guide his actions, rather than his intellect, and there is a proverb to this effect: ‘The slave follows his heart’. If he were to think in a rational way, then his attachment to his master would come to an end; for it is the heart of an ‘abd which binds him to his master. If an ‘abd is told that his master is exploiting him, he will deny this and show contentment with the relationship. He is expected to obey his master and he should not go against the wishes of the latter; submissiveness is a quality demanded from an ‘abd. Hence the proverb, ‘The female slave of the man of religion is obliged to pray’. In general, women are not expected to perform their religious duties with the same rigour as men. This proverb implies that although the female slave is less strict in the performance of her religious obligations, she must nevertheless obey her master. It is also used generally when someone is compelled to undertake a task which he does not want to do, but he has no choice in the matter. ‘‘Abid are considered to lack patience and perseverance as the following proverb suggests, ‘She finished grinding most of the grain and when only a small part was left she threw herself into the river’.

‘Abid can be trusted because of their emotional attachment to their masters, whereas ‘arab cannot be trusted with material goods or women: ‘There is no safety with a nomad’.

In retaliation, ‘arab, ‘abid and halab use sayings among themselves which attribute certain characteristics to Nuri people. They say, ‘The Shaigiya are unstable’; ‘The Shaigiya deceive one another’; ‘The Shaigiya betray one another’; ‘The Shaigiya are fooled easily’. In reality, within the community of Nuri people there is bickering, conflict and friction Which can be observed openly; but the lower-status social groups tend to keep their problems and disputes to themselves and appear, at least outwardly, united.

*** IV

The following proverbs and sayings about ‘abid are used by Nuri people, ‘arab and halab:

(I) ‘Abdan li (la) ga‘r al-gadah[73]

He is a slave through and through.

The literal translation of this proverb is:

He is a slave to the bottom of the wooden bowl.

(II) Al-jiddu[74] tiya[75]

In tamma al-miya

Yarja‘a li tiya

His grandfather was a slave A hundred years later He reverts to being a slave.

Other proverbs in general use express the same underlying idea:

Al-irg dassas The root goes deep.

In tar al-samayd hu ‘abd Even if he reaches heaven position) he is still a slave.

(III) Jibtafahm ajdddak (jidudak)

You have no more understanding than your grandfathers.

(IV) Md biyitwakadh al-habubtu[76] khddim

Do not put the blame on him whose grandmother is a slave.

(V) Fahmufahm al-yadugg al-tuza[77]

His understanding is that of the drummer.

(VI) Al-abd mukhu yaji al-sa’a ithna’ashr[78]

A slave’s mind does not function until midnight.

(VII) Al-‘abdfug galbu

The slave follows his heart.

(VIII) Wad girf[79] in dagguhu ‘arif

Wa in khaluhu rayu tilif

A slave understands a beating

And he does not come to his senses without one.

(IX) Tahanat al-muW[80] ‘ind al-tasi waga’at al-bahr

She finished grinding most of the grain and when only a small part was left she threw herself into the river.

(X) Al-abd rds malak muri (or tasa) ‘aish The slave’s price is a bag of rice.

(XI) Al-abd na‘lu al-diraisa

Wa tdgitu al-shams

The slave has no slippers except the thorn And no cap but the sun.

(XII) Sajam al-hilla al-dalila ‘abd

It is a blot on the settlement to have a slave for its headman.

(XIII) Hu ‘abd wa al-ya‘ris ma‘a sidu

He is a slave and let him marry at the same time as his master.

(XIV) Majbura khadim al-fagi ‘ala al-sald The female slave of the man of religion is obliged to pray.

The following saying and proverb are applied to ‘arab by Nuri people, ‘abid and halab-.

(XV) Yd ‘arabi mukhak gay mukhjamalak

O nomad! Your brain is like the brain of your camel.

(XVI) Wad al-‘arab ma ‘indu aman

There is no safety with a nomad.

The following proverb and saying are applied to halab by Nuri people, ‘abid and ‘arab:

(XVII) In nikta al-halabiya arba‘in yaum[81] md tathar

ili titbaradfug al-tuba al-hamra[82]

If you have intercourse with a (female) tinker you will not be clean for forty days until you have scrubbed yourself with a red brick.

(XVIII) Inta [inti} halabi (halabiya)?

Are you a tinker (female tinker) ?

The following sayings are used of Nuri people by “abid, ^larab and halab:

(XIX) Al-Shawdiga[83] yakhunu ba’adhum

The Shaigiya betray one another.

(XX) Al-Shawaiga yaghadru ba’adhum

The Shaigiya deceive one another.

(XXI) Al-Shawaiga mutartashin

The Shaigiya are unstable.

(XXII) Al-Shawaiga mughaffalln The Shaigiya are fooled easily.

The following proverb is used by Nuri people and “abid’.

(XXIII) Al-halab wa al-arab wa al-jarab wa al-far

Allah la dandlhum ddr

Tinkers, nomads, lepers and mice, May God keep their homes far from us.

The following proverb is in general use by all social groups in the Nuri community:

(XXIV) Saw li waladak khal[84]

Give your son an uncle.

Other proverbs in general use stress the importance of the mother’s brother:

Al-khdl walid

The mother’s brother is father.

Al-walad khdl

The son is mother’s brother.

In Nuri community there are rigid distinctions between the four social groups to which I have referred: the principles which separate members of the different groups are applied in reality and they are expressed in verbal terms. Mobility between the social groups is very difficult: ‘‘arab who have married Nuri women, or who have acquired land by the tagrVa system in the village, are still looked upon by Nuri people as being ‘arab and ‘not one of us’. This also applies to

“abid. It appears that the oppressed social group in Nuri are the ‘abid who, therefore, tend to leave the village because they cannot advance their social status and they can only advance their economic status to a limited extent in Nuri community.

Although the distinctions between the social groups give an impression of disunity in the Nuri community, their separation is counteracted by their functional interdependence. In the economic sphere each group is needed by the other groups. Moreover, all the groups participate in each other’s social occasions. The payment of financial contributions, mu‘dmala, on these occasions binds the social groups in a system of exchange and reciprocity.

While individual achievement is sought after, an individual is looked upon in terms of the status of his social group as a whole. It is this fact which makes it difficult for any individual to raise his social status above the status of the group to which he belongs. This is to say that group status has a greater significance in the system of social stratification than does individual status.

The cardinal factors which determine membership in the highest-status social group of Nuri people are: kinship, land, and the concept of muwatinin, those who belong to the place. A person qualifies for consideration as a muwatin through possessing a combination of kinship affiliation and inherited rights to land in Nuri village. The Jabal people do not possess these qualifications, and however much an ‘abd, ‘arabl or halabi betters himself in other respects he can never be a muwatin.

** VI. Blood Money, Vengeance and Joint Responsibility: The Baggara Case

Ian Cunnison

Evans-Pritchard's account of the consequences of homicide was crucial to his analysis of Nuer politics. Vengeance, leading perhaps to prolonged feuding, operated in the absence of a settlement by blood money when the parties were socially distant from one another or when people took the 'law' into their own hands. Vengeance and blood money are responses to homicide also among the Humr tribe of Baggara Arabs (whose seasonal movements fringe those of the north-western Nuer). The customs of these two peoples, as may be expected from the diverse historical backgrounds, are different in detail. But there is a more basic distinction; for while the Nuer customs at the time that Evans-Pritchard observed them were for all we know peculiarly their own, those of the Baggara have to be taken in the setting of a wider system, the law of Islam, and of the constraint of a coercive authority, the Sudan Penal Code.

The Humr are part of the Arab Muslim world and belong, if peripherally, to its long and extensive cultural tradition. They claim to be descended from pre-Islamic Arabs, with whom they probably have some physical and cultural continuity: it is likely that lineal ancestors of some present-day Humr lived in Arabia before the time of the Prophet and that some later ancestors left Arabia for North Africa, whence they made their way to the south of the Sahara and occupied with others the present 'Baggara belt'.[85]

Just as the allegation of Humr ancestry goes back to pre-Islamic days, so docs the tradition of blood money in the Arab world generally. Robertson Smith, Procksch, and others have discussed the complex of related practices including talion, blood money, and the feud, and have shown that continuities existed between pre-Islamic and Islamic precepts.[86] Nevertheless the Humr do not in these matters follow either Islamic law or what is commonly understood about the pre-Islamic practice; but these are the basis of many received notions about nomadic Arab society and so they will be considered for the argument of this paper. This leads up to a contrast between what the Humr do and certain classical interpretations of the form of Arab societies; in particular it will be shown that the different ways in which Humr organise their blood money and vengeance institutions are hard to reconcile with ideas of joint responsibility shared by tribesmen of a certain degree of kinship. It will be necessary also to examine the relationship

between Humr practice and the modern binding Sudan Penal Code, in order to appreciate what in Humr practice is affected by it. The line of argument thus has to set together three sources of law, Shari’a, qanun, and ‘urf-—Islamic law, the secular law of the state, and tribal custom.

Robertson Smith argued that changes in the social organisation took place in Arabia shortly before the rise of Islam. From a situation in which a ‘tribe’ (hayy) of agnates shared in vengeance, inheritance, and the distribution of blood money, there was a move to place emphasis on the ‘family’ and, he claims, it was this new recognition of degrees of kinship within the tribe which led to ‘the disintegration of society in the fraternal wars which rent Arabia in the century before the Flight’.[87]

As a result of the Prophet’s entry on the scene of growing insecurity, attempts were made at control; and a Shari’a procedure developed which, while generally accepting talion and blood money (but outlawing the feud) brought significant changes into them. J. N. D. Anderson has summarised the nature of these changes: ‘only the guilty party, and not his fellow-tribesmen, was liable to be killed... and then only if the homicide.... was regarded as both deliberate and wrongful, and after the facts had been established before the Ruler or Judge. No attempt was made, however, to change the system itself, so it was still for the... nearest heirs... to bring the matter before the judge; and it was still in their absolute discretion to pardon the culprit altogether, to settle the case out of Court, to accept the payment of blood-money instead of retaliation, or to claim the right of appropriate retaliation in person’.[88]

The Shari‘a rules of blood money (diyd) and talion (kisas) are complex. Different situations give rise to different precepts. These vary, for example, according to the respective status in Islam of killer and victim; to the status of the killing, deliberate, ‘quasi-deliberate’, or accidental; to the manner of the death whether from individual action or affray; to the Rite followed by the respective parties, and so on. Similar problems also attend compensation or retaliation for wounds, and the types and circumstances of woundings give rise to actions or payments of different kinds. This paper refers only to the situation of

homicide between Muslim males. The most general of the precepts which came to be recognised about them in the Shari‘a may be outlined as follows.

For the regulation of talion it was laid down that premeditated killing alone deserved it (killings in retaliation being of course exempt). Heirs of the blood alone could exact talion, only after a court hearing, only if they requested it unanimously, and only upon the killer himself. The heirs of the blood had the right to choose between talion, blood money, and total remission. Blood money was payable at different rates according to the degree of intention shown in the act. It was measured in terms of camels, money, or gold, the amounts varying with the nature of the killing and the victim’s status. In deliberate murder, the killer alone paid; in other forms of homicide the group of people known as the ⁱakila paid. The recipient was the heir of the blood, who then distributed it to those who would receive inheritance from the deceased, and in the same proportions. If the killer was among the heirs of the blood, vengeance was not exacted and blood money was not paid.[89]

For these rules to operate it was necessary for civil cases to be brought to properly constituted courts whose decisions could be enforced. Not all Muslim societies have lain within the orbit of such effective enforcement, and nomadic tribes have predominantly lain outside. E. Tyan has said for the camel nomads of the Middle East generally: “Among the Bedouin tribes, with their innate hostility to a state organisation, the system of private vengeance tempered by the practice of diya still survives upon a basis of customs in several particulars—though they differ from tribe to tribe—and which often contradict the precepts of the Koran and the rules of Islamic law. The efforts of governments concerned have not been able to achieve more than the imposition upon these groups of certain regulations of a procedural character and of limited scope”.[90]

This generalisation about Bedouin can be applied to the Huinr as they existed until the latter part of the nineteenth century. For some centuries before then they had clung to the edges of various of the sub-Saharan sultanates, avoiding integration with them. While in the nineteenth century much of the present Sudan, including Kordofan province, was an outpost of the Ottoman empire, records from the period suggest that Baggara were

never under the effective administration of the Khedivial province headquarters at El Obeid. Huinr were interested in avoiding tribute payment and this was enough to make them use their mobility to keep out of the way of authorities, and it is most unlikely that the Turks had the power to regulate the consequences of homicide. During the Mahdiya, when the Sudanese again became independent, the Humr as Baggara were an integral and important part of the new Islamic state.[91] But in the tribal areas there was, during this period, a disruption of the social organisation since most of the men were in Omdurman and the customary pattern of relationships could not be said to exist in the tribal lands. It was only with the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1899 and the further consolidation with independence in 1956 that there has been direct and effective control by government authorities of the Humr as a local community. Humr activities relating to homicide and its aftermath came under a state with power to coerce. A system of courts was established and alongside them a network of Sharp a courts and assessors was part of the formal legal structure of the country.

Accordingly at those times when the Humr have been formally administered it has been by a secular foreign regime, the Condominium, and by its successor, the Republic, which by and large has continued until now (1970) the administration of justice as the Condominium established it. In other words, in carrying out their customs relating to homicide they have never been a part of an Islamic state strictly administering the Shari‘a; but they came to constitute part of a secular state strictly administering a penal code.

Humr practice differs from the SharPa precepts in many details but the general principles are held in common: homicide is followed by blood money or retaliation; the upset of relationships to which it leads is adjusted locally. But between Humr practice and the Sudan Penal Code the difference is basic. Such a difference exists where codes patterned on the western model and the Shari‘a are found together. One of the areas in which this difference is most evident is homicide, for what in the SharPa lay in the realm of delict is in the new codes treated as a crime against the state; what for the state is the worst of crimes could only doubtfully under the SharPa be considered to contain a ‘criminal’ factor. For the state, a homicide is followed by the creation of a special relation between the state and the killer. The beneficiary of the penalty is the state itself. For the SharPa, the state enters not as an

agent of criminal justice but as an intermediary between the killer on the one hand and the victim's heirs of the blood on the other; it controls the retaliatory act; the beneficiary of the penalty is the kin group of the victim. For the Humr, the state had no part; there was no state that mattered; and the adjustment the Humr set in motion was between a range of kin of the victim on the one hand, and the killer and a range of his kin on the other. Here as in Islamic law the adjustment takes the form of retaliation or blood money. With the state it is punishment. The state is hostile to the notion of retaliation which it views as another and aggravated homicide, leading to another act of punishment; but it is less clear about the moral and legal status of blood money, and this has led different state organisations into confusions about its purpose and inconsistencies in its treatment.

Some of these confusions and inconsistencies emerge in a study by M. J. L. Hardy of the developments in Ottoman codes after 1839 when 'the principles of responsibility upon which Islamic law had traditionally been founded were gradually superseded... by legislation derived from foreign models'.[92] Elements of punishment and of civil reparations have at one time or another been included, resulting in various degrees of logical congruity between the parts of the system. In the Sudan also the question of blood money has had much attention from the authorities. Here the matter is made complicated because of the wide range of pre-existing practices in both Muslim and pagan societies of which the new legislation had to take some account. The traditional systems, Muslim and pagan, had in common that there was no state-demanded punishment. To the new legislators it was no longer enough for a homicide to be settled by force or pecuniary adjustment between groups of kin; the state had to take charge; any local adjustment that was made was subordinate in the state's view to the punishment of the culprit. The state could not be seen to agree that murder might be settled as if it were of the same order as a debt. And while the legal authorities in the Sudan decided that blood money could continue to exist, it became an optional extra to standard practice in the wake of homicide rather than an inherent part of it.

The courts of the Sudan arc guided in these matters now by Criminal Court Circular 18. Its issue in 1932 was preceded by wide-ranging correspondence between the Chief Justice and legal authorities in the provinces, and some of this has been published.[93] It shows that the use of blood money, while

tolerated, is hedged about by restrictions particularly in relation to the balance which the legal authorities see as important between the idea of punishment on the one hand and the idea of compensation on the other. Reasons adduced for allowing blood money to continue at all included a desire to “satisfy the native idea of justice” and the recognition of its effectiveness as a peace-keeping mechanism.[94] The Circular reads as follows:[95]

1. It is not possible to lay down any fixed rule as to what extent, and how, the customary payment of dia in cases of homicide should be taken into consideration in arriving at the proper punishment under the Code, but where that custom is applicable and it is allowed (whether in addition to a sentence of imprisonment on the actual offender or not) the general principles set out in the following paragraph should be followed.

2. (a) Dia is essentially a tribal custom. It should not therefore be considered in detribalised communities or towns.

(b) Dia should not be considered in cases of murder where appropriate sentence is sentence of death. But where a Court passes sentence of death and is satisfied that on the event of such sentence being commuted ‘dia’ would be payable in accordance with tribal custom, a recommendation to that effect may be recorded.

(c) In tribal affrays, or where the accused is immature or where the death is due to accident or where the actual offender is unknown but it is known that the death was caused by one or more member of a tribe or section, dia being the customary mode of settlement may be allowed, whether with or without a sentence of imprisonment. Of course, in some of the class of cases mentioned above no offence against the Penal Code has been committed at all and dia is a complete settlement.

3. Where an offence has been committed and there is sufficient evidence to put the offender on trial the case should be tried under the Code of Criminal Procedure whether or not the custom of dia is applicable.

4. Where the Court is satisfied that the case falls within that class of cases which are customarily concluded by the payment of dia the Court should impose the sentence which it considers appropriate under the Penal Code and add a recommendation to the effect that if all parties agree to dia, and if the dia is duly paid, then the sentence should be reduced by a certain period. The length of that period should be assessed by the Court and set out in the recommendation.

This directive applies to Muslim and pagan areas in the Sudan alike. The leejal treatment of homicide is uniform throughout the Sudan. There is indeed a difference between the legal processes generally in the north and the south, for where all parties are Muslims the existence of Shari'a assessors in civil courts guarantees them a hearing in those spheres of law that indicate it; but where the parties are not Muslims naturally the SharP a assessors do not intervene. Section 5 of the Civil Justice Ordinance lays down that 'where in any suit or other proceeding in a Civil Court any question arises regarding succession, inheritance, wills, legacies, marriage, divorce, family relations, or the constitution of Wakfs, the rule of decision shall be (a) any custom applicable to the parties concerned which is not contrary to justice, equity and good conscience...' The Chiefs' Courts Ordinance (for southern provinces) and Native Courts Ordinance (for northern provinces) also lay down that 'native law and custom' are applicable if they are not contrary to 'justice morality and order'.[96]

The Shari'a has provisions which govern the consequences of homicide. However the criminal aspect of it which the Penal Code introduced means that the burden of dealing with it lies in the criminal courts. Similarly the Shari'a has provisions which govern the administration of blood money. But the Ordinances do not take specific mention of blood money and the Circular empowers criminal courts to consider whether blood money should be paid or not in cases they hear. Subject, thus, to this intervention by the criminal courts, it appears that when blood money is taken cognisance of in the courts it comes under the category of 'native law and custom', whether it is operated by Muslims or pagans. In practice this appears to mean that on occasions when some matter of blood money turns up in the course of a civil or criminal case, it is treated not as a matter on which a Shari'a jurist has to

pronounce, but as a matter which can be adjudicated by anyone of the court who has a specialised knowledge of local custom.

The blood money of the Arabs in the Sudan is thus determined by neither the Shari‘a nor the qdniin. The secular law recognises it as inoffensive local custom and the authorities take an interest in it for the role it plays in the maintenance of public order. As for the Shari‘a it is unlikely that the jurists are embarrassed by the divergence from Islamic law, for while ‘the consensus of scholars denied conscious recognition to custom’, yet ‘custom and customary law have coexisted with the ideal theory of Islamic law, while remaining outside its system, in the whole of the Islamic world’. [97] Shari‘a courts appear not to be approached on blood-money questions.

The wording of the Criminal Court Circular is ambiguous, but it seems that criminal courts can ‘allow’ blood money to be paid in certain cases, and can ‘recommend’ that if it is paid then the appropriate sentence given should be lessened. But this is as far as it lets the courts go.[98] The details of any particular payment or receipt of blood money are worked out at tribal level by the groups mainly concerned in the event. For the Humr, the nazirs, who have courts with limited powers, take a part in the negotiations but it is likely that they do this in their capacity as ‘notables’ or as political officers (rather than as legal authorities), whose presence adds formality to the proceedings and who influence at times the details of the payments from their overall view of the crisis in the local community.

I turn now to homicide in the community of Humr. Some detail on this has been published[99] and I simply outline the procedure, which will then be reviewed in the framework of a different argument. Certain established moves are regularly made, but there is one area of great flexibility, and that is the composition of the groups that cooperate in payment and receipt of blood money. This is an issue that will be considered in the context of views about common blood and collective responsibility, which orientalists have seen as the crux of Bedouin societies.

When a killing occurs among the Humr, the usual procedure is that ajawid, senior men who are not identified with the

contending parties, immediately come to the place, seize the male kin of the dead man and physically restrain them from attempting retaliation. They get the victim’s camp to move out of the area. They call the police; these take the killer, as well as the dead man’s kin, whom they imprison while their desire for vengeance cools. A guarantor of the peace is named, usually a man of standing of the victim’s lineage and closely linked to the other. When the result of the trial (which takes place outside the tribal lands) is known talk of blood money begins. Eventually a notable connected with the killer goes to meet the other party, proclaims the guilt of his own, and offers blood money. Separate discussions follow, amongst potential participants, about who is to pay on the one hand and who is to receive on the other; finally up to sixty head of cattle are handed over. After a while a further meeting, a murda”, or final reconciliation, is arranged, with the purpose of restoring the parties to their former relationships.

It may happen however that homicide is followed not by blood money but by a vengeance killing. Thus an affray which incurs deaths may be followed by another affray, which results in unequal total losses, and so the matter may continue for a while; or else the kin of the dead, after their release, may have less than the normal restraint and resolve to kill in vengeance. This is much less usual, although a vengeance killing may occur at any time if the personalities of the dead man’s close kin are such that the death continues to rankle with them; it may occur even after a settlement by blood money. Vengeance killings are carried out always by one or two of the very close circle of the dead man’s kin; the victim may be the killer himself if he is not imprisoned, or anyone from his very close circle. This can in turn lead to countervengeance, but mutual killing does not continue for long. Pacification occurs in one of two ways: either there is extreme pressure from neutrals, including the nazirs, to bring the affair to an end; or else one of the parties feeling itself grievously offended will move to another part of the country, perhaps even to another tribe, to be out of all contact. Even then they are not forgotten but after a generation approaches are made to ask them to return, with the offer of a generous price of peace.

On any killing, the appropriate behaviour for uncommitted people and for the elders of the groups concerned is to press for restraint and eventual settlement by blood money. But side by side with this, it is equally appropriate for the younger kin of the dead man, and for youths in general,

to speak of the need for retaliation. This also has the approval of their girl friends. The threat of vengeance after a killing is felt as very real, and the killer's kin go in fear and travel circumspectly in case of ambush. It appears nevertheless that even before the legal penalties for vengeance were brought in, settlement by blood money was the usual outcome. We should ask why. Although they are recognised as alternatives, they are not equivalents, either in their immediate effects or in their underlying consequences. For the receipt of blood money marks a step on the way to the restoration of relations, while resort to vengeance makes eventual settlement less likely.[100]

The two accepted modes of procedure have opposite effects.

There are few situations in which the outcome of a homicide is predictable. For the Nuer Evans-Pritchard speaks of the 'likelihood' of a homicide developing into a blood feud:[101] some groups may settle by blood money while others in similar structural situations may resort to violence. Prediction is possible only in a statistical sense. For the Humr, the government's non-Islamic view of homicide and vengeance no doubt has some effect on the relative frequency with which these occur (the avenger takes no care to hide, but boasts, and shaves off his beard for the world to know). This apart, we must recognise that blood money and vengeance are not equally political decisions. Blood money comes as a result of a deliberate choice in which most of the interested parties have participated, while vengeance is a matter of an emotional and personal nature or else the result of chaos following an affray. There is an element of chance, in the personalities of the dead man's close kin; but the influential decision-makers are to be found among those who have restoration of relations as a high value.

The varying influence of structural relations on the consequences of homicide have been often enough written about. For the Tonga of Zambia, Colson claimed that the feud (as a lasting series of vengeance and counter-vengeance killings) could not occur, the society being such that, despite the acknowledged duty of vengeance incumbent on the victim's matrilineal group, its members were effectively prevented from feuding by the interlocking of individual and group interests.[102] In a society like the Nuer of Evans-Pritchard's model, these conditions for restraint exist, but only at

village and tertiary-tribal level.[103] For the Bedouin Arabs of Cyrenaica, Peters has indicated levels of segmentation at which responses of particular kinds take place: notably feuding between secondary sections, and blood money and vengeance between tertiary sections (both, in this case, ‘achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships’.[104])

For the Humr it appears that there is no level at which relationships are of such little consequence that they can be dominated by feuding. Ecological factors at least partially account for this. The terrain is such that it is possible for Humr to spread out in the dry season, but the rains quarters are cramped, and especially in the early weeks of the rains the pools fill irregularly and herders from all omodiyas are compelled to concentrate where the water happens to be. The situation demands great forbearance in dry years. This same need to intermingle is recognised also in the absence of sectional land rights, tribesmen being free to set up camp in any part of the whole tribal land, no matter to what section of the tribe they belong.

Permanent hostilities are out of order, but hostilities as well as alliances of shorter term exist and change with passing events. Homicides force people to declare where they stand, and the patterns of alliance and hostility, far from following predetermined lines, are fluid. In the payment and receipt of blood money on the one hand, and in the alignment of hostility in situations of vengeance and counter-vengeance on the other, people unite on different principles. In this respect Humr practice is clearly distinct from pre-Islamic practice according to most accounts, and from the precepts of Islamic law.

In Islamic law the group of people who participate in the payment of blood money is called the ‘dkila. While Humr do use some technical terms from the Shari‘a in their discussion of blood money they do not use this one, but instead speak of people who bedrubu jemi‘—‘pay together’. The ‘akila, in Brunschvig’s definition, is ‘the group of persons upon whom devolves, as the result of a natural joint liability with the person who has committed homicide or inflicted bodily harm, the payment of compensation in cash or kind’. He points out that in this there was continuity with pre-Islamic practice: ‘the schools of law are thus virtually unanimous on the point that the “akila

comprise, as in the pre-Islamic period, the ‘asaba of the guilty party, that is to say the male relatives or

agnates’. Later the nature of the ‘dkila was changed to fit the urban situation; its use was gradually eroded; and it ‘seems that collective responsibility today exists only in societies where the joint responsibility of the tribe is still an active force, for example among the Arabic-speaking nomads...; customary law then predominates, only influenced in varying measure by Muslim law’.[105]

It is hardly possible to suggest which, if any, Humr group corresponds in its extent with the ‘akila since a clear definition of this is lacking. Islamic scholarship is weak on many details of crucial importance to the anthropologist, and the meanings of groups called family, kindred, clan, tribe, or agnates, in terms of which ‘akila is usually discussed, are vague. But it seems clear at any rate that no Humr group corresponds in function with the ‘dkila, or with the khams of certain Bedouin tribes;[106] for Humr have no permanent or semi-permanent groups, or series of groups varying with the relationship of killer and victim, which participate in payment. Inter-tribal cases apart, it is impossible to predict who the participants will be. For the most part blood-money discussions raise basic political problems, such as who is willing to cooperate with whom in payment and receipt. Humr indeed have a model of the proper participants, based on the omodiya and its constituent lineages; but there is every time an overlay of tactical considerations which brings endless variability to the patterns.

According to the relationship of killer and victim there are three broad categories of arrangement within which the variations take place. In the comparatively unusual case of a killing between the Humr and another tribe the blood money has the special name of diyat el-saff-, [107] the arrangements are controlled to some extent, since they are watched over by the government for reasons of public order. There used to be no blood money between tribes but separate agreements between pairs

of neighbouring tribes now lay down that settlement is by blood money, and specify the amounts. These written agreements are lodged with provincial headquarters. The tribe however arranges the details of their administration. If the Humr are the payers every family is involved in payment and if they are the recipients every family is involved in receipt. The nazirs first divide the amounts in set proportions between the omodiyas, but from that stage the sharing within each omodiya is worked out by representatives of its parts.

The second case, blood money between different omodiyas of Humr, is distinct from the first in that very few groups, or none, from outside the omodiyas concerned participate.[108] But according to the local situation at the time the whole of the omodiya may or may not take part. In this case, as always in the first, there is usually no overlapping between donor and recipient groups.

The third case, which is much the commonest, is blood money within the omodiya. At this level the pattern of payment and receipt is widely variable, not only in terms of participants, but also in terms of the methods of sharing out the sums between sub-groups of payers, and between families within the sub-groups. And it happens not uncommonly that there is some overlap between donors and recipients. This point gives a distinctive quality to blood money within the omodiya. For in the first two cases, in inter-tribal and inter-omodiya transactions, there is a separation between the paying and receiving groups. Some are the guilty, they collect cattle and hand them over to others, quite different, who are the aggrieved. Each participant is squarely on one side or the other. A gift of wealth from the killer and his people compensates another set of people for a death. There is a clear moral separation between the two sides, and the arrangement is not incompatible with the notion that a group shares a joint responsibility.

Whereas an omodiya as a group cannot withhold from inter-tribal cases, constituent parts of an omodiya can withhold from inter- and intra-omodiya cases. The omodiya is the group

within which negotiations and debates go ahead concerning the way a blood-money transaction is to be administered. There is a wide choice for the constituent parts of an omodiya in reference to any transaction, for a given group may pay and not receive, or receive and not pay, or do both, or do neither. Decisions here are a major field of political choice.

These decisions are slowly worked out at a series of meetings called by lineages of various orders of segmentation. In this particular blood payment are they going to participate? If they arc who does it mean cooperating with? In terms of current relations within the omodiya do they accept the implications of such cooperation? Are they going to divide the shares straight away according to the number of men, or first among the number of constituent lineages? These tactical considerations derive largely from the power relations within the omodiya surrounding the office of Omda.[109] The decisions which are reached on these and similar matters reflect quite subtly, so refined are the possible variations, how the parts of the omodiya stand to one another. Various transactions overlap in time, for injuries as well as deaths lead to them, and the result is a continuing series of meetings, ostensibly about blood money, but in reality defining the momentary state of relations within the omodiya which are given their clearest expression in terms of blood-money participation.

No two payments follow the same pattern. If relations within the omodiya are good all its members may be assessed as having to pay something and having to receive something, but the proportions may differ according to various considerations. Even if all agree to participate, they do not necessarily agree to participate in equal measure. It is much more typical however that some of the lineages withhold participation on account of hostility arising from some other matter—but they do not do this evenly. Cutting across the agnatic kinship shared by all members of an omodiya, there arc tactical hostilities creating distance between agnatically close lineages and tactical alliances drawing more distant lineages together. The result can be a pattern of payment and receipt which bears little relation to the formal agnatic structure.

One conclusion towards which this tends, is that within the omodiya there is no enduring entity which blood money is directed to compensating. If we think in terms of compensation for a loss, and restitution made on account of guilt, two things do not fit. One is that the associates differ from occasion to occasion, and the other is that the same people may be involved in both sides of a single transaction—as both offenders and offended, guilty and innocent, debtors and creditors, donors and recipients. The omodiya is marked out as the unit within which these opposing categories become mixed.

But two other indications bear on the question of joint responsibility. One concerns the way in which blood-money shares, in both payment and receipt, are divided, for in any transaction distinction is made between ‘the share of the blood’ and ‘the share of the many’. On the killer’s side the share of the blood (usually called the ‘spear-head’) constitutes a third of the total and is due from the killer and his immediate agnates (father, brothers, possibly father’s brothers). The remaining two thirds is the share of the many due from the rest of the participants in proportions worked out separately for each occasion. On the side of receipt the share of the blood, two thirds, goes to the father and brothers of the dead man and the remaining third to all the other participants in shares worked out for each occasion.

This indicates that some special responsibility lies upon the dydl rajl (father and sons) on each side. There is, however, a contrary indication, in the way in which Humr use the expression ‘blood is indivisible’. This invariably relates to the ‘blood’ of a larger group, the surra: this is the five- to seven-generation lineage which forms the basis of the camp, and within which blood money is not paid for homicide. Affairs of blood, as many other events, close its ranks and point to it as a group with corporate interests. In the context of blood money the phrase implies that whoever else in the omodiya may decline to pay along with the killer, the surra always will pay; that if the killer is in difficulties over a blood debt it is fellow members of his surra who have to help him with his share. When a man wishes to move permanently away from his own kin, this is the smallest unit into which he becomes incorporated, for the same reason. Despite the metaphorical unity however, members of the killer’s surra do not usually pay more than the ‘many’; members of the dead man’s surra may receive only marginally more than the many. It would appear that

although the surra blood is ‘indivisible’, those who are customarily responsible for and who are the main beneficiaries of blood money are the immediate agnates; and that the many, including the rest of the surra, are people who willingly help, rather than people who are inescapably liable.

In situations of vengeance and counter-vengeance alignments again occur, but not for the enactment of a specific task like the payment or receipt of blood money. While acts of vengeance take place within narrowly delimited groups of kin on each side, scarcely more than the ‘iydl rajl, the sense if not the physical expression of hostility extends more widely. Humr define and name various degrees of hostility, and these correspond to various kinds of avoidance behaviour. The generic expression is beinathum tar (there is vengeance between them); the specific types are muwagafa (stoppage) in which males avoid one another socially, and mugdtaⁱa (cutting off; in which pre-existing arrangements to join together in bloodmoney transactions are cancelled, and there is more widespread avoidance. Such states of hostility typically activate fewer people than blood-money transactions do: whereas bloodmoney payments may enmesh all members of an omodiya, states of vengeance are usually confined to the two minor lineages within it most closely concerned. Others within the omodiya may or may not take sides on the issue, but the institutionalised expression of hostility is limited in this way.

These remarks indicate that just as there is a clear difference between the consequences of blood money and vengeance, so there is a clear difference in the way in which the two are organised. And the organisation of each differs from that of agnation. This being so, it is worth while to point to the contrast with the classical accounts of nomadic Arab society. Thus, in Robertson Smith these three features of social organisation arc congruent. He says: ‘The key to all divisions and aggregations of Arab groups lies in the action and reaction ol two principles: that the only effective bond is a bond of blood, and that the purpose of society is to unite men for offence and defence. These two principles meet in the law of the blood-feud, the theory of which is that the blood-bond, embracing all men who bear a common nisba or group-name, constitutes a standing obligation to take up the quarrel of every tribal brother.’[110] And further, ‘Every tribesman risked his life equally in the blood-feud, and every tribesman might be called

upon to contribute to the atonement by paying which blood-feud could be healed. This is still the rule of the desert.’[111] The separation of organisations within Humr society means that they can be seen to interpret, rather than to define, a political reality. In the first place there is the great fluidity in arrangements; through this, political choice can clearly be expressed. Secondly the fact that participation in blood-money transactions is wider than in instituted expressions of hostility, can be seen as a customary recognition of the politics of ecological constraint. The environment forces a degree of cooperation which is incompatible with the hostile state and the wide participation in blood money brings public opinion to reinforce this as a value.

The difference between these organisations, and their fluidity, invite consideration of certain classical notions of joint responsibility. It would be a mistake to consider that the members of the omodiya, or any other unit, share in a responsibility such that all are punishable for the guilt of one. More especially is it a mistake to consider that there is some sort of mystical bond of blood, covering a particular agnatic span, through which the act of one of its members becomes the moral responsibility of all. In the Shari’a, responsibility became personalised: only the killer could be killed in talion. Yet there are suggestions that the idea of the ‘dkila did still include legal-philosophical notions of collective responsibility. Brunschvig has said: ‘Attention must be drawn to a theoretical discussion... on the nature of the obligation devolving on the ⁱakila. Does this obligation rest on the ‘akila “per se”... that is, are they considered as debtors “per se”, or does it result from a legal “transfer”... from the guilty party, the “acceptance of responsibility”... being made by the group?’ His own view on the varying interpretation in different schools of Islamic law is that the first hypothesis would ‘doubtless tally better... with the primitive conception by which the clan, jointly responsible, feels itself bound to offer reparation collectively, as much or even more on its own behalf as on behalf of the guilty party.’[112]

The Condominium government in the Sudan was no less ambiguous, for its legal and administrative philosophies clashed in respect of this problem. The government tolerated blood money which carries an implicit suggestion of joint responsibility; but if the culprit was known, his sole criminal

responsibility was recognised. On the other hand, the principle of joint responsibility was also implicit in the device of the ‘administrative fine’ by which the administration, unable to find the perpetrator of some offence, fined as a whole the omodiya, or other lineage, to which they had good reason to know he belonged. The device was specially handy, since there was already a mechanism for gathering the fine—namely the well-established procedure of blood-money collection. (Before the days of personally assessed taxation, ‘tribute’ also was collected from the tribe by the same method.) Thus the political officers were asserting the principle of joint responsibility, whose validity the legal officers had abolished by their introduction of a criminal code.

I have reviewed for various sizes of groups the occasions on which they exercise some sort of corporate activity in the wake of homicide and suggested that it is difficult to identify any one group whose members are united in some ultimately binding moral collectivity or joint liability. The ‘iyal rajl perhaps comes nearest to it, being avengers and avengees, and having the bulk of blood money to pay and receive, but this is no more than a group of father and sons who are bound already by intense family intimacy and common interests in the herd. In blood money all others are helpers, even the surra which is the ideological ‘blood’ unity in Humr metaphor. The minor lineage, which gives strong moral support in situations of vengeance, has a special role to play in blood money—but there is nothing automatic about the support it gives, and groups within it can opt out if they so wish.

The position of the omodiya is special. Except for the intertribal case, in blood money it is the largest unit of potential cooperation; in exceptional circumstances when political relations make it possible there could be complete representation of all its families on both sides of a ti’ansaction. It is in this sense the ultimate simultaneous diya-paying and diya-receiving unit. Potentially therefore all its members could, through a blood-money transaction, express their solidarity with both sides of a dispute within it and so emphatically assert the omodiya’s unity in the face of internal strain. That this seldom (if ever) happens is only partly significant: for Humr carry with them the idea that this is what ought to happen, and do what they can to achieve it in the face of political constraints. Significantly this is not only the smallest unit with a modern government-sponsored authority position (which

gives rise to most of the political struggles in it); it is also the smallest of the three levels of lineage segment called by the name gabila, a word usually translated as ‘tribe’. The joint responsibility which this ‘tribe’ carries is not the sharing of responsibility for a death, but that of exercising pressure against divisiveness by the widest possible participation in the peace-bringing blood-money agreements.

These data do not sustain the notion of a ‘natural joint liability’[113] for homicide vested in any particular kind of group. The Humr are one of numerous tribes of Arab nomads, about whom many generalisations of this sort have been made. A close look at processes within similar societies might well suggest that for them, also, generalisations based on knowledge of pre-Islamic documents and the precepts of Islamic scholars are not enough; and that however strongly ideology may appear to dominate them, this must give way in the face of an understanding of the political and ecological setting within which social crises take place.

** VII. Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe

Talal Asad

*** I

It has been said by critics that when modern anthropologists talk in terms of “the tribe”, they are talking about a rapidly diminishing world (“the world of the primitive”), or misrepresenting much of the real world (“the Third World”), because there are now very few communities, if any, which are politically or economically isolated, or whose social boundaries are clearly and permanently set. Recoiling from this charge, anthropologists have reacted in a variety of ways. Some have avoided the problem altogether by choosing areas of research which could not in any sense of the word be called tribal. Others, refining an older tradition, have addressed themselves to the problem of defining “the tribe” as a complex empirical unit: they have tried to sort out traits, traditions, linguistic and ethnic criteria, in order to describe more precisely the overlaps and interconnections between “tribal”

units, and to trace the fluid historical boundaries between such units, as well as between units that arc defined as “tribal” and others described as “national” or “imperial”.[114] Finally, there has been the attempt to understand “tribalism” as a new phenomenon in its own right, in which “the tribe” is treated as a cognitive category by which rural immigrants in cosmopolitan milieux identify and rank themselves and each other.[115]

Although both these concerns have proved worthwhile, very few anthropologists have tried to identify the ideological significance of the concept of tribe or its equivalents—i.e. its significance as a concept which, besides representing a collective identity, aspiration, and way of life, has the quality of masking divisions, contradictions of interest, forms of exploitation, and conflicting modes of social experience. But to understand the significance of concepts in this way it is necessary to criticise them—i.e. to attempt to discover the kind of error they contain and what its social determinants and consequences are. One reason why this approach has not found general favour among anthropologists is connected with the doctrine that in his treatment of indigenous social concepts the social scientist may re-interpret the data but not criticise it.[116] The standard anthropological view on this matter is well represented in the following remarks by Leach: “The anthropologist as distinct from the philosopher is concerned with what is the case rather than with what ought to be the case. To this end a dialectic of good and bad, free and unfree seems too polemical. The anthropologist’s concern is not with right and wrong but with rights and obligations.”[117] The position taken in the present paper is very different: although it is inappropriate for the anthropologist to apply arbitrary labels of “good” and “bad” to his data, there is an important sense in which what is the case in the social world can only be properly understood if one is prepared to apply certain critical standards—within which the factual and moral aspects cannot always be clearly distinguished and, where they can be so distinguished, should not be completely severed.

In what follows I attempt a brief exposition and schematic explanation of the structure of political inequality in the Kababish tribe. I do so on the explicit assumption that no adequate explanation of this phenomenon can be attempted unless it incorporates a critical approach towards the concepts that help to maintain it, which in the present case are all articulated through the categorising concept of “tribe”. The criticism as it is developed here is

necessarily directed at three targets which are connected in a triangular relationship of mutual confirmation—the colonial administrator, the Kababish, and the anthropologist. For the first, “the tribe” as an administrative convenience represented a unit of authentic interest, regulated but not shaped by the colonial government. For the second, “the tribe” as an experience of structured inequality appeared as part of a just and natural world of rulers and ruled. For the third, “the tribe” as a theoretical construct for approaching the problem of political domination was ultimately based on specific assumptions about the nature of man, assumptions which he shared with the colonial administrator to the extent that both participated in a common cultural tradition. The first helped to create, the second to maintain, and the third to validate the structure of inequality which was the tribe.

*** II

The present pattern of political inequality among the Kababish is the product of historical circumstances which I have described in detail elsewhere.[118] Here I recapitulate only the most important events.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries “Kababish” was the name of a loose confederation of tribes of diverse origin which occupied what is now the north-western region of the Sudan, straddling three major caravan routes from the Nile valley to Central and Western Africa. There was no clear-cut boundary which marked off a given set of tribes as belonging permanently to “the Kababish”; groups appear to have joined and left the confederation at different periods, and migrated from one locality to another. In the nineteenth century the confederation was headed by a Paramount Shaikh who was recognised and supported by the Turco-Egyptian regime, then ruling the Sudan. Although it is difficult to say precisely what was his formal authority, it is clear that his de facto power over members of the confederation was uneven.

It is also hard to say what was the internal constitution of the Kababish tribes, except that some of the shaikhs appear to have wielded autocratic power over their own followers, while others had very little, and that the groups varied greatly in their dependence on pastoralism.

During the turbulent years of the Mahdiya (1883 -98) the confederation broke up after an initial resistance by one or two of the tribes (including part of the Paramount Shaikh's tribe) against the Mahdi. Over the years drought, civil war and disease impoverished "the Kababish", as well as other inhabitants of the West, and drove most of them eastwards towards the Nile.

Immediately after the Anglo-Egyptian Reconquest, the British Administration appointed 'All al-Tom as Nazir (chief) of "the Kababish Tribe", whose traditional dar (home territory) was recognised to be in northern Kordofan Province. Gradually scattered remnants of many of the pre-Mahdiya "Kababish tribes", who had been living along the riverain tracts, re-entered northern Kordofan and moved across in a westerly direction towards the remote, ill-defined frontier between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the autonomous sultanate of Darfur. (From now on I refer to the nineteenth-century Kababish "tribes" as "clans", although British officials refer to them as "sections" or "subdivisions". The Arabic term used locally for "the clan" is gabila, which is the same as that used for "tribe".)

Uneasy relations between the British Administration at Khartoum and Sultan 'Ali Dinar of Darfur aided Shaikh 'All al-Tom in his policy of applying judicious pressure against the latter's borders—an activist policy which strengthened his position in the eyes of his overlords in Khartoum and his power in relation to his fellow Kababish. By 1916 the Darfur policy of Shaikh 'Ali al-Tom converged with that of the British Administration at Khartoum when a full-scale military attack was launched against 'All Dinar and the Sultanate destroyed.

In the two decades after the absorption of Darfur into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the British gradually elaborated and regularised local administrative practice.[119] In its fully-fledged form the local administrative system (known officially as Native Administration) was a system of government of, for and by the Natives who were all (with a few exceptions relating mainly to urban areas) arranged into "tribes", each under "representative leaders" (i.e. shaikhs, chiefs, omdas). The practice of utilising Native institutions at the

local level for administrative purposes was well established in many other British colonies, and it was justified by the doctrine that the primary concern of government is to be efficient. And since efficiency was to be measured essentially by financial solvency and minimum opposition, government through Native institutions (such as shaikhs, chiefs and omdas of tribes) was reckoned to be highly efficient on both counts: it was relatively cheap and relatively trouble-free. Thus the tribe with its authoritative hierarchy became necessary to the colonial regime, as the colonial regime became necessary to the tribe.

The formal, legal autonomy that this system of government gave Shaikh ‘All, as well as the mandate for imposing a primitive bureaucratic structure, enabled him to complete the process, begun much earlier, of eliminating the independent power of the “clan” shaikhs, and dissolving such corporate character as the “clans” had possessed. (This last process was also facilitated by the fact that the Pax Brittanica, and the new pasturelands opened up after 1916, allowed the adoption of a flexible pastoral system, with greater opportunities for independent movement by individual households or small groups of households.) All the important executive and judicial posts within the “tribal structure” were kept within the circle of Shaikh ‘All’s close relatives—which eventually developed into the privileged Awlad Fadlallah lineage. The government-imposed animal tax passed through the hands of this lineage (the “clan” shaikhs were finally little more than tax-collectors), and the “traditional” tribute was retained by them. When in the early 1950s an elected rural council was constituted within the district, seats were allocated by tribe—to the Kababish and to a number of other smaller tribes within the district. The Awlad Fadlallah had undisputed control of Kababish seats and were generally also able to dominate district-level politics. Independence in 1956 left the system virtually untouched.

Thus when I began my study of “the Kababish tribe” in 1961, the total reality began to make sense as a structure of inequality comprising the Awlad Fadlallah rulers and their subjects, a structure which I saw as involving exploitation.[120] This exploitation took a material form (e.g. extraction of tribute retained by the Awlad-Fadlallah rulers), as well as a psychological form (the exclusion of the overwhelming majority of Kabba-shi householders from crucial areas in which political decisions affecting their life were taken). The structure itself was thus summed up in (a) the

exclusive political authority of the Awlad Fadlallah, and (Z>) the atomistic social organisation of subject Kabbashi pastoralists. In its essentials, it reproduced in miniature, and received indispensable support from, the larger structure of inequality which had held together the entire colonial Sudan.

Seen in historical perspective the objective formation of a Kababish “tribe” represents the emergence and crystallisation of a determinate pattern of inequality between the privileged chief’s family and their subjects, established by ‘AH al-T6m under the aegis of a colonial government (which was concerned with particular problems of consolidating and administering the Sudan as a whole, and of implementing or developing international policies in the colonial African context), and continued under various nationalist governments from 1956 to 1969. In conceptual terms our concern is with a particular ideological category, “the tribe”, which served British officials with a concept for rationalising (in both senses, Weberian and Freudian) a host of administrative decisions and actions on a pan-Sudanic scale, which they alone were taking, as decisions and actions concerned with the identity and welfare of an unambiguous entity held to be part of a widespread and interlinked system of similar entities throughout the rural Sudan. At this level it was a concept born of the colonial encounter, which at once represented regular administrative practice, and obscured real political contradictions. For the structure of tribal administration enabled the ruling British elite to deny any representative character to the troublesome urban nationalist,[121] while claiming for itself just that on the grounds that it remained the essential co-ordinator of the system of Native Administration, which held together and represented most of the real Sudan. Thus ^{Cl}the tribe” and “the tribal system” from being a means of efficient administration became the justification for perpetuating colonial domination.

*** III

Let us look a little more closely at this entity, apparently designated by such terms as “the Kababish”, “the Kababish tribe”, and (in Arabic) “gabilat al-kababish”, in its local context.

Roughly speaking the Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs and their subjects share a common culture (mode of life, material artefacts, technology, language, religion, etc.). But so too do the Kababish and the neighbouring pastoral populations (e.g. Hawawir, Kawahla). More important in the context of the present discussion, therefore, is the fact that the Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs and their subjects are distinguished from one another by separate (and even contradictory) experiences of political life. These differences are represented in and obscured by the expression “the Kababish tribe” as used by government administrators, the anthropologist, and Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs (in the Arabic equivalent “gabilat al-kaba-bish”—or simply “al-kababish”). In what way are these separate experiences significant in the lives of the people concerned? Or, to put it another way, what separates the Kabbashi population, and what brings them together as “a tribe”?

Take means of existence: among the pastoral Kababish livestock is owned by individuals and managed by households, while grazing and water-points are collectively-owned resources. The collective process of production among Kabbashi pastoralists makes available a surplus which is partly appropriated by the Awlad Fadlallah rulers. In other words, the elite does not contribute uniquely to the collective process of production, i.e. to the basic means of existence, but it does appropriate a privileged portion of the collective surplus.

Yet does the elite not do something correspondingly unique and indispensable to the basic conditions of collective existence—i.e. “secure social order”? “Order” for some functionalists refers to a normative system which it seems may be compatible with a state of almost continuous violence (as among the Nuer): it is clear that such normative order does not depend upon a ruling elite. But does not the Kabbashi elite “secure order” in a more positive sense also, i.e. by helping on a consensual basis to underwrite a relatively peaceful acceptance of social norms and customs (in local law courts, etc.), and by representing the collective interest?[122] In this connection two points are worth making: first, so do most ordinary Kabbashis, for custom as the norm of everyday life is largely underwritten in the practice of everyday life with its own (relatively peaceful) system of reciprocal pressures and moral orientations. I have shown in my detailed account of the ordinary Kabbashi pastoralist’s mode of life, that he has neither the material nor the moral means to establish permanent exploitative

relations with people outside his household, and still less to constitute a permanent threat to their collective existence.[123] I must stress this again, because the argument that the need to secure a relatively peaceful acceptance of social norms is a sufficient sociological reason for the tribal elite's political privilege (regardless of its historical origins), rests on certain far-reaching assumptions about human nature and society. In particular, it rests on the assumption that since aggressiveness and acquisitiveness are innate human characteristics, and material scarcity a universal social condition, the population of any given society must be controlled by a governing elite according to generally agreed rules if it is not to fall into a condition of violent anarchy.[124] Second: the alternative to the function of maintaining a given system of social norms and moral values is not necessarily chaos but a radically different system. This last point may be seen concretely in the fact that the underwriting of social norms was carried out just as effectively during the early years of this century, before Shaikh 'Ali consolidated undisputed power for himself and his family, as after. And there is no reason to insist that if the paternalist structure of this part of the Sudan were to be effectively dismantled the population would immediately lapse into normlessness. This point is perhaps almost platitudinous in its present formulation but it should serve to raise the question "what then does the political elite really do? What are the alternatives to what it does?"

There is one further argument concerning the ruling elite's indispensable function, namely that they represent the tribe as a collectivity in relations with outsiders—other tribes, the government, etc. In recent anthropological literature this kind of representative function has been analysed with the aid of explicit economic imagery, in which the chief or ruling group has been seen as an indispensable entrepreneur or middle-man.[125] Such market imagery does have some relevance in the Kababish situation, although it is likely to obscure as much as it reveals. The political elite may indeed act in the capacity of entrepreneur, middleman or representative, but it does so as a middleman who has a privileged monopoly in relation to his tribal "clients". As with all holders of crucial monopolies this gives the elite-middleman dominant power over others: the middleman is able to define the conditions for the fulfillment of his clients' interests, and even to determine their essential priorities. And as with all effective cases of crucial monopolies, arguments justifying the existing arrangement in terms of requirements of the market, or of the clients' interests, are not wanting, but there is no a

priori reason why the anthropologist should regard himself bound to accept such arguments at their face value. Alternatives do exist, and in the case of the Kabbashi political elite’s representative function, the alternative is any arrangement which gives the ordinary Kabbashi greater choice over the political decisions affecting his life than he has at present.

Much more important than its maintenance of the social norms and social welfare of the Kabbashi population or its representative role is another function of the political elite— the perpetuation of a particular structure of inequality which is part of its definition of “the Kababish tribe”. This is the essential mode in which the Kabbashi population is brought together. And in order to carry out this function effectively, the rulers must impose a distinctive ideological order on their experience of political life. They must convince not only their subjects but also themselves of the legitimacy of their distinctive position and privilege, and in seeking to meet this need they set themselves ideologically apart from those of “the Kababish tribe” who are dominated by them. They perceive the political structure in characteristic fashion, justifying it and describing its reality in ways that are not those of the non-elite. The non-elite for their part must make sense of the reality of their subordination.[126]

Although their perceptions differ, both elite and non-elite accept the political structure, with its privilege and its exclusion, as legitimate—i. c. as part of a just and natural social order. Hence we must speak of the “political authority” and not merely the “political dominance” of the elite. As I pointed out in my book, it is neither physical force, nor consent that constitutes the primary condition of Awlad Fadlallah political authority, but rather the complex historical reality of legitimate structural exclusion.

Broadly speaking the Awlad Fadlallah rulers tend to think in terms of the authority of norms, and their subjects in terms of the authority of persons. In their conceptualisation of “the tribe”, the elite tend to stress homogeneity, unity, consensus. In conversations with outsiders they often represent “the Kababish” as a kind of collective personality—whence their assertion that “The Kababish stand as one man”. Thus they present their sectional interests in universalist categories. In legitimating their political dominance and privilege as authority, they appeal to the legality derived from

central government fiats and historical continuity, and to the need for performing essential administrative tasks within “the tribe” (keeping law and order, judging disputes, collecting taxes, managing the essential business of the Rural Council, which they feel they are better equipped to carry out than the non-Awlad-Fadlallah tribesmen. The ordinary Kabbashi pastoralist’s view is partly of a heterogeneous collection of “clans” (each of which is seen as a homogeneous category of kinsmen—those who have the same origin, the same clan name, and therefore in some measure the same identity) and partly of interlinked groups of politically equal households. It is therefore in terms of kinship ideology that the ordinary Kabbashi seeks to represent household interest in relation to his political peers. It is rarely if ever that he has occasion to speak in terms of “the Kababish tribe”.[127] If he speaks of himself as “Kababish” when confronted with, for example, a non-Arab Meidobi tribesman, it is to refer to part of his concrete individuality, and to his address, which is summed up by the category “Kababish”. In relation to the superior position of the Awlad Fadlallah he sees himself subordinated by an individual condition of powerlessness. Superior political power is ipso facto legitimate power (authority) because its exercise is seen as reasonable and just. This statement may appear tautological, but I have attempted in my book to spell out the terms of this tautology which saves it, I hope, from being completely vacuous. I have there tried to describe the social circumstances which help to give substance to Kabbashi notions of reasonableness and justice, and to show how existing socio-economic conditions permit the average Kabbashi pastoralist to pursue his normal aspirations within the present structure of political inequality.

*** IV

Political ideology refers to an expression of the experience that is formed in the process of adjusting to, or shaping, or in some other way responding to political reality. It conceptualises political reality, as well as being part of it. But the conception of political reality that an ideology contains is partly a distortion because it is inevitably influenced by the fact that people have to adjust to circumstances, to hope for alternatives, and to justify their hope or their adjustment.

I have suggested above that the rulers' conception of the political structure is ideological not only because it is an expression of social reality perceived, experienced and lived out, but also because it is a partial, obscure and distorted account of that reality. But the ordinary Kabbashi's conception of the political structure is in its own way no less ideological. In my book I was able to analyse the ideological character of the Awlad Fadlallah conceptions of authority because I adopted the contradictory perspective of the ordinary Kabbashi subject based on his distinctive mode of life and work. But I did not go beyond this point in my analysis (as I should have done) by examining the ideological components in the subject's own conceptions from the contradictory perspective of the Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs after this perspective had itself been criticised. Thus my analysis of the Kabbashi subject's ideology, because it was essentially uncritical, remained incomplete and somewhat misleading—in fact it was little more than a restatement of that ideology.

When I returned briefly to the Sudan in July 1970[128] in order to collect data for a more developed analysis of Kabbashi political ideologies than the one I had been able to provide in my book, I encountered certain practical difficulties in the field: first, exceptionally heavy rains at a time when most Kabbashi pastoralists were themselves on the move made physical communication a complicated matter; secondly, potentially far-reaching political changes were beginning to be initiated by the central government, which made it impossible for me to question adequately those members of the Awlad Fadlallah I was able to contact, concerning their views on the political structure of "the tribe". I did, however, have a number of discussions on this subject with ordinary Kababish, which served to clarify some aspects of their ideology, and hence some of the conditions that had made the pattern of inequality the viable structure that it was.

I give a few extracts from one such conversation I recorded. In connection with a particular incident involving a third party known to both of us, I asked my informant about the role of the section shaikh—of whom there are generally several to one 'clan', and who are the historical successors to the autonomous tribal shaikhs of the nineteenth century Kababish confederation.

The shaikh far a” (section shaikh) has certain administrative duties but in the event of some injustice we go straight to the big shaikhs (Awlad Fadlallah). When he comes before the Nazir or the big shaikhs the shaikh fara‘ is just an ordinary Arab. He has no sulta (authority)... Or we go straight to the Rural Council office —the hakilma (government) has sulta.

(If the hakuma commits an injustice against you, will you accept it quietly?)

What can we do? Are we above the hakuma? The hakuma is the hakuma and we are like cattle. From the time that God created man there has always been hakuma. In the old days, they say, the hakuma used to cut off people’s heads and destroy them. People could only run away into the wilderness or jump into the river like Esh in order to escape. Is there any other way? • • •

Our complaint is against the merchants—they raise the prices of everything we buy, so that if we sell them animals and buy goods from them we come away with nothing in our hands. By God they are so clever, they can even deceive the hakuma. If anyone comes by lorry from the towns they sell to him at the fixed price, but to the Arabs they sell dear. They sell us tea at 30 and 35 (piastres per pound), and last year it cost 20 and 21. By God this hakuma has helped us more than anything because it has fixed the prices of many things which were not fixed before. But the merchants are clever. They oppress us. They have no sulta but they have the benefit of the pen which gives them a way to the hakuma.

• • ♦

The Nazirs and the big shaikhs do nothing for us. They ought to help us.

(Why do you say that? How can they help you?)

They ought to go to the hakuma and say “Fix such and such a price for the Arabs who are oppressed by the merchants”. For after all, do the Nazirs and the big shaikhs not benefit from us (lit. eat from us) ? When a king comes or a guest of the hakuma, is it not from us that the Nazirs and the big shaikhs collect the animals and the gifts? The hospitality that they give is all from the Arabs. Is it not right that they should help us against the merchants? But they don’t care. They leave us and the merchants to ourselves.

A few points are already apparent from these brief extracts. The hakuma is seen as all-powerful and as part of the natural order of things—being all-powerful it is perhaps not subject to moral approval or disapproval (which is not to say that it does not have a moral aspect). My informant’s reference to the hakuma during what I take to be the Mahdiya, though scarcely complimentary, was made not as a criticism of the gross injustice of that hakuma, but rather as an instance of its all-powerfulness. This does not mean, of course, that when the occasion came, the ordinary Kabbashi would be incapable of conceiving of hakuma in terms other than limitless power. It is merely that under present circumstances the hakuma appears to the ordinary Kabbashi as a kind of deus ex machina. It seems to impinge on his life only indirectly, impersonally and arbitrarily—mainly through the authority of the Nazir and the big shaikhs, and through the problem of merchants and rising prices.

Thus another clement in the Kabbashi subject’s perception of the political structure is the sulta of the Nazir and the big shaikhs, and the homogeneous subordination of all non-Awlad-Fadlallah. He does not see a pyramid of graded offices which embraces the whole tribe, but a dichotomous structure of a group with power and authority and a group without. This is how things are and this is how they should be, for there is no attempt to question this inegalitarian structure in any fundamental way. On the contrary, such criticism of the Nazir and the big shaikhs as there is depends for its force precisely on a positive acceptance of this inequality. My informant did not criticise the tribal rulers for taking animals and tribute from their subjects, but for not carrying out their moral duty as rulers who owe their subjects something in return for what they take. The rulers are blamed for their inaction in relation to the merchants, and there is therefore some conception of a just and adequate group of rulers which docs not coincide exactly with the way in which today’s real rulers are sometimes seen to act.

Thus in this part of the view of political structure entertained by the Kabbashi subject things as they are and things as they should be are distinguished in a way that they arc not in the part that relates to the hakuma.

A third clement in the Kabbashi subject’s perception of the political structure is the merchant, who is seen as exercising dominant power over the ordinary tribesman, but a power that is resented even though it is submitted to. The merchant may not commit any explicit legal offence, but he is seen as using his power cxploitativcly. In fact no clearcut distinction is made between the merchant’s dominant power as such (his manipulation of the commodity market for personal profit) and his unjust use of that power. The Kabbashi pastoralist sees the merchant’s dominant power (rightly) as market power, which he resents, perhaps because of a vague feeling that it conflicts with the notion of just prices (prices that do not increase?) At any rate, one may see that it is because the merchants do not have sulta that their dominant power is resented—the reverse is not true, for Awlad Fadlallah behaviour may be resented without any questioning of their sulta. Hence sulta is a legitimation of dominance relationships which represents much more than a practical acquiescence in dominant power. For although the merchant’s exercise in dominant commercial power is accepted (it is not yet pervasive), it is, as coercion, seen as an incongruous intrusion into a just and natural world.

One of the most important ideological features of the text quoted above is the sharp distinction made between the hakuma and the shaikhs. Not only are different moral attitudes adopted in relation to the hakuma and the shaikhs, but the two also seem to constitute different kinds of existential category. One obvious aspect of this is the personal, regular, anticipated character of shaikhly political activity, something that the hakuma lacks: it is possible that the willingness to pass moral judgement on the former but not on the latter is connected with this difference. Yet in reality the Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs are an extension of the hakuma (central government), in the shape of the Native Administration System and as constituted members of the Rural District Council. Of course, they have considerable autonomy and initiative, but always an indispensable measure of their dominant power is derived from the central government, first colonial and then nationalist.

The shaikhly rulers see this quite clearly, but their subjects do not. It is in a partial, distorted sense that the subjects see this connection: for them the Awlad Fadlallah shaikh as hakim (ruler) shares in that quality of all-powerfulness that is a primary defining characteristic of the hakuma. But in this ideological form the connection works only one way—it helps to re-enforce the legitimacy that is claimed by the Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs as something due to all rulers (who must, as rulers, at least possess the visible signs of dominant power). It docs not provoke the question of how the central government (what it stands for, what it achieves and how it relates to "the Kababish tribe") is to be evaluated through its tribal extension; or the equally important question of how relevant the structure of tribal authority is to certain practical problems which the ordinary Kabbashi recognises (easier watering, more medical and veterinary attention, improved grazing, "reasonable" prices for goods bought and animals sold) and which can only be resolved at the pan-Sudanic level. It leads him to exaggerate the power of the tribal elite, and to see his particular predicament entirely in relation to this elite rather than to the hakuma, within a structured political reality whose foundations were laid in the colonial epoch.

Thus the ideological pattern that links together in a specific way hakuma, Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs and Kabbashi pastoralists, is not simply an ideational structure (which has a mainly logical relationship to society), or simply a set of social norms (which has a mainly instrumental value in social situations), but primarily a form of consciousness which has a determinate yet dynamic connection with socio-economic conditions, and which contributes towards the maintenance of the objective structure of political inequality in this part of the Sudan.

*** V

If the ideological positions of Kabbashi subjects and their rulers are different (as I have suggested) and even to some extent contradictory, why do they not come into direct conflict? The brief answer to the question is that up to the present, socio-economic conditions have permitted them to remain not incompatible.[129] It might have been apposite at this point to attempt a sketch of the socio-economic circumstances which would be likely to bring

out into the open a direct clash between the ideological position of the Kabbashi pastoralists and that of their shaikhly rulers, had it not been for the fact that certain political developments emanating from the capital make such a discussion redundant.

The revolutionary, military regime that came to power in 1969 has now (1970) abolished the Native Administration System, and the elected Rural District Council—in this as in all other areas of the Sudan. For the moment the business of the district as a whole is carried out by central government administrators (Inspector, Executive Officer) together with other civil servants (local Medical Officer, Veterinary Officer, Education Officer, etc.). The Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs still function as tax officials, but section shaikhs who do the actual work are being increasingly encouraged to bypass them and deliver directly to the executive headquarters at Sodiri. More important, Awlad Fadlallah shaikhs continue to work as local court judges (court presidents), but the central government has plans to replace them soon by trained judges who are gazetted civil servants.

All of this points to the probability that “the tribe” will dissolve into “the district” in a way that was not possible before. If, when this happens, “tribalism” of the kind that has been reported and analysed for West and Central Africa were to emerge here, it would of course be a very different ideological phenomenon from the one represented by “the tribe” with its authoritative structure of cohesive, privileged shaikhs ruling in the name of “the Kababish”. Now that the Native Administration system has been repudiated and is to be progressively dismantled, one ideological element encapsulated in the concept of “the Kababish tribe” should become more evident to the ordinary Kabbashi pastoralists, for nothing will now stand between them and the hakuma to obscure the latter’s true character. One hopes that this development will make them more aware than was possible before, of the way in which their destiny is affected by decisions taken (or not taken) at the pan-Sudanic level. And perhaps it will also reveal to them that the hakuma is not as all-powerful as it once appeared to be.

*** VI

I will not insist that my analysis of the Kabbashi subject's ideology is correct in all respects, still less that it is complete. A fuller analysis would reveal the ideology to be far richer and far more contradictory, within itself and in relation to developing socio-economic circumstances, than I have been able to demonstrate here. But I think I have said enough to make the main point in my paper a little clearer: we cannot understand historical structures of political domination unless we also undertake a critical investigation of ideologies in order to uncover the partial, distorted conceptions of reality built into them, and which being thus built, constitute an indispensable part of such structures. And in so far as such critical investigations are also a kind of challenge to claims about the true nature of moral/political reality, the understanding of facts gained must be allowed to interact rationally with the moral and political assumptions of the investigator himself.

It will be seen that this kind of analysis has been pursued for at least a hundred years in the context of theory which is aimed primarily at understanding European (i.e. Western} political experience. In the context of theories concerned mainly with non-Europcan, "exotic" politics, however, this approach is still very rare. In most cases the term "ideology" is handled by anthropologists in a non-critical way, to indicate (i) a set of moral ideals from which (men being what they are) actual conduct falls short; or (ii) a set of more or less articulate beliefs (myth, theory) which has a certain "fit" in relation to social structure (symbolises it, reflects it, adjusts to it); or (iii) a set of publicly accepted rules of behaviour which are sufficiently ambiguous or flexible to allow the individual to manipulate them to his advantage (hence, the essential "rationality" of all men is vindicated). Although such conceptualisations of ideology have yielded insights into the nature of political reality, they are all essentially non-critical, and based directly on the principle of the strict separation of fact and value.[130]

Certainly the systematic theoretical elaboration of a critical approach would involve the Western anthropologist in difficult and disturbing questions, including the ideological implications of his own cultural position from which his views of "tribal", non-European societies are drawn. He would have to consider whether, to what extent and why these views tend to represent such societies basically in the image of European historical experience. He would have to consider the fact that these societies have

been and still are militarily, economically and intellectually vulnerable in relation to his own. He would have to ask himself how he can account for this systematic historical fact without criticising their conditions and ideologies, as well as the conditions and ideologies of his own society which in theory denies the systematic significance of this vulnerability, and in practice re-enforces and deepens it. Finally he would have to re-examine whether the extreme theoretical relativism which he believes is necessary for science, and is also by a happy chance an indication of his moral integrity towards Native human beings, does in fact serve the cause either of science or of a common humanity.[131]

Perhaps one reason why these questions are not raised, or raised only to be contemptuously brushed aside, is that unlike the Western theorist of Western society, the Western anthropologist has not yet been compelled to argue with the objects of his scientific contemplation. Is this not in effect the substance of the recent claim (in a synoptic account of political anthropology) that by concentrating on the “relatively isolated”, “small-scale”, “pre-industrial” society, in which he is not himself apparently involved, the anthropologist avoids “the problem of ideology” which has “thwarted” the work of such thinkers as “Marx, Carlyle, Weber, Durkheim and K. Burke”?[132] Is the epistemological privilege the anthropologist claims after all much more than a reflection of the political privilege he unconsciously enjoys as member of a prestigious profession in a powerful society confronting immeasurably weaker ones?

** VIII. Nomadisation as an Economic Career Among the Sedentaries In the Sudan Savannah Belt

Gunnar Haaland

The relationship between ideology, environmental conditions and economic activity is one of the problems elucidated by Evans-Pritchard in The Nuer. The Nuer preference for a pastoral style of life, “the herdsman’s outlook”, is documented as it manifests itself in daily conversation, in ritual, in songs and play, and in verbal categories. Although Nuer have to practise some cultivation, Evans-Pritchard explicitly states that it is the pastoral life

they prefer: “The present number and distribution of cattle do not permit the Nuer to lead an entirely pastoral life as they would like to do, and possibly did at one time.... A mixed economy is therefore necessary.”[133]

Nuer ideological statements about the “good life” fit the observed facts of what people actually do; the ideology emphasises cattle and a pastoral style of life, and householders among the Nuer do try to accumulate cattle. The more cattle a person has, the less he has to rely upon millet cultivation and the greater is his freedom to migrate between places that are optimal for cattle in the various seasons.

In this article I shall discuss the relationship between pastoral ideology and the premises on which the actors base their decisions to accumulate pastoral capital and to practise a migratory life. From the literature on nomads the impression often arises that the ideology mirrors these premises or that it is the premise. Basing my argument on material collected during two periods of fieldwork in Darfur (April 1965 to May 1966, and April 1969 to November 1969), I shall here suggest that this relationship is more complicated.

The dominant traditional subsistence activities in Darfur are camel nomadism, cattle nomadism, and grain cultivation. The geographical location of these activities is related to environmental conditions. Cultivators are mainly located in the centre of the region in places where there are permanent water supplies and where soil fertility makes it possible to base one’s livelihood on cultivation, while seasonal fluctuations in water supplies, natural vegetation, and the presence of insects encourage the pastoralists to migrate between dry and rainy season areas; the camel nomads migrating in the parts and the cattle nomads migrating in the southern parts.

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These subsistence activities are typically associated with different ethnic groups; Fur, Masalit, Daju, Senyar, and Tama are localised in the central region and their members mainly subsist on grain cultivation (dura on the alluvial soil, and dukhn elsewhere). Baggara Arabs of several political groups

(Ta’aisha, Beni Helba, Habbaniya, Rizeigat, and Beni Hussein), and recent Fulani immigrants pursue cattle husbandry, while camel nomadism is practised by Arabs and Bideyat. The Zaghawa practise all these subsistence activities but emphasise livestock: camels, cattle and sheep.

Ethnic groups are thus identified with one of the traditional subsistence patterns, and ideologically one also finds that each emphasises its own characteristic pattern and associated style of life. The Fulani and Baggara ideologies show preferences for pastoralism[134] while my first impression during fieldwork was that the Fur, Masalit, and Daju were identified with grain cultivation and sedentary village life. Thus, it was a surprise for me when I came across several cattle camps whose members came from Fur, Masalit, and Daju villages.

Out of a total population of 8681 (according to the 1956 Census) the nomadised sedentaries in the Amballa Omodiya number as follows:

| Camps | Ethnic origin of household heads |

| I | 5 Fur |

| II | 4 Fur |

| III | 7 Fur, 1 Senyar, 1 Rizeigat |

| IV and V | No census data, probably all Fur

| VI | 4 Daju |

| VII
VIII | 7 Masalit
3 Masalit | From Dar Masalit just west of Amballa |

In addition informants in Amballa named twelve Fur and one Masalit who originally came from Amballa and surrounding villages but who now migrate with the Baggara outside this omodiya.

Interviews and census data from the Fur village of Amballa also showed that several of the villagers had lived in cattle camps part of their life. Here I shall describe two cases that are particularly interesting in this connection.

Hawa Arbab was an old Fur widow in Amballa. As a young girl she had for seven years migrated to Kubbum with her father, mainly in camps composed of Baggara Arabs of a Salamat lineage. She then married a Fur cultivator and settled in a village. Her brother, who was married to a Fur woman, continued to migrate with the Salamat. Three of his sons married Salamat women and are still in camps, but she does not know where.

Mahmud Yumma, a Fur farmer about fifty years of age, had spent twenty years in camp. The first nine years he migrated to Kubbum with his father and his brother Adim. When their father died, Mahmud and Adim inherited his cattle, but Mahmud did not succeed as a nomad; disease and bad management reduced his herd and he had to choose migratory routes that were less favourable for the cattle but where he could grow enough grain to make up for the reduced income from his herd. However, he did not manage to build up his herd again and he is now a sedentary grain cultivator in Amballa. His brother Adim succeeded in his cattle enterprise and attached himself to a camp of Heimat Baggara. He married a woman from the camp and stayed with them until he died. Mahmud does not know where his brother’s son is, but he assumes he is with the Baggara and that he docs not know the Fur language.

In certain ways this seems to be a situation similar to that of the Nuer: most households are sedentary cultivators here, but some have accumulated enough cattle to base their subsistence on them and lead a migratory life. Census data from Amballa indicate a yearly nomadisation rate in the order of one per cent.

At first I thought that my initial impression of Fur culture was wrong and that this nomadisation was a consequence of a cattle complex, and I started to look for ideological manifestations of such cultural preferences. Further observations did not, however, confirm this hypothesis.

For all Fur, grain products (porridge and beer) are the dominant items of diet and all of them, except those who have become pastoral nomads, gear their productive activity towards self-sufficiency with regard to grain. Both daily meals consist of porridge with a spicy sauce including vegetables, meat or milk. If one cannot afford these last ingredients wild herbs may be substituted for them. If one has no grain, on the other hand, one is faced with hunger. The fact that grain products are important for a man's subsistence does not necessarily imply that his ideology will reflect this. Ecological circumstances may make agriculture a safer livelihood although ideologically he evaluates cattle and pastoralism higher. This I understand is the case for some groups in East Africa (Bunyoro, Kipsigis, Arusha) who would ideologically fall in the cattle complex area, but who economically mainly rely on agriculture. Among the Fur, however, the ideological emphasis is consistent with the subsistence importance of grain. I shall try to document this ideological emphasis by comparing the ritual importance the Fur attach to grain and cultivation versus cattle and herding.

Grain products, porridge and beer, are set apart from other goods in the sense that they cannot be transacted in the market place. They belong to the domestic sphere like sex; to sell them in the market would be an act similar to prostitution. Marriage among the Fur establishes very little jointness between the spouses in terms of resources and decisions, in fact they constitute separate households. I suggest that the special position of porridge and beer in the husband-wife relation is associated with the fact that sex and preparation of food are the only important services the wife renders the husband. The importance of cultivation is indicated by grain products having these associations, and not milk products.

At critical phases of the agricultural cycle various rituals are performed. A historical source, Al-Tunisy,[135] tells how the Sultan of Darfur initiated the growing season by ritual sowing. In Amballa I have been told that in order to get sufficient rain the old women used to gather under a special tree where a sacred snake was supposed to live. There they sprinkled a mixture of flour and water on the tree in order to make the snake stay in its hole down under the tree and not come outside and thereby prevent the rain from falling. The form of these rituals apparently varies within the Fur area.[136] Today

islamised rites are more commonly performed when drought threatens. If locusts threaten the crop, there is a special locust magician (dambare) who performs magic rites to drive them away.

The Fur thus have rites for protection and increase of the grain harvest while I have not come across corresponding practices pertaining to cattle. The ritual use of grain also indicates its special importance in Fur culture. At circumcision, while a boy is waiting in his mother's hut before the operation, a group of relatives will come into the hut with a gourd filled with a mixture of flour and water and sprinkle the contents over them while exclaiming bora fatta (white milk—mother's milk). The same mixture is used in the rain-making ritual. When war with the Masalit threatened, the old men of Amballa used to go to some special stones east of the village where they asked their ancestors for support (kuing wouonga adonga kele alang kaue—our grandfathers, the enemy is coming to kill us) while placing grain dough on the stones. Grain is also used in rites performed when certain diseases occur.

Compared to the ceremonial use of cattle, I think there are some striking differences. Traditionally, bridewealth was two or three cows, now it is usually money. At ceremonial occasions like circumcision or the commemoration of a dead relative, an ox is slaughtered. This may also be the case in some rain rituals. Typically, the use of cattle on these occasions either implies that rights in this specific form of wealth are exchanged for other types of rights, or arc lost without the person gaining access to new rights although the consumption of cattle may enhance the giver's prestige or prevent him losing reputation on occasions demanding display of wealth. Cattle arc thus exchanged or consumed on occasions where transactions over important values take place while the consumption of grain products on ritual occasions does not have such implications. I suggest that because cattle are the most important among the few concrete objects of value that can be accumulated in Fur society they may serve as a medium for channelling the distribution of prestige and important rights. In other words the use of cattle on ceremonial occasions has both symbolic functions and pragmatic consequences. Without committing myself to a statement which implies that these pragmatic consequences are the single cause underlying this ceremonial practice I will draw attention to the fact that cattle in this and

other parts of Africa are the most convenient economic means which can have these consequences.

The value of grain used on ritual occasions on the other hand is hardly measurable; the amount is so small that it is not a scarce resource for anybody. Consequently it cannot have the pragmatic implications that the use of cattle has; its functions are purely symbolic. I suggest that the fact that this product is chosen to have symbolic functions in important relationships and at specific, intensely meaningful and crucial situations in a person's life, indicates the agricultural orientation of Fur culture.

Furthermore, one does not find the elaboration of verbal categories relating to cattle that is so common among cattle people; in fact, terms relating to migratory camp life are to a large extent derived from Arabic.

My interpretation of these formal aspects of culture corresponds very well with observation of how the Fur themselves describe the relationship between cattle and grain, camp and village: "A nomad is rich but camp life is a poor way of life"; "cattle is a man's wealth but grain is his food". The focus of daily conversation is to a very small extent concerned with cattle and camp, it is rain, drought, grain and village affairs that figure most prominently.

The ideology as it was explicitly or implicitly formulated in culturally codified statements was thus not fully consistent with the observed behaviour patterns. In fact, the nomadisation process seemed to be a paradox in the light of the ideologically expressed preferences for a sedentary agricultural life. The general statements about "the good life", preference or correct behaviour that was ideologically formulated, could not thus unambiguously be understood as the actual determinant of behaviour. I was therefore forced to look at the problem from a different point of view.

Whatever the ideological importance cattle may have, they represent a type of value, and the question of why people accumulate cattle can alternatively be analysed in the context of value management.

Such an economic analysis has been published elsewhere[137] and I shall therefore merely summarise the main argument. The management unit among the Fur is the single, grown-up individual; marriage thus does not establish a joint household of the spouses. Every accepted member of the local community has usufruct rights to land, which is administered on behalf of the community by the local headman. Because of soil exhaustion, fields are not cultivated continuously but will be left fallow. Rights to fallow land revert to the village community and the headman will allocate a new plot to the cultivator. Land is thus allocated administratively and cannot be transacted for any other form of value. Transactions over labour are likewise restricted because wage labour is codified as shameful; beer is the only appropriate counter-prestation for labour and the transaction is mediated in the communal spirit of the beer party.

Every adult member of the community thus has the basic resources—land and his own time—by which he can satisfy his subsistence needs. His primary concern is to acquire self-sufficiency in production of the staple crop, millet, which he consumes as porridge and beer; secondly, to grow some vegetables (onion, chilli, okra, tomatoes, sesame) for consumption or sale. The important fact here is that the profit a cultivator may make on his agricultural enterprise can only to a very limited extent be reinvested in the factors of agricultural production. The only investment objects arc livestock and, most importantly, cattle. The major alternatives available to the management units among the Fur can dia-grammatically be described in a flow-chart (Fig. 1) where the boxes indicate form of value, and the arrows indicate transformations of value mediated by production and exchange mechanisms, or consumption of value (dotted).

Within such a structure, any person, whether his ideological preferences are for cattle or for cultivation, will be stimulated to invest in cattle. Cattle produce more value in the form of milk and calves; they can be consumed directly, they can be exchanged for money or other goods in the market place. Traditionally, they were a necessary prestation at the establishment of marriage, and they can give esteem when slaughtered on ritual or ceremonial occasions. In other words, cattle are the most liquid and the most productive major form of value among the Fur, and that is the reason why

the cultivators try to channel their profit into the cattle sector. The profitability of this investment is, however, restricted by ecological conditions. Amballa is situated on the alluvial bank of Wadi ‘Azum. During the rainy season diseases caused by insects and muddy soil make it a great risk to keep cattle there. This problem is solved by leaving the cows in the care of the Baggara, who take the herd to a more favourable area in this season. The owner gets the calves and the Baggara get the milk. An important factor concerning this contract is that the Baggara are not held responsible if a cow is killed by wild animals or disease. This poses a dilemma for the farmer, as it is difficult for him to get information about the causes of the death of his cow: the Baggara may just as well have sold it or consumed it. Cows are thus the farmer’s most important wealth, and the more he has, the greater his concern for their welfare, and the more will the risky contract with the Baggara worry him.

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The alternative way to solve this problem of value managemerit is for the cultivator to migrate with the cattle himself, which implies a less attractive way of life, according to his ideologically formulated preferences. Empirically, the Fur solve this dilemma by establishing themselves as nomads only after they have accumulated seven to ten cows. Initially, these migrations are short, moving between the wadi area in the dry season and the higher lying sandy areas between the wadis in the rainy season where they also grow grain. It is only when they have accumulated twenty to twenty-five cows that they adopt the longer migrations of the Baggara.

The ideologically formulated Fur views of the good life thus cannot be considered the sole premise underlying their economic careers. These careers represent the accumulated result of strategic choices taken with reference to value management. The premises for the choices are the culturally defined goals that one wants to realise (e.g. preferences for special consumption patterns, style of life, prestige, wealth) and the institutional and ecological factors which constitute strategic limitations on the realisation of these goals. The ideology obviously says something about the goals people want to realise, but just how these goals are made relevant to behaviour cannot be stated in an unambiguous way.

As I have tried to show, a pastoral ideology is not a necessary condition for the emergence of nomadic households. Nor is such an ideology a sufficient condition for the maintenance of nomadic careers, as comparative materials show. Barth demonstrates in his analysis of the Basseri of South Persia[138] how vested interests in capital management lead wealthy herd owners to settle despite their preferences for a nomadic life. For the Kipsigis of Kenya, Manners[139] has described how they changed their way of life from pastoralism to cultivation within a surprisingly short time and he argues that this was related to the new opportunities for value management that followed when cash crops were introduced and land was codified as private property. Likewise, Abdel Ghaffar Mohammed in this volume has shown how decreasing returns from investments in herds lead rich nomads among the Rula'a to invest in mechanised cultivation schemes. Vested interests in the management of these schemes gradually induce them to adopt a sedentary life.

The culturally defined goals that people try to realise are not necessarily consistent with each other, and ideological elaborations of these goals will, I assume, tend rather to hide discrepancies than make them explicit.

Among the Fur, the value discrepancies I have been discussing here (e.g. discrepancy between the value placed on the Fur style of life and the value placed on being wealthy) will only be faced by persons in specific circumstances: most Fur will not experience this dilemma. But it is by focussing on the strategies that lead persons into these circumstances that one may discover how the Fur themselves evaluate these goals relative to each other.

The hypothesis that the strategy of cattle accumulation and nomadisation is a result of the economic structure and ecological conditions can be tested by comparison of communities exhibiting variations in these factors. I have not made detailed studies of other villages of the lower wadis, but I have travelled along the major wadis, 'Azum, Debarei, and Salih, and interviews in villages have confirmed that nomadisation occurs there too. I will consequently assume this to be the case in every village having the same

constellation of economic and ecological factors as Amballa. In the following I shall try to show some implications of ecological variations within the Fur area.

Between the wadis lie areas which are less muddy, and less infected with insects, especially if the soil is sandy. In such areas it is possible to keep the cattle in the village the whole year, but here also one will find that a man having a herd of about ten head is faced with the dilemma of choosing the economically more rewarding migratory life or to stay in the more comfortable village. This is also the pattern in the western foothills of Jebel Marra.

On Jebel Marra itself, however, the situation is different. I have no cases of nomadisation there, and according to

Barth[140] the mountain people do not keep cows there but invest in oxen. Native informants state that they do so because cows become infertile under mountain conditions, a statement that I am unable to verify. The profitability of this investment depends on external sources of supply and demand. Baggara groups who camp in the foothills of Jebel Marra during the dry season are the suppliers of ox calves, while travelling Arab cattle traders buy the grown oxen and sell them in larger demand centres, mainly Khartoum. In the mountains there is thus no reason for a man to become a nomad. Agriculture and this specific form of animal husbandry can be combined. Investment in the cattle sector will therefore not lead the cultivator into a position where the way of life he prefers is inconsistent with the actions he has to perform for optimal management of his capital.

The northern parts of the Fur area, Jebel Si and Dar Furnung, offer still other variations.

I am here mainly referring to Fur population settled on the hills and mountain slopes of this area. The mountains of Dar Furnung constitute the northern boundary of the Fur; the plains and hills north of them are inhabited by the Zaghawa; the goz plains between these mountains, however, are settled by people who identify themselves as Fur-Tungur. They speak the Fur language and intermarry with the mountain Fur, but in other respects they differ in certain cultural features; they practise female circumcision while the mountain Fur do not.

Among the mountain Fur of Jebcl Si and Dar Furnung, agricultural profits are also invested in cattle. In this area, cattle owners keep the cattle close to the villages during the rainy season. Because of lack of water in the dry season the herd-owners move their herds into the plains where there are springs and wells which keep enough water through the whole year.

In the Jebcl Si area investment in cattle leads to migratory movements between the rainy season village and dry season camp in the plains. Informants state that some herd-owners leave their mountain villages and settle in villages in the plains. The reasons given are that conditions for cattle are better there in the rainy season also. Migrations practised by cattle owners in this area are very short, the camp is seldom further away from the village than a day’s march. However, I have no census data from this area that can document the extent to which this is done.

Having been only a few days in Dar Furnung, I have to rely completely on a few interviews. The patterns seem to be similar to those of Jebel Si, but with fewer herd-owners leaving their home villages to settle on the northern plains although many may have relatively large herds, of twenty to thirty head.

The conditions for animal husbandry are said to be better on the plains. In order to understand why herd-owners are apparently reluctant to leave their home villages, we have to consider another ecological factor, namely competition with other groups. There are two aspects involved here, an economic and a political one. Cultural skills and preferences provide the basis for the way the economic units manage their resources. Units of

different ethnic origin may therefore not be equally effective in exploiting joint resources. Where pressure on resources increases this may lead to a systematic selection of units with reference to ethnic background. Undoubtedly, there are differences in expertise between nomadic households whose personnel originated in sedentary Fur villages and those originating from nomadic Baggara or Zaghawa communities. Such cultural differences, although they may lead to a high frequency of sedentarisation of nomadised Fur households, are not however an insurmountable barrier preventing the success of a Fur farmer shifting to a nomadic enterprise.

This success is, however, also dependent on political factors. In the Sudan grazing territories are not monopolised by political groups as they are many places in the Middle East. The maintenance of a herd does not only depend on access to grazing areas, but also on ability to protect it from thieves and raiders. The less an area is under the control of the government's administration, the greater the need for herdowners to mobilise local support for the protection of their livestock. Northern Darfur is probably the part of the province where government control is least effective, and the Zaghawa also have a reputation as livestock thieves.

Although, for the welfare of the cattle, it might be preferable for a herd-owner in Dar Furnung to leave his village and move in the Zaghawa area the whole year, this is a more risky venture politically, unless he has established relationships to groups that he can trust for support. Marriage with a Zaghawa girl and uxorilocal residence is a mechanism for establishing such relations.

Bridewealth among the Zaghawa is said to be substantially higher than among the Fur (20–30 as compared to 3–5 head of cattle) but not all of it need be transferred at the establishment of marriage. For a Fur herd-owner the economic cost of marrying a Zaghawa girl can be seen as an investment because the political support he thereby gets gives the opportunity for a faster growth of the cattle capital. The occurrence of such marriages is widely recognised; thus the population just north of Dar Furnung is called Fora-Mcrita by the Fur and Kora-Berri by the Zaghawa, both terms meaning Fur-Zaghawa and referring to intermarriage as well as to the mixed origin of the population there. As an ethnic group they may be identified as Zaghawa,

since it is according to the standards of this culture that performance is judged and sanctioned. Social life is thus structured with reference to Zaghawa standards and the idioms of Zaghawa culture are used for signalling identity.

This comparison of communities in different ecological circumstances seems to validate the hypothesis that these circumstances affect the occurrence and character of nomadic careers.

The effect of economic structure can be tested by comparison with the villages Nycrtcte and lour in the western foothills of Jebel Marra. In these villages there arc perennial streams and springs. For thirty years this water has been used for irrigation of orchards (mainly mango, guava, citrus). The introduction of these trees and the demand for the fruits stimulated cultivators to reorganise their economic activities, specialising in fruit production for sale and buying grain for consumption. Trees arc private property and they can be bought and sold. In these villages there is thus an alternative to cattle as a way of investing agricultural profits. According to Fur cultivator preferences, investing in orchards is more attractive than investing in cattle; the trees are productive capital and their value is comparable to cattle since both can be exchanged for money; until the time of fieldwork the price situation had been such that capital invested in trees gave a higher return than capital invested in cattle, and this investment makes it possible to continue as a villager. From these two villages I have no record of nomadisation, but I have two cases of sedentarisation in Tour: in one the man identified himself as Fur-Tungur and he claimed that he sold his cattle in order to invest in trees and labour; in the other, a Terjam Baggari had managed to be accepted as member of the village and had thus been allotted land. The reason he gave for settling was that he had too few animals to continue as a nomad. He planted mango trees in his field and grew vegetables for sale when the trees were small. Now the trees are yielding and by selling them he would get the capital necessary for a nomadic life which he claims is a better way of living. His present enterprise is, however, so profitable that he prefers to stay in the village.

Tendencies towards nomadic careers are thus generated in Fur communities in various parts of the area. If this depends on the factors I have mentioned,

one would also expect this process to have a considerable time depth. In my material I have people who claim that their grandparents lived as nomads, which would bring the historical documented cases back to the beginning of this century.

With this background one might expect the emergence of a nomadic Fur section. This is not the case. In Dar Furnung and Jebel Si one sees the development of a mixed economy which is not considered categorically different from subsistence grain farming. Those who really specialise in animal husbandry will prefer, for economic reasons, to move into the northern plains, and for political reasons, to be assimilated into a Zaghawa group. Nomadic careers emerge gradually, and for the few really successful herd-owners political circumstances induce them to change ethnic identity by inclusion in a Zaghawa local community.

In the lower wadi area, grain cultivation and cattle husbandry can hardly be combined. The change from one subsistence activity to the other is therefore drastic, implying a radical change in a person's career and a reorganisation of style of life from village to camp. Political support from nomadic groups is not a crucial factor for the establishment of nomadic careers in such areas. The practice of nomadic cattle husbandry therefore does not depend on assimilation into a Baggara local community. Usually, the nomadic novice joins some other nomadised Fur in a camp community. It is thus not a political necessity for a nomad to change his identity. Still, identity is in fact changed when persons establish themselves as nomads. In a previous article[141] I have argued that this is a consequence of the way the Fur-Baggara dichotomy is categorised. The style of life associated with cultivation is categorised as Fur, the pastoral way of life as Baggara. By practising nomadism persons perform an activity that identifies them as Baggara. A Fur is thus categorised by others as a Baggari the day he leaves the village and migrates with his cattle. Since his performance in various roles is evaluated with reference to the standards of Baggara culture, he will be strongly encouraged to learn this culture because he is systematically sanctioned with reference to his command of it. In other words, he is ascribed Baggara identity the day he goes to camp. Although other Baggara look on him as inferior or abnormal, he is in a position where, by competent management of capital and ability to learn to act as a Baggari, he can be accepted as an equal.

In the lower wadis the nomadised Fur thus adopts a whole syndrome of idioms identifying him as a Baggari: house type, lay-out of camp, equipment, and the use of oxen for the transport of people and equipment. Language is of course not as easily changed, especially if he stays in a camp where the rest of the members originate from Fur communities. A most significant aspect of the identity change concerns milking. Among the Fur milking is codified as female work and it is considered shameful (ora) for men to perform this task. In the camps of the lower wadis, however, both men and women milk, as do the Baggara. A Fur from the village does not consider it shameful for a nomadised Fur to milk because the nomad is considered to be in a category to which Fur standards are not applied. The ease of identity switching is demonstrated by the fact that a nomadised Fur who has resettled in a village readily admits that as a member of the camp he milked cows although in the village he will not, and no stigma accrues to him because of these acts in the camp.

It might be argued that the changes of cultural features I have mentioned here are functional requirements in a nomadic adaptation. That this is not the case may easily be demonstrated with comparison with Jebel Si and Dar Furnung. Fur herd-owners who live in camp in the dry season practise the same division of labour between the sexes with reference to milking as Fur in villages do. Furthermore, among the Zaghawa, milking is also codified as female work.

The use of oxen for transport is one of the most important idioms of Baggara identity, and it is not practised by the Zaghawa or the Fur. As for house type, the nomadised Fur of the lower wadis use the Baggara tent, a hemispherical construction of straw mats on a frame of branches; the houses in the Fur camps of Jebel Si are cylindrical constructions of intertwined branches fastened to P/2-metre poles arranged in a circle; the dry-season dwellings of the Zaghawa consist of a square structure within which a straw fence demarcates a smaller room containing a bed.

The current nomadisation process thus does not lead to the emergence of a nomadic Fur section but to the inclusion of the nomadised Fur into the adjoining ethnic category. As I have tried to show, these processes have a different character and frequency on the various boundaries of the Fur.

These micro-processes on the level of individual careers are intimately related to the macro-level of regional ecological balance. To simplify my argument let us concentrate on the Fur-Baggara relation and the two main resources they exploit: cultivated land and grazing land. As I have said, these resources are communal resources exploited by a multitude of individual householders typically basing their economy on one of these resources either as grain cultivators or cattle husbanders. My argument is illustrated in Fig. 2.

I have described a process whereby some households change their economy from one based on grain to one based on cattle. A condition for this is the possibility of accumulating a surplus in cultivation. Among other things, this depends on the pressure on land. Since land is cultivated on a shifting basis, and rights in fallow revert to the local community, all land resources will be reallocated according to need among all the members of the community. Population pressure in such a system will imply that everybody gets a smaller or less productive share.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-13.jpg][Fig. 2. Demographic balance of ethnic groups in relation to population movements, fertility rate and niches carrying capacity]]

The household units will experience the macro-relation between population and land as it affects the returns on labour input in production. Population pressure thus leads to diminishing returns in agricultural production which again leads to a decreasing possibility of creating a surplus that can be invested in cattle. This will reduce the frequency with which nomadic careers occur among the sedentary population. The macro-balance is thus hardly adaptive: higher population pressure will result in a lower rate of relief through nomadisation. In order to demonstrate these intricate balances one ought to have extensive data on land resources, population growth,

nomadisation and other career possibilities for relieving population pressure (e.g. labour migration).

Data on population growth arc scarce and difficult to evaluate. A sample of 148 women past the menopause in the Amballa area gives the following figures: in total they have given birth to 838 children of which 299 died before they reached the age of 8–10, i.e. the age when boys go to the Koranic school. The average number of children born alive to these women is 5.7 and the average number of children surviving childhood is 3.7. Twelve of the women in the sample had not given birth. These figures are not sufficient for realistic calculations of growth rate but I use them as a basis for estimating the yearly growth rate to be of the order of 1 1/2-2 %, i.e. a rate slightly higher than the rate of exclusion through nomadisation and inclusion in the Baggara population. Although this indicates a slowly growing population, the stage where pressure on land reduces the nomadisation rate has not been reached yet.

The number of cattle which the grazing area can carry is limited and this restricts the number of households that can subsist as pastoral nomads. Nomadisation of sedentary Fur increases this pastoral population and is only possible as long as other processes serve to keep the pastoral population down. These processes are of two kinds: a low fertility rate among the Baggara as documented by R. A. Henin[142], and sedentarisation. Henin gives the figure 4.6 as the average number of children born alive to women past menopause for the Humr and Rizeigat Baggara. Pressure on grazing leads to decreasing returns on cattle which implies that the minimal number of cattle necessary for a pastoral household would have to be higher. This argument holds even if marginal households may be able to substitute their reduced income by some grain cultivation, because such cultivation usually further reduces the householder’s ability to care for cattle and therefore increases the chance of loss by disease or predatory animals.

Those who are not able to subsist as pastoralists will have to find other resources on which to base their livelihood either as wage labourers or as farmers if they have access to land. Baggara who came originally from a Fur community and therefore know Fur culture, will usually be accepted as members of a Fur local community and will thereby get land. Nomadised Fur

thus have a cultural resource that they can make relevant if they do not succeed as nomads. It is difficult to assess the rate of sedentarisation among nomadised Fur, but the presence of a large number of people in the village who claim that they have been members of nomadic camps for a part of their life shows that the elimination of personnel through nomadisation is to some extent counter-balanced by inclusion of personnel through sedentarisation. Disappearing lines in local genealogies indicate, however, that there are nomadised Fur who never return to the Fur community and that the rate of exclusion therefore is higher. This is also related to the fact that Baggara who do not know the Fur culture tend to settle among Arab farmers in the southern Darfur and Kordofan.

Typical career patterns thus emerge in Fur communities as a result of the restricting influence of factors of various orders.

I have tried to show how careers of nomadisation have important aggregate effects in terms of pressure on resources and how the state of this pressure in turn influences individual careers. The system I have described here is in a precarious balance; to establish the quantitative conditions for this balance would, however, require macro-level data that is not available.

Fur-Zaghawa relations differ in important respects from those of the Fur-Baggara. Fur and Baggara exploit different niches in the Fur area and in some respects they benefit mutually from each other; the cattle may feed on millet canes left on the farmers' harvested fields, while the farmers' fields will be fertilised by the dung that is deposited around the nomads' camps. Furthermore, the rainy season area of the Baggara is not an attractive area of expansion for Fur farmers. Competition for resources between Fur and Baggara is therefore limited. Since nomadised Fur are categorised as Baggara, they do not emerge as a competing group to the Baggara, but they add to the number of competing households among the Baggara.

In Dar Furnung the Fur exploit resources more or less in the same way as do the Zaghawa. Since both of them grow grain and keep cattle they compete for territory. This competition mainly arises because larger herd-owners among the Fur are interested in utilising the grazing possibilities of the

northern plains. Since the practice of cattle husbandry does not automatically define a Fur herd-owner as a Zaghawa, competition in this area is interpreted in ethnic terms: Fur versus Zaghawa. Despite this, cases oi assimilation of Fur into Zaghawa groups do occur. Another important aspect in this comparison would be the demographic situation. The Baggara's willingness to allow nomads of Fur origin to join their camps could probably not be maintained over time if it had not been for their low reproductive capacity. As far as I know demographic data on the Zaghawa is lacking, but on the basis of conversations with Zaghawa on this topic I gained the impression that their fertility is higher than that of the Baggara. A household's loss of economic viability among the Zaghawa furthermore does not necessarily lead to emigration to other parts of the country, because it is possible to subsist on grain cultivation in their area. Both of these factors would produce greater pressure on resources in Zaghawa country and therefore it is reasonable to assume a greater unwillingness to allow households of different ethnic identity to utilise these resources.

*** Conclusion

In this article I have said that a pastoral ideology is neither a necessary condition for the emergence of nomadic careers, nor a sufficient condition for maintenance of such enterprises. Instead I have emphasised how the actors' decisions to become nomads or farmers are conditioned by factors determining the profitability of alternative ways of value management.

This does not imply economic reductionism where cultural factors are given little or no explanatory value. Ideological statements obviously communicate something about the goals people pursue. These goals constitute the fundamental cultural basis for how people evaluate the desirability of alternative courses of action. In the savannah belt there are differences among groups concerning the style of life they emphasise in ritual, myth and other forms of ideological expression. Different groups thus have different preferences with reference to a sedentary or a nomadic life and this is made relevant for behaviour. How it is made relevant can be found out, I think, by comparing what opportunity costs people of various groups are willing to carry in order to realise the style of life they prefer.

People everywhere are faced with problems of value management. I have here discussed how courses of action which

are advantageous in terms of value accumulation lead to disadvantages with reference to the style of life they imply. There would thus be differences, I assume, between the perspective an impoverished sedentarised Baggari has on his economic enterprise and that of a Fur. Nomadisation is probably never considered an attractive goal by a Fur; it is an end-product of a series of decisions that he considered optimal at various stages in his economic career. The sedentarised Baggari on the other hand would more systematically gear his economic activities towards accumulation of the capital necessary to return to a pastoral life. The same argument as I applied to nomadisation of the Fur can also be applied to sedentarisation of wealthy nomads. There are limits to how far a Baggari is willing to go in order to continue as a nomad if this costs him increasing disadvantage in his value management. He would, however, probably be willing to carry greater opportunity costs in these respects than a nomadised Fur.

Natural conditions will largely determine the profitability of different subsistence activities in various areas of the Sudan savannah belt. Typically, ethnic groups specialise in one of these activities, e.g. in West Africa the Fulani arc cattle nomads, Tuareg are camel nomads and sedentary cultivators belong to various othei' ethnic categories. This corresponds closely to the situation in Sudan with Baggara cattle nomads, Arab camel nomads, and various sedentary ethnic groups. In some localities combinations of these activities are possible, and one thus finds ethnic groups where the economic units combine various subsistence activities as they do among the Nuer, the Zaghawa and Northern Fur, but where they have preference for the style of life associated with one of them and only pursue other activities because of the economic advantages to which they lead.

I have shown how these economic advantages lead Fur o

cultivators to invest in cattle and establish themselves as nomads. If my hypothesis is correct, one would expect nomadisation to occur among sedentary cultivators elsewhere in the savannah belt where economic units are subject to similar sets of restrictions as those of the Fur.

As I have already mentioned, nomadisation does in fact occur also among the Masalit and the Daju; and from interviews I know that this is also the case among the Tama, and this leads to the same kind of identity change as it does for Fur nomads. Both economic structure and ecological conditions are similar to those of the Fur and this should confirm my hypothesis. In fact I think the main structure of Fur economy is common to large parts of Africa.

Under similar ecological conditions in the Sudan savannah, one should thus expect nomadisation to occur in other parts as well. Whether this is so or not, I am not able to demonstrate, but I think the two other variables I mentioned, technological differences and political mechanisms for excluding people from the use of resources have a more restricting effect in the western savannah. The Fulani are probably more of a proper cattle-people than the Baggara. They are for example able to control their large herds by verbal commands in such ways that the Baggara of Darfur think they use magical means. The Fulani standard of hospitality requires a lower level of consumption than Baggara standards do, and the Fulani are generally willing to take greater reductions in consumption in order to build up their herd than are the Baggara. Both Fur and Baggara thus ridicule the Fulani for their poor standard of living. This poor standard does not reflect poverty in cattle, it reflects the cultural preferences of the Fulani which make them allocate their income in such a way that a minimum goes to consumption and as much as possible to investment in cattle. Measured in cattle they are therefore usually rich. These cultural factors probably imply that it would be much more difficult for cultivators to establish themselves as nomads in areas where the Fulani are the dominating cattle owning population because competition for grazing would systematically favour households of Fulani origin. Furthermore Fulani preferences for endogamous marriage and their unwillingness to mix with people of different background would make it difficult for nomadised cultivators to be assimilated in Fulani local groups. On the demographic side, their reproductive capacity is probably high as indicated in their expansion

from the Atlantic Ocean and into the Sudan, although it is a question whether this could be possible without inclusion of personnel from other groups.

Although sedentary groups in the western savannah may have similar incentives to accumulate cattle and become

nomads as the Fur have, they are faced with more difficult problems in terms of ability to compete economically and be assimilated politically, in the nomadic Fulani community. If nomadisation and inclusion in Fulani groups does occur, I would hypothesise that it is dependent on the consent of the Fulani, probably based on political considerations.

Farmers in the savannah thus have incentives to invest in cattle whether they have a cattle complex like the Nuer or preferences for a sedentary life like the Fur. Variations in natural conditions and relations to other ethnic groups will determine the rate and the aggregate consequences of nomadisation in various areas.

** IX. The Rufa‘a Al-hoj Economy

Abdel Ghaffar Mohammed Ahmed

In discussions about sedentarisation of nomads it is often argued that a nomad will only engage in agricultural activities in order to accumulate a profit that he can invest in livestock in order to resume his nomadic life. In a discussion at the Sudan Philosophical Society Conference of 1962, Cunnison was asked if cultivation of cotton would induce the nomads (Humr) to have permanent settlement. He answered that “profits from cotton are either used

to buy more cattle or to provide the nomads with necessities which would otherwise make the selling of cattle inevitable. Cultivation of cotton therefore does not automatically lead to settlement."[143] Behind this argument lies the assumption that people are nomads because they have cultural preferences for this way of life. That is of course true, but I shall here argue that these cultural preferences do not constitute a sufficient set of conditions for predicting the investment policies that a nomad may follow, since he engages in management of other resources existing in his environment. On the basis of material from the Rufa'a al-Hoj nomads (introduced below) I shall try to show that generalisations about investment policies and sedentarisation have to be based on an analysis of the total set of opportunities for value management. Thus, generalisation about profits going back to build up cattle herds or to pay for necessities cannot be sound unless it is shown who of the nomads go to cultivate in relation to the number of animals they have and what kind of principles govern the decision to cultivate land. There is excess labour force in nomad camps which is used less profitably in the traditional sector and can be channelled in such a way that it produces more profit in the cultivation sector. It cannot be argued that profits always go back to be invested in cattle because this field of investment may show more profitability to the individuals involved than that of cattle.

Looking at the economy of the Rufa'a al-Hoj nomads we find that a nomad strives for the best allocation of all possible resources his environment provides. This leads to a mixed economy. Although the values of nomadic life (preference for cattle as wealth, seasonal migration, etc.) are dominant a balance has to be maintained in distributing time between all fields of possible investment. Fields of greater profit are looked at with care and time is given to them. At the extremes, that is to say with the very wealthy and the very poor, a slow process of sedentarisation is apparent. The present state of affairs in the area, especially with the growth of large cultivation schemes leading to a reduction of the grazing areas, together with the increased competition due to the invasion of the Pastoral Fulani, leads to the belief that the Rufa'a al-Hoj are increasingly adopting the tendency to find new profitable fields of investment. This may lead to another way of life, totally different from the present one of pastoral nomadism.

My intention in this paper is to give a description of the Rufa’a al-Hoj economy with reference to the way they allocate time to their different resources, and to offer remarks on the possible alternatives that they can choose between, in the situation of rapid change in the area.[144]

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*** The tribe and its seasonal migration

The term “Rufa’a al-Hoj” refers to a nomadic Arab tribe of the Juhayna, the second largest group in the Sudan. They reside in the southern part of the Gezira in the Blue Nile Province. The area utilised by the Rufa’a al-Hoj in their seasonal movement is limited by latitude 13’40’ N; in the south-east they go as far as Khor Yabus and even slightly south of it towards the Ethiopian border; to the south-west they reach the swampy area of the Upper Nile Province.

In the north of their area the Rufa’a al-Hoj come into contact with the Kenana Arabs—who share with them the same grazing area and also the same Rural Council—as well as the Baggara of the White Nile who move in the western part of the Gezira. The Rural Council is Abu Hujar which consists of the Nazirates[145] of the Rufa’a al-Hoj including 26,890 nomads and 28,051 sedentaries under four Omdas, all of them being the Nazir’s brothers. There is also the population of the Kenana Nazirate including 5,108 nomads and 14,804 sedentaries under three Omdas.[146] The sedentaries in in the Rufa’a al-Hoj Nazirate are not Rufa’a. Most of them originate from western Sudan and Nigeria having settled during and after the Mahdist Rule.

In the southern part of their area the Muslim Rufa’a came into contact with many pagan tribes who have varied cultures and different languages. Of these the Ingessana, Berta, and “Burun” may be mentioned. Recently nomadic Fulani came to the area. Their invasion and their use of the same grazing area as the Rufa’a has led to many problems both on tribal and administrative levels.

The country of the Rufa’a al-Hoj is one of low rainfall woodland savannah. The rainfall is less towards the north and heavier towards the south. It ranges between 440 mm. at its o

northern limit and 700 mm. or more at the southern one. The whole area is a continuous cotton soil plain carrying a few isolated jebels. The plains merge into sloping land near the rivers. Apart from the Blue Nile the Yabus is the only perennial river. It does not reach the White Nile but loses itself in swamps. Khors Tumat and Offat have very wide beds and carry a heavy flood. Water is easily found in their beds throughout the year and in the rainy season they reach the Blue Nile. The westward flowing khors, Doleib, Sama‘a, Ahmar and Tombak are all lost in swamps.

Acacia forest and savannah are distributed irregularly over the whole area in patches of varying size. The forests consist of mainly hejllj (Balanites aegyptiaca), talk (Acacia seyal), kittir (A. mellifera) and hashab (A. verek) in varying proportions. The most important of them to Rufa‘a al-Hoj life—besides the grass—is the hashab, an economic resource which is politically significant.

The fact that the Rufa‘a al-Hoj keep camels, cattle and sheep, the pasture for which differs in both the dry and wet seasons, leads to considerable dispersion of residential sites among the different sections of the tribe. The tribal sections divide into two groups on the basis of their seasonal movement. Those who graze in the northern part of the region during the dry season (on the banks of the Blue Nile) are known as the Northern Badiya (Badiya simply means nomads). Those who graze in the southern part of the region (Kurmuk and Boing area) during the same season are known as the Southern Badiya. This distribution has been administratively recognised since the beginning of the Condominium rule. Sometimes part of a section stays with the Northern Badiya while the other part moves with the Southern Badiya. This always depends on the kind of animals people choose to keep. The environment in the north is favourable for camels and cattle while in the south it is favourable for sheep and cattle but it is impossible to keep herds of camels: it is too wet and there is a certain kind of noxious fly.

The Rufa‘a al-Hoj spend the wet season near Jebel Dali, Jebel Moya and their surroundings. When in October they start their movement southwards, whether to the river bank or towards the southern grazing areas of Kurmuk and Boing, the Rufa‘a al-Hoj move in small groups consisting of the settlement unit that may be composed of the head of the family, his wife (or wives), his children and married sons and their wives and children. The distance between these settlement units may be five to eight miles or a day’s walk. They follow each other in a stream. Southwards, the herds go first and the households follow since there is always adequate water and grass. But in their movement north, which starts about April, the households move first together with the rabob—that is the sheep, goats and cows kept with the household to provide milk, and also those animals which are for one reason or another unable to keep up with the movement of the main herd. During these movements if water is not found in running khors or pools, it can be dug from the beds of the sandy khors. The herds join households and rabob near Mazmum, where both Badiyas meet and thence move together to the rains grazing area. The movements north and south take three months each and the map shows the routes of the migration.

*** The economic unit, resources and division of labour

The Rufa’a al-Hoj practise a subsistence economy which is based on three kinds of asset. Traditionally their major assets have been herds of camels, cattle or sheep together with a few goats, and grazing rights, but recently they have developed an interest in gum tapping as a source of cash income. Their economic resources— like those of most nomadic groups arc very simple. Animals are individually owned as private property and a household makes its livelihood from the production of animals owned by its members. The land is free or sometimes looked at as government property and every individual has equal access to it and can graze where he wants. Only when it comes to gum gardens is the position different. These are given by the government on contract terms to the leaders of the tribe, who are supposed to distribute them to their tribesmen, but on certain bases.

The smallest economic unit, which I shall term a household, consists of a man, his wife and his children. A number of households, generally less than fifteen, makes a settlement. Also one or a number of settlements, not more than four, will make zferig with a man as its head known as a sheikh. He is responsible for the collection of taxes. Together with the

elders of the ferig he settles disputes between members of the settlement and represents the ferig to the rest of the tribe.

Settlement groups keep their herds of sheep, cattle or camels together. The young men of the settlement follow the herds to the grazing areas which are usually far from the place where the tents are pitched. For the Northern Badiya when settlements are on the west bank the herds may be on the east bank or near the Dinder river. In the case of the Southern Badiya when the settlements are on Khors Tombak, Ahmar and Babarus, the herds are usually grazed far south of Khor Yabus. The young men will spend approximately two months with the herds before being replaced by others. Not all the young men of the settlement will be with the herds all the time. Some will be in the settlement looking after the children and old men, while others get equipment such as saddles and ropes ready for the annual movement. Above all young men staying in the settlement will look after the weak animals which cannot cope with the herd movement and are kept behind as part of the rabob. Together with these there are the camels used for carrying baggage during the seasonal movement. With the Southern Badiya whose conditions are not favourable for camels, those used for carrying baggage have to be given especial care. Some of the weak animals can be sent back to the herd when they are well enough to move with the rest. Milk animals will be replaced when they have ceased giving milk. Some of the sheep or goats from the rabbb might be killed from time to time for important guests.

The women remain in the settlement all the time. They do all the domestic work and in their spare time they make semn (liquid butter), and birth. and other mats. They are also fond of making decorations for their howdahs, the tent-like beds made specially to be put on the camel’s back where women can sit during migrations. This takes a considerable proportion of their time. The young girls help their

mothers, and might help, together with young boys, in looking after the rabob. They and the young boys are sometimes responsible for bringing water to the settlement. Water is drawn from the Blue Nile in the case of the Northern Badiya and this may be sometimes more than three or four miles from the settlement, or from nearby khors in the case of Southern Badiya.

The old men spend most of their time in the khalwa, which is a birsh tent, a rakuba (shelter built from wood and straw), or a big tree some distance from the settlement tents where guests arc received. They may sometimes help the young men in making ropes or saddles. In the khalwas which act as meeting places for the men of the settlements, they discuss the daily situation of their herds, the grazing and water places, the price of dura and market goods, as well as settling minor disputes between the members of the settlement. Old men from different settlements visit each other from time to time and spend hours discussing grazing prospects and local political problems.

*** Building of capital and allocation of time

The material property of a household includes a tent, bedding, saddle bags, ropes and leather sacks for milk and water. All these are produced by the members of the household. Clothes, shoes, cooking and eating utensils are obtained from the small towns they pass. There is a tendency to abandon birsh tents for cloth ones obtained from markets as well as buying bedding made of cotton instead of making beds from strong birsh or skin. The value of such household equipment is slight compared to that represented by the animals they own.

For the Rufa‘a al-Hoj it is essential that all productive capital with the exception of gum trees is in consumable form. Their main productive assets —the animals—can be slaughtered at any time and thus be consumed directly.

As I have indicated the economic resources for a Rufa‘a al-Hoj nomadic household are animals, lands and gum trees. A household does not need to own land or gum trees but must o

have enough animals to enable it to solve the main economic problem of getting market goods and dura. The minimum requirements for a household to live on are about 10–15 cows, more than 30 sheep, and at least two camels to carry tents and other baggage. With any number less than this it is difficult to practise an adequate nomadic life. Depleted nomadic households therefore switch to sedentary life until they build such minimum capital that they can rejoin the nomadic life once more.

The household capital is formed by a well established process. A child is given a cow or a sheep by his father. From this basic gift, the number increases every year. On the occasion of circumcision he is given some more by his father and other relatives as well. After this he will start accumulating his own capital. He may, if he is not very much needed by his household, go to tap gum and will get an income of about LS 70 or more for the dry-season work on the gum garden. Or he may join much richer households who are short of herders. Here he gets a job which is worth about LS 60 a year, but the payment is always in kind, in the shape of fifteen or more sheep. Some also get work in cultivation schemes during the harvest season which pays a similar amount of money. If a young man stays all the time with his own household then his father will be responsible for the expenses of his marriage and for helping him to get the minimum capital required to start his own household. The father can distribute his wealth among his sons and daughters as he likes while he is alive. After his death they inherit the wealth and it is distributed according to Islamic principles. That is to say a son takes twice a daughter’s share.

Women can have a considerable number of animals through inheritance. Also divorced women get animals from their ex-husbands in order to help in bringing up the children, if they have any. During a girl’s childhood, or at circumcision, she is expected to get gifts from relatives. These animals are cared for by the males of her household.

From his animals the nomad gets milk which is an important item in his diet. Some of the milk is consumed and the rest is made into liquid butter. This is also either consumed or sold to the sedentary population when the nomads are camping near a village or a small town. Sometimes milk can be sold in such places but this can only be done by poor households.

All households need dura for their own consumption as this is the major staple of the Rufa’a al-Hoj nomads beside milk. The Rufa‘a al-Hoj used to cultivate small fields, which covered their needs, in the Dali—Mazmum area. But with the growth of their herds and the need to move south before the harvest, together with the increase in the late 1950s of mechanised cultivation schemes in the area, and with the establishment of villages, they had to abandon cultivation. Now they depend for their supplies of dura on villages of Hill Burun, Uduk, Jum

Jum and Meban in the southern part of their region, which they get through barter for meat, salt or beads. The Northern Badiya may obtain dura from merchants in the villages on the bank of the Blue Nile.

Selling animals is the usual way of getting cash income to buy dura and other market goods. The Rufa‘a al-Hoj call their sale of animals gelba. In the gelba the nomads select some male animals together with the old female ones and take them to markets such as Sinja, Sennar, and Wad Medani. The minimum number of the animals taken for the gelba is about five oxen, which can be sold for LS 15 each, and fifteen sheep, which can be sold for LS 4 each. This gives a total of LS 135. The average annual rate of consumption in dura and other market goods is of a value of nearly LS 200 per household of about six or seven persons. To cover the deficit, the excess labour in the household —those who are not needed to manage herds—will be transferred to gum tapping in order to generate increased cash income and to avoid selling animals. Such a member can get a cash income of more than LS 70 in the gum tapping season. Also they can join rich households as herders as mentioned above. In this way they can balance the budget of the household.

A significant fraction of income is in the form of animal increase. Some animals must be set aside each year to ensure replacement of stock. Even the surplus money left after buying dura and market goods and other expenses is invested in animals. Sheep give birth to young once every six months and cows every year. The Rufa‘a al-Hoj will try to make this increase balance the reduction resulting from theg«ZZ>a. Having their capital in this form which can be directly consumed the only way to maintain it is by a systematic policy of reserving the young animals for the replacement. There is always a continual risk of total or partial loss of capital through famine, drought or an epidemic.

Those with large herds arc forced to employ herders from other households that have labour to spare. The employment of such herders may lead to diminishing returns. A hired herder may not pay the same attention to the herds as the owner would. Also the fact that herders must be paid a certain amount at the end of the year reduces the ability of the owner of the herd to maintain sufficient replacement for the stock.

There is another means for providing sheep herders for the Southern Badiya. That is by employing the Burun, the Uduk or the Jum Jum who may be paid LS 2 a year; but these people have no experience in herding.

Among the Southern Badiya camels cannot survive for more than two years and always an allowance for a new camel is included as part of a household annual budget. The cash left over after these necessary expenses is used on items of conspicuous consumption. It is used for bridewealth, where a householder can take a second, third or fourth wife or marry off his sons. This feeds back into the system by creating new labour, or even forming a new unit. It can be spent in going on the pilgrimage to Mecca, which gives the individual status which can be used to exercise authority, from which he can derive more income. It can also be used for building political support. This comes through hospitality which is a major item of expenditure among the Rufa’a al-Hoj nomads, for it is a highly valued virtue. The hospitable man is admired and people think highly of him whether he be present or absent from the place where they are sitting. Men seek his company and come to the khalwa where he sits, or even to his tent. Members of his settlement help him in receiving guests and they will share his good

reputation and high status. This reputation is necessary for that political support which can lead to positions of power and authority such as sheikh of a ferig, or wakil (Nazir’s deputy). Being in one of these positions he can get most of the things he wants done —such as having gum gardens or reducing taxes levied on the members of his ferig—through maintaining good relations with the Rural Council officials or even bribing them. Cash is also used for paying taxes levied by the Council on the herds.

*** Flow chart of value

The chart gives here[147] the major economic strategies available to the Rufa’a al-Hoj households. The dotted lines attempt to mark the boundaries between the three possible alternatives for management of values. These boundaries are marked on the basis of the principles that give nomads access to resources in each and the sanctions involved in their transaction. The major forms of values are shown as boxes and their transformation as arrows. Disappearing arrows indicate consumption.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-15.jpg][Chart showing the major forms of value (boxes) and transformation of value (arrows), ‘f’ indicates female labour.]]

Let us take first the central section of the chart where the household is nomadic with some animals and access to grazing land and also, if it has enough labour, can cultivate dura on the same land. Here all households have equal rights to the use of land and their property as a whole can be converted into cash and vice versa. But when it comes to gum gardens, it is not all households that can obtain them. The right to distribute gum gardens is laid (by the government) in the hands of a certain group of people in the tribe. These are the Nazir, his deputies and Omdas who allocate them to those from whom they need effective support on certain tribal political issues. This is why they are treated differently from the communal land. Also gum gardens are divided between those for the nomads and those for villagers, among whom the Omdas are supposed to allocate them on similar principles.

I have mentioned above that some nomads are forced by certain circumstances to become sedentary until they can build sufficient capital to return to nomadic life. They cultivate land or tap gum in order to get additional income. Principles for obtaining land here are different from when they are moving as nomads. The land they use is on the bank of the river which is the private property of settled village people. The Rufa'a have a contract relationship here and are required to pay a certain agreed portion of their crop to the sedentary landowner. Also when a villager gets a gum garden allotted to him by the Omdas he can share it with individual Rufa'a by similar contracts. This is why the "land" box appears in this part of the chart. This situation can lead, and has led, to a slow process of sedentarisation of some nomads. Some fail for a long time to accumulate enough capital to build a herd and thus decide to settle. Others having practised cultivation and the sedentary life for a long time start to compare the gains they get while settled to those they gain moving and on the basis of this decide to stay; but only few individuals have done this.

There is also the case of some rich household heads. They have realised the diminishing returns they get after a certain stage of investing in animals. They also see the sedentary population (especially merchants) starting mechanised cultivation schemes and profiting from them in a short time; and they decide to enter this new field. Neither merchants nor rich nomads have experience in land cultivation but they depend on the large amounts of capital they use. They pay the Rural Council for a licence for the scheme, which implies that the land is now privately controlled.

In such a case only the head of the rich household and his wife and children, if any, join the sedentary life sharing a cultivation scheme with a merchant or having one of their own. But from time to time the rich nomad will join the rest of his family who continue to practise a nomadic life and are taking care of his herds. In the schemes the rich man depends mainly on hired labour and from time to time those of his household who are free may join him for a short period. The leaders of the tribe (the Nazir, his deputies and Omdas) are settled and have been involved in these schemes for a long time now. They have known how profitable these schemes are and have learned how to compete with settled people.

The individuals within each household divide their time economically in management of alternative resources, that is to say, animals, land to be cultivated for dura, and gum gardens. Animals are the most important item and the most time-consuming, but in seeking to balance his economy the nomad must follow a certain rhythmic pattern. He must sell animals to get consumption goods, and if he continues to sell animals all the time he will end up with nothing. Thus there is always a need to cultivate if he has small herds in order to save selling animals for dura. The table shows how the time of the household can be distributed between the different resources. The most significant features of the table are that of the twelve months of the year the busiest are December and January when the members of the household have reached their dry-season grazing area. Some of them have to come back to the area they cultivated, if they have one, so as to harvest the crop. Others go gum tapping for it is the beginning of the gum season. This is in addition to those who stay to manage the herds. In April and May the only job the nomads do is the management of herds when they are moving to the rains grazing area. August, September and October are free months compared to the rest of the year. In the first two the Rufa‘a al-Hoj nomads only manage their herds which are in the rains grazing area, not far from the settlement. At the same time they are getting themselves ready for the southward move. In October they start moving south. This table is in contrast to any similar table that can be drawn for households in the mechanised cultivation schemes or those settled in villages on the bank of the Blue Nile. Those in villages on the mechanised schemes are busy for seven months a year starting from June and ending in January, while those on the bank of the Blue Nile can make themselves busy all the year round. Households here have different economic resources.

TABLE 1: Seasonal Activities of Rufd‘a al-Hoj

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Movement:— South									x	x	x	

| North | | | | x | x | x | | | | | | |

| Cultivation | | | | | | x | x | | | | | |

| Harvesting | x | | | | | | | | | | | x |

| Gum tapping | x | x | x | | | | | | | | x | x |

| Herding: —
Dry season | x | x | x | | | | | | | | | |

| Wet season | | | | | | | x | x | x | | | |

*** Conclusion

I have not discussed the ideological preference of the nomads for the way of life they lead. I agree with the argument presented by Haaland in this volume, that this is not the only premise for determining the way they go about manipulating other possibilities of profit within their environment. Strategic choices can be made between different resources at the time of allocation of labour. When it comes to sedentarisation it is not a matter of accepting the ideology of the sedentary population, as many central authorities dealing with nomads put it. It is a matter of measuring the profitability of the new way of investment, as with those rich households where decreasing return on capital (animals) leads to investment elsewhere — mechanised cultivation schemes—which in turn leads to gradual sedentarisation. But for those who are not able to maintain a minimum capital requirement to practise nomadism sedentarisation is an obligation.

Recently competition for the use of grazing lands has increased especially after the invasion of the Pastoral Fulani and the rapid growth of the mechanised schemes in 1969. There is a growing necessity to reduce the size of the herds, but it is not yet acute. Talks about investment in new schemes have started to dominate discussion in the Rufa’a al-Hoj nomads’ khalwas. The next few years will reflect the result of these discussions.

** X. A Rotating Credit Association in the Three Towns

F. Rehfisch

In this essay I propose to describe the institution of the sandug especially as it operates in the Three Towns.[148] In the course of this exposition I will answer in terms of Sudanese material some of the questions put by Shirley Ardener in a stimulating-paper on rotating credit associations.[149] According to her definition, an association of this kind is “formed upon a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation.”[150]

The Arabic term sandug has as its primary meaning “box”, but Sudanese apply it by extension to a type of rotating credit association. Several informants told me that the term sandug is used because the contribution is kept in a box before being distributed.

The information given here was acquired in two ways, the first by direct interviews of members of such groups, the second from a number of essays written by Khartoum University students who were asked to describe a sandug to which they had belonged, or about which they could readily obtain information.

The Three Towns, of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman, make up a conurbation at the junction of the Blue and White Niles. The census taken in 1955/6 gave the total population as 245,735, while a later sample count in 1964/5 estimated it to have reached about 438,000.[151] The population is of rather heterogeneous origin though the majority originates from tribes located in the Northern Sudan. The lingua franca is Arabic and most residents with other mother tongues speak it adequately. There are no statistics available on religious affiliations, but it is clear that the great majority are Muslims. Although the inhabitants come originally from distinct

tribal groupings, there is a common tradition and culture stemming largely from a shared language and religion. Interaction between members of different groups is thus facilitated.

The sandug is commonly thought of as a women’s institution and some male informants claimed that they knew nothing about it. In fact however associations include male members, and there are even some exclusively male groups. Ardener wrote in 1964 that “rotating credit associations seem to have been introduced into the Sudan about fifteen to twenty years ago” and was informed that they were started by middle-aged women who wanted to collect money to buy gold ornaments for their daughters’ weddings.[152] Informants stated to me that they were introduced during the early nineteen-forties by women, but that the aim in the first phase was not so much to obtain gold ornaments, as to obtain scarce goods, sugar, tea and others, which were at that time severely rationed. Tea and sugar play an important part in the social life of the Sudan, both urban and rural, where a guest coming for a visit, however brief, is offered as a minimum a glass of highly sweetened tea. In the case of the original sandug each member would put aside a small portion of her ration and at the meetings, usually held weekly or fortnightly, would hand it to the member whose turn it was to receive the contribution. The meeting would be held in the home of the recipient and she would provide tea and sugar and perhaps other refreshments for the members. It is clear that the members did not as a result receive any more of the scarce commodities than they would had they not belonged; indeed as they had to entertain their fellow members, in a real sense they gained little. But they saw a benefit since at regular intervals they would acquire an amount which would allow them to be somewhat lavish in their entertainment. The groups were made up of friends, and the offering of refreshments was seen as a normal obligation of relations of friendship. Several informants stated that membership had another advantage in that if one of the group should need large amounts of tea and sugar, owing perhaps to heavy obligations of hospitality at a wedding, funeral, circumcision or other occasion, she might be allowed to take the contribution even though it was not her regular turn. It can readily be seen that the institution was a means to introduce forced savings as well as insurance.

Rotating credit associations sprang up rapidly among Sudanese women in the Three Towns at this time. As far as I could determine, at the outset there were no male members. Two informants said their mothers had learned about the institution from Egyptian women living in Omdurman among whom the associations had been common for some time.[153] With the lifting of rationing, after the war, many of these groups melted away. In some cases, payments in cash replaced payments in commodities.

I shall now give details of a few rotating credit associations.

The first example was founded in 1960 by a group of eight girls who had been sent to the Three Towns for their secondary schooling. They came from the same area and had been classmates at an Intermediate School. My informant had taken the lead in this project and suggested it to the others, who all agreed. They were to pay one piastre (about a penny), at that time. The founder decided on the rotation order, that is the order in which members would collect the contributions. The meetings were to be held fortnightly. It soon became the custom that the recipient would use the amount to buy sweets which would be shared out equally among the members. Quite soon girls from other areas showed an interest in joining but were refused membership; it was felt that they could not be trusted. After several months the founder suggested that one of her best friends, from another part of

the Sudan, be allowed to join and this was agreed. Soon others were included and at its largest the group numbered seventeen girls. Four months after the foundation of the association the contribution was raised to 3 piastres. During the first two years membership numbers fluctuated as some girls left the school and others quarrelled and resigned.

The first crisis occurred when one of the founding members asked permission of the group to be allowed to keep the contributions when her turn came rather than buying sweets with it. She came from a poor family and wished

to buy sugar and tea to take to her mother at the end of term. After considerable debate the group agreed, though not unanimously. At the very next meeting a member, not one of the founders, made the same request, for the same reason as the first, but was refused. The founders voted en bloc against her while the others were divided. Nonetheless she insisted upon her rights, was given the contribution and then expelled from the group. Some members resigned there and then but the association limped on until the end of the school year. After the summer holidays the founder made an unsuccessful attempt to start up the group again.

When the group was founded originally, the girl who had put forward the idea was named sheikha or female head. Her responsibilities were to call meetings, take care of any money not immediately paid out and act as chairman. Outside these very limited spheres she had no authority.

An interesting feature of this group is that it was first formed on the basis of home tics and foreigners wishing to join were rejected, but later as individual girls became friendly with schoolmates from other areas the barrier was breached. The girls widened their social horizons. However when the time ofcrisis came it is clear that home ties were overriding. Thus the sponsor of the member who brought the crisis to a head voted against her, although they had been fast friends. Also, the founding members voted together when one of their number petitioned for this favour. The group had no sanctions to enforce its will. The sandug was not considered by its members to be an economic institution; no one gained financially in any way from membership, since each member paid in a certain amount at each meeting and in return received a roughly equivalent amount of sweets. Rather it was a social institution founded to maintain the solidarity of girls from one area, and later expanded to include other friends. The fact that the group dissolved after an existence of two years would seem to indicate that the girls had become less provincial and interacted more freely with persons from other areas; nevertheless shortly before its disappearance home ties had overridden other links.

Another more characteristic type of association will now be described. This group was founded in 1940 or 1941. The founding core consisted of a

number of women all living on the same street in Omdurman. At the outset there were fifteen members. Twelve of these lived in the same area, many in adjoining houses. One lived about four hundred yards away from this group but was a sister of one of the core. The sister of another, living a mile or more away, was also allowed to join as well as the brother's wife of one of the core, who lived half a mile away. The core was essentially a neighbourhood group even though some of the members were related to each other. Some were long-term residents of the town, having been born there, while others had come there recently. Ages ranged roughly from twenty to fifty and all were married or had been at one time. No detailed information on the economic status of the women or their husbands' occupation was obtained; some were quite well off, others were poor. Finally a number of different northern tribes were represented in the group.

The group met weekly and the contribution was a cup of sugar and a small amount of tea. The meetings were always held in the core area, at the home of the person whose turn it was to receive the donations except at the turns of those living outside, when the group would meet at the house of their relative in the neighbourhood. The members were each served with sugared tea and biscuits or sweets. At the outset the order of rotation was set by lot, but it could be altered in special circumstances. Attendance at the meetings was not mandatory, but members were expected to come. In case of absence contributions should be taken beforehand or sent through another member. If a member could not make her contribution at any time she was expected to give the reason, and no more would be said. She might make a double contribution at a later date, which would be given to the person

whose turn it was to receive it at the time that she defaulted.

With the lifting of rationing payment began to be made in cash, the amount at first being three piastres a week and later five. Some members might save the payment to buy gold ornaments, but it often went to purchase small luxuries and in some cases simply was used to cover household expenses. Again members might apply to have their turn brought forward; no case of

refusal was recorded. Immediately after rationing was abolished the membership shrank, but by 1966 when the investigation was carried out it had grown to include seventeen women, and five men whom I prefer to call associate members, for they did not attend meetings, but sent their contributions through their wives or sisters. They received their shares in the same way. Twelve of the women came from the core area. All were married except for one, a widow. The ages ranged from about thirty-five to about sixty. Husbands' occupations were very varied. There were two government messengers and two government clerks; two had stalls in the fruit and vegetable market; one worked in the same area, probably as a porter. Two were labourers and two were elementary school teachers. Of the five women living outside the area, two were married to labourers, one to a goldsmith, one to a man working in the market and one to a high-ranking civil servant. Three of these were sisters, one a mother-in-law, and one a husband's sister, of members in the core area. The two male teachers, the goldsmith, a marketstall holder and a labourer were associate members. The amount paid in weekly in 1966 was six piastres. Seven of the women were Ja^caliyin, two were Nubians, three Shaigiya and three Juhayna; the remaining two were not identified.

Again we find that this group is based on locality and that members from outside were allowed in because of kinship ties. It is hardly surprising that locality plays such an important role in view of Sudanese urban customs. Women in towns were not expected to wander about freely unless accompanied by a male guardian. They were allowed to visit close neighbours, as long as they used back alleys and so limited chance encounters with strangers. While this tradition is slowly breaking down, it still holds among the more conservative, and of course held when this group was first organised. The fact that the group can be said to have no tribal basis reflects the structure of neighbourhoods. The vast majority contain a tribally heterogenous population. Again the neighbourhood structure is reflected in the economic status of the members, for most neighbourhoods in Omdurman include people from widely differing economic strata. Houses of red brick or stone are found side by side with others of mud or mud brick. The economically successful for the most part do not move out of their districts, but instead improve their housing. In the case of this association no income figures were collected but it can be safely assumed that the range was wide, from labourers earning from 25 to 30 piastres a day to the higher civil servants whose income would be well above LSI,000 a year. Close social

interaction between persons in quite different social strata is a common feature of Sudan urban life.

The association described above can hardly be said to have a formal authority structure. One woman was the informal leader; she had a dominant personality and was one of the founding members. Moreover, her family were less strict than others and she could visit those members outside the core area more frequently. Her duties were to chair meetings and to be a link between members. She should be told if a member could not attend a scheduled gathering or pay her subscription. No sanctions were levied against those unable to pay their subscriptions and there is no evidence that any serious disputes arose when defaults occurred. A member unable to pay informed the group, although she might be expected to compensate later.

Considerable data on other rotating credit associations of the above type were collected, but they were all broadly similar. Membership of some was restricted to small neighbourhoods. Quite a number had no male affiliates. None had either tribe or kinship as an exclusive basis for membership.

The third sandug to be discussed is one founded by a group of recent graduates of the University of Khartoum and now employed in the civil service. They had been close friends at the university and wished to maintain this contact, which they feared might be lost by their dispersion in different ministries. Shortly after taking up their employment five of them met by chance at a wedding. They regretted having drifted apart over the past few months and decided to do something about it. One suggested that they form a sandug and the rest agreed.

It was also agreed that three other friends be invited to join. A meeting was held a week later to discuss arrangements. The one who had originally suggested the idea was chosen as leader. He had long been one of the most popular members of the group and, at his suggestion, the first meeting was held at his house. The group unanimously agreed to fixing the contributions

at a pound each month, salaried officials being paid monthly. The original order of payments was determined by lot, as is customary. Sometimes a meeting would be held at the home of the recipient, but if his house was unsuitable it was held at a cafe. At home, a host supplied his guests with soft drinks. A problem arose at cafes when a member ordered beer, which is much more expensive. The group agreed that this was permissible, the argument being that the meetings were primarily social and not money-making events and hence the host should supply his guests with what they wished. When the group met at a cafe, the host was responsible for paying only for the first round of drinks. Some who held the entertainment at home introduced beer but not all. Shortly aftei' the group's formation the contribution was raised to two pounds a month, although some members were against this as they feared that if the financial aspect was enhanced it might override the social. A further increase to three pounds took place about a year later, when one of the members announced that he was to get married and needed money. As all had just received their annual increment it was agreed. Also the order of rotation was altered so that the bridegroom would receive the contribution in the week preceding his marriage. The members were interviewed two years after the founding. All agreed that its primary function was social, but four hastened to add that it was an efficient means of saving money. One stated that when his turn came to receive the contribution, he immediately banked it as he was saving money to buy furniture in view of marriage. Another was saving to buy a car, and a third to get married, itself an expensive proposition in the urban Sudan. A fourth also deposited his money in the bank but had no specific savings goal. Others said that the amount was added to their cash in hand and treated no differently from their ordinary income.

In this case all of the members had the same educational and economic characteristics. They came from various parts of the northern riverain Sudan and only two were distantly related. Most lived in Khartoum, but they were not confined to a single neighbourhood. There had been no defaults of payment but it was agreed that one who was in difficulties would be excused, although when his turn came to receive the contributions he should make compensation. No fine would be levied. The group showed no signs of breaking up nor had any attempt been made to recruit new members. One informant said that when one of the meetings was held at his house his wife asked to be allowed to join, but the request was not taken seriously.

I turn now to a more general discussion and to some of the questions posed by Ardener in what she calls her “fieldguide” to these associations. I shall refer to a general survey of rotating credit associations undertaken in Omdurman in 1961–2. Table 1 gives the size of the groups studied at that time.

TABLE 1

No. of members	No. of associations
6	3
8	6
9	4
10	2
13	2
14	I
17	I
22	I
not known	I
	Total 21
Mean 11 members	

The majority of these associations were made up of women or of a female core with associated male members, as can be seen from Table 2.

TABLE 2

| Membership | Number |

| Women only | 10 |

| Female core with male associates | 4 |

| Males only | 7 |

| | 21 |

Probably if all of the associations in the Three Towns had been investigated, less than a third of them would be found to be male groupings.

All women’s sandugs except one had a neighbourhood base, although some of them included some members living outside. The exception was a group of midwives who had formed one of these associations. Midwives are of necessity more mobile than most women and it was easy for them to form such a group. One male group was also neighbourhood based, all members living within about two hundred yards of each other. The nine members met almost every night at a club in the locality. Five of the men’s groups were composed of fellow employees.

Occupational or economic or social status seems to play very little part in the organisation of these groups. Even in the case of those restricted to persons working for one employer, one finds members at varying levels of the occupational hierarchy. For example one included the assistant manager, and a number of clerks and messengers. None had either a kinship or a tribal basis.

None of the groups investigated had a formal constitution. There were no rules specifically setting out who might be eligible for membership. There was little formal organisation: no rigid structure, no proliferation of offices; written records were not kept. Most of them had a nominal head, the most

popular or the oldest member, or sometimes the originator. However it is the group which makes decisions and in only one case did the head have a casting vote, this being the third group described above. In no case were fines or other penalties inflicted upon defaulters, the rationale being that the sandug was a group of friends, none of whom would willingly act to the detriment of his or her fellows. Such defaults as occurred were regarded as unavoidable, and in most cases tacitly ignored, although occasionally the defaulter was expected to compensate the group at some future date.

With the earliest associations contributions were usually in sugar and tea. When rationing was lifted a shift was made to cash. The amount ofcash varied considerably. The lowest amount I have recorded recently is three piastres a week, and the largest five pounds a month. The groups might meet weekly, fortnightly or monthly. Those who meet monthly are groups made up of civil servants receiving a monthly salary. Two of the twenty-one groups paid six piastres or less per month. Nine groups collected from 6 to 50 piastres a month per member, five from 50 piastres to a pound, and five over a pound. All those with fees of over a pound were male groups except the midwives' association. One informant told me of a sandug in one of the ministries where the members paid LS 25 a month, but this is unusual.

Ardener has criticised Geertz for arguing that rotating credit associations should be seen as a product of a shift from traditional peasant societies to a commercial one, or as an educational mechanism whereby peasants learn to be traders.[154] The Sudanese material would seem to confirm this criticism. Firstly it is primarily a women's institution and (in contrast to certain parts of West Africa) most urban Sudanese women are not traders, indeed the majority have no remunerative occupation. Equally it would be difficult to argue that most inhabitants of the Three Towns were peasants learning to be traders. The majority were born in the towns and have never been a part of a peasant economy. And as for men members, most are not traders, but civil servants and other types of salaried or wage-earning workers.

Again Ardener criticises Geertz for arguing that there is a continuous ranging from "traditionalistic associations" which lay stress on "ritualistic, solidarity-

strengthening elements," to associations which are more "rationally oriented", being increasingly concerned with the financial probity of members, the legal enforceability of obligations and with complex organisation and commercial calculations.[155] It has been seen that the latter concerns hardly enter at all into the sandug. Since defaulters are not penalised it would appear as if social factors override the economic. In the association a member has two roles which analytically can be separated. The first is that of giver and receiver, which can be called economic, the second that of friend, neighbour or kinsman, and members see the second as being more important. Ultimately the members do not derive a benefit from membership in purely economic terms, since part of each payment they receive must be returned to the givers in terms of refreshment. It might be argued that the economic rationale was in introducing forced savings and this is true, but the cost, especially in the cases where payments are small, is extremely high.

Hence I would argue that the majority of these associations in the Sudan can best be classified as social institutions binding together people with already existing social ties by the addition of what might be termed an economic link. However one must not ignore the fact that some appear to be "pure" economic institutions, that is those few where the element of entertainment is absent. Hence under the rubric of sandug is to be found one general type of institution whose function lies along a continuum ranging from social to economic with the majority falling more closely towards the social end.

** XI. Social Characteristics Of Big Merchants and Businessmen in El Obeid

Taj al-Anbia Ali al-Dawi

This paper is concerned with El Obeid, one of the leading towns in the Sudan.[156] More specifically, it deals with the social characteristics of the big merchants and businessmen in the town. The material relevant for this

purpose is primarily derived from interviews with twenty-eight out of ninety-two wealthy merchants in El Obeid.[157] But before discussing the results of the interviews, it is necessary to present a brief description of the town itself in order to help the reader to place the merchants in their environment.

El Obeid has a population of well over sixty thousand. For centuries it has served as a commercial centre for Kordofan, a tributary area extending from 10° to 16° N and from 27° to 32° E, which forms one of the largest administrative divisions of the country. In the second half of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century, the town furnished an important link for the traffic between Kordofan and the adjoining regions particularly Darfur and the Nile. In 1912, the railway line reached El Obeid, and so Kordofan and indeed the whole of western Sudan became open to the outside world. The train had the effect on the town of promoting and building up an export trade notably in gum arabic, livestock, ground-nuts and sesame, as well as an import trade in manufactured goods. Recently, the town became the scene for small industries including oil mills, soap factories, repair workshops, and the like.

Besides being a focal point for commerce, El Obeid is also an important administrative centre. At the provincial level, the town is the residence of the mudir (province governor) and other senior civil servants while, at the local level, it is the seat of two local councils, its own town council and that of the Bidayriya rural council, the district immediately surrounding it.[158]

These commercial and administrative facts largely determine the kinds of economic activities in which the residents of El Obeid are involved. Briefly, the majority of the town’s inhabitants earn their livelihood as traders of one sort oi’ another. Apart from these self-employed persons, a sizeable number of El Obeid’s population work as government employees, ranging from senior civil servants to unskilled workers. Moreover, many’ of the town’s residents obtain their living as craftsmen.

Culturally, the inhabitants of El Obeid fall into the following categories and sub-categories: the Arabs:[159] the Darfurians; the Nuba; the Nubians; the

Southerners; the Muwalladin;[160] the Fellata (Muslim immigrants from West Africa and their descendants); and some other groups representing at least four national cultures, namely, the Egyptians; the Greeks; the Syrians; and the Indians. The cultural principles which mark off, or conversely provide links between these categories are varied. They include national origin, language, and religion. In terms of national origin, the town's population can be divided into two broad groups: the one containing cultural categories stemming from the Sudan and the other comprising cultural categories stemming from other countries, that is, Egypt, Greece, Syria, India, Nigeria, Chad, etc. This simple dichotomy is, of course, complicated by the fact that in El Obeid many of the representatives of the categories originating from outside the country are of Sudanese birth and nationality. Language is, perhaps, a primary index of differentiation in the town. In general, each of the town's cultural categories has a language or a group of languages associated with it. Furthermore, even within each of the major categories finer distinctions can be made on the basis of linguistic origin. For example, the Arabs use different dialects or forms of Arabic, the Fellata speak a variety of languages, the Darfurians have various tongues, and so on. However, by cross-cutting ethnic and other cultural divisions, language provides a crucial link between the different residents of El Obeid. In the town, Arabic is the principal language that has come to perform this unifying role. Religion, too, is an important diversifying and, conversely, unifying factor in El Obeid. The adherents of the two main religions found in the town, that is, Islam and Christianity, are set apart by their respective faiths. Thus, the Muslims have their mosques whereas the Christians have their churches. Nevertheless, since Islam has representation in all the broad cultural streams in El Obeid, save those of the Greeks and the Indians, it tends to intersect ethnic and other cultural differences to furnish a common tie between the various segments of the town's population. Likewise, as Christianity has adherents among the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Syrians, the Nuba, and the Southerners, it tends to produce a unifying effect.

In the context of these main features of El Obeid's social organisation, some background information will now be presented relating to the town's merchants and businessmen. To begin with, the merchants are engaged in numerous economic activities. However, in the kinds of occupations in which they are involved, one finds certain clusterings. For example, of the twenty-eight persons studied, the largest number arc engaged in the import trade. There are fifteen such men in the sample. Seven of these arc primarily

involved in general imports, four in fabrics, two in spare-parts, and two others in household goods. Comparatively large industrial and commercial undertakings are represented by the next largest number, namely, nine merchants. Three of these are owners of repair workshops, three others are owners of bakeries, two are owners of oil mills, and one is the owner of a restaurant. Gum and seed merchants are represented in the sample by three persons. The one remaining person in the sample of twenty-eight merchants is a rich butcher and livestock trader. Since El Obeid had been described as a commercial centre serving a wide agricultural hinterland, these clusterings are not surprising. However, it is necessary to stress that nearly all the merchants included in the sample have one or more subsidiary occupations besides the main activities in which they are involved. From these activities the merchants not only earn their living, but also provide work and money for a considerable number of the wage earners in the town. Moreover, the occupations which the merchants pursue tend, for better ox' worse, to dominate the economic scene in El Obeid. They provide these merchants with large sums of money and certainly make them the largest tax payers in the town.

With regard to the ethnic and cultural background of the businessmen, the following points need to be emphasised. First, of the dozen or so ethnic categories met with in El Obcid, the presence of the Arabs, especially members of such 'tribes' as the Ja'aliyin and the Shaigiya as well as the Bidayriya is well marked in the business community. Fox' instance, according to the sample about 46 per cent out of twenty-eight of the businessmen are Arabs. Secondly, the Muwalladin arc fairly represented among the merchants, constituting 14 per cent (foui' out of twenty-eight). Thirdly, apart from the riverain Arab 'tribes', the Bidayriya, and the Muwalladin, a sizeable number of the businessmen (nine out of twenty-eight or about 32 per cent) come from among members of the minority groups, that is, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Syrians, and the Indians. Finally, while the Nubians and the

Darfurians are represented by a few individuals (about 4 per cent in each case), other cultural categories and sub-categories, namely, the Kordofanian Arab 'tribes', the Nuba, the Southerners, and the Fellata are virtually not present in the town's business group.

The merchants of El Obeid have a somewhat varied geographical background. Of the twenty-eight merchants studied, eleven were born in the town and seventeen were born elsewhere. Twelve of the latter came from five of the administrative divisions of the Sudan, namely, Northern Province (four merchants), Kordofan (3), Khartoum (2), Blue Nile (2), and Kassala (1). The remaining five came from outside the country; two from Egypt, two from India, and one from Syria. Four out of the nine merchants who belong to the minority groups were born in El Obeid. Moreover, a fairly large number of the merchants who were born outside the town have had a long period of residence there.

In order to have full background information about the merchants and businessmen, it is important to give some data relating to their work records. The descriptions presented here are drawn from material given by the merchants in interviews, from things said about them by other people, and from personal observations. As might be expected, individually all the merchants are different. Nevertheless, when two or more of them reveal similar work experience, they are considered under the same description. Those who were born outside El Obeid are twelve Sudanese, two Egyptians, two Indians, and one Syrian. Four of the twelve Sudanese have inherited business and/or money from their fathers. Two of them, one Arab of thirty-one years of age and the other Nubian of forty years, have continued business more or less along their fathers' lines as a wholesaler in general imports and an owner of oil mills respectively. The other two, an Arab of thirty-five years of age and a Muwallad of forty-one years, have invested the money they inherited in economic enterprises that differ from those of their fathers. The former, a son of a wealthy general merchant, became specialised in the trade of spare-parts while the latter, a son of a rich livestock trader, became involved in trade in general imports. The remaining eight Sudanese merchants, unlike the previous ones, began their careers as owners of small businesses. Three of them, all

Arabs with an average age of fifty-five years, started as shopkeepers and during the 1940s turned into general wholesalers. At the present, in addition to their wholesale activities they invested the money they managed to accumulate in such enterprises as bakeries, ownership of estates, etc. Two other businessmen, both of whom are Arabs, began as butchers. The elder—sixty-five years of age—continued as a butcher and in addition became

involved in livestock trade, whereas the younger—forty-eight years—became the owner of a restaurant and a bakery. Two other merchants, both of whom are Arabs of about forty years of age, came to El Obeid with some knowledge of trade in produce. In the town, they continued as small traders along the same line and little by little their businesses began to grow. At the present, they have established themselves as successful produce and storage merchants. The last of those Sudanese businessmen who were born outside El Obeid is a Muwallad of forty-two years of age. He began as an apprentice in a workshop. He then managed to acquire a small workshop of his own which began gradually to expand.

Of the five non-Sudanese merchants who were born outside the town, four—two Egyptians and two Indians—have somewhat similar work records. All of them started as salesmen in shops owned by members of their respective nationality groups and eventually they succeeded in establishing their own independent businesses as wholesalers in import trade, particularly in fabrics. The last of those businessmen who were born outside El Obeid is a Syrian who started as a draper, but had to desert this business when he went bankrupt. He then began once more as a trader in spareparts and continued in this line until, in the late 1950s, he joined with a partner to set up one of the largest companies in the town specialising in spare-parts and machinery equipment.

As mentioned earlier, the eleven businessmen who were born in El Obcid include one Syrian, three Greeks, and seven Sudanese. The Syrian is forty-two years of age and his business is a commercial enterprise connected with the distribution of imported fabrics. It was left to him by his father. In addition, he works as a commission agent. Two of the Greeks worked as wage earners after they finished their secondary education[161]. However the elder of the two, who is forty-four, worked with his father for some time and on the latter’s death fell heir to the business. He is now ownei’ of a large provision store and a contractor. The younger, who is thirty-eight, left his work to assume his father’s business after the latter’s death in the middle of the 1950s. He is now owner of a bakery.

Two of the seven Sudanese merchants who were born in El Obeid have inherited their fathers’ wealth. One of them, a Muwallad of forty-two years of

age, continued in his father's line and established himself as a leading produce merchant as well as an owner of oil mills. The other, an Arab of thirtyeight, invested the money he inherited in the trade of electrical appliances. Of the remaining five Sudanese businessmen who were born in El Obeid two started as apprentices in repair workshops. The older of the two, a Muwallad of forty-six years of age, managed to establish his own workshop in the early 1950s. At the present, besides running his workshop, he is also involved in seed-oil production and trade in crops. The younger, a Darfurian of thirty-six, had his own workshop by the middle of the 1950s. In addition, he is now investing the money he saved in a number of economic activities including flour-mills. The three remaining businessmen, all Arabs, have somewhat different backgrounds. The first, who is forty-eight, began as a messenger in the 1930s, then joined the trade in produce and in the middle of the 1940s he became an owner of a bakery. From that time onwards his business began to expand rapidly and he is now an owner of flour-mills, buses, etc., as well as a contractor. The second, who is forty-two, started by working with his father who was a general merchant. In the later 1940s he was able to save sufficient money to set up a soap factory. Now he is also involved in trade in crops. The third and the last merchant, who is thirty-two, also started by working with his father, a retailer. He then got a loan from his father which enabled him to establish his own independent retail business. Towards the early 1960s he became specialised in the trade of imported household utensils.

The above descriptions show that nine out of the twentyseven merchants who answered the questions relating to their work experience fell heir to their fathers' businesses and/or wealth while eighteen did not. In other words, the minority came from families already well-established economically whereas the majority came from humble homes. Thus, it is important to ask the question: what is the reason behind the business success of the latter? A partial answer to this question can be given by considering some of the factors which seem to have facilitated the success of a considerable number of these merchants and businessmen. As can be seen from their work records, the 1940s were a turning-point in the development of the businesses of a number of them. These were the years of the war-time rationing rendered necessary by the rise in the demand and the fall in the supply of consumer goods. It is thus possible to infer that many of the present-day merchants of the town had benefited from the rationing years and that their businesses expanded accordingly. Furthermore, the mid-

1950s marked an important phase in the development of the businesses of many of El Obeid's merchants, especially the Sudanese ones. This period witnessed the departure from the town of a very large number of non-Sudanese businessmen, either to their respective countries or to Khartoum. As these businessmen used to dominate business in the town, the implications of their absence for the success of Sudanese merchants hardly need to be stressed. Thus, it is not surprising that the businesses of many of the merchants in El Obeid have prospered over the last two decades or so.

The above descriptions also underline another point—one which has been already mentioned—that is, with almost no exception, the merchants are engaged in more than one occupation or economic activity. This tendency can be traced to what is called 'demonstration effect' in that the success of a merchant in a certain economic field is likelv to induce others to invest in the same field. As will be shown below, this tendency for emulation extends beyond the economic activities of the merchants to embrace other aspects of their social behaviour.

Having dealt with the social background of the different merchants and businessmen in El Obeid, it is relevant to examine their social traits. In particular, stress will be put on those characteristics which seem to mark them off from the othei' economic and social categories met with in the town. At the outset, the big merchants have little education. For example, according to the sample, of the 28 merchants interviewed nine had never attended school, eleven attended the elementary school, two had completed their intermediate education, and six had joined the secondary school. It is worth mentioning that five of the six businessmen who had secondary education belong to the category of merchants who inherited wealth from their fathers, a fact which further illustrates the favourable economic background to which they belong. Of prime importance, however, is the fact that the general lack of education characteristic of the merchants tends to set them apart from the senior civil servants and the professionals, as well as from a fairly large number of others, notably the semiprofessionals and even some of the skilled workers. On the whole, the educational attainment of these salary and wage earners accords them much status and prestige which the merchants do not enjoy. On the other hand, although the latter are less educated, yet they are aware of education as a status symbol. This is reflected in a variety of situations. First, the merchants strive to educate and

to increase the educational qualifications of their children. Thus some of these, particularly those who fail to attain post-secondary education, are sent abroad at the expense of their fathers. Secondly, in the feasts and parties which the merchants often give, they like to invite members of the educated group but, it may be noted, this is largely not reciprocated. Thirdly, a few of the unschooled merchants are honorary members of social and cultural associations that belong to the professionals. Finally, at least three of the businessmen studied have wives with better education. Thus, in their attempt to secure more education for their sons and in their attempt to associate with the educated, the merchants tend to underline the importance of education as a mark of status.

It must however be pointed out that, although the fact that the majority of the businessmen have little education tends to mark them off from the relatively small group of the educated, yet it brings them closer to the bulk of the inhabitants of El Obeid, so many of whom are unschooled.

But the merchants are set apart from these by their possession of wealth. With this important resource in their hands, they are able to enjoy a high standard of living which many of El Obeid's citizens cannot afford. For example, this is seen in the merchants' tendency to move into better residential areas in the town. For full appreciation of this, it is desirable to give some material relating to the spatial pattern of El Obeid. Briefly, prior to the 1940s, the town consisted of two broad parts: the built-up area or the 'town proper', and the grass-built settlements, generally known as the Native Lodging Areas. The rapid increase in the town's population, especially during the last three decades, transformed the landscape of the town greatly. As the increase led to overcrowding and congestion in different parts of El Obeid, it obliged the town's authorities to embark on a process of upgrading[162] Native Lodging Areas as well as of extending the built-up area by utilising open spaces within and around it. This process resulted in the upgrading of some but not all of the town's Native Areas and the emergence of what came to be known as the New Areas. These include residential areas for all classes, that is, New First, Second, and Third Class Areas. Thus, El Obeid came to consist of three main sections: New Areas; Old Town, including the former built-up area and the upgraded Native Areas; and Native Lodging Areas. The critical differences which obtain among these sections relate to three factor: (i) general layout, (ii) range and type of services, and (iii) status and

prestige. Broadly speaking, with regard to these factors the three main sections of the town form a gradient with the New Areas at one end and the Native Lodging Areas at the other. The New Areas are neatly laid out, provided with more varied and better services and enjoy high prestige whereas the Native Areas are haphazardly arranged, enjoy virtually no services and are mostly occupied by the poor residents of El Obeid. The Old Town occupies an intermediary position between these two extremes. To a large extent, competition for land and better areas is determined by wealth. In this competition the merchants are better equipped than the majority of the town's inhabitants.

In consequence, many of them moved into the New Areas particularly the First and Second Class Areas. For instance, eleven out of the twenty-eight merchants studied live in these areas. The remaining seventeen merchants are found in the better areas of the Old Town. Some of the reasons why many of the businessmen live in the Old Town will be given later. For the moment, it is important to stress that irrespective of where they reside, the businessmen tend, on the whole, to enjoy better housing conditions and to own more material possessions. The following data drawn from observations as well as from interviews throw light on this. First, with a few exceptions (notably among members of the minority groups), most of the merchants own the houses in which they live. Secondly, the majority of them live in houses built in durable material such as red brick, with better roofs and better design. Thirdly, a fairly large number of them have varied and expensive furniture. Finally, all the merchants have radios; all save one have refrigerators; all except three have cars; and all except four have telephones at home. Now, all this is beyond the reach of the generality of El Obeid's inhabitants.

As might be expected, there is much variation in the wealth of merchants and businessmen. Thus, although most of them own houses, yet the size of their plots varies from 300 to 3,400 square metres. Again, nearly every merchant has a car but some have two or more cars. In short, differences in the merchants' material possessions largely reflect differences in their wealth.

Other social characteristics of the merchants relate to their family life. Generally speaking, the big merchants and businessmen in El Obeid are family-oriented. Thus according to the main sample, 27 of the 28 merchants have at some time been married. However, marked differences occur among the businessmen who are currently married as far as the number of their wives is concerned. Nineteen of these are monogamous while seven are polygynous. Of the polygynous merchants four have two wives each, one has three wives, and two have four wives each. With a few exceptions, most of these wives are unschooled and virtually all of them are housewives. Besides their wives, the merchants support other dependants including sons, daughters, relatives and sometimes resident domestic servants. According to the sample, the average number of persons per household for all the merchants is seven. It is important to point out that there is a difference between the Sudanese businessmen who live in the New Residential Areas and those who live in the Old Town with regard to the average number of persons who depend on and live with them. Thus, the nine Sudanese merchants who reside in the New Areas support on average six persons per household whereas the ten who live in the various parts of the Old Town support on average ten persons per household. It is this fact which seems to discourage many of the latter from moving into the New Areas where they come into contact with the senior civil servants and the professional workers who are either monogamous or unmarried. Therefore, although some of these merchants do own houses in the New Residential Areas, yet they prefer to let them rather than to leave their homes or compounds in the Old Town. In other words, even though these merchants can afford to live in the New Areas, it is largely because of their kinship as well as neighbourhood and friendship ties that they prefer to stay in the Old Town. It can be seen that, on the whole, many of the merchants in El Obeid especially the Sudanese ones remain traditional in their outlook. While stressing this, it is important to note that some of these merchants, notably the relatively young and those who live in the New Residential Areas, have become affected by the civil servants and the professionals with whom they frequently come into contact. Thus, instead of wearing the traditional dress, they tend to wear suits or shirts and trousers and, moreover, they tend to join the cliques of the educated group.

The merchants and businessmen in El Obeid arc active in politics. The extent to which they participate in the political life of the town can best be seen in their struggle to control the Town Council. This is a local council consisting of

twenty-two elected members and seven appointed ones. It has nine committees, that is, for Finance, Personnel, Public Works, Town Planning, Health, Commerce, Education, General Purposes, and Social Services. Although the legal powers of the Town Council arc circumscribed by those of the Central as well as the Provincial Government, it came to assume much authority and to have a wide range of services greatly affecting the day-to-day life of El Obeid's citizens. For instance, it has the power to levy certain types of taxes and rates, to issue trading licences, to supervise street construction and maintenance, and many other similar powers and functions. In other words, the Town Council is the place for those who wish to dominate the affairs of the town.

Now, persons seeking to control the Town Council need to have following, prestige, and electoral support. In meeting these three requirements, the merchants in El Obeid are better equipped than most of the town's residents. No pretence is made, of course, that the businessmen represent the totality of leadership in the town, nor that the strategies which they adopt are the only roads that lead to power and influence.

The merchants and businessmen, as owners of relatively large commercial and industrial undertakings, have come to gain control over numerous persons. Some of these, notably their employees, depend directly on the merchants for their livelihood. This relationship does not necessarily imply that the employee should give the businessman his political support. However, since the employee obtains work and money from the businessman, the power of expulsion certainly gives the latter a hold on the former. In other words, it is likely to turn the employee into a follower. Like the wage earners, the retailers and other small traders enter with the merchants and businessmen into a similar relationship. The merchants supply them with goods and services which include sometimes credit facilities. The threat to withdraw such services no doubt gives the merchants a hold on the retailer, that is, it turns him into a follower. It is true that the merchant depends on the retailer for extending his market. But if the latter wished to withdraw the services he makes to a particular businessman, the only alternative for him would be to place himself under the control of another. Moreover, the retailer has to accept the rules of the game in the hope that he might one day be able to become a businessman himself and be in a position to influence small traders.

The merchants, however, must have prestige and must gain the support of a wider following if they are to succeed in achieving their political aims. Here, their strategy calls for generosity. This appears in several ways. For instance, the merchants are very much concerned with feasts and parties— which form an important feature of social life in El Obeid— and many of them spend a great deal on them. Such lavish feast-giving and hospitality accords them merit and prestige. Moreover, the merchants use their financial resources to make contributions to build mosques, schools, etc., as well as to help the poor and the needy. In short, they manipulate their wealth in several ways in order to win gratitude and popularity and to assure themselves a following.

Perhaps in a more direct manner the merchants need to organise themselves if they are to achieve power and prestige. Here, their effort is directed towards dominating the political parties found in the town. Briefly, at the time of the study, there were two leading parties in El Obeid, namely, the Unionist Democratic Party (U.D.P.), which was a merger of the National Unionist Party (N. U.P.) and the Peoples' Democratic Party (P.D.P.), and the Umma Party; and there were other less popular parties notably the Communist Party and the Islamic Front.[163] For reasons which fall beyond the scope of the present article, the two leading parties came to depend heavily on the merchants' donations and contributions and, consequently, the merchants came to prevail on them. Political parties in the town, as elsewhere in the country, used to be characterised by an elaborate system of offices. For example, the committee members of the U.D.P. (the party in power at the time of the study), as distinct from the ordinary or rank-and-file members, numbered 156, of whom 109 were advisory or general committee members and forty-seven were executive members; of these forty-seven, nineteen held offices. The presence of the big merchants and businessmen (with the exception of members of the minority groups) was conspicuously marked at all the levels of this elaborate committee. Perhaps more important is that the top offices of the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, treasurer, deputy treasurer, etc. were all in the hands of some of the leading merchants in the town. In short, the merchants used their resources to monopolise leadership in the political parties.

Finally, the merchants had to gain electoral support if they were to reach the Town Council. Here, they used their resources to cover the cost of campaigns. Thus candidates and party members were expected to contribute heavily to these campaigns and, furthermore, many of the businessmen who were, strictly speaking, not party members were also expected to help parties that represented their interests. A great deal of the contributions that the parties received during campaigns went to the quarter leaders and similar functionaries to encourage them to rally more people for the support of a certain candidate.

The above instances clearly indicate that the effort to assume control over the Town Council entails a cost which not everybody can afford. Other things being equal, those who have, that is, the big merchants, are better equipped for this struggle than those who have not, that is, the remainder of El Obeid's inhabitants. So it is not surprising that the merchants (or the party leaders) were also the leaders of the Town Council. Material from the last elections (1967) throws light on this. To begin with, the battle for these elections was fought along party lines. The list of the candidates included the following: o

| U.D.P. | 32 candidates (N.U. P. 26 and P. D.P. 6) |

| Umma Party | 25 candidates |

| Communist Party | 5 candidates |

| Independents | 3 candidates |

| Islamic Front | 1 candidate |

The result was: the U.D.P. got twelve seats (N.U.P. eleven, P.D.P. one), and the Umma Party ten seats. The distribution of the appointed members closely followed this pattern. It was as follows: the U.D.P. had four members (three from the N.U.P. and one from the P.D.P.), and the Umma Party had three members. Now, nine of all the winning candidates (six from the U.D.P. and three from the Umma Party) were businessmen as distinct from the other candidates of whom fourteen were small traders; four were wage earners (including two workers and two professionals); and two were professional politicians. Of prime importance is the fact that the most influential offices of the council, that of the chairman and the deputy chairman, and, moreover,

the chairmen of four out of its nine committees, were in the hands of the leading executive committee members of the winning party—the U.D. P.— or the big merchants and businessmen.

Thus, wealth is a primary source from which the merchants in El Obeid derive their power and influence. However, it is important to note that, viewed over a period of time, a fairly large number of these merchants had for long been active in the town's politics. Many of them had been elected more than once to the Town Council since its formation in the early 1940s. That the businesses of some of these merchants had grown over the last two decades or so—as already mentioned— is not unrelated to the fact that they came during this period to occupy key positions in the town. In other words, power is an avenue to wealth. This means that there is a close interdependence between wealth and power in that the possession of one leads to the other.

The object of this paper has been to show in what respects the big merchants and businessmen in El Obeid, a relatively small group, with better financial resources and income, are marked off from the rest of the town's residents, the great bulk of whom do not possess these advantages. In particular, it has shown that the merchants through the use of their wealth came to enjoy a comparatively high standard of living and to wield much power. They do not, however, form a corporate group. That they are aware of some common interests is seen in the trade associations to which they belong, namely, the Kordofan Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants' Union.[164] But the ties created by these associations are very far from counteracting the social, economic, and political differences that obtain among the merchants of which enough has been implicitly or explicitly said in this paper.

** XII. The Jamutya Development Scheme: An Essay on the Utility of 'Instant Anthropology'

Peter Harries-Jones

In recent years, the marrying of empirical social research through participant observation to the formulation of concepts and hypotheses—the ‘anthropological method’—has acquired an enhanced utility in studies of social and economic development in the Third World. Whatever the views that may be held there about the subject matter of social anthropology, the virtues of anthropological method in defining varied problems of rapid social change are becoming more clearly recognised, both inside and outside the academic community. Social anthropology may be attacked for concentrating on aspects of social and political processes that are inimical to economic development and ‘national integration’. Yet in the universities, there is a general move to persuade the political scientist and the economist to expose themselves to its methods in order to explain vital ‘non-economic’ factors in development, or to give substance to generalised notions of ‘modernisation’. [165] The anthropologist may thus find himself described, in a derogatory manner, as focussing on ‘the intensive study of backwardness in remote areas’, but he is in demand as the person best equipped to advise on the collection of data in such areas and to explain their significance. Though the study of traditional social processes may be considered irrelevant, the study of the means by which they can be changed is regarded as being of crucial importance.

Even the critics grudgingly assent that the anthropologist can provide a conceptual understanding of social change unattainable elsewhere. But they complain that he takes too long to produce his results. Anthropological methods may be useful, but, says the critic, the anthropologist uses them to bolster his curriculum vitae rather than to supply information to planners, or to government ministries. Often indeed the results of an anthropological study emerge too late for planning purposes. Consequently planner and anthropologist indulge in mutual recrimination, the one wanting results quickly, the other responding that there must be an interval between gathering data and understanding it conceptually. The critic may retort that the long interval between gathering data and writing it up is itself an inherent limitation of the ‘anthropological method’.

This retort should be taken seriously. An anthropologist after a short time in the field ought to be able to give a planner an outline of social problems confronting a development programme. Yet no one knows better that simplification and generality can often distort the complexities which

confront him. And it is the social complexities, not a travelogue of custom, that the anthropologist undertakes to explain. The marriage of concepts and empirical data does take time, and any shortening of this process is a compromise both with the subject matter of social relations and with the scholar's own expertise. 'Instant anthropology' is in several ways a violation of the anthropological method and this essay is about its utility. The question I have set myself here is, how useful is a deliberately conceived compromise with anthropological method? To what extent does the simplification and generalisation of 'instant anthropology' provide a useful resolution of problems for the planner and provide an explanation of social complexities for the anthropologist?[166]

The period I wish to consider is one of two to three months from the beginning of fieldwork to completion of a report. The data gathered and presented here on the Jamu'iya Development Scheme was completed in a slightly shorter time. Fieldwork began in the first week of April 1970 and the report was delivered in the third week of May. But the speed with which the investigation was carried out was helped since the Scheme is near Khartoum, and I could set up residence in a primary school on the first day of fieldwork. Usually the £ask of getting to a remote area and establishing a residence takes much longer.

'Instant anthropology' at once defines the limits of the data that can be collected and the priorities of investigation. We were not trying to carry out a social survey, or to conduct a questionnaire, but to gather information about the Development Scheme through participant observation. In this situation the best procedure seemed to be first to assume the role of ethnographer by investigating major social institutions and second to concentrate in depth on the socio-political effects of the Scheme: that is to say to provide a map of social relationships, while considering in more detail the effects, if any, the Scheme had had on the systems of authority and decision-making among Jamu'iya.

*** The Scheme in outline

The northern end of the Jamu‘iya Development Scheme is about sixteen miles, by dirt road, from Omdurman. The Scheme runs southwards, parallel to the bank of the White Nile, for about eight miles to a pump station seven miles from Jebel Aulia Dam. At the time of writing the scheme embraces 10,000 feddans of which nine thousand are to be cultivated by those with registered land titles, and one thousand by the Government.[167] A proposed southward extension of the Scheme towards the dam will eventually double the amount of land under irrigation. Soil analysis has shown that the land on which the Scheme lies is among the best in Khartoum Province. The area is easily irrigated, and there is ready access to the White Nile at the pumping station (near the village of Sulcimaniya West), which needs only a short inlet for river water at low Nile, but which is also protected from flooding.

Proposals for an irrigation scheme in this area were first discussed during the 1930s. At the outset proposals concentrated on prospects of growing cotton, but closer investigation showed that the soil was infested. In the post-independence period, though there were further discussions, nothing definite came of these talks until June 1969. Then a capital loan was negotiated for the Scheme and an irrigation survey undertaken. By January 1970 the digging of canals had begun, and within three-and-a-half months the two major canals and their minor branches had been completed.

The objects of the Scheme, apart from the general socioeconomic development of the area, were twofold. First, irrigation would provide fruits and vegetables for Khartoum and Omdurman markets, and the production of vegetables would lead, in five to ten years, to a halving of market prices. Second, the Scheme would provide an alternative means of livelihood to those whose land was affected by the Jebel Aulia Dam. Since the dam was completed in 1937, this second objective would appear a somewhat tardy response to loss of livelihood. In fact, as early as 1938 the Condominium government had responded to the inundation of land caused by the building of the dam, by tacking an extra block onto the north-western end of the Gezira main canal. Tenants were then brought from the White Nile under their own headman. The whole ‘Abd al-Majid block, as it was called, was managed quite differently from the main Gezira enterprise, with indigenous authorities having much wider powers over cultivation.[168] The new population of the ‘Abd al-Majid block consisted mostly of tenants from

villages to the south of the dam, particularly Hasaniya. But villages to the north of the dam which had land inundated were granted only a few hawashas in the area. It was these, mainly Jamu'iya, who were now to be given luller compensation through the Development Scheme.

As originally conceived, vegetable-growing on irrigated land would be managed through a large-scale production and marketing co-operative. But here planners' hopes ran into immediate trouble. While the canals were under construction, the government announced, without prior consultation with the Jamu'iya, that in future it would hold the title to the land. People would be leased tenancies and given shares in the Jamu'iya Farming Co-operative. The method of dividing the shares was not clear. As a result, the views on the introduction of a co-operative were generally hostile. As the Jamu'iya saw it, the government proposed to give them water for their land with one hand, and take their land away with the other. It was an exchange that they could not accept. During the previous four years a drought had diminished their animal stock and food supplies to the limits of exhaustion; the villagers could not afford to exchange their sole hope of survival for shares—for bits of paper that would take a year to cash, as they put it.

As a co-operative enterprise, therefore, the Scheme began in a cloud of uncertainty and despair. A delegation of ministers and others from Khartoum who came on an official inspection was met by an angry crowd, some armed with swords and axes. An intended ceremonial greeting turned into a threatening situation. The demonstration had some effect. The government promised not to proceed with the distribution of tenancies before land had been registered. Yet even during the process of registration discontent with the prospect of a large-scale co-operative resulted in continuing threats to sabotage the main canal. At one point in April, while we were in the field, several lorry loads of soldiers descended on our camp site. They were moved in to ensure that the area was peaceful. Our last interview in the field was conducted in the presence of police officers, who came as a result of more rumours of unrest. Co-operatives, said informants, seemed to haunt the Jamu'iya like a 'hungry monster'.

*** Ecology

The central problem for the anthropologist in a discussion of ecology is the degree to which social relations are influenced or modified by environment. For the planners of a development project, the central ecological problems are similar: the extent to which a change in the mode of subsistence is likely to bring about a change in social relationships, and the extent to which changed social relationships will bring about increased individual efficiency and productive capacity. The JamuTya mode of subsistence is now mainly agricultural and a discussion of ecology is predominantly a discussion of people's relation to the land. But land is not their sole security. As in the past, herding plays a vital role in their subsistence economy, while more recently, they have been able to sell their labour for cash.[169]

The natural environment in which they live is influenced by two main features. The first of these is the closeness of their land to the White Nile; the second is the unreliability of the annual rainfall. In addition, the ecology' is modified by two man-made features, one the dam, the other the steadily growing city of Omdurman; both have affected the dependence on land and herds as sources of livelihood.

In the recent past the Jamu'iya were semi-nomads, stretching in a crescent from Karari, the site of the battle of Omdurman, in the north, to an area close to the site of the Jebel Aulia Dam in the south. This crescent is broadest where the boundaries of Khartoum Province meet the easternmost goz sands and wadis of Kordofan; it measures some twenty to thirty miles across and forty to fifty miles in length. Today, the heaviest concentration of population of Jamu'iya living outside Omdurman is found in the series of villages lying next to the Scheme. They are built within a few yards of high-water mark on the western bank of the White Nile. Together with these is another series of villages, two to three miles to the west, lying in a more scattered, but parallel line. Omdurman and its environs separates the northern area of Jamu'iya land from the riverbank villages of the south, but one community of Omdurman, Fiteihab, which lies within sight of Omdurman Bridge is regarded as being a village of Jamu'iya. While most JamuTya live on the west bank of the Nile, one group, those living at Kalakla, have shifted to the eastern side and reside in an area of mixed tribal origins.

Away from the river, Jamu’iya remain semi-nomadic, residing in impermanent camps rather than villages. The movement from semi-nomadism to settled agriculture in the past sixty or seventy years has meant a major change in the ecology of the Jamu‘iya. It is a movement which has not yet ceased. Just to the north of the Scheme, in small clusters of cardboard or karton houses, as they are called, reside semi-nomadic relatives of the settled agriculturalists—the most recent arrivals of the steady drift away from the western grazing grounds to the river bank.

During the early years of the Condominium, Jamu‘iya used the present sites of river-bank villages as dry-season herding posts. One informant, a former sheikh of Suleimaniya, and among the oldest inhabitants of the village, said that in those days Jamu‘iya were noted for the size of their herds. He recalled his move from the west, near Jebel Hineik, to Suleimaniya in 1916. In that year he had married his first wife with six head of cattle, and many young men of the surrounding tribes envied him. The usual gift in those days, he said, was only two head. Suleimaniya was among the first of the villages to be converted from dry-season herding posts into a permanent residence. The establishment of other villages around Suleimaniya varied in time, one or two being formed as recently as twenty years ago.[170]

The reasons for this shift to permanent settlement on the riverbank are probably complex, but one reason certainly seems to have been the unreliability of annual rainfall during the last fifty years. While lack of rain would affect land cultivated for dura near the river as much as it would affect land away from the river, villagers near the river have a source of alternative grain supplies, the markets of Omdurman. In drought conditions, such as those apparent while we were in the field, villagers can sell animals to secure grain. Transport by bus to and from Omdurman is always available, and relatively cheap.

The area along the Nile between the dam and the northernmost end of the Scheme is generally flat, but undulates to the extent that it is riven by khors and wadis and has some prominent dunes and goz sands. The gozes nearest the Nile have become sites for villages because of their satisfactory drainage during the wet season. In addition one small hill in the area, Jebel al-Teina, serves as a village site. The natural vegetation is mainly thorny bushes, with

scattered acacia and other thorny trees. With the coming of rain, the area is covered by grasses able to support a mixed animal population of goats, sheep, cattle, donkeys and camels. The soil is a mediumtexture clay, interrupted by or mixed with sand, and with pockets of cotton soil. But its holding capacity foi' water is low, due to the presence of salt, and this limits the range of crops produced. Crops are sown in small parcels of land of about one to three feddans in two distinctive cultivable areas, the flood-plain and the rain-fed lands. In the flood plain cucurbits, vegetables and fodder crops are generally grown, together with okra. In the rain-fed land, these crops may again be grown, but the area is more generally dominated by dura. This is harvested and stored in large holes in the ground where it can be kept in good condition for two to three years.

On the whole, techniques of cultivation are rudimentary, with only a few pockets of land under the plough and even fewer being mechanically cultivated. Crops are planted directly into the ground after the first rains with the aid of a saluka, or digging stick. With little or no rain, yields in the rain-fed land are poor, unless villagers are able to plant in a wadi, which tends to hold moisture for a longer period. It is in this rain-fed land, which in many places begins only two hundred yards from the high water mark of the Nile, that the canals of the Development Scheme have been dug.

Supplies of water for human consumption arc obtained from wells, and not from the Nile. The amount and quality of the water is better close to the river bank. Until the recent building of water towers, two villages on the north-western edge of the Scheme, Kidci and Ghamarab, had to import their water from Omdurman; another, Al-Samra, still has to import some; while, in the southwestern area a further water tower is planned in the village of Mugdab. One or two of the wells in the southwestern villages have a quality of water which is poor in comparison with the area as a whole.

Natural drainage runs from the Kordofan Hills east to the river; transport routes on the other hand run north and south, between Omdurman and Jebel Aulia. The Development Scheme affects both. First, the Scheme has been built across one of the main wadis in the area, the Wadi Mansurab. If the Scheme's drainage system is successful in containing this wadi during the

rainy season, then the wadi's outlet to the river, which was a prime grain-growing area, will become dry. Second, when the Scheme comes into full production the present dry-weather roads will have to be improved. During the wet weather, motorised transport at present has to make a detour of several miles westwards before continuing on a suitable track. The building of a tarmac road on the west bank, or the construction of a ferry across to the existing tarmac road on the east bank of the Nile are both suitable alternatives.

I have mentioned that the ecology has been modified by the building of the Jebel Aulia Dam and by the growth of Omdurman, the one providing income through fishing, and the other through paid employment. Although I did not carry out a survey, it became clear that the pull of Omdurman affected villages at the northern end of the Scheme, the more so in that prevailing drought conditions had forced all able-bodied males to seek daily paid employment. In most of the villages at the centre of the Scheme young adult males sought work in Omdurman during the day and returned to their villages in the late afternoon. The number of males seeking paid employment diminished as the bus fare and the distance from Omdurman increased. For residents of villages around Jebel Aulia, a daily journey to work was impracticable.

Though the dam is now a source of livelihood, its initial effect was counter-productive to the Jamu'iya. It was built as a reservoir on the White Nile to offset water consumed by the Gezira Scheme on the Blue Nile, the balance between the amount of water flowing from both rivers being governed by an agreement with Egypt. Much good flood-plain land disappeared, as did the gardens on islands in the middle of the river. Villagers near the dam suffered most, and these have sought to make a living from the Gezira by taking up tenancies, diverting their herds to the Gezira away from traditional grazing grounds, and seeking seasonal employment there with their camels. Absence of young males in these southern villages was particularly noticeable.

While males from several villages have now adopted fishing as a source of livelihood, in the two villages Jebel al-Teina and Omorat fishing appears to be the major source of income. But returns from fishing are not lucrative. Sales are divided into 'shares', including portions for the lorry driver who drives the

fish to market, and for the owners of the fishing boat and net. A boat owner, if he is also a net owner and the person responsible for bargaining with the lorry owner as to the cost of transport, may see a respectable profit from his catch. But there are only about thirty boats, while the number involved in fishing at .Jebel Aulia is several hundred. An ordinary fisherman has days when he works for eight hours for a net return of only 6 piastres. This rate of return may be judged against that from daily employment in Omdurman. Here a day's labour, if it is obtainable, may bring in 30–40 piastres. But transport to and from Omdurman will cost 15 piastres and, in addition, there is no guarantee of daily employment.

Of the other villages only one, Al-Tireis, has developed another source of income, that of capitalising on flood-plain land. However, this village is in a fortunate location next to the mouth of the Wadi Mansurab. This has made grain cultivation relatively easy and has encouraged the villagers to concentrate on mechanised farming on the flood-plain. The profit from marketing of vegetables has enabled a few of them to establish homes in Omdurman. In addition, they have drawn income from renting flood-plain land to families living in neighbouring villages. Thus, for Al-Tireis the Development Scheme will be an extension of current economic activity, and the problems of production and marketing of vegetables are to some degree already known.

Map 1 indicates the extent to which the sixteen Jamu'iya villages most closely associated with the Development Scheme have alternative sources of income. Villages that arc fully blocked on the Map, such as Al-Sainra, Al-Tireis and Kidci have a predominant proportion of resident males seeking daily employment in Omdurman. Villages horizontally blocked have some males going daily to Omdurman, while villages shown as vertically blocked have a high proportion of males gaining income from fishing. Those represented by a broken circle have shifted the ground of their traditional rural economy by sending their cattle away to the Gezira and taking up tenancies there.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-16.jpg][MAP 1]]

The 1956 Census returns of those omodiyas that I believe to be Jamu‘iya (though the ethnic ascriptions given and my own judgment on the matter vary at one or two points) are listed from north to south.

| Karari | 4,665 |

| Al-Faragin | 4,691 |

| Al-Fiteihab | 6,921 |

| Al-Zanarkha | 7,901 |

| Al-Ghamarab | 3,244... Kalakla (east bank) 4556 |

| Jamu'iya Nomadic | 12,956<verbatim>*</verbatim> |

| Kerriyat Nomadic | 4,857<verbatim>*</verbatim> |

| Mugdab | 6,602<verbatim>*</verbatim> |

| Total (ine. Kalakla) | 56,393 |

The three starred omodiyas are those which include the area of the villages presented in Map 1, but also include seminomads lying to the west of these villages. The sub-total of the three omodiyas is 24,415, approximately 47 per cent of the population I have listed above. It is certainly much too high to represent village population alone.

A survey of fifteen of the sixteen villages conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture before the start of the Scheme concluded that their total population was 14,415, consisting of 2,853 families with a variation of one to eighteen members and an average membership of five. Although our visits cast doubt on the village returns, 1 have used the Ministry of Agriculture survey as the basis for my own population estimate. On the whole I believe that the Ministry of Agriculture survey overestimated the resident population of the villages (defining ‘resident’ in this context as the proportion of the population which resides in the villages for more than six months of the year) by about a quarter to a half. This takes into account the bias of my own impressions of population in favour of a lower estimate because of the exodus of young males through drought conditions.

TABLE 1: A Population Allocation of the Villages of Jamuiya

Category A

Population of up to 300 Umm ‘Uweina

Al-Samra

Goz Niseir Al-Hajab Sheikh al-Beshir

Category B

Population size 300–600 Baraka

Jebel al-Teina Al-Garaza

Al-Tireis

Omorat

Category C

Population size 600–900

Shigeila

Kidei

‘Id al-Had

Suleimaniya W.

Mugdab

Estimated total resident population = 6,750

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-17.jpg]]

I have calculated the total resident population by making a population allocation, the results of which are listed in Table 1. My estimate of total resident population, 6,750, is calculated from the mid-point of each category multiplied by the number of villages in that category.

Relating population figures to Map 1, it can be seen that there is no definite correlation between village size and location. Villages of all categories, for example, can be found in the north, centre and south of the Scheme. There is no natural population centre among the fifteen villages, the nearest to such a centre being the line of villages including Suleimaniya, Shigeila, Baraka and Goz Niseir. To some extent, this will make provision of social services and amenities, and attributes of ‘development’ such as schools, electric light,

water and drainage, more difficult. Yet without a build-up of population in the area, together with the provision of these amenities, the crucial demographic

problem—the return of young males to residence in these villages—will be slow to resolve.

*** Agnatic kinship and village relations

Development Schemes to be successful require that the people affected take substantial decisions in the direction of social change. The anthropologist will normally study the course of decision-taking in rural areas through examination of kinship systems, since he holds that kinship is often the main idiom through which social relations are expressed. Kinship ties with their significance for leadership and authority, should be of interest to planners also. It is local leaders that the planners will first have to persuade to make decisions about the direction of social and economic change.

The distinguishing feature of kinship relations among Jamu‘iya, compared with their Kababish neighbours in the west and their Hasaniya neighbours to the south, is the importance they attach to the corporate kinship unit, the khashm bayt. Among the Hasaniya, for example, it is clan membership, linking those of the White Nile to their nomadic clansmen some hundreds of miles to the north, which is perhaps the most important social relationship.[171] As I will show, the diminished importance of clanship among Jamu’iya may be linked with their increasing sedentarisation; in other words, the khashm bayt has assumed greater significance with the move into permanent villages.

Like the Kababish, the Jamu‘iya express agnatic kinship relations in two ways. The first is that any villager will view other members of his village as awlad ‘amm (lit. father’s brother’s sons) signifying that they belong to the same kinship category. At a wider level, any villager will also view any other villages in the same way, i.e. as belonging to a homogeneous kinship category. “We arc all Jamu’iya” is the first response a field-worker will hear when questioning villagers about their relationship with other villages. At the same time most villagers when pressed on the point were willing to talk about themselves as differentiated bodies of kin, the differentiation arising from a series of agnatic lines extending over generations. The founders of these patrilineages were

originally closely related kin, but today through increasing genealogical distance, some descent lines are no longer regarded as being particularly ‘close’ to other descent lines. Tables 2 and 3 represent founders of tribal sections who acknowledged the authority of the Mek of the Jamu‘iya at about the beginning of the seventeenth century. Though these ancestors are regarded today as eponymous ancestors of villages, they do not represent ‘village founders’ in the more usual sense of this term.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-18.jpg][TABLE 2: Genealogical Connections of Selected Villages of Jamu’iya through Founding Ancestors]]

N. B. The table does not purport to show exact seniority of sons.

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-19.jpg][TABLE 3: Genealogical Connection of Selected Villages Tracing Descent to Ibrahim, Son of Mansur]]

From the beginning of the seventeenth century, as the authority of the Mek increased, scattered settlement grew up here and there along the west bank of the Nile. But the Jamu‘iya remained essentially herdsmen, practising some subsistence agriculture around Jebel al-Hineik and on the river bank.

The present array of villages between Jebel Aulia and Omdurman is a recent phenomenon. But despite the movement towards more permanent settlement, the agnatic closeness of various tribal sections is still an important concomitant of social interaction among Jamu’iya villagers. The concept of who is a ‘villager’ or who is an ‘outsider’ relates more to the closeness or otherwise of agnatic descent, than to the physical nearness of one village to another. Physical nearness is important however in those cases where one village acts as a religious centre for surrounding villages. The village of Sheikh al-Beshir, which acts as a religious centre for Mugdab, Hajab and Sandudab, is a case in point. As will be shown below, these villages recognised an identity of interest in several spheres of economic and social interaction.

The general significance of agnatic kinship is to define a concept of ‘closeness’ between certain of the villages. For each individual, on the other hand, this concept of ‘closeness’ may be modified by cognatic descent ties. As Asad has pointed out for the Kababish, ‘close kinsmen’ included relatives on mother’s and mother’s parents’ side, as well as agnates. He goes on to state that in practice it is cognatic ties that are operative in defining mutual obligations between agnates since “distant agnates never exhibit active solidarity unless they are also close kin.”[172] Among Jamu‘iya cognatic ties would appear to influence inter-village relations, since some khashm biyut deliberately seek wives from the khashm biyut ol other villages. The time available did not enable me to investigate this point more thoroughly: here I can only note the omission while underlining the significance of agnatic ties in assessing inter-village relations.

*** Sheikhs and khashm biyut

I have already mentioned that khashm biyut may have assumed greater significance as corporate units as Jamu‘iya moved from a semi-nomadic existence into permanent villages. At least, this is a useful hypothesis. Cunnison translates the term as ‘lineages’ among the Baggara; Asad, on the other hand, prefers ‘sub-clan’. He reports that khashm biyut are widely distributed among the different dry-season camps around water holes. But they had no administrative significance, as the administrative unit was the ‘section’ administered by the sheikh. Nevertheless, often the administrative ‘section’ coincided with the boundaries of the khashm bayt. [173]

Among Baggara, the khashm biyut are divisions of an omodiya, and must, therefore, be taken to have some administrative functions. But the term, says Cunnison, can be used to describe groupings at various levels. Khashm biyut are subdivided two or three times, each subdivision also calling itself a khashm bayt. The smallest of these subdivisions is termed a

surra, “a group of agnates whose common ancestor is said to have been five or six generations back from the living. The surra is also... the basis of a single camp.”[174] Within the surra are extended families of one, two or three generations, termed ‘iyal rajl, children of a man.

Thus between the sectionalised khashm biyut of the Baggara, and those of the Kababish, whose members may undertake joint activity but which could not be considered corporate groups, lies a range of social forms subsumed under one Arabic term. Turning to Jamu‘iya, we find again the organisation varies from the above. Members have a sense of corporateness and joint activity which exceeds that of the Kababish. Each khashm bayt has a ‘spokesman’ to represent its views, who is recognised as head and demands respect from its members. He is responsible for members’ welfare and, most particularly, has a final say in their marriages. His house is the centre for rituals concerned with marriage and mourning; it used to be the centre for communal meals. Today, there is greater economic independence among the households though all households still share in the goods of the khashm bayt. A sense of common obligation between households is also defined through a sharing of common honour. An insult to one member is taken as being an insult to all. However, the precise relationships of one bayt rijdl (extended household) to another within the khashm bayt requires further research.

A khashm bayt may be confined to one village, but members may be found in several villages, while one village may also have several khashm biyut. A village with several has each spatially separate. In ‘Id al-Had, for example, the spatial divisions make the place look like four small villages. In Suleimaniya, on the other hand, separation is less apparent to casual observation; but more intensive investigation reveals a definite clustering of members of khashm biyut in parts of the village.

The spatial separation is symbolic of the autonomy of the khashm bayt. Indeed, to judge by the language of dispute, defending this autonomy and canvassing interests was a major form

of social competition among villagers. The younger and better educated men were impatient of such competitiveness, but they were either village members who had only lived there briefly, or they were ‘outsiders’ performing a technical service. Among the older and senior males of the village, the rights and wrongs in village issues were, in effect, straightforward contests between the interests of khashm biyut.

As among the Kababish, the khashm bayt is to be distinguished from administrative structures. Generally, the village is the administrative unit, and each village has a sheikh who is recognised as having administrative authority. Of the villages in Category A, one or two did not have their own sheikh, and the administrative authority resided in a neighbouring village. This was the case of Umm ‘Uweina whose sheikh was the sheikh of Al-Tireis. Most sheikhs were resident in their own villages, but as can be seen from Table 4 the sheikh of Shigeila lives in Suleimaniya; the sheikh of Baraka lives in Shigeila, in an attempt to link up the two into a single village; while the sheikh of Goz Niscir lives in Al-Garaza, to the west of the Development Scheme.

Villages may have other people to whom they give the title ‘sheikh’, and who, in fact plays the role. In most cases these are the ‘spokesmen’ of khashm biyut in villages who have failed to agree upon an appointment of a single village sheikh. These ‘spokesmen’ then become sheikhs of sections of the village. A case of this sort is found in ‘Id al-Had. Further, since khashm biyut do not necessarily correspond to village boundaries, the sheikh of such a village section may even live in another village. To complicate matters even more, the spokesman of a khashm bayt in a small village which has no administrative authority of its own, such as Umm ‘Uweina, may be accorded the title of‘sheikh’. Thus the title itself may designate a role, but is by no means a precise guide to the duly authorised administrator of the village.

In villages of multiple khashm biyut, the sheikh largely relies on the goodwill of the various spokesmen for the effective carrying out of his duties. The appointment of sheikhs may be authorised by the provincial administration, but if the spokesmen cannot agree,

administration of the village through the sheikh is no easy task. As Table 4 reveals, the presence of multiple khashm biyut in a village is correlated with population size. Nine of the sixteen villages listed in the Table have one or two khashm biyut. But of the five villages of population 600–900, Shigeila is the only one to have less than four. In this respect, both Jebel al-Teina and Omorat may be taken as special cases. We may speak of the seven khashm biyut of these villages as subdivisions of a Mahass clan, interspersed between the two.

Thus in the larger villages the major role of sheikh is to mediate between the divisive factions brought about by clashes among khashm. biyut. At the same time, his role as mediator is sometimes incongruent with his being an executive for the village. The sheikh’s techniques of influence, therefore, include a constant weighing of information and support that he may have at his disposal, against that of the spokesmen. Decisions in the village are akin to bargains that satisfy some of the wishes of members of khashm biyut without undermining the sheikh’s essential interests. Over the years a sheikh who is regarded as a ‘strong man’ is the one who is adept at striking such bargains.

TABLE 4: Numbers of Sheikhs and Khashm Biyut in Jamuⁱiya

[[i-c-ian-cunnison-wendy-james-essays-in-sudan-ethno-20.jpg]]

| Village | Number of those termed ‘sheikh’ | Number of khashm biyut | Comments |

| Jebel al-Teina Omorat | 7 | 7 | Spokesmen for khashm biyut |

| ‘Id al-Had | 4 | 8 | — do — |

| Suleimaniya | 2 | 8 | Sheikh of Shigeila resident |

| Shigeila | 2 | 2 | Sheikh of Baraka resident |

| Mugdab | 1 | 5 | former ‘omda’ resident |

| Al-Garaza | at least one{1} | several{2} | Sheikh of Goz Niseir resident |

| Al-Tireis | 1 | 2 | |

| Sandudab | 1 | 2 | |

| Sheikh al-Beshir | 1 | 1 | |

| Al-Samra | 1 | 1 | |

| Al-Hajab | 1 | 1 | |

| Umm ‘Uweina | 1 | 1 | spokesman for *khashm bayt* |

| Kidei | Nil | 6 | Al-Mek resident in Omdurman |

| Baraka | Nil | 1 | resident in Shigeila |

| Goz Niseir | Nil | 1 | resident in Al-Garaza. |

{1} Informants unwilling to give information.

{2} Ibid.

From the standpoint of the sheikh, schemes of social development, like the building of schools, provision of clinics, opening of community centres and digging of boreholes, are two-edged weapons. Any such scheme will be a big issue in the village lor many months. If the sheikh can be seen to direct its course then the introduction of social services will increase his prestige throughout the village and among neighbouring villages. But if the spokesman of a khashm bayt can claim credit for the ‘development’, then he has a powerful lever through which to challenge the sheikh’s position. In Suleimaniya, the sheikh had several notable successes in organising social and economic services for his village; indeed this was the best of the sixteen villages for existing social services. Yet the

spokesman of one khashm bayt alleged that in recent years the sheikh had tried to oppose ‘improvements’ because they would not give him personal profit.

The dispute between the spokesman and the sheikh is interesting on two counts. First, it substantiates how necessary it is for the sheikh to seek support from all khashm biyut, if he is to administer the village efficiently. Second, it shows that even if new channels of decision-taking are created to deal specifically with problems of social development, the bonds of agnatic kinship tend to re-impose themselves and to constrain decision-taking within a traditional pattern.

The events of the dispute are relatively uncomplicated. The sheikh and the spokesman were for many years good friends, ‘like a man and his shadow’, as one informant put it. Both were commercially successful, and they decided to pool some of their resources and form a bakery in the village. For a time the bakery went well, but then the one suspected the other of mishandling funds and the partnership broke up. The break resulted in recriminations throughout the village.

At about this time, under the stimulus of a community development programme, Village Development Committees began to be formed in the surrounding villages to aid local co-operatives, school feeding schemes and the like. The spokesman’s nephew became Chairman of the Village Development Committee, while the sheikh avoided membership of the Committee entirely. At first the Committee seemed to work well, but then its Chairman put up a proposal for a dairy farm co-operative which in the long term would have benefited the village, but in the short term looked as if it would ensure a good profit for himself and other members of the Committee. For some time only those on the Village Development Committee knew about the proposal, but when the information got out villagers complained to the sheikh. The following year the sheikh and his supporters were elected to the Development Committee on the promise that the dairy farm would be thrown open to all villagers who could afford a one-pound share. The division within the Village Development Committee then reached breaking point. The sheikh and his supporters accused the Chairman of the Committee of being an ‘outsider’. While it was true that the Chairman’s mother came from

Suleimaniya his father had come from another village, they alleged. Thus the Chairman’s khashm bayt could not represent the interests of the village as a whole and, said the sheikh, the Chairman had proved this by not informing the whole village of his scheme. Work in the Committee came to a halt. Meanwhile the sheikh and his supporters managed to gather some LS.300 to back the cooperative dairy farm.

In the following year, 1969, Suleimaniya decided to disband the Village Development Committee as then constituted, and to elect a new Committee on the basis of two members from each khashm bayt. But among the older members of the Committee, the alignments of ‘outsiders’ and ‘villagers’ generated in the dispute over the dairy farm still persisted. As one younger and educated member of the newly elected Com mittee stated: “The new Village Development Committee is successful in that it satisfies the interests of each khashm bayt. But within the Committee, members scarcely can agree with one another. The Committee may fragment at any time. It is a place where one khashm bayt tries to dominate the other.”

The lack of progress of the Village Development Committee in Suleimaniya with its eight khashm biyut can be compared to the work of the Development Committee in Al-Tireis. Here there are only two khashm biyilt, both descendants of a common ancestor, ‘Abd al-Gadir. This village grows grain in the Wadi Mansurab, and has easy access to Omdurman. But Al-Tireis has capitalised on its physical advantages. Villagers have brought in tractors from the Gezira, and the comparative wealth of vegetable marketing has resulted in the beginnings of a system of tenancy in which the title-holders of land are given a 50 per cent return, even though they may themselves never work the land.

The Village Development Committee keeps a check on vegetables grown in the flood plain to see that they are untouched by smut or disease. In the last few years it has helped build a mosque, collected funds for the building of a village club, and started a co-operative shop. The income from vegetables, which has brought the village a return of between four and five hundred pounds a year, made the Committee particularly sensitive to proposals for

turning the Jamu‘iya Project into a government co-operative. While the people of Suleimaniya were divided in their opinion about co-operatives according to whether they were ‘outsiders’ or supporters of the sheikh, the protests of the Village Development Committee in Al-Tireis were the most trenchant in the area.

*** The villagers and the Scheme

Despite opposition to the running of the Development Scheme as a government co-operative, village co-operatives are to be found in half the Jamu‘iya villages in this area. The acceptance of village co-operatives indicates that they are not generally hostile to new techniques of economic association. But villagers had definite ideas about how innovation brought about by the Development Scheme ought to be managed.

To summarise from the field notes, Jamu‘iya were concerned that the management should be left as far as possible in their hands. They were also adamant that all labour connected with the Scheme should be undertaken by themselves, and that there should be no ‘alien labour’. The villagers of Suleimaniya, in particular, felt that innovation brought about by land registration and the allocation of hawashas on the Scheme should not upset the existing balance of interests among the khashm biyut. On the whole, therefore, villagers welcomed the Scheme for the advantages they were sure it would bring, but were anxious that it should not radically change the pattern of social relations.

The villagers’ concern that the Development Scheme should maintain the existing balance of interests was a measure of their lack of concrete knowledge of the Scheme. They knew the government had taken 1,000 feddans and the villagers had 9,000 feddans to cultivate, but no-one knew what was to be grown, or why each hawasha was 13 feddans.

To questions asked about the nature of the Scheme, the villagers, after an initial expression of uncertainty, replied that they thought it was to irrigate

land for grain and fodder crops. After the drought of the last four years, they said grain was a necessity. If they also grew fodder crops, then they could bring back their depleted herds from the Gezira and Kordofan, and the area would grow wealthy again. In their opinion, 13 feddans made too large a unit for a plot since no single family could work it successfully. A better division, they suggested, would have been 6 1/2 feddans. Not only would such a plot be easier to work, but not many people in the area had more than 2 feddans registered to their names. Hence making up a list of people to share in a 13-feddan plot was a difficult business. Villagers expressed surprise when told that the planners had created a 13-feddan plot in order to grow vegetables and citrus intermixed with fodder crops. They expressed even more surprise when told that there was no provision for growing grain on the Scheme.[175] To their relief, this matter was raised with the provincial administration, and village sheikhs got an agreement that the government cultivated area would grow grain for the first year at least.

Given these uncertainties, the ‘co-operative’ aspect of the Scheme was looked upon in an entirely different way from the formation of local co-operatives. I have already shown how social alignments of agnates in the villages tended to constrain decision-making in Village Development Committees. The pattern of formation of village co-operatives also corresponded to the villagers’ own definition of close agnatic ties, and to ‘traditional’ leadership. To cite one example, the secretary of the most successful co-operative in the area, consisting of villagers from Sandudab, Al-Hajab, Sheikh al-Beshir and Mugdab, was none other than the former Omda in the area, a resident of Mugdab.[176]

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A list of co-operatives is contained in Table 5. The eleven in the list range from bakeries and shops, to buses and transport of water. The co-operatives are not confined to villages whose members are predominantly wage-earning, or predominantly subsistence cultivators; nor are they confined to any particular population category. Rather they appear to have been formed to solve particular local problems of economic organisation. Thus the bus co-operative takes daily paid workers to Omdurman; the water co-operative

aided Kidei’s lack of wells until their water tower was built; the flour mill and bakery solved problems of local supply.

The most profitable co-operative, run by the ex-Omda of Mugdab, has now banked over a thousand pounds and though it started as a flour mill, is hoping to open up as a bakery as well. Only the unsuccessful co-operatives have caused rumblings of discontent. Umm ‘Uweina, after two attempts, has realised that it is too small to undertake a co-operative on its own, while many of the villagers of Baraka, Shigeila, and Suleimaniya who had shares in the flour mill now doubt the usefulness of co-operatives at all.

Comparative studies carried out by the United Nations Research Institute have noted that rural co-operatives of this scale tend to adjust to, or even strengthen, the existing socioeconomic systems they were intended to change. Further, traditional relationships of patronage, authority, or paternalism tend to be transferred to the leader of a rural co-operative, even when the co-operative has been introduced by a governmental agency and the person brought in to run it is from outside the local area.[177] For Jamu‘iya a co-operative is not so much an agency of change as a means through which a village or group of villages engages in a combined undertaking to generate wealth. It is the creation of more wealth, rather than the just distribution of wealth, that makes the local co-operative an appealing form of economic organisation. Villagers are less concerned with the fact that co-operatives can change an existing socio-economic system, since they have themselves so recently turned from semi-nomadism to more permanent settlement.

Planners might concede that these rural co-operatives have come to rely on traditional authorities for their leadership and traditional kinship ties for their partners in enterprise. This may reinforce a view that only large-scale co-operatives can induce social change. At the same time, the co-operative of the Omda of Mugdab should be set against the proposed large-scale Farming Co-operative and the question, which channel of authority has shown the most successful development so far, should be carefully considered.

*** Conclusion

“To avoid compromising scholarship anthropologists should eschew questions of policy,” warns Evans-Pritchard.[178] He goes on to say that anthropology may occasionally resolve problems of administration, or provide facts useful to future historians. “I do not myself attach as much importance to any service it is or may be in these respects as to the general attitudes, or habits of mind, it forms in us by what it teaches us about the nature of social life.” His warning raises three issues. First, any reluctance to aid policy-makers or to help in administrative decisions is, in effect, a comment on the morality and competence of administrators and government officials— not on the utility or non-utility of any work undertaken on their behalf. Recent revelations of how government may insinuate itself in social research and use research findings for ethically unsupportable aims, such as in the case of Project Camelot,[179] show that a personal assessment of the possible effects of policy recommendations should be made with care. At the same time, Project Camelot, in a backhanded way, underlines the potential importance of social research as a ‘service’ to government.

Second, while it is true that teaching the subject matter of social anthropology should be aimed at the creation of enlightened attitudes about the nature of social life as Evans-Pritchard points out, use of anthropological methods has a somewhat different aim. This is to describe and explain in any given social context the logic of social action; to show, in other words, how any social phenomenon is a scries of interrelated social regularities. It is this aspect of method, rather than the ethnographic subject matter of the discipline, that has proved so attractive to those engaged in planning in the countries of the Third World.

Third, there is the question of utility. Short term fact-finding is a compromise with scholarship. But docs this mean that short-term research has little utility? The view I have put forward in this essay is that if the research is deliberately matched to providing a low level of information, then it can be useful.

The biggest shortcoming of ‘instant anthropology’ is achieving accuracy at this comparatively low level of information. In presenting these field notes on

Jamu‘iya, I have been aware constantly that the evidence 1 have for my assertions is too thin, and requires double checking. The very fact that anthropological methods attempt to explain interrelations means that impressionistic evidence can be highly misleading. I have, for example, presented material about khashm biyut but left unassessed the precise relationship between khashm bayt membership and clan membership. Neither have I discussed possible conflicts between membership of a khashm bayt and the extended family. No doubt more research would modify the material presented here. Furthermore, there are several questions left unanswered. What is the extent today of seasonal transhumance? To what extent can the village rely on corporate activity of its members vis-a-vis other villages in the area? Is any material on the Jamu‘iya worthwhile without an investigation of their communities within an urban area such as Fiteihab?

Yet I think that the short period in the field revealed a consistent logic in Jamu‘iya social action. While they have undergone a change in their ecology in recent years, this has done little to alter the essential concepts of agnation prominent among more nomadic peoples, like the Kababish and Baggara. Agnatic descent ties among Jamu‘iya, and not physical closeness of one village to another, provide a ‘map’ for the assessment of ‘close’ relationships. Within the villages, khashm biyut form the major units of social organisation, but several of them within a single village pose problems of leadership. Thus their spokesmen may refuse to accept the leadership of a single sheikh and, by assuming the role of sheikh themselves, split the village into semi-autonomous units. If, on the other hand, a single man is recognised as sheikh, then he is forced to be both a mediator among khashm biyut and an executive for the provincial administration—roles which often conflict with each other. The striking of bargains is the main means through which a sheikh, placed in this position, tries to ensure coherent decision-making. The reaction of villagers to socioeconomic development, as the research showed, is related to patterns of bargaining and decision-making within the village. In the past few years, the effectiveness of Village Development Committees can be correlated with the willingness of ‘spokesmen’ of khashm biyut to work with one another. The pattern of the formation of village co-operatives also corresponds to the villagers’ own definition of close agnatic ties. Both Development Committees

and local co-operatives, therefore, have tended to strengthen the authority of those in the ‘traditional’ socio-economic system rather than to bring about a redistribution of wealth, and create new positions of influence and authority. Yet it can be said that Jamu‘iya are not hostile to innovation as such. What they do have are definite ideas about how innovation ought to be managed. The most important of these is that the new pattern of productive relations should reflect existing social relations in the villages, and not distort them.

This exercise in ‘instant anthropology’ has been able to contribute to an explanation of social relationships among the Jamu‘iya, even though it is evident that more ethnographic information is needed. At the same time, the discussion of the relationship between village organisation and leadership has highlighted several aspects of decision-making that have immediate relevance for planning purposes. Our report was also able to offer criticisms and evaluation of the Development Scheme. One or two of these criticisms stemmed directly from villagers’ own observations. For example the siting of the Scheme has resulted in a need for adjustment in transport routes. Again, it was questionable whether the irrigation engineers have made adequate protection against a wash-out from the course of the powerful Wadi Mansurab. Other criticisms stemmed from our own observations, such as the lack of foresight about the necessity for grain cultivation on the Scheme, and the evident lack of communication between government officials and the people over the introduction of a large-scale co-operative. Finally, by matching population estimates to the number of hawashas and calculating a ratio between the number of people in each village, and the number of feddans allocated to each village, it was possible to show that the four villages which had suffered most through the inundation of their land had the least favourable pcople-to-feddan ratios on the Development Scheme.[180] In this one respect therefore, the Jamu‘iya Development Scheme has so far failed to achieve its objective. One can only hope that recommendations on this point will bring forward the day when these villages will be able to share more fully in the Scheme’s benefits.

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[1] An authoritative bibliography of Evans-Pritchard’s writings appears in T. O. Beidelman (ed.), The Translation of Culture, London, Tavistock, 1971, pp. 419–34. For the account which follows the main sources

used were the series of articles he published in Sudan Notes and Records from 1927 onwards.

[2] Cf. M. Douglas, Purity and Danger, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966; V. Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1967.

[3] Cf. S. F. Nadel, “Witchcraft in four African societies”, American Anthropologist, liv, pp. 18–29, 1952

[4] Field research amongst the Southeastern Nuba was intermittent from December 1966 to April 1969. I should like to acknowledge the support of the University of Khartoum, the Ford Foundation, and of officials of the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Local Government, Democratic Republic of Sudan, without which the research would not have been possible. Abdel Basit Said assisted in a brief portion of the field research, and Abdel Ghaffar Mohammed Ahmed was of great help in Hillat Fungor, Omdurman.

[5] Probably of the Koalib-Moro group of Kordofanian languages—see R. G. Stevenson, “A survey of the phonetics and grammatical structure of the Nuba Mountain languages,” A frika und Vbersee, xli, pp. 27–35, 1957-

[6] Contra S. F. Nadel, The Nuba, London, Oxford University Press, 1947; and “Dual descent in the Nuba Hills,” in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde (eds.), A frican Systems of Kinship and Marriage, London, Oxford University Press, 1950. Gf. J. Faris, “Some aspects of clanship and descent amongst the Nuba of Southeastern Kordofan,” Sudan Notes and Records, xlix, pp. 45–57, 1968, and “Some cultural considerations of duolineal descent organizations,” Ethnology, viii, pp. 243–54, 1969.

[7] About 1800, cf. I. Cunnison, Baggara Arabs, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, p. 3.

[8] W. R. James, “Social assimilation and changing identity in the Southern Funj,” in Y. F. Hasan (ed.), Sudan in Africa, Khartoum University Press, 1971, pp. 197–211.

[9] P. M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881–1898, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958, pp. 48, 70.

[10] Smoking and the use of tobacco was considered more repulsive by the Mahdi than alcohol, and he is quoted as saying, “The sin of the smoker of tobacco is heavier than that of the drinker of wine, for the drinker of wine is beaten with 80 lashes and the smoker of tobacco is beaten with a hundred lashes” (quoted in Holt, The Mahdist State,,., p. 115). People relate that the Mahdi, while honoured with the gifts, nevertheless ordered several Southeastern Nuba elders in the party to be beaten for their tobacco use. Pleas that they were old and heathen and knew no better were successful, and the order was rescinded. The incident appears to have had no effect on Southeastern Nuba tobacco habits.

[11] M. Shibeika, The Independent Sudan, New York, Speller, 1959, p. 56.

[12] I have not been able conclusively to identify these men. Research now under way in the Department of History of the University of Khartoum on the army of the Khalifa may shed light on the problem.

Tradition holds that Majbur actually raided Fungor, while Rashid raided Jebel Werni—about 35 miles to the west of the Southeastern Nuba, southwest of Gedir. The peace priest and assistants from Kao and Nyaro met Rashid, and, with gifts, extracted from him a pledge not to raid Kao and Nyaro. A similar peace was established with Al-Nur ‘Anja with the presentation of a young woman of Jebel Werni. Al-Nur ‘Anja might have been related to Hamdan abu ‘Anja, leader of the jihadiya troops, or perhaps Al-Nur ‘Angara, a Government official of Kordofan who later became an

important lieutenant of the Mahdi. Slatin (R. Slatin, Fire and Sword in the Sudan, London, Arnold, 1896, p. 110) documents that Al-Nur ‘Angara was in the habit of collecting women in his campaigns, and that in 1887 he served Hamdan Abu ‘Anja in southern Kordofan (p. 418).

Shibeika (The Independent Sudan..., p. 57) describes a Fungor chieftain, Taifarah, who was supposed to have first harboured and then deceived the spies of the Mahdi, revealing them to Yusuf Hasan al-Shallali, the leader of an expeditionary force against the Mahdi at Gedir in 1882. The later raids on Fungor may have been in retaliation for this treachery. It is locally claimed, however, that the peace priest of Kao and Nyaro had effected rituals to bring destruction to Fungor— peace and war being a sphere of ritual activity over which the priest and his clan section assumed control. Tensions arose between Kao/Nyaro and Fungor regarding support for the Mahdists. Kao and Nyaro wished to cooperate, whereas Fungor wavered. Tradition in fact documents that the people of Kao and Nyaro lit fires on the mountain tops to warn the Mahdi at Gedir of the approach of hostile Government forces (a fact corroborated by Shibeika, The Independent Sudan..., P-49)’

There is the remote possibility that Rashid here is in fact Rashid Bey Ayman, the Governor of Fashoda. It is documented that Rashid Bey Ayman moved against the Mahdi at Gedir in 1881 (cf. Shibeika, The Independent Sudan..., p. 49–50; Holt, The Mahdist State..., p. 48), and was defeated and killed. The Southeastern Nuba villages stand directly on the route from Gedir to Fashoda. As Government troops were frequently slaves—acquired by means not unlike slave-raiding (cf. Holt, The Mahdist State..., p. 11), it is possible the Southeastern Nuba were raided by the Turko-Egyptian Government forces as well. On the defeat of Rashid Bey Ayman (and later, Yusuf Hasan al-Shallali, see Holt, The Mahdist State..., p. 49; and Shibeika, The Independent Sudan..., pp. 56ff), many Government irregulars probably became part of the Mahdi’s jihadiya, or slave soldiers, to be later organised against the British under Hamdan abu ‘Anja at Omdurman. In any case, Southeastern Nuba slave soldiers ended up in the same army.

MacMichael (H. A. MacMichael, The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan, Cambridge University Press, 1912, pp. 49–50) states that the Khalifa himself went to Fungor via Gedir in early 1899. Pursued by Wingate, and “...hard pressed all the way by the Nuba who were eager for plunder and had scores to settle for the dealings of Abu ‘Anja with them in the past”, the Khalifa was killed in November, 1899, at Umm Dibaykerat, approximately 3 days’-march from the Southeast Nuba villages. MacMichael does not indicate the source of this information, and I have been unable to find any other mention of the Khalifa at Fungor, although it is known that Wingate stopped at Fungor in late October, 1899, in pursuit of the Khalifa (cf. W. Churchill, The River War, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1951, p. 354).

[13] Brands were on the face, and either cheek—‘fk formales, ///for females.

[14] This is Hillat Fungor—just north of Khor Abu ‘Anja and west of Shari‘ al-Arbafin. Heretofore, to my knowledge, the origin of the name of this section of Omdurman has been a puzzle (cf. F. Rehfisch, “An unrecorded population count of Omdurman,” Sudan Notes and Records, xlvi 1965, pp. 33–39), for no clue is to be found in the present inhabitants, who are today primarily ‘Westerners’ from southern Darfur. Neither are any credible traditions remembered by older residents of Omdurman about the origin of the name—although several acknowledged that this was the location of one of camps of Hamdan abu ‘Anja. Holt (The Mahdist State..., p. 119) documents that Abu ‘Anja and his jihadiya troops were among the first to be stationed in Omdurman after the fall of Khartoum in 1885, and contemporary source material (such as the map by Slatin, Fire and Sword..., rear endpaper) indicates this area was occupied by jihadiya troops.

[15] More details of these unique features are available in a manuscript submitted to the 1969 conference of the Philosophical Society of the Sudan, “Society and change in the Southeastern Nuba Mountains.” The conference was unfortunately never held. To give but one example, consider the circumcision forced upon the Fungor male captives. Upon returning from Omdurman, certain males found themselves the only surviving members of one particular patrician section. Male circumcision is never practised by the

Southeastern Nuba, except in the rare case of a Muslim convert, and this mark is regarded as a prime segregating feature of the afterlife—circumcised males (such as Arabs) joining their ancestors, and uncircumcised males their own separate ancestors. The results in the case of the returning circumcised males (who were not converted to Islam), is that all their descendants (males of this patrician section) are now circumcised immediately after death (in what may be a unique practice in the world) in order that they may be able to join their circumcised ancestors in the afterlife. The importance of circumcision to the Southeastern Nuba can hardly be overemphasised—one semantic gloss for the term Itdera, ‘Arab’, is, in fact, ‘circumcised’—and it is a paramount symbol for placement in the afterlife. Any functional attempt to explain this unique custom without recourse to the historical circumstances is folly.

[16] It should be initially pointed out that the age organisation discussed herein is specific to males. Functions peculiar to the various age groups have only tangential bearing on female age statuses. Female age organisation is a far less complex situation—there is an elaborate set of diacritical marks, chiefly scarring, which accompany a host of minutely discriminated physiological changes. There are no female group activities or recruitment mechanisms based wholly on the age organisation.

[17] Certain patrician sections of the society give their infant males characteristic haircuts, and all infants and children belonging to the chimtipn society have a small tuft of hair at the top of their neck; see J. Faris, “Non-kin social groups of the Southeastern Nuba”, Sudan Society, v (forthcoming) for a description of this society with ascribed membership.

[18] For complete details of the colour and design rules and restrictions, see J. Faris, Southeastern Nuba Personal Art, London, Duckworth, 1972.

[19] S. F. Nadel, “Witchcraft in four African societies”.

[20] J. Faris, “Non-kin social groups...”

[21] Village sections each have a men’s hut [tawd) in which dances are held and in which men of the village section gather to gossip. Residential affiliation to these huts ‘defines’ the geographical limits to membership in the age set for purposes of initiation and affinal work parties. It may be that any particular village section has but a single young man so eligible, or as many as six to eight in each age set.

[22] J. Faris, “Non-kin social groups...”

[23] J. Faris, “Some cultural considerations of duolineal descent...”, p. 248.

[24] Ngorana is the name of a place near the village of Kao where the annual age organisation ceremony is held for Kao only. In Nyaro and in Fungor the same ceremony is known by different terms (in these latter two cases, also the names of places where the ritual takes place). As in most other cases, ritual and ceremony amongst the Southeastern Nuba is village based. Various society-wide rituals may be held at each village at slightly different times, thus enabling people from each village to participate in rituals of villages other than their own.

[25] The grain collection, like the punishment of priests mentioned below, is in fact a complicated situation. Talmara only take grain from fields of persons whose patrician sections stand in a non-reciprocal and nonbrother relationship to their own. Relationships between patrician sections are of three types: brother clan sections of the same clan; unrelated reciprocal clan sections with whom there are very important ritual bonds (most ritual assistants to one’s own priests come from reciprocal clan sections to one’s own) and with whom one may share the same residential village-section men’s hut, tawo\ and others not of

these first two categories. Reciprocal clans are dab a—those ‘between whom there

[26] J. Faris, “Non-kin social groups...”

[27] This is, of course, concomitant with any relative age behaviour, see below.

[28] J. Faris, “Non-kin social groups...”

[29] For details and analysis, sec J. Faris, “Sibling terminology and crosssex behavior: data from the Sootheastern Nuba Mountains,” American Anthropologist, Ixxi, 196g, pp. 482–8.

[30] As for the rest of the Nuba Mountains, age organisations are unreported in the north-central Heiban and Koalib Nuba. Age organisations are found in the north-central Otoro, l ira, and Moro Nuba, and amongst the south-central Korongo and Mesakin Nuba (see S. F. Nadel, The Nuba, p. 53; and Nadel, “Witchcraft...”, p. 23). These age organisations seem in many ways unrelated to the Southeastern Nuba system, for unlike the other Nuba age organisations, the Southeastern Nuba do not accompany changes in statuses with scarification, circumcision or flagellation.

[31] N. Dyson-Hudson, “The Karimojong age system,” Ethnology, ii, PP-353–4°i-

[32] E. P. Thompson, quoted by B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, in Ghana: End ofan Illusion, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1966, p. xi; and B. Magubane, “Pluralism and conflict situations in Africa: a new look,” African Social Research, vii, 1969, p. 529. The latter

two works arc among the few examples of the application of scientific history to explanation in Africa.

[33] See, for example, the account of Bari rainstones in the Seligmans' Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan (1932), pp. 280–289, and their article "The Bari", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Iviii, 1928; and compare M. W. Cavendish, "The custom of placing pebbles on Nubian graves", Sudan Notes and Records, xlvii, 1966. Rainstones are reported from various parts of the Nuba Hills; Dr. J. C. Faris tells me they play an important part in the ritual life of Kao-Nyaro. References to rainstones among the Acholi, Lotuko, Madi, and other peoples may be found through the index of the Seligmans' 1932 volume.

[34] "Ethnological observations in Dar Fung", Sudan .Votes and Records, xv, 1, 1932, P-32.

[35] My fieldwork, between 1965 and 1969, was generously supported by the University of Khartoum, and a grant from the Ford Foundation funds allocated by the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies. 1'he present paper was written during the tenure of a Leverhulme research fellowship at St. Hugh's College, Oxford. Dr. Godfrey Lienhardt was good enough to read an earlier draft ami make some helpful comments.

[36] The Uduk language is included by Greenberg in the Koman branch ol the Nilo-Saharan family of languages. Other members are Koma, Ganza, Gumuz, Mao and Gule, but Uduk is substantially different from any of these.

The system of orthography followed in this article is that of the S.I.M. Uduk Dictionary, 1956 revision (unpublished). Underlining indicates aspiration; an apostrophe preceding a consonant indicates explosion or implosion; and an oblique stroke indicates a glottal stop.

[37] There is a useful chapter on climate in K. M. Barbour, The Republic of the Sudan, University of London Press, 1961. These estimates are taken from the map on page 47.

[38] The essential notion of turbulence was illuminated for me when one day in early May, there was a strong damp southerly wind. One or two people had already commented to me that this meant Meban rain, and that the Meban were killing fish in their pools on the Yabus. 1 asked for further explanation, and an old man said, ‘Yes: the wind is coming from the water, from the place where the Meban are killing fish; there are great fish there, writhing about in the water, moving like the rain (asho’k)’: and he expressed with his hands the seething mass of fish.

[39] See M. Forsberg, Land Beyond the Nile, New York, Harper, 1958, especially Chapter 20.

[40] I have been told that when big sacrifices are held for the rain, there will be a gathering of women with small babies, women whose milk is coming down like the rain (this corresponds to Evans-Pritchard’s information, op. cit., p. 32). The women dance and sing with publish leaves. I have seen Meban women singing and dancing for rain with these leaves (which I have not identified botanically). The colour black, of course, occurs widely in Africa and elsewhere in connection with rain and fertility.

[41] An official attempt to introduce bridewealth payment into Uduk society, in 1063, tailed. I have explained this situation in my article “Why the Uduk won’t pay bridewealth”, in Sudan Notes and Records, li, 1970.

[42] This account was recorded in December, 1967, transcribed by Shadrach Pcyko Dhunya, and translated by him and myself. Proper names in this case have been altered.

[43] Another, probably larger part of the Berti now live in Eastern Darfur, where they migrated during last century under pressure of the neighbouring Meidob's expansion into their original territory in Northern Darfur. My contribution is solely concerned with the Berti in the Northern Darfur District among whom I did fieldwork in 1961 and 1965. I gratefully acknowledge the generous support of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and the International African Institute which made my research possible.

[44] Cf. Ward H. Goodenough, 'Residence rules', Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, xiii, 1956, pp. 22–37; J. L. Fischer, 'The classification of residence censuses', American Anthropologist, lx, 1958, pp. 508–1 7; Harry M. Raulet, 'A Note of Fischer's residence typology', ibid., lxi, 1959, pp. 108 11; J. L. Fischer, 'Reply to Raulet', ibid., lxi, 1959, pp. 679–81.

[45] Ol these eighty-seven households fifty-four were virilocal (62.1 per cent); nineteen uxorilocal (21.8 per cent); thirteen bilocal (15 per cent); and one neolocal (1.1 per cent).

[46] Cf. Goodenough, 'Residence rules', pp. 26–7.

[47] If the father does not agree to a marriage of his son's choice, the son can make arrangements to elope with the girl to a Muslim judge. The judge will summon the fathers or guardians of both and demand from them their consent to the marriage. The consent not given, the judge can still marry the couple. Such a marriage is called gabuna.

[48] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951, p. 28.

[49] David M. Schneider, "Some muddles in the models: or, how the system really works", in M. Banton (ed.) The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology, London, Tavistock (A.S.A. Monographs, 1), 1965, PP-25–85, at p. 74.

[50] A. N. Tucker and M. A. Bryan in The Non-Bantu Languages of North-Eastern Africa, Oxford, 1956, pp. 87–91, classify linguistically the Didinga, together with the Longarim, Murle, Suri and other units, as the isolated “Didinga-Murle” language group. The Didinga live on the Didinga and Boya Hills, and to the north; the Longarim (called Boya by the Topotha) on the Boya Hills (Eastern District, Equatoria Province).

[51] “If we are to have any words in our pure logical language, they must be such as express ‘logical constants’, and ‘logical constants’ will always be, or be derived from, what is in common among a group of propositions derivable from each other, in the above manner, by term-for-term substitution.” Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 11 th edition, London, Allen and Unwin, 1963, p. 202.

[52] ‘The stimulus of the chapter “Interest in cattle” in Evans-Pritchard’s The Nuer, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, was most seminal, as was his treatment of the other aspects of the social life of the Nuer. Among many authors, we want to mention here N. Dyson-Hudson, Karimojong Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966; P. H. Gulliver, The Family Herds, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955; Godfrey Lienhardt, Divinity and Experience, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961.

[53] M. J. Herskovits, “The cattle complex in East Africa”, in American Anthropologist, xxvii, 1926, pp. 230–72, 361–80, 494–528, 633–44.

[54] A. Kronenberg, “The Longarim favourite beast”, in Kush, ix, 1961, PP-258–77.

[55] Kronenberg, op. cit, p. 266; Lienhardt, op. cit, pp. 17–18.

[56] Kronenberg, op. cit., p. 269.

[57] Compare Gulliver, op. cit., pp. 49–57.

[58] Russell, op, cit.₉ p. i.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Translated into anthropological terms, meaning is used here as a particular fact observed by the ethnographer, and sense is its socio-cultural context. Russell, op. cit., p. 25, was influenced by Frege, and we think that it is useful here to quote Frege’s definition of meaning and sense: “Es seien a, b, c, die Geraden, welche die Ecken cines Dreiecks mit den Mitten der Gegcnseiten verbinden. Der Schnittpunkt von a und b ist dann derselbe wie dcr Schnittpunkt von b und c. Wir haben also verschiedcne Bezeichnungcn fur denselben Punkt, und diese Namen, (‘Schnittpunkt von a und b’, ‘Schnittpunkt von b und c’) deuten zugleich auf die Art des Gegebenseins, und daher ist in dem Satze cine wirkliche Erkenntnis enthalten. Es liegt nun nahe, mit Zeichen (Namen, Wortverbindung, Schriftzeichen) ausser dem Bezeichneten, was die Bcdcutung des Zeichens heissen moge, noch das verbunden zu denken, was ich den Sinn des Zeichens nennen mochte. Es wiirde danach in unserem Beispiele zwar die Bedcutung der Ausdriicke ‘der Schnittpunkt von a und b’ und ‘der Schnittpunkt von b und c’ dieselbe scin, aber nicht ihr Sinn... Aus dem Zusammenhange geht hervor, dass ich hier unter ‘Zeichen’ und ‘Namen’ irgendeine Bezeichnung verstanden habe, die einen Eigennamen vertritt, deren Bedeutung also ein bestimmter Gegenstand ist (dies Wort im weitesten Umfang genommen), aber kein Begriff und keine Beziehung... Die Bezeichnung eines einzelnen Gegenstandes kann auch aus mehreren Worten oder sonstigen Zeichen bestehen. Der Kiirze wegen mag jede solche Bezeichnung Eigenname gennant werden.” Gottlob Frege, ‘“Uber Sinn und Bedeutung” in Zeitschrift fur Philosophic und philosophische Kritik, NF ioo, 1892, pp. 25–50; new edition in Frege, Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung (ed. Gunther Patzig), Gottingen, Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, 1966, p. 41.

[61] S. R. K. Glanville, The Legacy of Egypt, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1942. See the chapter on “Science” by R. W. Sloley, p. 168.

[62] The place values of binary numbers are

| |

| instead of |

| in decadic numbers, or to put it in a relational way as fractions: |

| 1/2 1/4 1/8 1/16 ... 1/00 |

| instead of 1/10 1/100 1/1000 1/10000 ...1/00 |

in decimal fractions. Because we will use relations, i.c. fractions only, we can dispense with a comma. The binary numbers used in this paper are binary fractions which define the numbers and relations of parts but not of the one-class. “If circumstances made it practical to calculate differently than we do, i.e. because things multiplied or disappeared regularly upon being counted, we should adapt arithmetic calculations to the circumstance”: Alice Ambrose, “Wittgenstein on some questions in foundations of mathematics”, in K. T. Fann (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Man and his Philosophy, New York, Dell Publishing Co., 1967, p. 273.

[63] The last defined, i.e. the smallest, part of this progression is the computing unit. To its right there is an undefined section of the same size as the computing unit. If we should add it to our progression, we would obtain the one-class and would have thus an entity, but we would lose any notion of parts and relation among parts, i.e. our notion of order. Therefore an entity is neither more than the sum of its parts nor equal to the sum of its parts, because the notion of entity and the notion of parts exclude each other.

[64] Floyd G. Lounsbury, “A formal account of the Crow- and Omaha- type kinship terminologies” p. 357, in Ward H. Goodenough (ed.),

Explorations in Cultural Anthropology, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964.

[65] A patri-clan is an order of uterinities in the male lines, and the computing unit is the sister of the clan-founder.

[66] I am grateful to the Ford Foundation for granting me funds to carry out fieldwork among the Shaigiya tribe of the Northern Sudan, and to the University of Khartoum for facilitating my research. Further, my wife Anne, Dr. F. C. T. Moore and Sayid Al-Haj ‘Abdallah Bilal have kindly read this paper and made valuable suggestions.

[67] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, “Some collective expressions of obscenity in Africa” in The Position of Women in Primitive Societies and Other Essays in Social Anthropology, London, Faber and Faber, 1965.

[68] ‘Arab (singular: ‘arabi}: nomads; in Nuri village they are semi-nomadic. Sometimes they are called ‘arab ruhal. ‘Abid (singular: ‘abd}: ex-slaves; a female ex-slave is called khadiirr, for young children the terms farkh (boy) and farkha (girl) are used. Among themselves ex-slaves refer to one another as Sudani (male) and sudaniya (female). Halab (singular: halabi): tinkers; a female tinker is called halabiya. The number of halab in Nuri fluctuates because of their movements following trade in the area.

[69] These figures are according to the census which I carried out in April-May, 1967.

[70] I feddan = 4,200 square metres = 1.038 acres.

[71] The halab claim that they came from Upper Egypt and MacMichael makes reference to the “Shurafa el Ga’afira” who were traders. See H. A. MacMichacl, A History of the Arabs in the Sudan, 2nd edition, London, Frank Cass, 1967, Vol. I, p. 142.

[72] Tazri’a is a contract by which the ownership of the land is not transferred but only the rights of cultivation for a specified length of time in return for an agreed proportion of the crop.

[73] Gadah: a wooden bowl used for food or milk; it is rarely used nowadays.

[74] Jidd: a grandfather, either father’s father or mother’s father; also used as a term of address to any male of that generation.

[75] Tiya: another term for an ex-slave.

[76] Habuba’. a grandmother, either father’s mother or mother’s mother; also used as a term of address to any female of that generation.

[77] Tuza: a small longitudinal drum beaten only by ‘abid and brought by them to the area. Until recently, ‘abid used to beat these drums at Mcrowe on festive occasions. Nowadays, the local type of drum, nuggiira, is beaten usually by ‘abid.

[78] There were four shifts for the working of the sdgiya, water-wheel: daghashaivi, from midnight until morning; subhdivi, from the morning until noon; duhrawi, from noon until sunset; ‘ishdivi, from sunset until midnight.

[79] Girf: the bark of a tree or the skin of a fruit. Wad is an abbreviation of walad (son). Wad girj is another term for an ‘abd.

[80] Muri and fasi: these are dry measures.

Muri = i ardeb = 12 keila = 198 litres.

rnuri — 6 girat

i girat = 8 ids at

Therefore, i muri = 48 tasat

Hence the female slave has ground 47 lasdt and only 1 tdsa (tdsi) remains. The meaning of ‘aish is dura.

[81] Arba‘inyaurrr. forty days was the period of ‘danger’ after a rite de passage during which the subject was guarded by angels (fi al-maldyka) from devils (shaydtin). Previously, the bridegroom and bride, the circumcised boy and girl, and a woman who had given birth stayed at home for forty days; now the period is shorter.

[82] Al-tuba al-hamra: the red brick; this is a brick which has been fired as opposed to the native mud brick. The inference seems to be that the fired brick is meant to be used for cleaning off dirt because it is harder.

[83] Al-Shawaiga: this term is used by ‘abid, ‘arab and halab to refer to Nuri people; but Nuri people include people of other tribal affiliations as well as Shaigiya.

[84] Khal: mother’s brother.

[85] Y. F. Hasan, The Arabs and the Sudan, Edinburgh University Press, 1967, PP- 167–71.

[86] W. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia (ed. S. A. Cook), London, A. & C. Black, 1903, Chap. II; O. Procksch, Vber die Blutrache bei den vorislamischen Arabern und Muhammads Stellung zu ihr. Leipzig, Teubner, 1899, Chap. IV.

[87] kinship and Marriage... p. 63.

[88] J. N. D. Anderson, ‘Homicide in Islamic law’. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, xiii, 1951, pp. 811–28, at p. 812.

[89] J. Schacht, arts. ‘KatF and ‘Kisas’; E. Tyan, art. ‘Diya’; in Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd cdn.); Anderson, ‘Homicide...’

[90] E. Tyan, art. ‘Diya’, p. 342.

[91] For the position of the Baggara during the Mahdiya, see P. M. Holt, The Mahdist Stale in the Sudan, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958, pp. 141–5.

[92] M. J. L. Hardy, Blood Feuds and the Payment of Blood Money in the Middle East. Leiden, Brill, 1963, p. 47.

[93] See R. A. Cook (ed.) ‘Blood money and the law of homicide in the Sudan: a documentary survey’. Sudan Law Journal and Reports, 1962, pp. 470–84. This reproduces some correspondence with officials in the southern provinces only.

[94] Ibid.’ see letters by Chief Justice Bell, p. 473, and Governor Equatoria, J. F. Tierney, p. 477-

[95] The text here given is copied from the reproduction in Muhammad abu Rannat, ‘The relationship between Islamic and customary law in the Sudan’. Journal of African Law, iv, i960, pp. 9–16.

[96] Muhammad abu Rannat points out, however, that the rules of Shari‘a are not subjected to this test in the Sudan, ‘as what has been laid down by God obviously cannot be treated as “unjust”.’ Ibid., p. io.

[97] J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 62.

[98] But cf. Cook (ed.) ‘Blood money...’, p. 471, footnote 9: ‘The courts will ordinarily order the payment of dia in murder cases where the death penalty is commuted to imprisonment under a recommendation to mercy’ (emphasis added).

[99] In Baggara Arabs, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, especially pp. 157–62, pp. 173–86 and Appendix 5.

[100] Pace E. L. Peters, who shows that a vengeance killing can lead to settlement: ‘Some structural aspects of the feud among the camelherding Bedouin of Cyrenaica’. Africa, xxxvii, 3, 1967, pp. 261–82, at p. 265.

[101] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, p. 158.

[102] E. Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia, Manchester University Press, 1962, p. 120.

[103] The Nuer, p. 159.

[104] Peters, ibid., pp. 267–9 (the quotation is from p. 267).

[105] R. Brunschvig, art. “Akila’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.).

[106] See for example E. Marx, Bedouin of the Negev, Manchester University Press, 1967, p. 64.

[107] More likely than the transcription in Baggara Arabs, p. 102. Cf. the use of saff defined as ‘durch eincn Defensivpakt verbundene Stamme’: E. Graf, Das Rechtswesen der heutigen Beduinen, Walldorf-Hessen, Verlag fur Orientkunde, n. d., p. 190.

[108] The existence of‘Book’ alliances, by which impermanent blood-money arrangements are occasionally made between lineages of different omodiyas, is immaterial to the argument of this paper (Baggara Arabs, p. 160).

[109] Ibid., Chap. XII.

[110] Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage... p. 69.

[111] Ibid., pp. 63–4.

[112] Brunschvig, Art. ‘Akila’, p. 33g.

[113] Ibid., p. 338.

[114] Eor a recent example, see the collection edited by June Helm entitled Essays on the Problem of Tribe, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1968.

[115] Well-known instances in which this problem was first systematically explored in the African context include studies by M. Gluckman, J. C. Mitchell and A. L. Epstein.

[116] Cf. E. Gellner’s paper “Concepts and society” in Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, Washington, 1962: a valuable discussion of the anthropologist’s “extreme conceptual tolerance”, but one which does not go far enough.

[117] E. R. Leach, “Law as a condition of freedom”, in D. Bidney (ed.), The Concept of Freedom in Anthropology, The Hague, Mouton, 1963, PP- 76-7-

[118] “A note on the history of the Kababish tribe” in Sudan .Notes and Records, xlvii, 1966, and The Kababish Arabs: Power, Authority and Consent in a .Nomadic Tribe, London, Hurst, 1970.

[119] The most important legal stages of this process were marked by the Powers of Nomad Shaikhs Ordinance 1922, and the more inclusive Powers of Shaikhs Ordinance 1928.

[120] I use the word “exploitation” in both a moral and a factual sense. Most anthropologists would claim, with Leach, that if one can, one ought to avoid such terms precisely because of their evaluative connotations. A few are prepared to make the kind of compromise that exemplifies the dilemma that all of us in anthropology face: “...when used in a pejorative sense [exploitation] might be restricted to cases where the tribute was squeezed from an unwilling subject population to maintain not only the political elite at an extravagant level, but also the whole group from which they are drawn..., members of which do not carry out political duties.” (P. C. Lloyd, “The political structure of African kingdoms” in M. Banton (ed.), Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, London, Tavistock (A.S.A. Monograph 2), 1965, p. 78). Apart from the awkward question of deciding what is “an extravagant level”, the whole position comes dangerously close to the dubious principle that our moral concern may be activated only when human beings voice a vigorous protest against subjection. We do not avoid taking a moral attitude if we use a so-called “neutral” word, we simply insist on our privilege of remaining uninvolved, and on our option of bringing in the labels “good” or “bad” from a private box of ethical standards whenever we choose. I have used the word “exploitation” to describe the Kababish structure for reasons that I hope will emerge in the next section. It will be seen that these reasons have nothing to do with “too much” as against “only a little”, or with “unwillingness” and “protest”. (For an interesting discussion of the ideological roots of the principle of ethical neutrality in social science see A. W. Gouldner, “Anti-Minotaur: the myth of a value-free sociology” in I. L. Horowitz, (ed.), The New Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965. For a more general work on the historical transformations of the fact/value relationship, see A. MacIntyre’s admirable A Short History of Ethics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.)

[121] For example when the Graduates’ General Congress (a proto-political party of non-sectarian, urban nationalists) put forward a number of important demands to the colonial government in 1942, they were violently rebuffed. “The real reason”, according to a British ex-Administrator, “had nothing to do

with their demands. It lay in their claim to represent the whole country, which Government could not admit, as it repeatedly emphasized.” K. D. D. Henderson, Sudan Republic, London, Benn, 1965, p. 80.

[122] This is the classic Hobbesian formulation of the problem of social order. Hobbes, it may be recalled, argued the need for an absolute “sovereign” (individual or group) to represent the collective interest by ensuring the basic conditions in which a desirable social life could be lived. But he argued that the sovereign’s position to be effective required a monopoly of authority rather than a monopoly of force. It is as absolute umpire not as absolute tyrant that Hobbes sees the sovereign performing his essential function. Hence it is not surprising that the dominance of the sovereign is represented as being based on consent, regardless of whether he acquires his position by conquest or by contract (i. e. force and consent are not contraries). But as C. B. Macpherson has shown in his brilliant study The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962), Hobbes’s theory was an attempt to describe and resolve the political dilemmas of an emerging market society, with its pervasive values of aggressive, acquisitive individualism and its unequal distribution of property. It is given this background that the function of a sovereign becomes essential, for without him the desirable social life, as commercial, propertied England was coming to conceive and live it, would indeed be impossible. The only important factor that Hobbes’s theory appears to have overlooked is the existence of class interest and class cohesion, a factor which made it both unreasonable and uncongenial, from the point of view of the propertied classes, to accept the indispensability of an absolute sovereign. Hence the perennial preoccupation of English liberal political theory with constitutional checks and balances, the conditions of true consent, the bases of representation, etc. Is it entirely fortuitous, or without material consequence, that Western anthropologists have been so ready to conceptualise structures of political domination in all kinds of non-capitalist societies within the terms of a Hobbesian world?

[123] The Kababish Arabs. Kabbashi individualism does not take the form of a hypersensitive concern for personal honour or of an unlimited desire for accumulating possessions, but rather of the drive to attain self-sufficiency.

[124] Hence the identification of social control by so many anthropologists as the central political problem. For example J. Beattie opens the chapter entitled “Social Control: Political Organization” in Other Cultures with the following sentences: “There could be no coherent social life unless the social relationships which bind people together were at least to some degree orderly, institutionalized and predictable. The only alternative to order is chaos. To maintain an orderly system of social relations people have to be subjected to some degree of compulsion; they cannot, all the time, do as they like.” Thus “in every society some sort of internal order is secured on a tribal or territory-wide basis, external relations are provided for, and decisions in regard to these matters are taken in accordance with generally accepted rules. The political problem is how, in a society being studied, these things are brought about.” Ibid., p. 143. Hence the position of a governing elite which upholds a system of norms and values relatively peacefully may be viewed as being based on consent. This consensual element, seen sometimes as vested in the sovereign, sometimes in the norms and values, is a theme echoed or explicitly developed by innumerable anthropologists: P. C. Lloyd, Swartz, Turner and Tuden, F. G. Bailey, and G. Balandier—to mention only a few recent writers. Like Beattie, none of these writers is prepared to consider whether a political anthropology which bases itself on certain assumptions about the nature of man need make any intellectual contact with psychological anthropology or develop its own comparative social psychology.

[125] See, for example, F. Barth’s lucid discussion of the representative function of the Basseri chief: ‘“Perhaps the chief’s most important function is to represent the tribe in its relations with the Iranian administration, and in conflicts with sedentary communities of persons... Where persons or groups belonging to such different parts of a plural society meet, there must be mechanisms mediating the relationship between them—within the limited situation of their interaction, they must be ‘comparable’ in some appropriate framework. Usually... this situation is the market place, where people meet as buyers and sellers, producers and consumers, and are equally subject to the ‘terms of trade’ regardless of the differences in their backgrounds... In the relations between groups of tribesmen and the organs of government, or where conflicts between a nomad and a sedentary arc

made the subject of judicial procedure, however, the situation is far more complex", although still based on the market model... "A workable mechanism can only be achieved by channelling such conflicts through administrative superstructures which bridge... difference(s) by transforming the interests and the social units concerned to a poitit where they become comparable and thus able to communicate." (Nomads of South Persia, Oslo, 1961, pp. 77–9.) The market model, which has been applied with great ingenuity by recent anthropologists to "exotic" politics, is not only compatible with the Hobbesian model, but an elaboration of it: within the tribe the sovereign (as umpire) is necessary to orderly social life because he can regulate relations in conditions which tend to resemble imperfect competition; as between tribes the sovereign (as middleman) is necessary to orderly social life because he can transform particular interests and units into general exchange values in conditions which tend to resemble perfect competition—i.e. conditions in which (theoretical) equals meet, and the market regulates itself. In neither model are conflict and struggle seen as precluded by the presence of consent.

[126] In this differential conceptualisation and justification of the political order we find another reason for questioning the use of a consensual framework for understanding the relations between Kabbashi rulers and their subjects.

[127] In my fieldwork I was at first constantly frustrated by the answers that ordinary Kabbashi informants gave to my detailed enquiries about "Kababish customs": "People are not all the same..." they would begin. Awlad Fadlallah informants, on the other hand, were far more ready to generalise about "Kababish customs".

[128] I am grateful to the Social Science Research Council for the grant that enabled me to make this visit.

[129] When anthropologists have been aware of the existence of contradictory ideologies, it is generally in relation to revolutionary situations (e.g. L. de Heusch, "Mythe et socidtd feodale", Archives de Sociologie des Religions, xviii, 1964). This is the point at which ideologies

become relatively articulate and coherent, when they emerge from the concrete levels of sense-certainty and perception to the abstract levels of understanding and theory, the point at which contradictions between ideological positions become by definition explicit and explosive. But there is no reason to assume, as many anthropologists do, that in times of “stability” a single ideological order prevails—or even more strongly, that stability is dependent on the prevalence of a single ideology (see, e.g., P. C. Lloyd, op. cit.).

[130] An instructive example of the misunderstanding of the difference between a critical and non-critical approach to ideology is represented in the following comments by Merton: “...functionalists, with their emphasis on religion as a social mechanism for ‘reinforcing the sentiments’, may not differ materially in their analytical framework from Marxists who, if their metaphor of ‘opium of the masses’ is converted into a neutral statement of social fact, also assert that religion operates as a social mechanism for reinforcing certain secular as well as sacred sentiments among its believers. The point of difference appears only when evaluation of this commonly accepted fact came into question.” Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Free Press, 1957, p. 44. Such Marxist assertions are not “neutral statements of social fact” with an optional flavouring of value—they are epigrammatic references to a theory which incorporates a critical approach towards historical modes of consciousness. Whatever one may think of the theory as a whole, the Marxist statement about religion does not refer to the same “commonly accepted fact” as the functionalist.

[131] For a recent discussion of some of these problems, see Current Anthropology, December 1968.

[132] A. Cohen, “Political anthropology: the analysis of the symbolism of power relations”, Man, June, 1969, pp. 227–8.

[133] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, p. 25.

[134] I. Cunnison, Baggara Arabs, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966; D. J» Stenning, Savannah Nomads, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959; C. E. Hopen, The Pastoral Fulbe Family in Gvuandu, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

[135] Muhammad ibn ‘Umar al-Tunisy, Voyage au Darfour, Paris, 1845.

[136] H. G. Balfour Paul, “A prehistoric cult still practised in Muslim Darfur,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Ixxxvi, i, 1956.

[137] G. Haaland, ‘Economic determinants in ethnic processes’, in F. Barth (ed.). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Oslo University Press, 1969.

[138] F. Barth, ‘Capital, investment and the social structure of a pastoral nomad group in south Persia’, in R. Firth and B. S. Yamey (eds.). Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies, London, Allen and Unwin, 1964.

[139] R. A. Manners, ‘The Kipsigis—change with alacrity’, in P. Bohannan and G. Dalton (eds.), Markets in Africa. New York, Doubleday, 1965.

[140] F. Barth, ‘The Fur of Jebcl Marra’ in ‘Outline of Society’ series, Dept, of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Khartoum. Mimeo.

[141] Haaland, ‘Economic determinants...

[142] R. A. Henin, ‘Fertility differences in the Sudan’, Population Studies, xxii, 1, 1968.

[143] Philosophical Society of the Sudan, The Effect of Nomadism on the Economic and Social Development of the People of the Sudan (Proceedings of the X Annual Conference), 1962, p. 116.

[144] This paper is based on part of the material collected during two periods of field work among the Ruf a‘a al-Hoj nomads of four and two months respectively in 1969. I am grateful to the Research Committee of Khartoum University for financing the fieldwork, and to the Norwegian Agency for Development for a Fellowship at Bergen University, during which this paper was written.

[145] The Nazir is a head of a tribe in the Sudan. This term has been administratively recognised since the Turkish rule together with the term Omda. Omda means a head of an administrative unit composed of a collection of villages. This unit is known as omodiya. Under the present administrative system (1969) most of the rural population, settled or nomadic, are divided into nazirates and omodiyas.

[146] These figures are taken from 1955/6 census of the Sudan.

[147] Cf. F. Barth, “Economic spheres in Darfur”, in R. Firth (ed.), Themes in Economic Anthropology, London, Tavistock (A.S.A. Monograph 6), 1967, P-58.

[148] I wish to record my thanks to the Ford Foundation and to the University of Khartoum for financial and other help in carrying out the research on which this study is based.

[149] S. Ardener, “The comparative study of rotating credit associations”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, xciv, 2, 1964, pp. 201–29.

[150] Ardener, p. 201.

[151] First Population Census of the Sudan 1955–6, Town Planners' Supplement, Vol. I, Table 9.1 and Population and Housing Survey 1964–5.

[152] Ardener, pp. 207–8.

[153] Ibid., p. 208.

[154] Ibid., p. 221.

[155] Ibid.

[156] The material presented in this paper was collected as part of a study of El Obeid, the chief town in Kordofan Province, carried out between April 1967 and June 1968. This study was made possible by the Ford Foundation through grants to the University of Khartoum. An early version of the paper was read at the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, in Khartoum, and the author wishes to acknowledge the value of criticisms made by colleagues there. The author also wishes to express his thanks to Dr. P. Baxter of Manchester University for reading drafts of this paper and making helpful suggestions.

[157] The list of the ninety-two merchants was compiled from the official records and it contained all those merchants and businessmen who were liable to business profits tax for the year 1967 and whose annual assessable profits exceed LS 800.

[158] This district covers an area of about 7,000 square kilometres and it is named after the dominant tribe living in it, the Bidayriya.

[159] The Arabs in El Obeid do not form a homogeneous group. They fall into numerous ‘tribes’ (or tribal categories) including such riverain ‘tribes’ as the Ja‘aliyin and the Shaigiya as well as such Kordofan ‘tribes’ as the Bidayriya and the Jawama‘a.

[160] The Muwalladin (singular, Muwallad) are the offspring of the unions of Sudanese women with Egyptians, and with l urks and other Asians who came to El Obeid during the Turkish period (1821–81).

[161] One of the Greek merchants asked to fill in the interview schedule by himself—apparently to save time—and did not answer the set of questions relating to work record. Consequently, there is only information about the other two Greeks.

[162] Upgrading of Native Lodging Areas—essentially squatter areas—involves recognition from the town’s authorities, surveying, planning, the gradual extension of services, etc.

[163] The various political parties were banned after the Revolution of May, 1969-

[164] These are two rival associations. At the time of the study, the Kordofan Chamber of Commerce was dominated by the U.D. P. whereas the Merchants’ Union was dominated by a faction of the U.D.P. and the Umma Party.

[165] See the discussion in Daryll Forde “Social Anthropology in African Studies.” African Affairs, Special Issue, Spring 1965, pp. 15–24.

[166] I wish to thank Andrew Lochhead, Visiting Professor of Social Administration, University of Khartoum, for suggesting the topic of the Development scheme to me; Mansour Khalid, the Minister, and Mohammed Beshir and Osman Hassan, of the Ministry of Youth and Social Affairs, for their support; and most particularly Omer Abdel Majid, Mohammed Beshir,

Mohammed Musa, and Abdin Ahmed, students in the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, for their unstinting help in collecting information in the field.

[167] The government has made provision for the landless out of this 1,000 feddan area. This year only the government portion will be cultivated.

[168] A. Gaitskell, Gezira: a Story of Development in the Sudan, London, Faber and Faber, 1959, p. 209.

[169] 1’he Ministry of Agriculture census recorded that JamuTya had 330 camels; 1,300 donkeys; 2,000 cattle; 7,000 sheep, and 8,000 goats. This can only be an estimate, but the high proportion of goats is one indication of settlement.

[170] The list of Omdas drawn from the 1956 Census described people of river-bank villages as semi-nomadic, lumping them together with more western Jamu’iya. Of the omodiyas in this area, only Mugdab was regarded as being settled. However, these ascriptions may not be reliable, for through reasons I have yet to discover, the omodiya of Mugdab was listed as being ethnically Berti’—people from western Darfur—not Jamu‘iya at all.

[171] I wish to thank Abbas Ahmed Mohammed for discussion on this point.

[172] Talal z\sad, The Kababish Arabs, London, Hurst, 1970, p. 106.

[173] Ibid., pp. 142–4.

[174] I. Cunnison, Baggara Arabs, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, p. 9.

[175] The precise division of each 13-feddan hawasha is as follows: 4 feddans alfalfa; 2 abu sab‘in; 2 lubia; 2 1/2 citrus and fruit, with alfalfa and lubia undercover for the first six years; 2^x/₂ vegetables.

[176] The post of Omda was abolished by the government in 1969.

[177] United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Research Notes No. 2, July 1969, pp. 38–47.

[178] Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology, London, Cohen and West, 1951, pp. 120, 123.

[179] See I. L. Horowitz (ed.), The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, Cambridge, Mass., M. I. T. Press, 1967.

[180] Thus calculating the ratio as an expression of the number of people to each feddan in all fifteen villages, seven of the low-ratio villages were all villages lying next to the Development Scheme. These had from 0.6 to 1.9 people per feddan. Seven of the high-ratio villages were those in the southern end of the project. These ranged from 3.5 to people per feddan.

Archived News Story

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“Anthropology of the Middle East and North Africa” and “Magic. Faith and Healing” will be the course offerings during the fall term of “Sunrise Semester” during Its 12th season on the CBS Television Network.

The courses on the award-winning series offer full college credit at New York University and other institutions, and are taught by members of the faculty of Washington Square and University College of Arts and Science of New York University.

Professor Dale F. Eickelman will conduct “Anthropology of The Middle East and North Africa.” which will be transmitted by the network on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, beginning Monday. Sept. 22 The goal of this course is to look beyond the rush of current events in the vast region stretching roughly from Morocco to Afghanistan in order to comprehend the cultures and societies of this area and how people in them make sense of their world.

Since anthropology is the comparative study of societies and their cultures, the course has two related themes. The first is to provide a deeper understanding of the world-view and social conduct of North Africans and Middle Easterners. The second is to assess the contribution that the study of the Middle East and North Africa has made to the anthropological and historical understanding of societies in general.

“Magic, Faith and Healing.” to be transmitted Tuesdays. Thursdays and Saturdays, beginning Tuesday. Sept 23, will be conducted by Professor Ari Kiev This course focuses on the universal features of social support and therapeutic systems. The links between culture, personality and the concepts and techniques of folk psychiatry will be studied in the light of their relevance to the needs of the developing world.

The course examines the impact of social change on the lives of people in the developing world, in an effort to understand the special sources of human problems in these societies. These themes are examined in the light of our general knowledge of man’s interaction with society. Special attention will be paid to areas of stress or discordance in those societies where, in the face of limited personnel and resources, new forms of medical care and educational programs will have to be introduced in the years ahead.